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Water is a scarce resource in Australia, therefore the significant use of groundwater 
from the Great Artesian Basin by the mining industry is inevitably controversial. This 
thesis examines one such water dispute that emanated from BHP Billiton Olympic Dam 
Corporation Pty Ltd’s (BHP OD) expansion and the associated water related risks.  
Therefore, it is concerned with the politicised control of the Australia’s largest 
groundwater resource arising from the Australia’s largest multi-mineral mine against the 
broad backdrop of water scarcity. In particular, the thesis highlights the culturally 
constructed meanings of risk in a contested domain of accounting and accountability. 
In order to frame competing water risk perspectives from different institutions - industry, 
government and civil society - into a communicative effort for enhanced public 
participation and engagement, this thesis adopts a critical cultural risk perspective 
combined with Burkean rhetorical criticism to analyse mandatory and voluntary water 
accounting disclosures and policy debates from BHP, BHP OD, and its representative, 
the Minerals Council of Australia (MCA);  GAB water regulatory policy documents and 
proposals from the South Australian government and Australian Federal government; 
and, alternative disclosures from civil society, including non-government organisations 
(NGOs), (radical) environmentalists and Aboriginal groups.  
Since discourse is considered as a mode of institutional and political practice, and 
rhetoric is the technique of using discourse for persuasive effects, a Burkean rhetorical 
criticism (Stillar, 1998) combined with Douglas and Wildavsky’s (1982) cultural risk 
theory allows a critical exploration of the underlying assumptions of contentious water 
related disclosures. Further, it implicates accountability discourses and their role in 
incorporating economic, social and environmental accountability into a transdisciplinary 
dialogue to risk-based sustainability. Nine major sustainability-related concepts 
including; preferred learning style, view of nature, properties of knowledge ideal, 
attitude towards technology, view of risk, resolution of risk, cause of ecological crisis, 
view of justice and fairness and properties of desired system are revealed. These 
concepts map to three accounting related concepts/themes of the concept of control, 
stewardship and economic consequences. Three different styles of accountability -  
managerial, administrative and moral accountability inform the unavoidable conflicts 




(government) institutions, and a radical agenda proposed and warranted by border (civil 
society) institutions. 
This thesis makes unique methodological and theoretical contributions by adopting a 
discursive and dialogical accounting approach and a ‘transdisciplinary’ cultural risk 
theory to allow social and environmental visibilities, promote democratic participation, 
enhance transparency in decision-making and improve accountability in a ‘polylogic’ 
society during the era of impending environmental crisis (Brown, 2009; Gray, 1992). 
This study was conducted at a meso-level of analysis and therefore does not address all 
the complexity and anomalies of pluralist and competing interests involved in the GAB 
water debate. In respect of future research, this methodology and theoretical 
development can be applied to other political debates such as those from GAB Strategic 
Management Plan more broadly and other specific dialogues concerning water, for 
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
Water is an essential natural resource for life. It is pivotal in sustaining human health, 
economic development, as well as environmental and ecological stability (Morrison, 
Schulte & Schenck, 2010; United Nations, 2006). In recent decades, increasing water 
scarcity, a growing demand for water, and degraded water quality have become a 
challenge to human beings and ecosystems at regional, national and international 
level (Morrison et al., 2010). 
Historically, in Australia, controversies and debates have arisen around water 
scarcity and control (James, Dowd, Rodriguez & Jeanneret, 2012). Due to a 
significant variability of rainfall, Australia faces a range of issues resulting from 
drought because of high evaporation rates and a low proportion of runoff (Prosser, 
2011). Fully-allocated and over-allocated use of river and underground water 
systems compound the problem (Prosser, 2011) and give rise to conflicts over the 
control of water, both at a material and symbolic level (James et al., 2012).  
According to James, et al. (2012), water, as a practical and daily substance, is highly 
valued and deeply integrated across multiple cultures. People attribute various 
meanings to water ranging from an essential resource for life, a binding fabric for 
communities, an inherent substance for social identity, as well as a means to 
maintain wealth, health, social order and power (Strang, 2005a; Strang, 2005b). In 
Australia, conflicts over allocation of water arise between irrigation challenges and 
environmental conservation (Jackson, Stoeckl, Straton & Stanley, 2008), rural and 
urban, indigenous and non-indigenous populations (Alston & Mason, 2008a; Jackson 
et al., 2008), industrial water consumption and recreational water use in the public 
sphere (Jackson et al., 2008). Certain actions that are perceived to endanger the water 
resource, such as mining operations, have the potential to provoke intense backlash 
from residents of local communities (James et al., 2012). This thesis delves into this 
contested domain over the control of the GAB underground water resource among 
three different socio-cultural institutions in society - industry, government and civil 
society (including NGOs, (radical) environmentalists and Aboriginal groups). 
To comprehend the social conflict arising from water issues, it is pivotal to 




managerial, economic and technical perspective focusing on efficiency and 
productivity, often from industries and to a certain extent the government authorities 
overlooks and underemphasises social and environmental values. This inadequate 
representation of the values of the broader community sets the scene for a 
worldview-clash (Allan, 2003; Hussey & Dovers, 2006; Patrick, 2012; Syme, 
Portera, Goeftb & Kington, 2008) over water allocation that will be discussed in this 
thesis.  
The context of water scarcity gives rise to the fraught terrain of accounting and 
associated issues of accountability. Since the late 1970s and 1980s, critical 
accounting studies have emerged as an alternative perspective to acknowledge 
accounting’s discursive and ideological significance. According to Hutchinson (1989) 
and Brown (2009), accounting inscribes its value as an authoritative discourse 
through which power is exercised and imposed. It therefore has significant influence 
upon social and economic exchange and conflict mediation, such as “widespread 
debate” on water control and allocation (Head, 2010, p.2). 
As asserted by Brown (2009, p. 316), a mainstream approach to accounting is 
“notably monologic” and it is “overwhelmed” by capitalist assumptions. It 
downplays the context-dependent or social-situated nature of knowledge, 
depoliticises politics, and gives priority implicitly to the interests of financial capital. 
Such a one-dimensional viewpoint sidesteps conflicting perspectives and naturalises 
the “non-reporting of others” (Hutchinson, 1989, p.317). However, a body of 
accounting literature has recognised that the majority of ‘critical’ social and 
environmental accounting and reporting (SEAR) studies (including accounts of 
water) are under-theorised with respect to social conflict and dissention and its 
implications for wider social engagement (Brown & Dillard, 2013; Spence, Husillos 
& Correa-Ruiz, 2010; Tinker, Neimark & Lehman, 1991). As contended by Spence 
et al. (2010), this apolitical approach (in terms of ignorance of political struggles 
within civil society) undermines both the theoretical and practical agenda for social 
change. 
To respond to this criticism, a stream of studies has emerged in the accounting 




Larrinaga & Spence, 2009; Boyce, 2000; Gallhofer et al., 2006; O'Sullivan & 
O'Dwyer, 2009). By giving voice to alternative views and interests from socio-
political constituencies (other than those from industry and sometimes the 
government), these counter-accounting (see Chapter 3, Section 3.2.1) studies expose 
the fundamental contradictions and exploitative dimensions of a capitalist system, 
and promote democratic dialogue and enhanced accountability (Bebbington, Brown, 
Frame & Thomson, 2007; Brown, 2009; Brown & Fraser, 2006; Dillard & Brown, 
2012). 
This thesis is concerned with a broader appeal of how water matters to a range of 
stakeholders. It extends water-related SEAR studies by collating and analysing 
accounting disclosures in the form of mandatory and voluntary social and 
environmental disclosures within the context of a policy debate from industry, water 
regulation related disclosures from governments and external alternative accounting 
disclosures in form of public submissions, independent academic research and web 
documents from civil society. It further interrogates three different modes of 
accountability/stewardship through the lens of water-related accounts/accounting 
disclosures. It is therefore aligned with the counter-accounting studies and ethos for 
the call for a dialogical approach to accounting to facilitate democratic participation 
(Brown, 2009; Gray, 1992). 
By adopting a cultural risk perspective as a methodology and cultural risk theory as a 
theoretical framework, this thesis explicitly identifies and engages contested 
ideological perspectives from water accounting disclosures and discourses among 
divergent social groups. In this sense, accounting serves an enabling function to 
create social and environmental visibilities, broaden the exposure of priority and 
values for public dialogue and debate, promote transparent decision-making process 
and improve accountability discourses in the form of democratic participation 
(Boyce, 2000; Brown, 2009). It is important to note that this accounting system does 
not aim to bring premature and decisive closure or any consensually-orientated 
approach given that the definition for the concept of sustainability is elusive and 
contestable. Accounting’s social worth is judged here in terms of producing 




discussion (Brown, 2009; Frame & Brown, 2008). Figure 1.1 maps the different 
main areas of this thesis. 
 
Figure 1.1 Mapping Main Areas of the Thesis 
 The study: GAB water governance and BHP OD mine 1.1
The term ‘water governance’ appeared in 2000 at the second World Water Forum 
held in Hague, and is referred to as  
the range of political, social, economic and administrative systems that are in 
place to develop and manage water resources, and the delivery of water services, 
at different levels of society (Veiga da Cunha, 2009, p. 109).  
Bearing the prospect of (re)solving social and environmental problems, water 
governance systems cover the establishment of legal frameworks, institutional 
reforms as well as efficient use, equitable access to water resources and enhanced 
allocation for environmental ecosystems (James et al., 2012; Veiga da Cunha, 2009). 
The role of politics and how diverse interests are involved in the decision-making is 
critical in defining the dynamics of water governance, especially in the broader 
context of water scarcity (Veiga da Cunha, 2009). A participatory approach to water 
governance “build[s] a diverse picture of water values” in terms of fairness and 
justice (James et al., 2012, p. 5) which “benefits from the input of broad-ranging 
stakeholders who, together, produce knowledge about sustainability in dialogic, ad 
hoc and incremental ways” (Frame & Brown, 2008, p. 228). 
The mining industry is chosen as the empirical site for its importance in economic 




its social and environmental impacts (Cortese, Irvine & Kaidonis, 2009, 2010; 
Stoianoff & Kaidonis, 2005). As one of the most socially and environmentally 
disruptive activities ever undertaken by mankind, the mining industry is generally 
coupled with a negative image including; pollution (ten Kate & Wilde-Ramsing, 
2011), exploration of the weak and vulnerable (e.g. workers in regional areas, 
indigenous populations in native lands and local villagers in developing countries) 
and depletion of limited natural resources (Peck & Sinding, 2003). 
Like the rest of the world, access to water is one of the major sustainability issues for 
the mining industry in Australia. The Australian mining industry at present 
constitutes 3.6% of the total water consumption in Australia (Barrett, 2011). Despite 
this relatively small proportion, the mining industry is considered responsible for a 
significant volume of water usage in local catchments (Barrett, 2011; National Water 
Commission, 2010). When mining companies’ water-related activities are deemed as 
irresponsible, conflicts and protests often arise and, consequently, corporate water 
practices are subjected to a stricter regulatory scrutiny (Morrison, Morikawa, 
Murphy & Schutle, 2009; Morrison et al., 2010). The GAB water issue from BHP’s 
ODEP is one such example. 
According to Sampford (2009, p. 47), the Australian treatment of this underground 
water resource is “positively criminal”. Australia has the deepest and largest artesian 
basin - the Great Artesian Basin (GAB), in the world and it is up to 3,000 metre deep, 
covering one fifth of the continent and holding an estimated water amount of 
64,900km3. Deep drilling of bores without capping over the last century has caused a 
massive wastage of water for the last 100 years. The BHP OD mine - Australia’s 
largest multi-mineral mine in South Australia is located over 1,600 km from any 
significant water system and currently draws water at the rate of 33 ML/d from the 
GAB. In 2005, the mine sought to treble its output, moving from an underground 
operation to an open cut method. A corresponding increase in water use magnified 
the controversy of water scarcity and mining. 
Risk discourse, in this context, has proliferated as a water governance tool to frame 




p. 9) provides a classification of three interrelated risk types arising from water 
scarcity: 
a) Risk from insufficient water resources to meet the basic needs of people, the 
environment and business, which in turn leads to... b) Risk from the 
consequences of insufficient water resources, such as higher energy prices, loss 
of competitive advantage, political and economic instability, population 
migration, or lost economic opportunities to name a few; and as a result... c) Risk 
from poor water management decisions taken in reaction to water scarcity, with 
negative consequences for some or all users. Such decisions may be a result of 
political or economic expediency, short term thinking, lack of knowledge or 
capacity or simply desperation and lack of choice. 
In this thesis, these three-tier risk types are investigated from the perspectives of the 
mining industry, government and civil society. The debate about whether the GAB 
underground water system is ‘replenishable’ or ‘inrechargeable’ (Chapter 7) has 
exacerbated public dispute over the economic, social and environmental benefits 
(Chapter 8). To respond to this confronting water scarcity, GAB water resource 
management and planning activity led by government agencies has again triggered 
significant controversies over potential social and environmental consequences 
(re)allocated to different institutional groups within society (Chapter 9). As such, this 
thesis emphasises the socially constructed nature of the GAB water risk debate. 
In contemporary risk research, risks have not only been viewed from a realist, 
techno-scientific perspective, but also a social constructivist aspect, which perceive 
the recognition and assessment of risk as inherent socio-political activity infused 
with the (re)production of shared meaning and understanding of reality (Horlick-
Jones & Sime, 2004). Although contemporary water governance policies tend to be 
dominated by “the managerialist focus on greater efficiency” and “bureaucratic focus 
on authoritative processes” (Head, 2010, p. 10), these generalised, decontextualised 
and reductionist approaches in discipline based risk research has been insufficient for 
understanding the entire risk profile related to water resources issues (Baleta, 2012; 
Horlick-Jones & Sime, 2004). Transdisciplinary research is a potential method to 
address the increasingly complex water problems with an emphasis on socio-cultural 
expectations and value debates (Horlick-Jones & Sime, 2004; Sampford, 2009). 
It is notable that the (re)solution to wicked water problems are uncertain and 




desirable practice for the achievement of a democratic and fair representation goes 
beyond the scope of this thesis, it is acknowledged that there is a need to engage with 
various stakeholder groups to understand the fuller aspects of each dimension of the 
water issue before any possible policy adjustment or change can be achieved. 
The diverse perspectives of various stakeholder groups in the water contest reflect 
the contentious domains of accounting disclosure and the related discourse of 
accountability. Accounting’s discursive and ideological functions have been 
highlighted in critical accounting studies since the 1980s (e.g. Chua, 1986a; Dillard, 
1991; Hines, 1988, 1989). Accounting disclosures do not simply provide neutral and 
value-free information, but rather, a set of ideological discourse, constructing the 
social reality with the inscription of a particular version of accountability (Brown, 
2009; Messner, 2009; Roberts, 1991; Shearer, 2002). 
This thesis explores the GAB water risk debate from BHP OD’s water extraction by 
investigating corporate sustainability reports and statements, government regulatory 
documents, and by contrasting them with alternative disclosures in form of public 
submissions, independent academic research and web documents obtained from civil 
society. It examines how ideologies inscribed in corporate and governmental water 
disclosures are resisted and challenged by NGOs, environmental activists and 
Aboriginal groups. This thesis, therefore, is consistent with a genre of alternative 
accounting studies that problematises and destabilises the normalised nature and 
taken-for-granted assumptions of business and sometimes government (e.g. Dey, 
Russell & Thomson, 2011). As a result, it facilitates the articulation of, and 
reflection upon, different modes of accountability from corporation, government and 
civil society (Buhr, 2001; Rodrigue, 2014). 
Consistent with a social constructivist ontology and epistemology, this thesis 
performs a discourse analysis approach to collate and analyse accounts for the GAB 
water debate. It investigates discourses within institutional disclosure documents, 
using rhetorical criticism in general, and Burkean rhetorical criticism as a mode of 
inquiry in particular. It examines how rhetoric is used by three institutions - industry, 
government and civil society through accounting and accountability discourses as a 




in society.  This study seeks to advance an understanding of accounting for water by 
focusing on contested accounting disclosures which is further informed and 
explicated by a theoretical framework of cultural risk theory (Douglas & Wildavsky, 
1982). By applying a Burkean rhetorical criticism framework to cultural risk theory, 
major sustainability-related assumptions of three institutions - industry, government 
and civil society become explicit and enable informed and genuine public 
participation in the processes of natural resource policy decision-making.  
In summary, this study investigates the mandatory and voluntary water disclosures 
and policy debates from BHP; GAB water regulatory statements and policies of the 
Australian Federal and South Australian government; and, juxtaposes these with 
alternative disclosures from civil society to examine the constructed meanings for 
the GAB risk-based sustainability debate. The context is noteworthy for this study, 
as it delves into the contested socio-political terrain over the control of the GAB - the 
Australia’s largest groundwater resource arising from the Australia’s largest multi-
mineral mine against the broad backdrop of water scarcity. This context provides a 
unique opportunity to analyse disclosures with their related accountability discourse. 
Therefore, the following research question is identified for this study: 
How do disclosures of perceived risk impact on assumptions of accounting and 
accountability provided by industry, government and civil society in the case of 
contested water sustainability of the GAB? 
 Methodological consideration 1.2
Although most of the water accounting studies identify water-related SEAR practices 
as neither neutral nor apolitical but rather ideological (e. g. Daniel & Sojamo, 2012; 
Egan, Frost & Andreeva, 2015; Morrison et al., 2010; Von Schwedler, 2011), the 
entry point of the current literature on SEAR is often at the level of managerial and 
economic accountability through corporate disclosure mechanisms including 
mandatory and voluntary sustainability type reports. In other words, they tend to be 
organisational or industry-focused without juxtaposing and engaging with the 
construction of social and environmental values and positions from other perspective 




This thesis adopts a cultural risk perspective as a transdisciplinary methodology to 
investigate ecological issues as well as accounting and accountability discourses. 
Positivist research with a techno-economic focus has viewed risk as an object and is 
insufficient to understand the entire risk profile related to water resource issues 
(Baleta, 2012; Horlick-Jones & Sime, 2004). Cultural risk perspective emphasises 
the culturally constructed nature of this debate on risk-based sustainability related 
concepts to facilitate public engagement and participation for the ‘polyglot’ problem 
of water governance.  
This cultural perspective, unlike a psychological analysis, assumes a (proactive) 
organisation or institution, rather than an individual, since individuals “affiliate with 
organizations that resonate with their values” (Dietz, Frey & Rosa, 2002, p. 346). 
Risk is inherently a social construction and a cultural choice according to 
imperatives of an organisation (Reddy, 1996). Therefore, the cultural risk 
perspective combines elements of various methodologies from both positive and 
normative risk disciplines in a single approach (Horlick-Jones & Sime, 2004). It is 
located within critical theory as it assumes that rationality is embedded within social 
institutions and systems within a pluralist society, where risk is a real phenomenon 
caused by structural constraints such as the capitalist system (Baleta, 2012).  
This thesis frames the contested GAB water risk to deliver and enhance public 
participation and engagement in policy decision-making. Participatory discourses in 
the form of disclosures are analysed at the institutional level. This thesis therefore 
brings together ‘hard’ - positive and objective, and ‘soft’ - normative and 
judgemental, knowledge in a transdisciplinary form. As Horlick-Jones and Sime’s 
(2004, p. 444) assert, cultural risk perspective exchanges  
inputs and outputs… across disciplinary boundaries, in an evolved methodology 
which transcends ‘pure’ disciplines. In epistemological terms, [this] 
transdisciplinary [approach] involves an integration of knowledge.  
Accounts in this thesis are conceived and utilised as rhetorical components of a 
dialogue or a conversation (Frame & Brown, 2008). By making cultural assumptions 
from each institution more transparent, this study exposes the pluralistic nature of 




 Method of analysis 1.3
This study employs a critical accounting approach to acknowledge divergent 
ideologies and interests among different stakeholder groups to promote democratic 
participation through genuine ‘dialogue’. It explores the GAB water risk debate from 
BHP OD’s water extraction by compiling accounts from corporate sustainability 
reports and other public statements; government regulatory documents and 
alternative public disclosures obtained from civil society respectively. 
This study performs a discourse analysis approach to collate and analyse a range of 
accounts for GAB water. In social theories and analyses, discourse is used widely 
referring to “different ways of structuring areas of knowledge and social practice” 
(Fairclough, 2003, p. 3). This stance is attributed to Foucault’s (1976, 1980 in 
Alvesson & Karreman, 2000) assumption that discourses constitute both subjects and 
objects, and arrange and naturalise the social world in a particular way to inform 
social practices. 
While discourse is considered as a particular way of representing some area of the 
world or a possible world with projected change in some directions, discourses are 
often alternative and competing, consistent with different social identities, positions 
and social relationships with others (Fairclough, 2003). In this thesis, discourse is 
considered to be a mode of institutional and political practice. In accordance with a 
culture risk perspective as methodology (Lupton, 1999), both competing and 
complementary discourses emanate out of interactions between BHP OD, 
governments and civil society around the water intake of BHP OD for the ODEP.  
This thesis uses documents issued by three institutions as data sources to analyse 
three different sets of institutional discourses emerging from the GAB water debate. 
Documents define and specify things, classify events and describe processes (Prior, 
2004).  In this thesis, the documents issued by BHP, BHP OD and governments can 
be largely recruited and used as allies to support each other’s actions when their 
interests coincided (except in some special cases - for example, see Chapter 9), while 





Since discourses are both embodied and enacted in various texts, texts can be 
regarded as “a discursive ‘unit’ and a material manifestation of discourse” (Phillips 
& Hardy, 2002, p. 4). This thesis analyses textual discourses in documents. When 
texts are approached as elements of social events, texts are concerned as an 
interactive process of meaning-making (Fairclough, 2003). Discourse studies can be 
considered to be an analysis of text in context.  
This thesis investigates discourses through a textual approach based on “interpretive 
structuralism” (Phillips & Hardy, 2002, p. 24). An interpretive structuralist approach 
is primarily concerned with how social and cultural meanings are constructed. In this 
study, the particular emphasis is on rhetoric. Rhetoric is the technique of using 
discourse for persuasive effect, and this study examines how rhetoric is used by three 
institutions as a strategic resource to further their views. 
To analyse rhetoric, Burkean rhetorical criticism (Stillar, 1998) is adopted as a 
specific method to interrogate institutional documents. It is a specific method based 
on the assumption that rhetoric is one of the symbols to constitute the world, give it 
meaning and express common interests required for achieving social unity (Burke, 
1950, 1966, 1969). Burkean rhetorical criticism incorporates three levels of analysis 
- grammar, rhetoric and logology (Stillar, 1998). The grammatical analysis focuses 
on the features of texts within the documents issued by three institutions and the 
rhetorical situation from which the production of those texts arise. Rhetorical 
analysis deals with the function of texts, which is how the public, as audiences, are 
invited by each institution to share and believe in different risk assumptions 
regarding the GAB. Logological analysis is concerned with social implications and 
the consequences of “terministic screens” (Burke, 1966, p.50). In different 
institutions, texts and discourses function to condense the GAB water-related reality 
by highlighting certain aspects of it for public attention and engagement. Burkean 
rhetorical criticism is applied to cultural risk theory (Chapter 6, Section 6.3) to allow 
the researcher to identify features, functions and implications of each institutional 
risk practice. Making those theoretical elements explicit, in turn, provides analytical 




Since the GAB water risk debate is centred upon BHP OD’s entitlement to the GAB 
water and its water management, the timeline covered by this study is from 2005, the 
year in which BHP acquired Western Mining Corporation (thereafter WMC), 
established BHP OD and applied for ODEP, to October 2011, when the final 
decision (Approval with conditions) from Commonwealth Federal Government, 
South Australian and Northern Territory Government about the ODEP was made. It 
is important to note that while BHP OD’s direct involvement into the GAB water 
risk debate started from 2005, the debate has been evolving since the WMC, BHP 
OD’s predecessor, discovered and started operating the Olympic Dam mine in 1978. 
Therefore, historic documents issued that are highly relevant to the GAB water 
controversy are also selected for analysis. The overall data therefore cover 
disclosures made at any time relating to this period. 
 Theory to explicate 1.4
To investigate the GAB water debate from various constituencies, a cultural risk 
theory (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982; Schwarz & Thompson, 1990; Thompson et al., 
1990; Thompson & Rayner, 1998) is utilised as a transdisciplinary theoretical 
approach to define problems from heterogeneous domains (Lawrence, 2010). It 
critically explores the underlying assumptions for contentious water-related 
disclosures and accountability discourses (embedded within disclosures) and 
analyses their role in incorporating economic, social and environmental 
accountability into a transdisciplinary dialogue to the risk-based sustainability 
problems. Assessing risk as socio-political activities, cultural risk theory (Douglas, 
1970; Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982) enables contestation among divergent interest 
groups, creates and enlarges institutional spaces of potentiality through which 
alternatives are facilitated to emerge (Brown & Dillard, 2013). 
Cultural risk theory (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982) conceives risk as social constructs 
determined by structural and institutional constraints of society. Risk-based 
sustainability policies, from this viewpoint, are a result of a constant struggle among 
these participants to position their risk perspective on the public agenda and also 
impose it on others (Baleta, 2012). Although these pluralist views of knowledge 
systems, lifestyles and values make direct communication difficult within society, 




highlight the essentiality of communication (Baleta, 2012). This locus is pivotal in 
the context of a water crisis, where industry (market), government (hierarchy) and 
civil society (border) consider water as inherently different resources.  
Since the three-fold Burkean rhetorical criticism as a method in Chapter 5 identifies 
and interprets the features, functions and implications of discursive practices (Stillar, 
1998), applying a Burkean framework to cultural risk theory allows a researcher to 
identify various notions for conceptualising risk-based sustainability, with the 
features, functions and implications of each institutional groups’ risk discourses 
manifest within disclosures. These notions form the major concepts of cultural risk 
theory to analyse the discourses of the GAB water related disclosures from BHP OD, 
governments and civil society. In this thesis, these concepts are ‘preferred learning 
style’ (feature), ‘view of nature’ (function), ‘property of knowledge ideal’ 
(implication), ‘attitude towards technology’ (feature), ‘view of risk’ (function), 
‘resolution of risk’ (implication), ‘cause of ecological crisis’ (feature), ‘view of 
justice and fairness’ (function), and ‘property of desired system’ (implication).  
These nine concepts in turn are linked to three accounting and accountability related 
themes. A preferred learning style, view of nature and property of knowledge ideals 
from three institutions help to understand the contested nature of the accounting 
concepts of control with associated accounting recognition and measurement rules. 
Institutional assumptions of an attitude towards technology, view of risk and risk 
resolution facilitate the understanding of the stewardship debate from both 
mainstream and critical accounting’s perspectives. Institutional perceptions of a 
cause of ecological crisis, view of justice and fairness and property of desired system 
enable the analysis of the natural resource allocation debate with its related economic 








Table 1.1 Application of Burkean Rhetorical Criticism Framework to Cultural Risk 
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Adapted from: Schwarz and Thompson (1990, pp.66-67, see also Ney & Thompson, 2011; 
1990; Thompson, 1980; Thompson et al., 1990; Thompson & Rayner, 1998) 
Cultural risk theory (Douglas, 1970; Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982) recognises the 
existence of three active (and one inactive) institutional solidarities. Each institution 
possesses a restricted risk position and corresponding solution according to its 
cultural assumptions and beliefs. These value-consistent solutions may be 
satisfactory to solve simple, one-dimensional problems, but unsuitable to solve 
complex water problems (Linsley & Shrives, 2014). In fact, each institution’s 
assumptions of risk-based sustainability shapes the definition of the perceived water 
problem, and each institutional solution is only  endorsed by its institutional norms 




The utilisation of a cultural risk theory (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982) therefore 
forefronts topics and issues of social and environmental concern and provides a locus 
for transdisciplinary approaches. It delivers a typology to examine various 
institutions and their diverse ontological and epistemological positions. Cultural risk 
theory allows the topic or issue, rather than an organisation or institution of 
stakeholder to become the locus of analysis; discloses partisan interests from various 
parties; and, harnesses an interdisciplinary approach to study phenomena. 
 Structure of the thesis 1.5
This thesis is structured as follows: 
Chapter 2: This chapter provides an overview of the water scarcity as an issue at 
global and national level. Three contested water governance paradigms are then 
discussed from perspectives of industry, governments and civil society with an 
example of contemporary Australian water reform. This is followed by a 
presentation of the GAB water governance and mining industry’s water use in 
general and BHP OD’s GAB water intake in particular. The GAB water debate 
arising from BHP OD’s mining operation and the proposed ODEP concludes this 
chapter. 
Chapter 3: This chapter provides an overview of the water scarcity as an issue at 
global and national level. Three contested water governance paradigms are then 
discussed from the perspectives of industry, governments and civil society with an 
example of contemporary Australian water reform. This is followed by a 
presentation of the GAB water governance and mining industry’s water use in 
general and BHP OD’s GAB water intake in particular. The GAB water debate 
arising from BHP OD’s mining operation and the proposed ODEP concludes this 
chapter. 
Chapter 4: This chapter discusses of methodological issue of risk research with its 
application in accounting studies. Shifted meanings of risk representing different 
methodologies are outlined first before the overview of realist/positivist perspective 
of risk. This is followed by a presentation of social constructivist perspective of risk. 




accounting studies are reviewed individually with a focus on cultural risk 
methodology in critical accounting research. 
Chapter 5: This chapter explicates the research method used to examine how the 
GAB water risk debate is manifest through cultural practices. It begins with an 
overview of a critical accounting approach, discourses, discourse in documents, and 
text and textual analysis with reference to an interpretive structuralist approach. This 
is followed by a general discussion of rhetoric and rhetorical criticism. A Burkean 
perspective of rhetorical criticism is subsequently discussed, with a particular 
emphasis on grammatical, rhetorical and logological analyses. The documents used 
as data in this study are then presented before a final description of the process of 
data analysis. 
Chapter 6: This chapter first introduces cultural risk theory in general (Douglas, 
1970; Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982). The three folded Burkean framework of 
rhetorical criticism is then applied to the cultural risk theory to tease out the 
theoretical elements for each institutional risk discursive practices. Three critical 
themes derived from these institutional discourses are finally discussed with the 
implication for accounting research and practices.  
Chapter 7: This chapter applies three major concepts from the cultural risk theory - 
preferred learning style, view of nature and property of knowledge ideal to analyse 
market - BHP and BHP OD, hierarchy - Australian Federal and South Australian 
government and border institutions’ - civil society’s viewpoints manifest in their 
disclosure documents in the context of the GAB water-related risks. This analysis 
has implications to understand the accounting concept of control of natural resources 
from both mainstream and critical perspectives, and it provides insights for financial 
accounting-standard setting in the era of impending environmental crisis. 
Chapter 8: This chapter applies three major concepts from cultural risk theory - 
attitude towards technology, view of risk and resolution of risk to analyse market - 
BHP and BHP OD, hierarchy - Australian Federal and South Australian government 
and border institutions’- civil society’s viewpoints manifest in their disclosure 
documents in the context of the GAB water-related risks. This analysis has 




both mainstream and critical perspectives, and it provides insights for social and 
environmental accounting and reporting practices in the era of looming 
environmental crisis. 
Chapter 9: This chapter applies three major concepts from cultural risk theory- the 
cause of ecological crisis, view of justice and fairness and property of desired system 
to analyse market - BHP and BHP OD, hierarchy - Australian Federal and South 
Australian governments and border institutions’ - civil society’s viewpoints manifest 
in their disclosure documents in the context of the GAB water-related risks. This 
analysis has implications for an understanding of the accounting concept of 
‘economic consequence’ from both mainstream and critical perspectives. It also 
provides insights to facilitate/justify government intervention in financial accounting 
and reporting practices in the era of looming environmental crisis. 
Chapter 10: This final chapter provides a recap of the study and detailed 
contributions of this thesis. It concludes the insights from previous chapters and 
discusses the concept of value underpinning the juxtaposed assumptions for risk-
based sustainability among market - BHP and BHP OD; hierarchy - Australian 
Federal government and South Australian government; and border institutions - civil 
society. Contribution to extant accounting literature and methodology and theory are 
also considered with regard to the democratic participation in public policy decision 
making based on accounting and accountability discourses against the background of 
sustainability problems. A presentation of thesis limitations and further research 
opportunities conclude this chapter.  
 Summary 1.6
This chapter introduces the study in general - presenting background, research 
motivations and purposes, discussing methodology and method, and describing the 
structure of the thesis. The next chapter provides an overview of water scarcity and 





CHAPTER 2 BACKGROUND 
 Introduction  2.1
This chapter provides the context for the case of the Great Artesian Basin (GAB) 
water governance and GAB water risk related controversies arising from BHP 
Billiton Olympic Dam Corporation, Pty Ltd. (BHP OD)’s mining operation and the 
proposed Olympic Dam Expansion Project (ODEP). This context is important for an 
understanding of three contested water governance paradigms, from the perspectives 
of industry, governments and civil society, which manifest as irresolvable conflicts 
to date. In Chapter 7, 8 and 9, this context and different water governance paradigms 
will be reconsidered in light of cultural risk theory. 
The next section (2.2) provides an overview of water scarcity as an issue at global 
and national level. This environmental, social, economic and political environment is 
particularly salient as it helps to understand the highly politicised relationships over 
water resource allocation. Three contested water governance paradigms are then 
discussed from the perspectives of industry, governments and civil society with an 
example of contemporary Australian water reform (Section 2.3). This discussion is 
relatively brief and will be revisited in Chapter 7, 8 and 9, as its significance is 
inscribed and predicated in the contested disclosures regarding the GAB water risks 
from the BHP OD’s water intake. This is followed by a presentation of the GAB 
water governance and mining industry’s water use in general and BHP OD’s GAB 
water intake in particular. The GAB water debate arising from BHP OD’s mining 
operation and the proposed ODEP concludes this chapter (Section 2.4). 
 Why water is an issue 2.2
Although two thirds of earth’s surface is covered by water, only 1% of it is fresh 
water. Like any other natural resource, this water resource is unevenly distributed 
around the planet, with some regions enjoying relatively abundant watering and 
more regular rainfall, while others face a dearth of water availability (Hazelton, 
2007). Climate change also poses a serious threat to the hydrologic cycle, rainfall 
pattern and freshwater systems (Bates, Kundzewicz, Wu & Palutikof, 2008; 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), 2007; Morrison et al., 2009). 




climate change, have affected more regions 1 and caused acute shortages of water in 
Asia, Africa, Australia and the United States. For example, in China and India, 
declined water supplies have arisen from depleted groundwater and melting glaciers, 
which have caused receding river levels (Gleick, Cooley, Katz, Lee, Morrison, 
Palaniappan, Samulon & Wolff, 2007; Morrison et al., 2009). In the United States, 
annual river flows and natural water storage capacities are also reducing due to the 
shrinking snow-cap on the Rocky Mountains (Barnett & Pierce, 2008)  
Population growth also results in significant pressure on water resources (Morrison 
et al., 2009; United Nations, 2006). Agriculture water use constitutes more than two-
thirds of global usage, including almost 90% in developing countries (ESCAP, 2007). 
With the world population growth of fifty million per year (Morrison et al., 2009), 
freshwater consumption is expected to rise 25% by 2030 (Wild, Francke, Menzli & 
Schön, 2007). 2  Furthermore, there has been increased competition between 
agriculture and industry’s demand for water, leaving many countries in a dilemma 
between the issues of water scarcity and constrained economic growth (Plummer & 
Tower, 2010). 
Another severe problem in accessing a freshwater resource is declining water quality 
(United Nations, 2006). In developing countries, like China, India, and Pakistan, 
rising agricultural and industrial water demands, combined with a lack of adequate 
treatment for wastewater, have already caused heavily contaminated waterways 
resulting in more than one billion people short of safe drinking water (Morrison et al., 
2009). For instance, many rivers have been so heavily contaminated in China that 
even industry cannot use the water, and more than two-thirds of the large cities in 
China do not have sufficient recycling or sanitation facilities for wastewater (Wild et 
al., 2007). 
Agenda 21 (United Nations Division for Sustainable Development, 1992) ranked 
preservation and supply of freshwater reserves among the most urgent and important 
environmental issues. United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural 
                                                 
1 The percentage of ‘very dry’ land had doubled since 1970s, including large parts in Africa and Australia (National Center for 
Atmospheric Research (NCAR), 2005). 
2According to the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations (UN-FAO) (2007), currently around 2.4 billion 
people - more than one third of the world population live in countries under water stress. And this number is expected to be 




Organisation (UNESCO) (2006, p.524) neatly summarises the UN’s assessment of 
global water supplies:  
Providing the water needed to feed a growing population and balancing this with 
all the other demands in water is one of the great challenges of this century. 
Providing water for environmental flows and industry will tax water resources 
even more.  
The United Nations Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights (2002) has 
also declared access to adequate and clean water resource as one of the basic human 
rights. 
As the second driest continent next to Antarctica (Vardon, Lenzen, Peevor & Creaser, 
2007) and the driest continent with inhabitants in the world (Wahlquist, 2008), 
Australia is confronted with water problems such as water scarcity, declined water 
quality, and increased salinity (Hazelton, 2007). Apart from water availability, the 
causes of the current water crisis are also attributed to problematic water 
management (Melendez & Hazelton, 2009; UNESCO, 2006, 2009; World Water 
Council, 2000).3 For example, in the early twentieth century Australia’s water was 
“managed as if it were worthless” rather than “the life-sustaining, valuable, and 
increasingly scarce resource that it is” (Clark, 2007, p. 1) because of the reliability 
and quality of water supplies, largely due to publicly-owned utilities with low usage 
charges (Egan, 2009). By 1970, emerging concerns over water pollution and misuse 
resulted in an investigation from the Australian Federal Senate Selected Committee’s 
into the issue of water pollution. The Commonwealth of Australia (1970) and the 
Committee concluded that there was little public awareness about the threats and 
challenges to the Australian water resource (Commonwealth of Australia, 1970, p. 
184). In 1987, the Brundtland Report (1987) marked the start of global sustainability 
agenda and encouraged the global community to take into account the water needs of 
future generations and the environment. According to Egan (2009, p. 280), the 
Brundtland Report also “lent added legitimacy to Australian water management 
policies focused on demand management”. 
                                                 
3 Nestle’s chairman Peter Bradeck-Letmathe bluntly points out that the challenges of water availability is more severe than that 





From the late 1990s water storage has declined rapidly and water scarcity has 
become acute in Australia as a result of continued droughts (Egan, 2009). According 
to the Australian Government Bureau of Meteorology (AGBoM) (2007), Eastern and 
Southern Australia have been affected by droughts since 1996, with the worst years 
on record in 1997/1998 and 2002/2003; while some regions in Southern-Western 
Australia have suffered protracted droughts for 30 years (World Meteorological 
Organisation (WMO), 2006). For this reason, every Australian mainland state capital 
since 2006 has had to deal with water restrictions due to an insufficient water supply 
(Melendez & Hazelton, 2009; Wahlquist, 2008).  
Climate change is now widely accepted as exacerbating water risks (Plummer & 
Tower, 2010; Savolainen, 2008; The Economist, 2009). In 2008, the then Australian 
Federal Minster for Climate Change and Water, Penny Wong, stated in 2008 that, 
while the overconsumption and mismanagement of water have imposed a serious 
negative impact on Australian aquifers and rivers, climate change will worsen the 
situation resulting in more droughts and unreliable rainfalls (IPCC, 2007; Wong, 
2008).4  
 Contested water governance paradigm  2.3
As with most natural resources, scarcity gives rise to opportunities for those with 
access. Accordingly, relationships over water resources tend to be highly politicised, 
especially where allocation issues abound. Generally speaking, water is understood 
as a multi-purpose resource and it functions on different levels and dimensions 
(Dubreuil, 2006). The priority of, and the focus on, different levels and dimensions 
leads to contested water governance paradigms5, inspired and driven by different 
social and institutional preferences and interests (Allan, 2003; Dubreuil, 2006; Veiga 
da Cunha, 2009).  
                                                 
4 The Garnaut Report (2008) notes that problematic water supply in Australia results from climate change increased population 
and uneconomic water pricing policies. 
5 Governance is defined as ‘‘the exercise of economic, political and administrative authority to manage a country’s affairs at all 
levels. It comprises the mechanisms, processes and institutions through which citizens and groups articulate their interests, 
exercise their legal rights, meet their obligations and mediate their differences”  (Sampford, 2009, p. 51). 
Water governance refers to ‘‘the range of political, social, economic and administrative systems that are in place to develop and 





 Water for development and industrial water governance paradigm 2.3.1
Dubreuil (2006) advances three levels and dimensions of water function. They are 
‘water for development’, ‘water for citizens’ and ‘water for life’. ‘Water for 
development’ is “an economic function related to production activities” (Dubreuil, 
2006, p. 4). It is normally the concern of private interests including irrigation for 
agriculture, food and industrial production, hydropower generation as well as 
recreation and tourism (Wallacw, Acreman & Sullivan, 2003). For economists to 
formalise the benefits of water resources, a key concept termed ‘production function’ 
is used. Hanemann (2006, p. 84) defines a production function as “an empirical, 
causal relationship between the levels of inputs required to produce an output, or an 
outcome, and the level of output or the outcome that results.” One example is the 
production function for mining, agriculture or forestry industrial output as a function 
of water extracted from rivers or underground resources and other inputs to the 
production process (Hanemann, 2006). 
To fulfil the production function on an ongoing basis, it is essential that access to 
water of sufficient quantity and quality is available (Syme et al., 2008). From this 
perspective, nature in general and water in particular could and should be mastered 
by science and industrial technologies (Allan, 2003), along with the principle of 
efficiency as the primary criterion for water allocation (Patrick, 2012). It is argued 
that water, as a scarce resource, has an economic value, therefore should be allocated 
according to the principle of economic efficiency (Allan, 2003). Making water 
available at a subsidised price, from an industrial perspective, will generate 
inefficient water use, thereby contributing to water scarcity (Veiga da Cunha, 2009).  
However, this economic argument is sometimes mutually exclusive with respect to 
the principle of social and environmental equity (Dinar, Rosegrant & Meinzen-Dick, 
1997). This idea is exemplified through a focus on  short-term gains derived from 
acute changes to natural water flows through dams, reservoirs or irrigation schemes 
which are unsustainable in the long run6 (Syme et al., 2008). It is worth noting that 
                                                 
6 So far there has been a view that environmental concerns conflict with economic development. In terms of contested process 
for water allocation decision-making, this conflict essentially is, according to (Patrick, 2012), a short-term vs long-term view. 
That is, water resources for immediate use or production might be in direct conflict with its long-term benefits for those in 




one of the reasons for allocative water criteria to resort to efficiency-based rules is 
the ease and simplicity to account for and justify use (Patrick, 2012). 
 Water for citizens and government water governance paradigm 2.3.2
While water is considered by industry as an economic good, it is “a special economic 
good” due to its essential, non-substitutable, finite nature (Veiga da Cunha, 2009, p. 
101). Water, therefore, can be perceived as a social good, as the benefits and costs 
from individual or group use of water tends to affect a larger social community 
within the same water distribution system (Veiga da Cunha, 2009). Dubreuil (2006) 
argues that it is the role of governments to act in the interest of the social wellbeing 
in respect of social rights of citizens. As such, ‘water for citizens’ is concerned with 
“providing water for general interest purposes, as regards public health or the 
promotion of values of social equity or social cohesion” (Dubreuil, 2006, p. 4).  
As noted by Veiga da Cunha (2009, p. 10), this social dimension points to the 
“equitable use” of water resources, since water is unevenly distributed not only “in 
time and space”, but also among “various socio-economic strata of society”. How the 
water resource is distributed and allocated entails direct impacts on a citizen’s 
physical and mental health, as well as their livelihood opportunities (United Nations 
Children's Emergency Fund & World Health Organization, 2011; Veiga da Cunha, 
2009). From a social perspective, public health cannot be achieved when access to 
sufficient water for personal and domestic use is not safeguarded (Patrick, 2012). 
Basic human needs of water include water for drinking, food preparation, bathing 
and sanitation. Gleick (1998) suggests 50 litres of water per person per day as the 
minimum to secure health and the minimal standard of living in these four areas, and 
the state holds due diligence to protect these rights, for both intra-generational and 
inter-generational equity (Veiga da Cunha, 2009).  
Therefore, governments have the dual goal of ensuring the supply of water to 
industry, as well as the basic health need of communities. These goals sometimes 
contradict each other (Roa-García, 2014; Veiga da Cunha, 2009). On one hand, 
considering water as an economic good facilitates the implementation of efficiency 
measures to benefit society as a whole. On the other hand, however, water allocation 




social costs cannot be quantified in practice (Roa-García, 2014; Veiga da Cunha, 
2009). Therefore, to decide on the most sustainable and advantageous water use in a 
broader social and political context, governments sometimes make water available 
free of charge or at subsidised cost to some water users, including industry, irrigation 
and domestic users (Veiga da Cunha, 2009).  
Since planning for dual and often competing objectives is complicated, it is often 
found that “the partial achievement of one goal” has been used by governments to 
“offset significant failures to achieve others” (Sampford, 2009, p. 63). For example, 
in recent decades in Western liberal democratic societies, water has been governed 
and managed in “an apolitical way - as if the engineers and technocrats/bureaucrats 
were engaged in the administration of things” (Sampford, 2009, p. 50). Water policy 
and management has often been implemented through the use of market mechanisms 
to improve water use efficiency in an attempt to protect ecosystems that supply water 
for public interest (Mercer, Christesen &  Buxton, 2007).  
This market model of water governance by governments has raised questions about 
whether government values water in the general interests of civil society. There are 
doubts on “the agenda surrounding water decisions and prioritised stakeholders” 
(Alston & Mason, 2008b, p. 132). It is argued that governments have taken “a far 
narrower perspective” on the idea of ‘water for citizen[s]’ (Sampford, 2009, p. 51) 
by prioritising economics and overshadowing the social equity implications of water 
allocation (Alston & Mason, 2008b). As Alston and Mason’s (2008b, p. 136) assert, 
these government water policies are found “neither fair nor efficient”, and reflect the 
interests of certain stakeholder groups more than others “even in the absence of overt 
conflict”. One reason is that governments are identified as poor community engagers, 
albeit the acknowledgement of the significance of community participation and 
engagement (Alston & Mason, 2008b). 
 Water for life and civil society’s water governance paradigm 2.3.3
‘Water for life’ entails “providing water for the survival of both human beings 
(individual and collective) and other living beings” (Dubreuil, 2006, p. 4). As the 
basis of nature, water is described by Ripl (2003, p. 1921) as “the bloodstream of the 




environmental benefits provided by water-based ecosystems and categorise them 
into four types of services - provisioning, regulating, cultural and supporting services. 
Provisioning services cover goods or products such as food, fibre, fuel and 
freshwater that can be obtained from ecosystems. Regulating services include water, 
air quality and climate regulation, for disease or natural hazard control. Cultural 
services refer to the nonmaterial benefits like spiritual, religious and ethical values 
that are attached to ecosystems. Supporting services are those underlying processes 
necessary to produce all three other ecosystem services, which involve soil formation, 
nutrient cycling and so on (Ranganathan, Raudsepp-Hearne, Lucas, Irwin, Zurek, 
Bennett, Ash & West, 2008). 
From this perspective, water is treated as an environmental, social and cultural good, 
“not primarily as an economic good” (Hazelton, 2013, p. 276). As Syme et al. (2008, 
p. 332) suggest, “the moral, the cultural and the natural have always been intimately 
related”, and the importance of water is continually reflected in rituals, ceremonies 
and language of a particular culture. For example, watercourses and floodplain areas 
hold “significant cultural and social value as a focus for spiritual, political, national 
or other cultural sentiment” (Environment Australia, 1998, p. 3), as they have long 
enabled human activities including settlement, transportation and recreation (Syme et 
al., 2008). People from a culture close to water or whose lives associated inseparably 
with water, like fishermen, give prominence to water, as well as indigenous 
Australians who are morally obligated to look after their country and all it contains, 
including surface and groundwater (Syme et al., 2008). This moral obligation also 
includes adequate care for current and future generations, and those beyond the 
scope of immediate social relations, such as ecosystems and nonhuman life forms 
(Smith, 2000; Syme et al., 2008). In respect of the cultural value of water, Nathan 
(2007, p. 4) argues that:  
[o]ur imagination ... require[s] a history of our past connections with water, a 
sense of how our values have shaped particular waterscapes and then ricocheted 
back into community life ... A scientific understanding of changes in riparian 
vegetation, streamflow volume, and the physical form of bed and banks are 





As such, the fundamental values of life are intrinsically linked to those of sustainable 
ecosystems including aquatic ecosystems. The value of this dimension of water 
function cannot be measured in monetary terms, therefore should not be 
administrated and managed according to market rule (Dubreuil, 2006). From the 
perspective of civil society, including the non-government organisations (NGOs), 
environmentalists and Aboriginal groups, water governance is 
not just a matter of management but of making value choices, allocating 
resources, avoiding inefficiencies and recognizing the dangers of market failure 
and the abuse of market power… [from] engineers and technocrats (Sampford, 
2009, p. 51). 
In other words, current water resource governance and management policies in 
Australia promote an economic and technical view that lacks equity considerations 
including the distribution of social, cultural and environmental costs and benefits 
(Alston & Mason, 2008b). Therefore, government authorities are required to broaden 
their capacity, to be more inclusive of social and cultural concerns of sustainable use 
of water resources and ecosystem integrity (Jackson, 2005; Veiga da Cunha, 2009). 
A process of transparent and participatory engagement for a shared vision is 
suggested especially from those marginalised communities, such as Aboriginal 
groups (Alston & Mason, 2008b; Jackson, 2005; Veiga da Cunha, 2009). As 
contended by Alston and Mason (2008b, p. 133), it is the dimension of ‘water for life’ 
that adds to the “quality of life experiences” that have not been addressed by 
industries at large, and governments to a some extent, with regard to their 
reconceptualisation of water scarcity and the value of water. 
 Conflictual facets within the contemporary Australia water reform 2.3.4
The Australian governments’ National Water Initiative (NWI) is used to exemplify 
these contested water paradigms. The NWI aims to facilitate Australian Water 
Management Reform7 through a coordinated approach in response to concerns over 
droughts and climate change (Egan & Frost, 2010; Hazelton, 2007; Melendez & 
Hazelton, 2009; Morrison et al., 2010). The signing of the Intergovernmental 
Agreement on the NWI (National Water Commission, 2007) is said to represent a 
                                                 
7 SKM (2008) and Waterlines (2008) identify the problems involving in water reform, including conflicting interests of winners 
and losers in a new system of transparency (SKM, 2008); lack of professionals with technical expertise related to water issues, 
government intervention at local and state level, lack of agreement and clarity on the specific actions needed; and lack of clear 




culminating step for water policy in Australia,8 because critical ideas, previously in 
the form of “proposals and points for discussion, now have official status at a 
national level” (Chalmers, Godfrey & Lynch, 2010, p. 8). With assistance from the 
National Water Commission (2007),9 the key objectives of the NWI are to: increase 
the efficiency and productivity of water use; ensure the need to service urban and 
rural communities; improve the health of river and groundwater system; and, 
establish an efficient national water market with a pricing system, trading 
arrangement and water resource accounting (National Water Commission, 2007). 
However, the NWI incorporates tensions among key components and the challenges 
of associated implementation (Hussey & Dovers, 2006). In spite of its commitment 
to integral and ecologically sustainable water development (Hussey & Dovers, 2007), 
it is argued that the NWI fails to reconcile major conflicting imperatives such as 
those of social equity, environmental sustainability and economic rationality (Hussey 
& Dovers, 2006). Its incapability to accommodate the diverse aspirations of multiple 
participants is reflected through the focus of this reform, which is to ensure 
efficiency of water usage for an increasing level of productivity and competitiveness 
through introduction of privatisation, market and property right mechanisms, as well 
as the environmental flow allocation (Hussey & Dovers, 2006; Syme, 2014). 
According to Hussey and Dovers (2006, p. 39), these managerial and administrative 
approaches are deeply rooted within “dominant neoliberal political philosophy and 
neo-classical economic theory, manifesting in the Australian term ‘economic 
rationalism’”. The role of market mechanisms, along with increased knowledge in 
hydrology are only rational from a technical, economic and organisational-centred 
perspective (Funder & Ravnborg, 2004), yet doubtful on environmental and social 
grounds (Hussey & Dovers, 2006). As suggested by Hussey and Dovers (2006, p. 
43), a technical and procedural water governance paradigm shifts the logic of water 
resource management and planning from that of “the social and ecological” to that of 
                                                 
8 Furner (2008) indicates that the Australian government’s fundamental reform agenda embraces four key policy initiatives: 
wisely using water; ensuring water supply; supporting healthiness of river systems; and, combating climate change. New ways 
are suggested to increase water supply, for example, establishment of desalination plants, recycling of more wastewater, less 
wastage from evaporation and seepage and so on. 
9 Egan (2009, p. 285) notes that “the need for an NWC [National Water Commission] had however been flagged decades 
earlier by the 1970 Senate Select Committee investigation into water pollution. It was only when water became particularly 
scare throughout Australia that the NWC was finally established, resulting in an increasingly co-ordinated national dialogue on 




“the economic”. Markets are seen as a social and ecological goal instead of an 
instrument to that goal (Common, 1995). 
This above example demonstrate that the debates around water tend to be highly 
political and it is almost impossible, through increasingly sophisticated scientific 
knowledge, technology and developed market mechanisms, that optimal strategies 
and decisions for water allocation can be achieved (Gross, 2011). Similarly, such 
techno-economic approaches recommended through national water policy 
frameworks such as the NWI also set the scene for the governance of the Great 
Artesian Basin (GAB) in general and the on-going public outrage and protests over 
BHP’s GAB water extraction for the Olympic Dam expansion project (ODEP). 
 The GAB water issue  2.4
The GAB is an underground aquifer which spans three states including Queensland, 
New South Wales, South Australia and the Northern Territory10 (Endersbee, 2000a). 
Covering one fifth of Australia, it is one of the largest artesian groundwater basins 
across the world (Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation 
(CSIRO), 2013a). Australia’s dependence on water is evident in its historic and 
continued use of groundwater from the GAB. Since 1886, drilling of deep bores into 
the basin has allowed the artesian water released under natural pressure to flow 
uncontrolledly into creeks and open drains for stock distribution (Department of the 
Environment, 2011). This has caused a high waste rate of 80% due to evaporation 
and seepage (Plastics Industry Pipe Association of Australia Ltd, 2002). Such 
uncontrolled development, according to Llamas and Martinez-Santos (2006), can 
give rise to a series of negative effects such as depletion of the water table, 
degradation of groundwater quality and subsidence of land. In the GAB case, 
uncontrolled flow has led to pressure decline - some bores and springs have stopped 
flowing and wetlands have desiccated (Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial 
Research Organisation (CSIRO), 2013a). As a consequence, the health of 
groundwater dependant ecosystems has been threatened, together with the continued 
                                                 
10  The Commonwealth of Australia is a federation consisting of six states and two territories. They are New South Wales, 
Victoria, Queensland, Western Australia, South Australia, Tasmania (States), the Australia Capital Territory and the Northern 
Territory (Territories). The Commonwealth government, is also called Australian government or Federal 




access of groundwater by local users including pastoralists (Department of the 
Environment, 2011). 
 GAB governance in general 2.4.1
Against the backdrop of a national focus on water management reform and 
investment, especially in the form of a national policy framework, such as the NWI, 
particularly heightened attention is given to the sustainable and effective ‘whole of 
basin’ management and its coordinated approach between stakeholders (National 
Water Commission, 2011). While each State and Territory manage the GAB water 
resource under their respective legislative frameworks, the National Resource 
Management Ministerial Council (NRMMC) established the Great Artesian Basin 
Coordinating Committee (GABCC) in 2004, comprising key stakeholder 
representatives from each State and Territory governments’ advisory bodies 
(National Water Commission, 2011). The Great Artesian Basin Technical Working 
Group was set up alongside the GABCC to provide technical advice to the 
Committee (National Water Commission, 2011). 
The Great Artesian Basin Strategic Management Plan (the Plan) was released to 
guide governance and management regarding groundwater and related natural 
resources. It is a 15-year (2000-2015) strategic framework, providing direction to all 
jurisdictions across the GAB on policies, supporting programs and actions essential 
to obtain the optimum social, economic and environmental benefits from the existent 
and continuing use of the GAB water resources (Department of the Environment, 
2011; National Water Commission, 2011). Responding to the NWI, the Plan also 
embraces national policy principles on sustainable groundwater and biodiversity 
management, including market approaches to reallocate water savings for new usage 
(Great Artesian Basin Coordinating Committee, 2009b; National Water Commission, 
2011). It is said to complement, rather than override existing State and Territory 
groundwater resource legislation and statutory responsibilities (National Water 
Commission, 2011). 
To implement key actions of the Plan, the Australian Federal and State governments 
established a joint project- the Great Artesian Basin Sustainability Initiative (GABSI) 




initiative aims to encourage sustainable usage and maintenance of the GAB water by 
repairing uncontrolled artesian bores and replacing the open earth bore drain with 
reticulated piped water systems (Department of the Environment, 2011). 
Under the Plan, there is a significant focus on the scientific and technical assessment 
of the nature of artesian water interaction and the characteristics of artesian springs 
(National Water Commission, 2013). In March 2013, the Great Artesian Basin Water 
Resource Assessment (the Assessment) was delivered by the Australian Government 
Department of Sustainability, Environment, Water, Population and Communities, 
Geoscience Australia and the National Water Commission is engaged the 
Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO) to provide 
an analytical framework to facilitate water management, along with the Allocating 
Water and Maintaining Springs in the Great Artesian Basin research project (the 
GAB Mound Springs project) to investigate the operation of mound springs 11 
(Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO), 2013b). 
Through a substantial update of geological and hydro-geological knowledge, and, an 
improvement of measuring and monitoring techniques (Commonwealth Scientific 
and Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO), 2013a; Smerdon, 2013), it is 
believed that an advanced understanding of the extent and complexity of the GAB is 
likely to be attained through improved modelling and predictive capacity (Great 
Artesian Basin Coordinating Committee, 2009a; National Water Commission, 2013). 
 Australian mining industry’s water use in general 2.4.2
Secure access to water is a feature that affects individuals, communities, the natural 
environment, agriculture and industry. In particular, the mining and extraction 
industry rely on water as a resource. The Australian mining and mineral processing 
sector is the world’s leading producer of lead, bauxite and alumina, diamonds (by 
volume), ilmenite, rutile and zircon (and synthetic rutile) and tantalum; the second 
largest producer of uranium, zinc, and nickel; the third largest producer of iron ore, 
lignite, silver, manganese and gold, the fourth largest producer of black coal and 
copper, and the fifth largest producer of aluminium (Minerals Council of Australia, 
                                                 
11 Mound springs in South Australia are “a unique groundwater discharge feature of the Great Artesian Basin (GAB), a deep 
regional groundwater system that covers 22% of the Australian continent. They are the principal sources of surface water in the 
arid to semi-arid inland heart of Australia, and have great ecological, scientific, anthropological and economic significance” 




2011). As a main force of the Australian national economy, the mining industry 
contributed up to 9% ($115.56 billion) of the Australian GDP and accounted for 68.4% 
of total merchandise exports during 2009-2010 (ABARES, 2011). Australian mine 
production for 2010-2011 is forecast to rise by 2%, with the increasing earnings from 
exports of minerals and energy commodities by 30% to $182 billion (ABARES, 
2011)12. 
In the mining industry, secure access to water is critical for developing and 
processing minerals. As the input to almost all operations, water is used in a broad 
range of ways, particularly for processing and separating ores from waste material 
(DRET, 2008; Minerals Council of Australia, 2009a; National Water Commission, 
2010). The water consumption by mining industry currently makes up 3.6% of the 
total water use in Australia (Barrett, 2011). Although this proportion is relatively 
small, compared to urban and agriculture water usage, the mining industry is 
responsible for a significant component of water accounts in local catchments 
(Barrett, 2011; Minerals Council of Australia, 2009a; National Water Commission, 
2010). According to the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) (2006), for example, 
mining activities can comprise up to 73% of consumptive use outside the Murray 
Darling Basin 13 . During periods affected by droughts, the mining industry is a 
primary consumer of water within a region due to slow agricultural production 
and/or water entitlements purchased by mining companies (Barrett, 2011).  
In addition, water use in the mining industry has rapidly increased over the last 
decade and will keep rising, since, strong demand especially from China and India, 
has “drive[n] an ongoing need for Australian resources” (Barrett, 2011, p.1). As a 
result, direct water use14 in the mining industry grew from 321 GL/year in 2001 to 
413GL/year in 2004/2005 and 508GL/year in 2008/2009. This figure will further 
escalate to 1,000GL/year in 2020, according to linear forward projections (Barrett, 
                                                 
12 The time span covered by this study is concerned with BHP OD’s direct involvement into the GAB water risk debate from 
2005 to 2011. 
13  The Murry-Darling basin originates from two main rivers- the Murry River and the Darling River. It “covers 1,062,025 km² 
or approximately one-seventh (13.8%) of the total area of mainland Australia (7,692,024 square kilometres). It contains over 40% 
of all Australian farms, which produce wool, cotton, wheat, sheep, cattle, dairy produce, rice, oil-seed, wine, fruit and 
vegetables for both domestic and overseas markets. As Australia's most important agricultural region, the Basin produces one 
third of Australia's food supply and supports over a third of Australia's total gross value of agricultural production” (Discover 
Murray River™ - Official Murray River Travel Website, 2016)  
14 According to Barrett (2011) in the mining industry, direct water use is for processing, transporting and other tasks associated 
with production of ores. Indirect use of water includes water needed to generate energy required by mining activities. Despite 
the inextricable link between water and energy, the detailed discussion of indirect water usage in mining industry for electricity 




2011). Considering the impact of mining it is not surprising that the ODEP was 
controversial. 
 BHP OD’s Olympic Dam mine and ODEP 2.4.3
The Olympic Dam (Roxby Down) mine is located in South Australia, 550 km north-
northwest (NNW) of Adelaide. It is the largest known single deposit of uranium and 
the fourth largest copper deposit in the world. This deposit was first discovered in 
1975 by Western Mining Corporation (WMC) and has been mined since 1988 (BHP 
Billiton, 2005). In 2005, BHP Billiton (BHP) acquired WMC resources, formed BHP 
Billiton Olympic Dam Corporation Pty Ltd. (BHP OD) and applied to the State and 
Federal governments for the expansion of Olympic Dam. Open cut methods of 
extraction are recommended since it is not economical to mine low grade ore under 
the current underground operations (BHP Billiton, 2009). Both governments later 
required BHP to submit an Environment Impact Statement (EIS) for the ODEP, 
consistent with joint EIS governmental guidelines (Wallace & Smiles, 2007).  
The 4,600 page EIS was finally released by BHP on 1 May 2009, following three 
years of preparation (Gout, 2009). The expansion plan for the Olympic Dam 
incorporated three stages with the ultimate target of extracting 1 million tonnes of 
copper and 25,000 tonnes of uranium per annum. This EIS was available for public 
comment for 14 weeks (Gout, 2009), and after addressing issues of public concerns, 
BHP published the supplementary EIS (SEIS - the final plan) on 13 May 2011 (BHP 
Billiton, 2011a).  
The expansion proposal of Olympic Dam resulted in extensive public debate within 
Australia around corresponding environmental and social issues. Generally it is 
claimed that, although the mine has an expected 70-100 year life, BHP has only 
disclosed the impact for the next 40 years, thereby underestimating at least half of 
their environmental impacts (Parnell, 2009). According to an anti-nuclear 
campaigner, Jim Green, from Friends of the Earth Australia, the uranium fuel pellets 
which caused the meltdown of Fukushima reactor cores were from BHP’s Olympic 
Dam mine. He holds BHP accountable for the safety issues and fraud of the Japanese 
nuclear industry, accusing it of “turning a blind eye… [and] continu[ing] to peddle 




(Rugh, 2012, p. 2). BHP OD is also South Australia’s single biggest electricity user, 
while the proposed expansion requires diesel fuel to increase to more than one 
million litre per day regardless of the enormous amount of greenhouse gas pollution 
(Australian Greens., 2011c; Rugh, 2012) Apart from that, concerns such as: waste 
management of tailings; negotiation with Aboriginal landowners; and, the use of 
water resources were all on the agenda for debate (Gout, 2009; Parnell, 2009). These 
issues are complex and this thesis will concentrate on the issue of water, especially 
underground water from the GAB for the period 2005-2011 that corresponds with 
the time span between acquisition of WMC by BHP and when the final decision 
from the State and Federal government about the ODEP was made.  
 The GAB water debate  2.4.4
BHP OD’s mining operation is governed under the Roxby Downs (Indenture 
Ratification) Act (1982). Two special water licences are issued by the South 
Australian government to BHP OD for GAB water extraction under the criteria of an 
acceptable drawdown rate (Roxby Downs (Indenture Ratification) (Amendment of 
Indenture) Amendment Act 2011; Roxby Downs (Indenture Ratification) Act 1982) 
(see Chapter 8). The Olympic Dam mine uses approximately 33 million litre of GAB 
water per day  (BHP Billiton, 2011a) via two principle borefields / wellfields, known 
as Borefield A and Borefield B (Great Artesian Basin Protection Group, 2009a). The 
proposed expansion of Olympic Dam had significant implications for water demands 
(Parnell, 2010). BHP OD not only needed to increase the water extraction rate from 
the GAB to 42 million litre / per day (maximum amount permitted under the current 
licence), it also planned for to establish a desalination plant at Point Lowly located in 
the north of Spencer’s Gulf (BHP Billiton, 2009). This increased amount of water 
usage imposed on the GAB gave impetus to concerns that already existed and led the 
increasing calls for protection of the GAB from civil society stakeholder groups, 
including NGOs, environmentalists, and Aboriginal elders (MacPherson, 2008; 
Serve the people, 2008). 
Apart from BHP OD’s free usage of GAB water, the nature of GAB is also open to 
debate. Some argue that the GAB is an open system replenished by rainfall in 
Northern Queensland - a view favoured by the government and industry; while 




2000a; Gregory, 2009). According to Endersbee (2000a), the formula used in 
textbooks to calculate groundwater flow is based on the key assumption that surface 
rainfall recharges the groundwater, which may not be the case for the GAB.  
Within the uncertainty of the nature of the GAB, evidence to date shows that water 
extraction from the two borefields by BHP has caused declining flows of many 
surrounding mound springs since 1988, with some springs, such as Venables and 
Beatrice, ceasing to flow (Great Artesian Basin Protection Group, 2009a). This has a 
major effect on rare and endangered flora and fauna nearby, which are drying out 
due to the water drawdown rate (Great Artesian Basin Protection Group, 2009a). 
However, despite this ecological degradation, BHP asserts that its “use of water from 
the GAB is sustainable and is subject to stringent licensing and reporting 
requirements of the South Australian Government” (BHP Billiton, 2011a, p. 115). 
For example, BHP has prepared and submitted a GAB Wellfields Report annually to 
satisfy requirements of the Roxby Downs (Indenture Ratification) Act 1982. These 
reports rely on technical language and hydrological factors supplemented by statistic 
hydrogeological modelling. There is seemingly a belief that through increasingly 
advanced science, technology and sophisticated modelling, an optimal plan for water 
allocation will be achieved (e.g. Syme, 2014). However, according to Lupton (1999), 
scientific measures and calculative mechanisms are not fully objective or neutral as 
they are often understood and negotiated through human interests and values 
(Kasperson, 1992; Lupton, 1999; Renn, 1992). 
It is worth noting that, in the case of the proposed ODEP, government interests 
overlap with the interests of BHP to a great extent. The South Australian Premier Mr. 
Rann, for example, announced in May 2009 when the original EIS was released, that 
“it [the expansion project] has got massive benefits for South Australia, but I will 
insist that world’s best practice in terms of the environment is complied with” 
(Parnell, 2011, p. 1). According to Serve the People (2008), BHP has the resources 
to wield large economic and political ‘sticks’, and has the power to play ‘games’. 
While BHP was waiting for the final decision following the submission of the SEIS 
(Supplementary Environmental Impact Statement) to Federal South Australian and 
Northern Territory governments, the public outrage at BHP’s water grab was still on-




2011; Serve the people, 2008) and the urgent need for funding the Cap and Pipe15 
scheme (e.g. Great Artesian Basin Protection Group, 2009c) were the most 
prevailing demands from these stakeholder groups. 
On 10 October 2011, BHP received environmental approvals (with conditions) from 
Federal Environmental Minister Tony Burke for its ODEP (Department of 
Sustainability Environment Water Population and Communities, 2011). BHP has 
also signed an Indenture Agreement with the South Australian Government to enable 
this project to go ahead. For part of the agreement, BHP would be required to pay for 
the GAB water that it extracts for the first time once the expansion started16 (Homer, 
2011). 
This case, presented above, is characteristic of a constant debate with multiple 
viewpoints promoted by different interests. From the perspective of BHP OD and the 
South Australian government, the Roxby Down (Indenture Ratification) Act (1982) is 
a legal framework to govern BHP OD’s mining project, the associated GAB water 
extraction and the future water charge. Subsequently, it should encourage sustainable 
usage and management of the GAB water resource by incorporating diverse social, 
economic and environmental concerns (National Water Commission, 2011). 
However, these approaches largely emphasise a scientific understanding of the 
complex GAB groundwater system, the importance of technology in achieving water 
use efficiency for enhanced productivity and competitiveness, as well as market 
approaches such as pricing mechanisms (e.g. water levy) to protect the water 
resource. Nevertheless, these statistical modelling, technical efficiency and market 
mechanism arguments for a more robust economy are proven to be somehow 
insufficient for those in civil society who are concerned with water-related social and 
environmental impacts. After all, water is a public/common/social good, and its 
management cannot be reduced purely to scientific, technical and economic 
dimensions.  
                                                 
15 According to Great Artesian Basin Protection Group (2009), since 1980s, some landholders of the GAB have began capping 
and piping their bores due to the realisation of unsustainable extraction and use of water from the GAB. “The water was then 
piped through poly pipe to tanks and troughs, where the stock watered. This eliminated the water running down open drains, 
and an estimated 95 percent of water was thus saved.” However, capping and piping is a very expensive exercise and 
governments have started funding it since 1999. 
16 According to Homer (2011) this Indenture Bill will be introduced to state Parliament in which “BHP will be charged for 
GAB at the current NRM Board levy rate (currently $0.0318/KL) for the region (capped at $0.10/KL) for a period of 30 years 




Inspired by a genre of recent social and environmental (critical) accounting studies 
on ‘counter accounting’ (Gallhofer, Haslam, Monk & Roberts, 2006) (see Chapter 3), 
this thesis analyses the debate surrounding BHP’s GAB water intake for the Olympic 
Dam mine operation and the proposed ODEP from several stakeholders including; 
BHP, the Federal and State governments and civil society through publicly available 
information/disclosures. It explores the procedural, techno-scientific and economic 
rationality of the industry and governments by contrasting them with social and 
environmental concerns from civil society. This thesis will critically evaluate BHP’s 
GAB water extraction related disclosures and the Australian Governments’ GAB 
water governance related disclosures and compare them with external disclosures 
from civil society. It explores and highlights aspects of accountability supported by 
different stakeholder groups or institutions as a form of moral agency that underpins 
these contested disclosures. This position echoes the perspective of critical 
accounting studies, which perceives accounting as a combination of discourse and 
ideology (Chapter 3).  
 Summary 2.5
This chapter introduces the context of water scarcity within which three contested 
water governance paradigms from industry, government and civil society emerge. 
These paradigms are evident in the GAB water debate and BHP OD’s mining 
operation and the proposed ODEP. The GAB water governance, the mining 
industry’s water use and BHP OD’s GAB water intake have been briefly presented. 
The mining industry and governments advocate a procedural, technical, scientific 
and economic rationality, whereas civil society including NGOs, environmentalists 
and Aboriginal groups are concerned with social justice and environmental equity. 
This will be further explicated in the thesis through the lens of cultural risk theory in 
chapter 6.  
Since this thesis explores BHP and BHP OD’s GAB reliance on disclosures, this 
chapter has provided a broad overview of environmental and socio-political setting 
for analysing these contested disclosures. The next chapter outlines different 
assumptions of accountability that give rise to the different ideals of water 




presents a critical perspective of accounting and water related social and 





CHAPTER 3 CRITICAL ACCOUNTING AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
 Introduction  3.1
The previous chapter presented the context of water scarcity for the case of Great 
Artesian Basin (GAB) water risk-related controversies arising from BHP Billiton 
Olympic Dam Corporation Pty Ltd (BHP OD)’s mining operations and Olympic 
Dam Expansion Project (ODEP). These controversies were discussed with regard to 
contested water governance paradigms from the perspective of industry, 
governments and civil society. This context reveals that the domain, within which 
accounting and accountability are related issues, is contentious. This chapter 
provides an overview of critical accounting studies in general and water accounting 
(disclosure) studies, in particular, to identify the discursive and ideological 
significance of accounting as a social practice and facilitate the discussion of three 
forms of accountability from the perspective of industry (BHP, BHP OD), 
government (Australian Federal government and South Australian government) and 
civil society (Non-Government Organisations (NGOs), environmental activists and 
Aboriginal groups). 
Critical accounting approaches and methodologies are reflected in the cultural risk 
perspective introduced in Chapter 4. Mainstream accounting approaches, 
fundamentally embedded in a realist ontology and positivist epistemology, promote 
“the dominance of capital market[s]” (Brown, 2009, p. 315) and uncritically accept 
and legitimate current social institutions and practices (e.g. Chua, 1986a; Cooper & 
Sherer, 1984; Dillard, 1991). Critical accounting approaches, on the other hand, are 
based on a social-constructivist ontology and anti-positivist epistemology that views 
accounting as emanating from a social, environmental, political and institutional 
context. Accounting, therefore, is not a neutral set of practices but an ideology 
(Dillard, 1991; Hines, 1988, 1989). By adopting a “radically” different value 
position (Chua, 1986a, p. 625), critical accounting with its emancipatory potential 
reconceptualises social welfare and promotes interests and concerns such as social 
equity and environmental conservation (Arnold, 1990; Cooper & Sherer, 1984). 
In the same vein, mainstream corporate water accounting and reporting practices are 
found to portray financial performance positively based on a particular set of 




and positions (Daniel & Sojamo, 2012; Egan et al., 2015; Von Schwedler, 2011). 
This thesis explores the GAB water risk debate from BHP OD’s water extraction by 
analysing corporate sustainability reports and other public statements, government 
regulatory documents, and contrasts these with alternative public disclosures 
obtained from external sources. It investigates how the ideology or value system 
inscribed in corporate and governmental water disclosures is resisted and challenged 
by the NGOs, environmental activists and Aboriginal groups. This thesis therefore is 
in line with a genre of studies termed ‘counter-accounting’ that problematise and 
destabilise the normalised nature and taken-for-granted assumptions of business and 
sometimes government (Dey et al., 2011). As a result, it facilitates the articulation of 
and reflection upon different styles of accountability/stewardship from the 
perspective of industry, government and civil society (Buhr, 2001; Rodrigue, 2014). 
It therefore echoes the call for a dialogical approach to accounting which enables 
democratic participation (Brown, 2009; Gray, 1992). 
This chapter first explores critical accounting studies in general and water related 
social and environmental disclosure with the notion of ‘counter-accounting’ in 
particular (Section 3.2). An emphasis is subsequently given on three forms of 
accountability from the perspective of industry, government and civil society 
(Section 3.3). 
 Critical accounting studies 3.2
Since the late 1970s and 1980s, a body of alternative accounting studies, including 
critical accounting perspectives, have emerged in the accounting literature (Andrew, 
2000; e.g. Chua, 1986a; Dillard, 1991; Moerman & van der Laan, 2005; Tinker, 
Merino & Neimark,  1982). These studies critique the dominant paradigm in 
accounting, which is characterised by utility - based marginalist economic theory 
(Tinker, 1985). 
Dillard (1991, p. 11) defines ontology as “the nature of being or reality” and 
epistemology as “the means or process of knowing”. Stated somewhat differently, 
ontology is the belief of what really exists, while epistemology is about what counts 
as knowledge and how it is acquired. A mainstream accounting approach holds a 




subjects [observers]” (Chua, 1986a, p. 611). Epistemologically, a mainstream 
accounting approach is dominated by positivism, which separates theory from 
observation (Chua, 1986a; Dillard, 1991). Positivists believe that knowledge can be 
gained and accumulated through activities searching for internal coherence, 
consistencies and causal relationships, regardless of the values or interests of the 
observer (Chua, 1986b; Dillard, 1991).  
A realist ontology and objectivist epistemology is fundamental to the predominate 
view that accounting is “a neutral set of techniques” (Roberts, 1991, p. 355), and 
accounting phenomena can be explained, predicted and controlled through scientific 
methodologies (Chua, 1986b). According to Cooper and Sherer (1984) and Chua 
(1986a), the scientific and technical approach to accounting uncritically accepts 
extant social institutions and practices, and assumes that the social order is 
essentially stable and controllable (Chua, 1986a). Such a mainstream approach to 
accounting is unlikely to reflect critically on the present system, let alone respond to 
the issue of radical change from a developmental, evolutionary and emancipatory 
perspective (Dillard, 1991). 
In contrast, a critical accounting approach holds a social-constructivist ontology and 
anti-positivist epistemology (Dillard, 1991). Reality is considered relativistic and 
produced and reproduced through subjective interpretation. Criteria for judging valid 
knowledge are based on social experience that is temporal and context-bound (Chua, 
1986a; Dillard, 1991). A study of historical development and change of an object is 
essential for understanding it within “the totality of relations” (Chua, 1986a, p. 622). 
Human beings are perceived as having inner potentiality, alienated from a full 
emergence through current social structures (Chua, 1986a).  
Following this ontology and epistemology, accounting can no longer be regarded as 
only scientific, but emanating from a social sphere (Dillard, 1991). It is within social, 
environmental, political and institutional frameworks that economic activities take 
place and accounting reports covering financial, narrative and pictorial disclosures 
have effects on distributions of income and wealth (Cooper & Sherer, 1984). 




technology (Dillard, 1991), which has a mutually constitutive relationship with 
social reality (Hines, 1988, 1989). 
Critical accounting researchers question and challenge the dominant view of 
accounting and its underpinning ideology (Dillard, 1991). Ideology is defined as a 
“representation of the imaginary relationship of individuals with the real conditions 
of their existence”, and it is inherent in “the taken-for-granted social practices and 
symbols that people use to interpret and organize their world” (Chua, 1986a, p. 625). 
According to Hutchinson (1989) and Brown (2009), mainstream accounting 
inscribes its value as an authoritative discourse through which power is exercised 
and imposed. It therefore has a significant influence upon social and economic 
exchange and conflict mediation as a discursive and ideological tool, legitimising 
particular interests and behaviour (Cooper & Sherer, 1984; Tinker et al., 1991). 
While accounting information provided by business entities is designed to serve 
specific interests associated with profits, shareholders and the financial class (Cooper 
& Sherer, 1984), governments in western societies regulating accounting information 
hold a “conservative political agenda” (Tinker et al., 1991, p. 29) based on liberal 
democracy which reduces politics to a merely administrative and technical project 
(Lehman, 1999; Spence et al., 2010). In the absence of “any significant 
countervailing power” to capital, there is rarely any valid political question to 
consider “what kind of economic system we will construct, but rather address what 
kind of capitalism we will live under the shadows of” (Spence et al., p. 78).  
Mainstream accounting therefore is said to promote a particular view of the 
importance of business, free markets and the State which “institutionalise[s] a biased 
version of structural conflicts” and rationalises power relations (Chua, 1986a, p. 625). 
In other words, it justifies a capitalist system and its patterns of advantage and 
disadvantage without questioning how different interests have been determined, or 
how the status quo has come about and is maintained (Cooper & Sherer, 1984). As 
such, mainstream accounting is “notably monologic” despite that it is alleged to 
serve pluralistic interests (Brown, 2009, p. 316). 
A critical accounting perspective holds the premise that the problems of accounting 




are a reflection of inherent contradictions and inequalities within the prevailing 
social system, instead of a mere temporary disruption (Dillard, 1991). The current 
social structure, therefore, needs to be critically analysed prior to a study of 
accounting technology (Cooper & Sherer, 1984; Dillard, 1991).  
This critical perspective encourages accounting researchers to adopt a “radically” 
different value position (Chua, 1986a, p. 625) to expose the social conflict and 
dissentions and their implications for wider social engagement (Brown & Dillard, 
2013; Spence et al., 2010; Tinker et al., 1991). This approach focuses on “the 
subjective, voluntary empowering action of individual members of society in 
bringing about individual, and thus social, emancipation” (Dillard, 1991, p. 14). It 
elucidates alternative understandings of the relationship between accounting and 
income, resource and power distribution within society, and suggests a different 
conceptualisation of social welfare that takes an aggregate view of society, 
emphasising the interests of other groups, such as social equity and environmental 
conservation, instead of those only from shareholders (Cooper & Sherer, 1984).  
A dialogic approach to accounting promotes the interests and concerns of 
subordinate classes and social movements (Arnold, 1990; Cooper & Sherer, 1984). 
Subsequently, a rethink of ‘recognition’ and ‘disclosure’ criteria in accounting 
regulation and practice to reconcile economic imperatives with demands for social 
equity and justice may exist (Lehman, 1999). The following sections discuss water 
related social and environmental disclosures, particularly drawing upon the notion of 
counter-accounting (Section 3.2.1); and accountability from the perspective of 
industry, governments and civil society in Western liberal democracy. 
 Water-related Social and Environmental disclosure & Counter-accounting 3.2.1
As water is critical for industrial processes, social cohesion and ecological integrity, 
water has become one of the dominant social and environmental issues around the 
world at a time of water scarcity (Chapter 2). There has been a development of 
water-related accounting practices in the last decade, and this development in both 
measurement methodologies and frameworks for non-financial disclosures is notable 
in the context of regulatory and community concerns with respect to the industrial 




In 2010, the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and the UN CEO 
Water Mandate 17  undertook a stocktake exercise to assess the current water 
accounting methods/tools used in the corporate sector, with the aim to investigate 
“commonalities and differences among emerging methods and practices” and 
identify “gaps and challenges” (Morrison et al., 2010, p.6). Four major 
methods/tools were found to be most commonly applied, they are: ‘Water 
Footprint’18, ‘Life Cycle Assessment’19, ‘World Business Council for Sustainable 
Development (WBCSD) Global Water Tool’ 20 ; and, ‘Global Environmental 
Management Initiative (GEMI) Water Sustainability Planner/Tools’.21 
While corporate water accounting has been undertaken for internal management, 
there is an increasing expectation for companies to disclose relevant data related to 
their water accounting to investors, shareholders and the general public (Morrison et 
al., 2010). For this reason, some water disclosure metrics and protocols have been 
developed by third party interests, including the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) 
and the Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP).22 
The most notable and widely applied sustainability reporting framework is the GRI 
Guidelines (Global Reporting Initiative, 2013). This 2013 version of the framework - 
G4 guidelines embraces five water-related indicators among economic, social and 
environmental criteria: the total amount of water withdrawal by source (EN8); the 
                                                 
17 The UN CEO Water Mandate requires corporate commitment for water responsibility and reporting against that commitment 
(United Nations (UN) Global Compact Office, 2015). 
18 Water Footprint is an emerging tool to assess direct and indirect water usage, discharge and pollution of any group of 
consumers (e.g. businesses, producers, regions, etc.) and to provide better understanding of their basic water use and 
relationship with watersheds. It has been developed and disseminated by Water Footprint Network (WFN), a not-for-profit 
entity which promotes water stewardship. There are three key components in the water footprint measure: blue water footprints 
- freshwater from surface or underground sources, green water footprints - rain water found in soils or evaporated water and 
gray water footprints - polluted water (Morrison et al., 2009; Water Footprint Network, 2012) 
19 Life Cycle Assessment (LCA) is defined by International Organization for Standardization (ISO) as “compilation and 
evaluation of the inputs and outputs and potential environmental impacts of a product system throughout its life-cycle” (ISO, 
1997, p.2). Regarding water accounting, LCA tool is particularly designed to measure water use and discharge through all 
components of products’ value chain (Horne et al., 2009; Morrison et al., 2010). Among a number of entities which develop 
LCA, Australia’s Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO) has played an active role especially 
in respect of water and other environmental issues (Horne, Grant & Verghese, 2009). CSIRO Minerals recently has facilitated 
the LCA implementation for Australian mining companies, helping them analyse and assess environmental impacts of different 
metal production, including water- related impacts throughout the value chain (Morrison et al., 2010). 
20 WBCSD Global Water Tool is launched in 2007 by WBCSD which is a business association promoting sustainable 
development (WBCSD, 2011). This free online software allows global companies with extended supply chains to calculate 
their water consumption and compare it with the water availability based on country and watershed. Unlike methodologies of 
Water Footprint and LCA, the most important feature of Global Water Tool is to access the water related business risks 
explicitly (Morrison et al., 2009; Morrison et al., 2010). 
21 GEMI Water Sustainability Tool and Planner are two free web-based platforms to enhance companies’ understanding of 
their water issue at both company and facility level (GEMI, 2010a, 2010b). They were released by GEMI, an organisation of 
companies worldwide striving for environmental and social sustainability. The Water Sustainability Tool assesses companies’ 
relationship to and impact on water, determines water related risks and suggests responses and actions. The water Sustainability 
Planner helps clarify a facility’s needs for water and the local watershed’s status (Morrison et al., 2010). 




water source affected significantly by water withdrawn (EN9); the percentage of 
water recycled and reused (EN10), the total amount of water discharge by 
destination and quality (EN21), and finally, the social and environmental impacts of 
water discharge (EN25).23 
The CDP developed a framework in 2010 to collect information from companies 
around the world regarding water-related policies and information (CDP Water, 
2012). An annual CDP Water Disclosure Information Request is sent to companies 
(from 2010) and requires a reply by 30th June by using an Online Response System 
(ORS). CDP’s water disclosure system uses information on companies’ water 
management and governance, assessment of risks and opportunities and associated 
water accounting.  
However, similar to critical researchers that view current Social and Environmental 
Accounting and Reporting (SEAR) practices as limited with respect to its sufficiency, 
credibility and usefulness (e. g. Gray, 2012; Jones & Solomon, 2013; Moneva, 
Archel & Correa,  2006; O'Dwyer, Unerman & Hession, 2005), water accounting 
procedures are also viewed negatively (Hazelton, 2013). In general, it is recognised 
that mainstream approaches to water accounting and reporting system are based on 
techno-scientific concepts such as neutrality, objectivity, verifiability and causality, 
and only provide a partial representation of a firm’s performance (Bebbington & 
Thomson, 2007). 
For example, Morrison and Schulte (2009) investigated a sample of 110 
multinational corporations in intensive water using industries, and found that 80% 
did not apply the GRI guidelines properly; only 55% provided information on 
materiality assessment processes; and, 53% outlined the stakeholders’ role in the 
reporting process. Egan and Frost (2010) reviewed the Australian food and beverage 
and tobacco sectors, and identify a shortage of basic disclosures of water inflows and 
outflows, despite of an increasing awareness of water issues. These disclosures in 
                                                 
23 However, Morrison et al. (2010) note that GRI guidelines do not require the disclosure of quanlitative information. In 
practice therefore, companies often report some limited and quatitative information (e.g. amount water usage, discharge, 
recycle, and efficiency of water use) without describing local water conditions. This aggregated nature of data obscures the 
contextual information related to water scarcity. Similarly, in another study (Hazelton, 2007) which examines the extent to 
which GRI indicators might improve the Australian corporate sustainable water practices, disclosure of aggregated water usage 
from BHP-Billiton is argued to be “of little comfort to a community if their primary water source is being unsustainably 
depleted” (Hazelton, 2007, p. 11). Yet to provide disaggregated data of each site for each water-extraction for BHP would be 





2013/2014 were found to decline in a more recent follow-up study (Egan et al., 
2015), which suggests that investment in corporate water management and 
disclosure practices during the late 2000s might have decreased. Hazelton (2014), in 
his study of water footprint labelling of products in the Australian context, contends 
that the concept of a water footprint fails as an indicator of environmental 
degradation, because it ignores the contextual dependence and localised impact of 
water extraction, although it contributes significantly to a public understanding of 
water scarcity.  
Moreover, a relatively sceptical view of SEAR is that it portrays only economic 
performance positively based on a specific set of institutional values or ideologies 
rather than a moral imperative (e.g. Buhr, 2001; Dey et al., 2011). This can be 
extended to reviews of water disclosures. For example, Von Schwedler (2011, p. 125) 
analyses the progress of sustainable development in the regulated UK water industry 
and remarks upon the regulatory requirement of corporate preparations of a 25-year 
strategic direction statement as aligned  with a “‘business as usual’ ideology”. 
Another study from Daniel and Sojamo (2012) points out that developing strategies 
around water management, encouraging water-risk debate participation, and using 
metrics or tools to account and disclose water risks by food and beverage companies, 
represents a proactive approach to risk management against a more stringent level of 
regulation. A similar argument is also made by Egan et al. (2015) where they found 
that corporate management in the food, beverage and tobacco sectors see value in 
disclosing internal water management information when communal interest and 
pressure emerges. In Morrison et al.’s (2010, p. 7) words, the disclosure of available 
corporate water accounting information is driven by “the desire to identify and 
reduce water-related business risks” through “building competitive advantage” (e.g. 
enhanced water use efficiency) and “ensuring long-term operational viability” (e.g. 
maintained or improved social licence to operate).  
As such, corporate water accounting and reporting practices seem to “fall somewhere 
within the status quo and reformist camps”, not that of the transformists24 (Hazelton, 
                                                 
24 Hazelton (2014, p. 12) summarises Hopwood, Mellor and O’Brien’s (2005) three categories of sustainability proponents: 
“those supporting the “status quo” who suggest that market forces with minimal government regulation are sufficient to drive 
social and environmental outcomes, such as the World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD); the 




2014, p. 12). Water related SEAR technologies, therefore, can no longer be treated as 
neutral or apolitical, but rather constitutive in terms of particular social relations. 
According to Lehman (1999, p. 222), modern SEAR has taken “a managerial and 
procedural turn”, therefore perpetuating the idea that “human[s] can control and 
manage nature”. It more often than not mutes social and environmental values and 
positions other than those of the technical, procedural and economic, and renders 
alternative voices and interpretations non-existent by exclusion and silence (Archel 
et al., 2009; Buhr, 2001).  
However, accounting studies that explicitly highlight the political struggle and social 
conflicts by bringing socio-political constituencies, other than those from the 
industry and sometimes the government are limited. In other words, the current 
literature on water related accounting practice tends to be organisational or industry-
focused without juxtaposing and engaging with the construction of social and 
environmental values and positions from other perspectives, such as those from civil 
society. As such, Spence, et al. (2010, p. 85) argue that SEAR studies should engage 
with social and environmental movements, and other grass roots actions, as “it is 
more important to engage with the construction of the ‘people’ and challenge the 
logic of the system per se”. 
This thesis echoes this call and examines how BHP, Australian Federal and South 
Australian governments and civil society perceive sustainable water governance and 
management in general and BHP’s entitlement to the GAB water in particular, by 
comparing corporate sustainability reports and statements, government regulatory 
documents and Hansards with alternative disclosures obtained from external sources. 
It explores the way in which ideology is manifest in water disclosures of the 
corporation and governments and is resisted and challenged by NGOs, 
environmental activists and Aboriginal groups. 
This thesis is also inspired by the notion of ‘counter-accounting’ (Gallhofer et al., 
2006). Counter-accounting has recently emerged in SEAR field as a stream of 
critical accounting research (e.g. Archel et al., 2009; Boyce, 2000; Gallhofer et al., 
                                                                                                                                          
fundamentally sound, such as the Club of Rome; and “transformationists” who believe that fundamental change is required, 





2006; O'Sullivan & O'Dwyer, 2009). It perceives accounting information as a 
rhetorical means to manipulate social perceptions and improve corporate image 
strategically (Archel et al., 2009; Mäkelä & Näsi, 2010). Counter-accounting 
embraces  
information and reporting systems employed by [different stakeholder] groups 
…with a view to promoting their causes or countering or challenging the 
prevailing official and hegemonic position (Gallhofer et al., 2006, pp. 681-682). 
The latter is largely dominated by business concerns, sometimes aligned or 
overlapping with those of the government (Archel et al., 2009; Gallhofer et al., 2006), 
whereas the former, notably environmental NGOs and other campaigners intend to 
reveal controversies and contradictions of existing situations by representing views 
of the less powerful, usually in the form of disadvantaged social groups or ecological 
systems (Dey et al., 2011). 
Adams (2004) for example, uses the concept of accountability as a framework to 
compare social, environmental and ethical disclosures of a company, Alpha, with 
information obtained from external sources. The portrayal gap she identifies between 
these various perspectives is found to be mainly due to the lack of completeness in 
reporting, leading to the conclusion that Alpha is not a highly responsible or 
accountable company to its key stakeholder groups.  
Mäkelä and Nasi (2010) combine stakeholder theory, legitimacy theory and the 
concept of social contract. They demonstrate how a multinational corporation 
understood corporate social responsibility differently from its employees, 
governments and the community in a case of organisational downsizing, by 
contrasting corporate reports with media articles. They find that while employees 
and their representatives adopt a social stance on the downsizing issue, the corporate 
argumentation is dominated by an economic dimension. 
Similarly, Archel et al. (2009), by expanding the scope of legitimacy theory, captures 
different channels of information to examine diverse views on a lean production 
process introduced by a corporation. Two types of discourse are revealed - the 
economic discourse represented in corporate annual reports and social discourse 
from employees on welfare issues. More specifically, they find that the State 




alignment, as opposed to the concerns of the employees, such as working conditions 
and life quality. 
The initial concern of counter-accounting activities is to problematise and destabilise 
the normalised nature and taken-for-granted assumptions of business and sometimes 
the government (Dey et al., 2011). In the same vein, counter-accounts often 
encompass the development of a counter-narrative (and metaphors) (as opposed to 
quantified indicators) to facilitate other voices (Boyce, 2000; Dey et al., 2011; 
Everett, 2004). This recognition and acknowledgement of alternative perspectives 
forms the initial step in the transformative potential of critical accounting and ethos 
the call for a dialogic approach to accounting which facilitates democratic interaction 
and participation (Brown, 2009; Gray, 1992).  
This thesis explores the procedural, techno-scientific and economic rationality of the 
corporation and governments through juxtaposing and contrasting them with social 
and environmental concerns from the civil society manifest through various 
disclosure documents. It exposes the fundamental contradictions and exploitative 
dimensions of capitalist systems to promote a democratic dialogue (Brown, 2009; 
Brown & Fraser, 2006). This thesis consequently allows different styles of 
accountability from corporations, governments and civil society to be articulated and 
reflected upon (Buhr, 2001; Rodrigue, 2014). 
 Accountability  3.3
Accountability is a sociological term that “denotes the exchange of reasons for 
conduct” (Messner, 2009, p. 920). It relates closely to one principle purpose of 
financial reporting - stewardship, and the other one is decision-usefulness 
(International Accounting Standard Broad (IASB), 2001, IASB Framework para. 12; 
13; 14). In fact, in July 2005, IASB proposed not to designate ‘stewardship’ as a 
separate objective of financial reporting in their converged framework. Instead, this 
conceptual framework should acknowledges that 
financial information directed at the primary objective of providing 
information useful for investment, credit, and similar resource allocation 
decisions is useful for other purposes, including assessing management's 




This proposal means that although stewardship will still be indicated in the 
framework, it is subsumed by the main objective of financial reporting to provide 
decision-useful information. Stewardship/accountability refers to the efficient 
administrative and executive plans for consuming and conserving resources, which 
include directing and controlling material and human resources of an organisation, 
and maintaining and reporting on the custodianship/stewardship decision of 
resources (Chen, 1975). 
Stewardship/accountability is derived from property rights and is based on the idea 
that managers as agents look after the assets or resources which are entrusted to them 
by the owners (IASB 2001, IASB Framework para.14). The concept of 
stewardship/accountability has evolved through historical development from 
traditional custodial relationship to the modern concept of managerial performance 
(O'Connell, 2007; Pannell, 1979). According to Chen (1975), the managerial 
stewardship concept covers not only the accountability to immediate owners-
shareholders’ interest, but also social accountability. In other words, it requires 
managerial accountability to not only embrace the “resolution of agency problems 
between management and owners” (Shearer, 2002, p. 562), but also extend to the 
accountability of environmental assets.  
Following this logic, it can be argued that financial accounting reports are reports of 
and reported by management on its stewardship/accountability (Chen, 1975; 
O'Connell, 2007). 
[I]t is management’s point of view that the accountant should adopt in order to 
define the objectives of financial reporting, to analyse transactions, and to 
provide financial statements pertinent to the evaluation of management’s 
performance as a steward  (Chen, 1975, p. 542). 
However, according to Sinclair (1995, p. 219), accountability is an “elusive” concept, 
and its meaning is nuanced dependent upon its context. An increasing body of 
accounting literature has demonstrated the different forms and multi-dimensions of 
accountability, such as Sinclair’s (1995) political, public, managerial, professional 
and personal accountability, Roberts’ (1991, 2003) hierarchical and socialising 
accountability, Benston’s (1982) corporate accountability, Shearer’s (2002) 




form and meanings one adopts, accountability unavoidably attempts to reflect 
“symbolically upon the practical interdependence of action”, that entails “both moral 
and strategic dimensions” (Roberts, 1991, p. 356). 
While the concept of accountability can be simply referred to as “the duty to provide 
an account of the actions for which one is held responsible” (Gray, Dey, Owen, 
Evans & Zadek, 1997, p. 334), there are social values featured by different 
stakeholder groups (institutions) which define who is expected to account to whom, 
for what, and in which manner (Messner, 2009; see also Shearer, 2002). In 
Schweiker’s (1993, p. 235) words, 
giving an account is one activity in which we come to be as selves and 
particular kinds of communities through forms of discourse that shape, guide 
and judge life regarding concern for the common good, human solidarity and 
basic respect. 
The competing views of stewardship/accountability therefore hinges on an 
understanding or disclosure of that which a company is said to control and manage. 
For the purpose of this thesis, managerial accountability, administrative 
accountability and moral accountability resonate with ‘ideal’ forms of accountability 
which BHP OD, the Federal and South Australian governments, and civil society 
have towards the GAB water resource respectively. It is the fundamental concepts of 
rights and obligations drawn from these different forms of accountability that the 
different institutions identify for its actions and undertakings as an account for 
legitimacy (Shearer, 2002).  
 Managerial accountability  3.3.1
Managerial accountability25 is normally assumed by private entities (Messner, 2009; 
Shearer, 2002). This accountability portrays human identities as merely economic 
subjects guided by self-interests, and restricts social relationships to economic terms 
(Messner, 2009; Roberts, 1991). In other words, when providing interpretations and 
justifications for its actions, a business entity will draw on the accepted motivations 
and rationales of economic subjects such as individualism, utilitarianism and an 
instrumental value of good (Arrington & Francis, 1993; Messner, 2009; Shearer, 
2002).  
                                                 




What underpins these assumptions is a strong liberal belief based in neoclassical 
economics that an individual should be free to pursue his or her vision of the good 
(Shearer, 2002). ‘Value’ of the good is not inherent in the good itself, but rather 
within that good’s relationship to the satisfaction of human needs and desires. 
Natural resources are treated, therefore, as economic goods objectified for efficiency 
and profit maximisation (Shearer, 2002), and are normally controlled and managed 
by modern science and technology through calculation, quantification and prediction 
(Gray, 1992; Power, 2007). 
Similarly, managerial accountability does not take into account the existence of 
social and environmental costs (Freedman & Stagliano, 1990; Lehman, 1996). There 
are two reasons for this. First, managerial accountability presupposes that the 
common good is the outcome of a free exchange which can be achieved by the 
pursuit of private interests.26 It does not acknowledge that shareholder interests do 
not necessarily serve the collective or common good of the wider community 
(Shearer, 2002). Therefore, the issue of managerial accountability is dependent upon 
“the extent or resolution of agency problems between management and owners”, not  
the possibility that society holds corporate owners accountable to a 
[common/public] good [such as social and environmental costs] that is not 
congruous with these owners’ private interests (Shearer, 2002, p. 562). 
Second, managerial accountability is based on the dominant neo-classical economic 
supposition that social and environmental costs and benefits are immaterial, thought 
to be unquantifiable, therefore unmeasurable, in the domain of a free market 
(Freedman & Stagliano, 1990). When natural resources such as water become scarce, 
the best way to protect them is to assign a monetary value to ensure that the market 
allocates water according to its best use. It is important to note that advocates of 
managerial accountability characterise the market as a ‘fair’ distributive mechanism, 
which is considered to “reward the ‘productive’ fairly with pecuniary compensation 
and to punish the ‘non-productive’ justly with failure” (Young, 1996, p. 49). Direct 
intervention, such as government regulation, therefore, is perceived as inappropriate 
unless it is aligned with principles of the free market (Young, 1996). Managerial 
                                                 
26 This point is evident in Benston’s (1982) essay on accounting and corporate accountability towards shareholders. ‘Corporate 
accountability’, from Benston’s perspective means ‘managerial accountability’, and it is a meaningful issue because managers 




accountability favours economic instruments such as water licences/rights/permits to 
protect the environment (Jones, 2010). 
 Administrative accountability  3.3.2
Administrative accountability 27  derives from Westminster traditions of the 
responsibility of public servants (Funnell & Cooper, 1998). These public servants 
exercise authority on behalf of elected representatives, who hold direct 
accountability to the public (Burritt & Welch, 1997; Sinclair, 1995). In modern 
liberal democracies, a Westminster government is said to be accountable to 
parliament and the people for “governing in the best interests of all citizens 
according to accepted conventions or legally prescribed processes” (Funnell, 2003, p. 
107).  
Government policies, accordingly, have a social value base, which is influenced by 
social needs and perceptions of doing the right thing. The underlying reason is 
assumed to be a mechanism “keeping the population safe from threats of discord, 
violence or, more broadly, freedom from fear” (Ball & Grubnic, 2007, p. 247). 
Government policies are considered to reflect the collective by focusing on a group 
of citizens instead of individual consumers’ choices (Burritt & Welch, 1997; Parker 
& Gould, 1999).  
It is notable that the necessity of government regulation is embedded in the notion of 
a common/public good. Common/public goods, from the perspective of the 
government, are common properties which are perceived as necessary for the 
enhancement of both the economic and social well-being of a nation (Barton, 2006; 
Pallot, 1992). With respect to the common/public goods as natural resources, the 
government objective is to preserve them in good condition so as to provide social 
and environmental benefits to the public in perpetuity (Barton, 1999). Under 
circumstances where a private entity uses a public resource to produce private goods, 
governments normally restrict its commercial activities by realigning the private, 
social and environmental costs through regulation or by levying ‘green taxes’ to 
remedy  the problem of externalities (Barton, 1999). 
                                                 




Government policy decisions are usually referred to as a “fair resource distribution” 
(Ball & Grubnic, 2007, p. 252) around “which public goods are to be provided, in 
what quantities and to whom, and their method of funding” (Barton, 1999, p. 25). 
Although governments are considered to have multiple roles i.e. to make the private 
sector accountable for its commercial performance, as well as the responsibility for 
social justice and environmental protection against the backdrop of sustainable 
development (Burritt & Welch, 1997), Western liberal democratic societies over the 
last three decades have largely concerned themselves with increasing economic 
growth, achieved through “passing more power to the market, coupled with steadily 
decreasing levels of political engagement from the demos” (Spence et al., 2010, p. 
78). According to Tinker, et al. (1991, p. 29), modern liberal democracy is founded 
on pluralist political assumptions. These assumptions include  
a belief that no undue concentrations of power exist that confer systemic 
advantages to some groups; that, notwithstanding their differences, social 
protagonists share a common interest in sustaining the whole system; and that 
the state pursues a neutral, mediating role in conflict resolution (Tinker et al., 
1991, p. 29). 
In other words, the government is considered as providing “a neutral marketplace” 
where aggregate social preferences are expressed in the political process (Arnold, 
1990, p. 179), and the democratic electoral and legal system and the market can 
function in “a desirable manner” (Tinker et al., 1991, p. 29). Regulation, as such, is 
deemed as a response to public demand and therefore upholds the public interest 
(Arnold, 1990). Government policies involved in modelling, standard-setting, 
monitoring, reporting and enforcement mechanisms are said to align with the 
prevailing business model (Burritt & Welch, 1997). 
From a civil society perspective, managerial accountability has an overriding 
concern with the individual and profits that serve to negate the very obligation to 
broader social and environmental distributive justice (Schweiker, 1993; Shearer, 
2002). Administrative accountability, albeit allegedly taking a social value base, is 
vested in agreed procedures and rules supported by government regulatory coercion 
(Puxty, Willmott, Cooper & Lowe, 1987), which is concerned with political 
pragmatism and acceptance rather than social and environmental equity and justice 




solution mechanism (Lehman, 1996), unlikely to rectify social ills fundamentally 
from “waste, exploitation, extravagance, disadvantage or coercion” (Tinker et al., 
1991, p. 29). According to Buhr (2001), Lehman (1995) and Tinker, et al. (1991), 
managerial accountability and administrative accountability are the forms most 
commonly seen in current western liberal societies, and subscribes to ‘business-as-
usual’ and ‘middle of the road’ cases for sustainability . 
As a steward, management’s performance should be evaluated in terms of both 
profit and the accomplishment of social objectives. The latter aspect has long 
been neglected by the accounting profession (Chen, 1975, p. 542). 
As Andrew (2007) asserts, managerial and administrative approaches to 
accountability focus mainly on the scientific, technical and procedural dimensions of 
accountability rather than ethical and moral dimensions. For example, the 
internalisation of externalities through regulation that requires modelling, standard-
setting, efficiency-oriented performance measures and green taxes that are numerical 
in general, and monetary in particular, reinforces scientific and analytical solutions 
(Gray, 1992). In the meantime, it neglects the full social and environmental costs that 
are beyond monetary value (Beder, 1997; Dumay, Guthrie & Farneti, 2010).  
This ostensible objectivity with both “positive and negative sanctions” surrounding 
managerial and administrative accountability make it “the image of events that 
counts” (Roberts, 1991, p. 363) and often entails “unintended and unacknowledged 
moral, social and environmental consequences that spill out from the pursuit of 
strategic objectives” (Roberts, 1991, p. 367). According to Lehman (1999, p. 518), 
managerial and administrative accountability form a “strict liberal accountability” 
framework perpetuating the status-quo by simply providing information so as to 
allow efficient utilisation of scarce resources without critically analysing what a 
corporation is doing to the environment and society.  
Therefore, managerial accountability at large and administrative accountability to 
some extent reflects “a sense of self as solitary and singular with no necessary 
connection to others” (Roberts, 1991, p. 358). That is, managerial accountability and 
administrative accountability can be considered as “a self-referential exercise” 
(Shearer, 2002, p. 559) which justify one’s actions for one’s own sake (Messner, 




to be diminished if not silenced (Shearer, 2002). In Adam’s (Adams, 2004, p. 732) 
words, the alignment of these two forms of accountability brings into focus 
“sustainability of the business [and government] rather than [social and] 
environmental sustainability”. This separation of strategic and moral dimensions of 
accountability is detrimental of both strategic and ethical concerns (Roberts, 1991). 
This combination of managerial and administrative accountability is reflected in the 
cultural risk model adopted in this thesis as both market and government institutions 
form a strong centre. 
 Moral accountability  3.3.3
To challenge the problematic capitalistic and governmental structures and mitigate 
environmental damage and social inequity, a wider concept of accountability is 
suggested by civil society. This form of accountability can be termed ‘moral 
accountability’28 which is a fundamental and more encompassing and democratic 
form of accountability to cover the ethical requirement of accountability to the other 
(Messner, 2009; Shearer, 2002). According to Shearer (2002, p. 559), to be 
accountable to the other is to acknowledge “a non-instrumental relationship”, which 
is a relationship of obligation to or responsibility for the other that cannot be 
discharged by reference merely to one’s own interest. As Roberts (1991, p. 358) 
contends, moral accountability can enact “a sense of self which, whilst individually 
confirming, simultaneously acknowledges and expresses the interdependence of self 
and other”. 
Moral accountability embraces ethical concerns regarding “the moral status of 
economic collectivities, including the scope of the moral community and the good 
that this community seeks” (Shearer, 2002, p. 541). It is the moral community within 
which private entities and governments are situated that defines “whose needs count 
and whose goods are sought” (Shearer, 2002, p. 546). Moral accountability, therefore, 
considers an identity answerable to wider social interests and  encompasses a wider 
scope of common/public good, apart from the private good (Schweiker, 1993).  
What we account for (actions, outcomes, intentions, relations) and our 
substantive notions of what is good are bound up with these relations to 
others and ourselves. As we will see, the social nature of giving an account… 
                                                 




is the roots for developing claims about distributive and social justice 
(Schweiker, 1993, p. 224). 
Moral accountability consequently cultivates openness and dialogue rather than 
scientific, technical and economic reasoning (Messner, 2009). The development of 
moral accountability can be regarded as a liberating social process with “a means to 
define and re-define community, to create closer social relationship and bring power 
back to “the People”” (Buhr, 2001, p.409). In this practice, others are encountered 
more directly and relationships between self and others developed more fully than 
merely fundamental utility that is demanded or officially required (Roberts, 1991). 
This moral relation to others necessitates mutual understanding beyond the giving 
and receiving of accounts through formal categories provided by managerial and 
administrative accountability (Messner, 2009). It requires face-to-face 
communications to facilitate openness and mutual understanding in the absence of 
hierarchical power dynamics and especially seeks to make the voice of the most 
vulnerable heard (Messner, 2009; Roberts, 1991).  
Moral accountability, therefore, involves democratic participation to make 
corporations not only comply with legal relationships, but also undertake “a process 
of negotiation, explanation and articulation” which seeks to create “a sense of 
belonging and understanding in the community” (Lehman, 1999, p. 232). In this case, 
moral accountability requires negotiation and explanation concerning whether a local 
community wants mining development, and whether they are given a fair hearing. 
Moral accountability 
offer[s] the possibility of a more complete recognition of self, the 
engagement of personal understanding and the challenging of others’ views 
and expectations. Out of such relationships is built mutual understanding and 
ties of friendship, loyalty and reciprocal obligation; a sense both of individual 
difference and mutual dependence. Self is confirmed but in a way that 
simultaneously acknowledges and articulates the interdependence of self and 
other (Roberts, 1991, p. 363). 
To promote democratic dialogue and discharge moral accountability, critical 
accounting (counter narrative) can act as an enabling tool that facilitates decisions of 
the community in a fairer and more equitable manner (Schweiker, 1993). Critical  




committed to exposing and explaining corporate effects on ‘the world’ and to reflect 
on what is ‘significant’ for communities” (Schweiker, 1993, p. 220).  
The utility of such accounting is not in its representation of “infallible truth'” but in 
its creation of a range of environmental and social visibilities and exposure of values 
and priorities that become inputs to wider democratic processes of discourse and 
decision making (Boyce, 2000, p. 53).The case of BHP OD’s water intake plan and 
the associated controversies of ODEP provide an opportunity to explore different 
forms of accountability. By comparing corporate sustainability reports and 
statements, government documents with alternative disclosures obtained from public 
submissions and other external sources, this study opens the door for a development 
of constructive participatory democracy, along with critical (counter) accounting’s 
emancipatory potential.  
 Summary 3.4
This chapter explored critical accounting studies generally and water related social 
and environmental disclosure specifically. This thesis is predicated on the 
assumption that mainstream accounting and reporting practices promote a capitalist 
ideology and economic interests while silencing social and environmental values.  
Since this thesis examines the GAB water debate arising from BHP OD’s Olympic 
Dam mining operations, the study will analyse the way in which ideology is 
inscribed in the water disclosures of corporations and governments and resisted and 
challenged by NGOs, environmental activists and Aboriginal groups. The study is 
located within critical accounting studies with a concern of a broader appeal of how 
water matters to a range of stakeholders. It exposes the fundamental contradictions 
and exploitative dimensions of capitalist system, and promotes democratic dialogue 
within society (Bebbington et al., 2007; Brown, 2009; Brown & Fraser, 2006; 
Dillard & Brown, 2012). Three types of accountability were also introduced in this 
chapter to facilitate an understanding of the rationality differences between BHP OD, 
governments and civil society. These different accountabilities map directly to a 





The following chapter examines a cultural perspective of risk as the methodology 
that this thesis adopts to investigate different institutional positions towards the GAB 






CHAPTER 4 METHODOLOGY 
  Introduction  4.1
Chapter 3 reviewed the critical accounting studies in general and water accounting 
studies in particular and included a discussion of three styles of accountability that 
underpins the rationality and value differences among BHP Billiton Olympic Dam 
Corporation Pty Ltd (BHP OD), governments and civil society in relation to the 
Great Artesian Basin (GAB) water debate. This chapter presents a cultural 
perspective of risk as an appropriate methodology to examine different institutional 
stances towards the GAB water related economic, social and environmental risks 
manifest in contested water disclosures. This methodology is anchored in a 
transdisciplinary approach that emphasises socio-cultural expectations and value 
debates (Horlick-Jones & Sime, 2004; Sampford, 2009). 
Risk, from a cultural perspective, is nuanced and water, as a scarce and valuable 
resource, is valued differently across a range of institutions according to different 
cultural patterns and belief systems (Lupton, 1999). By adopting a culturally inspired 
construction of risk, this thesis investigates the socially constructed nature of the 
GAB water risk debate and how it is linked to different assumptions underlying 
various institutional disclosures and the related issue of accountability. 
There has long been a struggle between positivism and social constructivism in the 
field of risk research. The term ‘risk’ came to light during the transitional period 
between late Middle Ages and early modernity (Lupton, 1999). Throughout the 
centuries, the meaning of risk has changed in its proliferate application to diverse 
situations (Luhmann, 1993). In pre-modern times, humans were preoccupied by the 
mysterious power of fate; and risk awareness often arose from uncertainties about 
the future. Natural disasters such as earthquakes, floods, storms, famines or 
epidemics were perceived as risk, since they created disorder outside the control of 
mankind (Luhmann, 1993; Lupton, 1999). The notion of risk was expanded by the 
nineteenth century. Instead of being located exclusively in nature, risk was also 
acknowledged in human conduct. Unexpected outcomes may come as a result of 
human action and has resulted in the modern way of looking at the world and its 




In a modernist view, risk is distinct from uncertainty, in that, the likelihood of an 
unanticipated event happening is estimable therefore manageable (Lupton, 1999; 
Renn, 1992). Uncertainty, conversely, presupposes a form of “indeterminacy” that is 
not subject to any probability evaluation (Reddy, 1996, p. 227). This “managerial 
distinction” (Power, 2007, p. 5) is derived from the development of scientific 
knowledge and rational thinking which is deemed as the key to human civilization 
and progress. It assumes that the social order and laws of nature may be measured, 
calculated and predicted (Lupton, 1999). As such, once uncertainty transforms into a 
form of risk through organising, it is subjected to rationalised counting, ordering and 
therefore, becomes manageable (Moerman & van der Laan, 2012; Power, 2007). 
Risk can also be used as a “neutral” idea incorporating both ‘good’ and ‘bad’. It 
represents the possibility for the occurrence of certain incidents associated with 
either losses or gains or both (Douglas, 1992, p. 23). 
Accounting systems have long played a pre-eminent role in the risk assessment and 
management of modern economic entities (Bebbington & Thomson, 2007; Miller, 
Kurunmäki & O’Leary, 2008; Moerman & van der Laan, 2012; Power, 2007). Being 
understood conventionally as “the process of identifying, measuring and 
communicating economic information to permit informed judgments and decisions 
by the user of that information” (American Accounting Association, 1966, p. 1), 
accounting practice is used to present an objective, true and fair view of the entities 
performance, including risk related calculations and cost-benefit analyses 
(Bebbington & Thomson, 2007; Young, 2001). Shifts in the meaning of risk 
connotes that the identification and conceptualization of risk is not static and one-
dimensional, but is dependent on both historical and social-cultural contexts (Lupton, 
1999). Particularly, it is dependent on the methodological framing of both the 
questions about risk and the subsequent means to find ‘solutions’. 
This chapter outlines the methodological issues in risk research with its application 
in accounting studies. An overview of a realist/positivist perspective of risk (Section 
4.2) is provided before a discussion of a social constructivist perspective of risk 
(Section 4.3). Throughout this discussion, the application of these diverse risk 
methodologies in accounting studies are reviewed with a focus on cultural risk in 




 Realist/Positivist perspective of risk 4.2
Risk criteria are framed and defined to enable the prioritisation of actions within 
social systems. According to Renn (1992, p. 54), core questions collateral to a risk 
debate include questions such as; 
[w]hat criteria are appropriate for dealing with risk? How safe is safe enough? 
Should society adapt a set of uniform criteria for all types of risk regardless of 
context? Who should be involved in designing these criteria? Who should be held 
accountable if the criteria prove inadequate? 
The responses to these questions vary according to different perspectives in society 
(Bradbury, 1989). If risk is viewed as pre-existing in nature and as an objective 
attribute of an activity or event, risk is identified and ordered through scientific 
measures and calculations of probability and magnitude of harm (Lupton, 1999; 
Renn, 1992) and result in the technical, economic and psychological perspectives of 
risk outlined below.  
 A technical perspective of risk 4.2.1
Technical approaches to risk stem from fields such as statistics, engineering and 
epidemiology and combine the notion of physical danger and hazard with a 
measurement instrument (Lupton, 1999; Renn, 1992). Risk here is defined as a 
“product of the probability and consequences (magnitude and severity) of an adverse 
event” (Bradbury, 1989, p. 382). Using models or observed relative frequencies, a 
technical approach anticipates the likelihood and the average of past risk events over 
time and space to estimate the magnitude of a negative effect. This focus on 
combining risk assessment and risk management underlies the prevalent risk analysis 
paradigm (Kasperson, 1992; Lupton, 1999; Renn, 1992). 
Accounting has been considered important to the development of risk analysis 
(Power, 2007). Through capturing, quantifying and communicating financial risk, 
traditional accounting systems help to “tam[e] incalculable uncertainties as 
calculable risks” (Power, 2007, p. 13) in the processes of corporate management and 
governance (Bebbington & Thomson, 2007). Social and environmental accounting 
and reporting practices are perceived to carry the same role in organisations with the 
extension of corporate accountability into social and environmental dimensions of 




However, a formal risk analysis, accompanied by an ill-masked system of expert 
knowledge, produces flawed and biased risk management practices, (Dietz, Frey & 
Rosa, 2002; Lupton, 1999; Reddy, 1996). Experts, while seeking the artefactual 
status of objective knowledge, tend to ignore underpinning value positions or 
assumptions (Lupton, 1999; Wynne, 1989). This is also the case for accountants. 
According to Bebbington and Thomson (2007, p. 41), the fact that accountancy 
professionals “promote themselves as experts in evidence-based governance and 
decision-making” is based on “an implicit assumption” that the objective, verifiable 
and rationality-based decision making process is most appropriate to manage risks. 
And this belief is pervasive in their official reports and statements. 
Yet accounting’s role as an ideological weapon that goes beyond a merely technical 
practice is increasingly recognized and well-documented by a large number of 
alternative accounting researchers (e.g. Chua, 1986a; Dillard, 1991; Hopwood, 1987; 
Miller, 1994; Power, 1994). Accounting, “as social and institutional practice” (Miller, 
1994, p. 1) implicates the context within which it operates as a “intervening ... device 
for acting upon activities, individuals and objects in such a way that the world may 
be transformed” (Miller, 1994, p. 2). It confers “a particular form of visibility” 
through calculating and recording certain processes or events in order to “alter the 
way in which it can be thought about and acted upon” (Miller, 1994, p. 1). By doing 
this, accounting may “tend to give undue prominence to values that can be calculated, 
not necessarily to the most significant” (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982, p. 70; see also 
Reddy, 1996). Additionally, this bias is not only restricted to the “numerical 
computations” of costs, profits, losses and returns since accounting also involves 
“complex language and meanings” (Miller, 1994, p. 3). Young (2001, p. 607) for 
example, analyses the risk-related language from the Financial Accounting Standards 
Board (FASB), and highlights the way in which “metaphors have contributed to the 
thinkability of risk management”. In this article, risk is depicted metaphorically as 
“exposure, disease, burden and adversary” (Young, 2001, p. 620) which is consistent 
with the idea of an “opponent” that “must and should be confronted and managed” 
(Young, 2001, p. 607). 
Since technical risk analysis does not represent an objective, neutral, absolute and 




objectify the localised nature of risk measurement and calculation. In so doing  they 
separate the socially and culturally shaped components of knowledge and reduce 
them to certain subjective values (Bebbington & Thomson, 2007; Lupton, 1999; 
Miller, 1994). This fact/value dichotomy (Bradbury, 1989; Rayner, 1992) is 
apparently convenient and attractive for science exponents to seek simple solutions 
to complex situations (e.g. Cohen, 1985). From this perspective, laypeople or public 
sources of knowledge are seen as ‘inappropriate’ or ‘incorrect’, in comparison to the 
‘superior’ and ‘sophisticated’ knowledge of experts (Lupton, 1999). 
 An economic perspective of risk 4.2.2
The realist perspective of risk is also reflected in the economic notion of costs and 
benefits associated with expected utility losses arising from an activity or event 
(Dietz et al., 2002; Reddy, 1996; Renn, 1992; Short, 1984). Here, the criterion to 
predetermine undesirable effects used in the technical perspective is substituted by 
the subjective satisfaction to “make benefits and risk commensurable” (Renn, 1992, 
p. 63). 
According to Miller (1992), accounting is identified as a commensuration practice 
that makes “activities and processes whose physical characteristics and geographical 
location may bear no resemblance” comparable by according them “the single figure” 
(Miller, 1992, pp. 68-69). The problem of incommensurability occurs because the 
emphasis is to “assign monetary values to all costs and benefits” (Dietz et al., 2002, 
p. 333). This approach is less problematic if the value is assigned to certain benefits, 
say, productivity. However, it is a serious issue when assigning costs arising from 
health, ecological and social risks (Dietz et al., 2002; Krimsky & Golding, 1991; 
Reddy, 1996). In a study investigating the implementation of private sector 
accounting in public prison entities, Mennicken (2011) argues that accounting and 
risk management, while promoting an individual prison’s financial performance, 
shifts the focus from “the individual prisoner... [and] the Prison Service as a whole” 
to “individual prison establishments.” It consequently results in “a systemic 
decentring of Prison Service accountability” (Mennicken, 2011, p. 18). 
Another critique of the economic model of cost-benefit-analysis is centred on the 




actor paradigm (Adams, 1995; Dietz et al., 2002; Renn, 1992). It has a considerable 
implications for accounting, especially since accounting texts are usually coupled 
with the image that purposive individuals search for accurate and complete 
information so as to make ‘rational’ decisions including acting rationally on risk 
decisions (Miller & O'Leary, 1990). Nonetheless, economic rationality is 
questionable in the face of uncertain conditions (Power, 2007). Indeed, as Miller 
(1994, p. 18) indicates, organizations and individuals “might not conform to the 
idealized and naive models of rational behaviour” and are more likely to be 
“constrained” and “uncertain” about preferences, especially under uncertainty. 
Therefore, as a “logical consequence” of a ‘rational’ cost and benefit analysis, 
uncertainty that “cannot be valued in an acceptable fashion” is “ignored and 
therefore does not form part of this analysis” (Bebbington & Thomson, 2007, p. 44). 
4.2.1 A psychological perspective of risk 
The rationality of a techno-economic risk analysis has also been explicitly 
challenged in studies regarding perceptions of risk perceptions (Kasperson, 1992; 
Lupton, 1999; Power, 2007). Combining risk perceptions with behavioural decision 
theory, a psychological perspective of risk has shed light on the controversial and 
conflicting phenomena of risk management in society. It provides insights to identify 
the differences and similarities among a group’s responses to risk events and found a 
systematic and predictable linkage between perceived and acceptable risk (Sovic, 
1992). For example, an experts’ judgement of risk is highly correlated with technical 
estimations while judgements from laypeople bear other contextual features (Renn, 
1992). 
The psychological approach to risk analysis expands the subjective notion of risk 
judgment in three ways (Sovic, 1992). First, it attempts to explain the divergence of 
public perception from expert assessment by focusing on the individual preference 
for probabilities and magnitude of risk (Renn, 1992). Second, it analyses individuals’ 
intuitive processing under uncertainty (Krimsky, 1992; Renn, 1992) and has 
uncovered judgmental biases in individual capability to estimate probability. These 
biases, referred to as ‘heuristics’, are certain discernible rules applied to simplify 
complex problems (e.g. complicated risk information) when facing potential 




risk attributes as contextual variables that influence an individuals’ risk perception 
(Krimsky, 1992). These attributes include: acceptability (Lupton, 1999), voluntary, 
involuntary (Krimsky, 1992), familiarity, equity, controllability, catastrophic 
potential (Sovic, 1992) and expected fatalities or losses (Renn, 1992). 
The psychology of risk reveals that public ideas about safety and risks are 
complicated “social constructions subject to processes of framing” (Power, 2007, p. 
15) and therefore cannot be reduced to techno-economic risk assessment in the form 
of consequences and probabilities, or cost-benefit analyses (Renn, 1992). However, 
it is still an “ahistorical and non-contextual” approach despite the “strong intuitive 
and phenomenological grounding” (Krimsky, 1992, p. 18). According to Lupton 
(1999), psychological risk analyses are established in rational behaviour theory to 
resemble an economic notion of risk. It is assumed that, through the design of a 
survey instrument, subjective factors influencing personal perception and their 
relationships can be quantified, modelled and tested in order to predict individual 
and societal responses to potential hazards (Sovic, 1992). In this approach, the nature 
of risk itself is taken-for-granted and the research emphasises “[p]eople’s responses 
to the objects, not the objects themselves” (Hilgartner, 1992, p. 41).  
These limitations of a psychological risk perspective highlight the need for a socio-
cultural inquiry (Dietz et al., 2002). For example, Douglas and Wildavsky (1982) 
argue that individuals’ risk attitudes and beliefs are ascribed to a broader cultural 
frame. Therefore, a cultural perspective of risk is deemed as more appropriate to 
explain how risk is selected, framed and presented by organizational dynamics 
(Dietz et al., 2002; Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982; Power, 2007). This perspective also 
underpins the theoretical framework for this study. Before discussing a cultural 
perspective of risk, the general social constructivist view of risk is presented, with 
examples of two other constructivist branches, namely a sociological perspective and 
a governmentality perspective of risk. 
 Social construction of risk  4.3
Those who adopt a social constructivist viewpoint deem risk to be a sociocultural 
construct that cannot ever be fully objective as it is bound with historical, social, 




believe that the social, material world and humans are in a dialectical relationship in 
which one creates the other. Social reality, although appearing to be objective and 
pre-existing, involves actors’ subjective interpretations and the production and 
reproduction of definition and knowledge via socialization, social interaction and a 
reliance upon shared meaning (Chua, 1986a; Lupton, 1999). Meanings are 
“emergent”, “subjectively created” and only “objectified through human interaction” 
(Chua, 1986a, p. 615). Scientific knowledge, like any other knowledge, is not 
constituted outside belief-systems or moral stances, but rather it is value-laden 
(Lupton, 1999). Risk therefore is not an objective or static phenomenon, but is 
continually “constructed and negotiated as part of the network of social interaction... 
[and] its meanings are precarious and subject to change” (Lupton, 1999, p. 29). 
For research into risk as phenomena, social constructionists focus on how it is 
identified, labelled and dealt with through sociocultural patterns and changing 
patterns of risk perception both spatially and temporally (Lupton, 1999). 
Accordingly, the notion of risk exists as a worldview that informs “assemblages of 
meanings, logics and beliefs cohering around material phenomena, giving these 
phenomena form and substance” (Lupton, 1999, p. 30). The corresponding risk 
management activities are planned to reflect life style preference and social value 
(Renn, 1992). 
There are many perspectives within this sociocultural dimension, yet they can be 
loosely grouped into three categories: a sociological perspective, a governmentality 
perspective, and a cultural perspective (Lupton, 1999). The following sections 
briefly introduce each perspective with its implications for accounting.  
 A sociological perspective of risk 4.3.1
All sociological concepts of risk share the common notion that human beings never 
look at the world with “pristine eyes” (Renn, 1992, p. 67). Risk events, as such, are 
understood and negotiated through human values and interests (Kasperson, 1992; 
Lupton, 1999). Probabilities and consequences of hazards are socially defined, 
constructed, and to a considerable degree, subject to human interventions, social 
processes and technological developments (Kasperson, 1992; Renn, 1992). Thus 




risk control and management is essentially founded in social institutions and 
interactions (Kasperson, 1992; Renn, 1992). 
The German sociologist Ulrich Beck has been predominant in sociological studies of 
risk. His work, for example Risk Society Towards a New Modernity (Beck, 1992b), 
Reflexive Modernization (1994), The Normal Chaos of Love (1995), and Ecological 
Politics in the Age of Risk (1995) are predominantly concerned with the macro-level 
process of contemporary risk meaning and strategy and its relationship to what he 
perceives as the unique features of the current post-industrial society29  (Lupton, 
1999). 
Beck (1992a, 1992b, 1994, 1995) asserts that the transformation of Western societies 
from the pre-modern/industrial to the post-modern/industrial era has had a significant 
impact on the concept of risk due to the process of industrialisation. Conventional 
industrial society is perceived as a ‘Risk Society’, whereby mass production and 
consumption are accompanied by risks which have flourished as a result of 
modernisation (Lupton, 1999). As such, the fundamental difference identified by 
Beck between industrial/modern society and contemporary post-industrial/modern 
society is that, whereas the former is concerned with distributing ‘goods’, the latter is 
concerned with distributing ‘bads’. Previously, these might have been considered as 
“latent and controllable ‘side effects’” (Reddy, 1996, p. 245), however, now are 
hazards which are deemed as “intrinsic, irreversible and uncontrollable” (Reddy, 
1996, p. 245). These risks, principally environmental, such as air and water pollution 
and nuclear radiation, differ markedly from those in previous epochs or other 
societies, in that they have confronted human health and life “on a unprecedented 
scale” with long-term effects (Lupton, 1999, p. 62). In addition, these risks are  
neither visible nor perceptible to the victims... [and] require the sensory organs of 
science, theories, experiments, measuring instruments in order to become visible 
or interpretable as hazards at all (Beck, 1992b, p. 27). 
From the aforementioned, science is understood by Beck as a key player in “the 
creation and multiplication of these risks” (Bebbington & Thomson, 2007, p. 47). 
This has a significant implication for accounting. Although one of the primary goals 
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of accounting is to enable complex, contingent and intangible risks to emerge and 
become amendable through management processes, it is argued that accountancy 
professions and accounting systems are incapable of illuminating risks from 
industrialisation, let alone managing them (Bebbington & Thomson, 2007; Reddy, 
1996). Indeed, mainstream accounting measurement, calculation and valuation are 
problematic and implicated in the production, proliferation and dissemination of 
these risks (Bebbington & Thomson, 2007; Reddy, 1996). For example, accounting 
can be used as a system to legitimate the effects of business-related environmental 
harms or hazards (Bebbington & Thomson, 2007). In the absence of an 
environmental cost or a social liability, accounting practice is usually taken to 
represent the “objective absence” of this externality (Bebbington & Thomson, 2007, 
p. 48). Accounting is reduced to “technical objective and apolitical means of 
quantifying the world out here” (Saravanamuthu, 2009, p. 164). 
According to Beck (1992b), in a post-industrial/modern society, anxieties arising 
from risk introduced by industrialisation or modernisation call into question 
established beliefs in scientific enterprise and current practices in authoritative 
calculation (Lupton, 1999; Reddy, 1996). Individuals no longer see modernity and 
science as a key to civilization and progress, but tend to challenge the fundamental 
assumptions of this period (Lupton, 1999). This is called ‘reflexive modernity’, 
which is characterised by “a negotiation of knowledge claims between science, 
political interests, and laypersons - in effect, negotiation between different 
epistemologies” (Dietz et al., 2002, p. 346). It highlights the need for “a more 
accessible and democratic discourse concerning human needs and divergent human 
perceptions [than the mere] calculating approaches to knowing the future” (Reddy, 
1996, p. 248). In the same vein, if accountants and accounting practices are about to 
capture environmental and social risks fully, make them visible and amenable to 
management, current social and environmental accounting technologies must 
provide a basis for stakeholder engagement to allow a new form of accountability 
(Bebbington & Thomson, 2007).  
There are a number of accounting studies conducted in this area. Georgakopoulos 
and Thomson (2005) for example, interview relevant stakeholders including 




explore their competing risk perceptions, discourses, and reasons for the absence of 
social and environmental accounting and reporting practices. They suggest that 
social and environmental accounting should reflexively engage stakeholders, for 
example, in a dialogical approach (Thomson & Bebbington, 2005) at all levels in 
order to improve democratic accountability. Saravanamuthu (2009, p. 121), on the 
other hand, constructs “a risk-based accountability mechanism” by combining 
Beck’s theory of ‘Risk Society’, Luhmann’s sociological theory of risk and Gandhi’s 
vehicle of communicative action to “facilitate reflexive communicative action” (see 
also Saravanamuthu, Lehman & Nyamori,  2012). 
To sum up, Beck’s ‘Risk Society’ is concerned with individuals’ emerging 
consciousness of shared risk arising from the industrial society where science has 
played a dominant role in “externalising and objectifying social form” (Reddy, 1996, 
p. 247). The potential of democratic engagement and discourse is to at least mitigate 
the “innumerable”, “uncircumscribable” and therefore “radically unpredictable” 
effect of risks (Reddy, 1996, p. 244). Beck’s epistemological position is labelled as 
‘weak’ social constructivism by Lupton (1999)30  because the risk phenomena in 
‘Risk Society’ are; 
based on objective facts about dangers and hazards amenable to rationalistic 
calculation, which are then mediated, perceived and responded to in particular 
ways via social, cultural and political processes (Lupton, 1999, p. 28).  
This thesis, rather than looking at accounting’s potential to objectify environmental 
and social danger and harm, focuses on the socially constructed nature of GAB water 
related risk and the role of accounting and disclosures within this construction 
process.  
 A Governmentality/Foucauldian perspective or risk 4.3.2
A governmentality perspective on risk investigates how risk is conceptualised and 
operated in postmodern society and, is especially related to discipline, surveillance 
and regulation exerted by governments upon the population (Lupton, 1999). 
Drawing on Michel Foucault’s insights on ‘Governmentality’, modernity and self-
                                                 
30 Lupton (1999, p. 26) also categorises the ‘risk society’ thesis as a critical structuralist approach. A critical structuralist 
approach, as she contends, “builds on the Marxist critical legacy to focus more on social conflict, inequities and dissent and the 
need for social change in relation to risk. Critical structuralists tend to be interested in critiquing the ways in which social 
institutions (such as government, the economic system and the legal system) wield power over individuals, reducing their 




information, ‘Governmentality’ theorists focus on risk strategies and discourses as 
the political echoes of neo-liberalism and  explore how they order the material and 
social world to render uncertainty and disorder controllable (Lupton, 1999). 31 
Therefore, ‘Governmentality’ is a strategy and rationale to social regulation and 
control in contemporary western societies is centred on neo-liberalism and political 
rule “which champion individual freedom and rights against the excessive 
intervention of the state” (Lupton, 1999, p. 86). 
Like Beck, the role of science and expert knowledge is emphasised by Foucault with 
regard to the phenomena of risk construction in post modernity (Lupton, 1999). 
However, instead of a transparent means of reflexive engagement for individuals, 
science and expert knowledge is viewed as a key to social administration to provide 
advice and guidance concerning risk governance and prevention to the government 
(Lupton, 1999).This mode of surveillance, or detecting and monitoring risks in the 
wider population, is based on the computing technology of normalization where 
statistic probabilities and correlations identify the norms of social behaviour within 
certain groups or the overall  population (Lupton, 1999). As such, risk is 
problematised, calculated (e.g. categorising marginalised individuals risk or groups) 
and governed through external regulation and intervention (Lupton, 1999). 
Apart from these directly enforced strategies, a contemporary ‘Governmentality’ 
approach also involves ‘indirect strategies’ which rely on individual autonomy 
through self-regulation (Lupton, 1999). Aligned with the neo-liberal goals and 
interests of the state, it is the most crucial aspect of ‘Governmentality’ to promote 
voluntary compliance and self-discipline of the population in order to minimize 
external intervention (Lupton, 1999). Accounting is understood as such an indirect 
means through which the conduct of individuals can be governed (Miller, 1994). 
Indeed, accounting systems and practices in a liberal democratic society are deemed 
as a mode “of governing economic life” (Miller & O'Leary, 1994, p. 111). According 
to Miller (1994, p. 29); 
                                                 
31 ‘Governmentality’/Foucauldian approach to risk adopts a poststructuralist perspective on power relations. Unlike functional 
structuralism, exponents of poststructuralism emphasize less on the rigid and static definition of structure, and more on the 
aspects such as change of meaning and flux in social structure and organization (Lupton, 1999). Individuals are seen as 
continuously shifting among different cultural and social identity, equipped with combination of power and knowledge. Power 
is not simply viewed as oppressive and coercive, but manipulated through manifold sites, as both productive and inescapable in 





[in] so far as such societies mark out the economy as a distinct sphere with its 
own laws and regularities, and make the individual a fundamental locus of 
responsibility, accounting has a central place. 
By focusing on performance evaluation, accounting techniques provide a particular 
way of “exert[ing] a positive influence” (Foucault & Hurley, 1981, p. 137) on 
individual actions to “remedy deficits on rationality and responsibility” (Miller, 1994, 
p. 29). This system of governmentality has been made possible by resorting to a 
neutral and objective “single figure” which is a final result from diverse technologies 
of calculation (Miller, 1994, p. 29). For example, standard costing and budgeting 
play a principal role in the attempt to make individual performance visible and 
calculable in terms of normative financial standards (Miller & O'Leary, 1987). The 
analysis of accounting as a governing practice is not only restricted to an 
organisational level, but extends to a national level. Knights and Vurdubakis (1993, 
p. 729), for instance, examine the “interdependencies between politics and forms of 
calculation” through the lens of life insurance. They argue that the “construction of 
risk as the object” in life insurance, along with calculative accounting techniques, are 
used as “moral and political” strategies by liberal governments to direct, coordinate 
and manage social life (Knights & Vurdubakis, 1993, p. 729). As such, accounting is 
regarded as pivotal “in creating and sustaining control of capitalistic activities... [It 
consequently] enable[s] organisation and governance frameworks to have a global 
reach” (Bebbington & Thomson, 2007, p. 45). 
In sum, ‘Governmentality’ highlights modern strategies and discourses which bring 
risk into being and link this risk concept to an idea of how people should conduct 
their life through self-control and management. This approach reflects the neo-liberal 
objectives of institutional governments (Lupton, 1999). A ‘Governmentality’ 
approach adopts a ‘strong’ version of social constructivist and relativist positions 
(Lupton, 1999). The intensification of risk discussion and management is a result of 
the social change associated with modernization (Lupton, 1999). This concept of risk 
is highly political and constitutes a particular norm of behaviour and basis for action 
by which individuals are organised and regulated (Lupton, 1999).  
For Foucauldian scholars, the physical nature of risk is not at the centre of an 




[n]othing is a risk in itself, there is no risk in reality. But on the other hand, 
anything can be a risk; it all depends on how one analyses the danger, considers 
the event.  
Although this thesis is concerned with the social construction of risk as an object, it 
does not focus on the governing process to promote voluntary compliance and self-
monitoring of individuals, organisations or industries (Lupton, 1999). Instead, this 
thesis investigates the constructed GAB water related risk phenomena from a 
cultural perspective, which is explicated in the next section. 
 A cultural perspective of risk 4.3.3
Whereas sociological and governmentality perspectives link risk perceptions, 
responses and strategies to social values and interests, a cultural analysis proposes 
that these social values are determined by different cultural patterns and principles 
(Krimsky, 1992; Lupton, 1999; Rayner, 1992; Renn, 1992). In other words, 
individuals’ risk perception and awareness cannot be made intelligible without 
reference to “cultural and political domains”, which are “potentially fraught with 
conflict between points of view” (Reddy, 1996, p. 239). This cultural divergence in 
risk consciousness has resulted in an emphasis on different risks (Krimsky & 
Golding, 1991) which either reinforce social cohesion or support a particular life-
style (Kasperson, 1992; Rayner, 1992; Thompson, Ellis & Wildavsky, 1990).  
It is important to note that a cultural perspective, unlike a psychological analysis, 
assumes a (proactive) organisation or institution, rather than an individual, since 
individuals “affiliate with organizations that resonate with their values” (Dietz et al., 
2002, p. 346). Risk is inherently a social construction and a cultural choice according 
to imperatives of an organisation (Reddy, 1996). Therefore, a cultural risk 
perspective combines elements of various methodologies, from both positive and 
normative risk disciplines, in a single approach. 
From a cultural approach, risk awareness and tolerance can never be elucidated 
merely by a technical risk assessment because it is not a value-free exercise (Reddy, 
1996). Although engineers and statesmen are said to obtain “objective” facts from 
tools such as risk analysis, “the figures about probabilities that are put into the 
calculation reflect the assigner’s confidence that the events are likely to occur” 




Assessments (EIA) and Environmental Impact Statements (EIS) 32 , for example, 
despite their official objectives of “identify[ing] the possible risks to the environment 
from project proposals” (Harding, 1998, p. 134), do not “necessarily guarantee 
scientific validity” (Harding, 1998, p. 142). Based on previous experience, those who 
conduct or commission the EIS - often proponents of the project, usually “formulate 
EISs so that their proposal is seen in a more favourable light” by highlighting 
advantages and trivialising disadvantages (e.g. any adverse effects to the 
environment associated with their proposal) (Harding, 1998, p. 142). In this thesis, 
BHP’s EIS related to Olympic Dam Expansion Project (ODEP) is found to be 
similarly biased, as BHP’s interests, including extracting more water from GAB, 
differ significantly from the interests of civil society. 
The rejection of a ‘science versus value’ dichotomy is also reflected in a cultural 
viewpoint of standard-setting processes (Krimsky & Golding, 1991). According to 
Weinberg (1981, p. 5): 
Even when the risk can be quantified, the setting of standards is intrinsically a 
political act. That is the standards themselves must in the final analysis be 
arbitrary. 
As such, public environmental decisions or policies, no matter how neutral or 
scientific the relevant risk assessment, are essentially derived from a social process 
involving the creation of a shared meaning among communities and relations of trust 
(Krimsky & Golding, 1991; Rayner, 1992). Water accounting standard-setting, for 
example, needs consensus from the key stakeholder groups such as water suppliers, 
water recipients and regulatory bodies (Egan & Frost, 2010). As well, environmental 
decisions from the Australian Federal and South Australian governments regarding 
the charging of a fee or levy for BHP for GAB water extraction required an 
agreement among major stakeholders including BHP, local community, and 
governmental agencies. As Krimsky and Golding (1991, p. 110) assert, decision-
making processes may also reflect “the ebbs and flows of any political debate”. 
                                                 
32 According to Harding (1998, p. 134), “[t]he EIA process enables consideration of environmental factors alongside traditional 
consideration such as economic and technical aspects of a development proposal”. As “a key document or step in the 
framework of an [EIA], an [EIS] ... is the document which details the case for a particular development, the state of the 
environment in which the proposal is to be located, likely environmental impacts of the proposal, the alternative operations, 




As described previously, a cultural perspective views risk as a social construct and 
emphasises the cultural patterns and belief systems through which risk knowledge is 
mediated (Lupton, 1999). This approach demonstrates a stronger constructivist view 
than the ‘Risk Society’ thesis (4.3.1) and a weaker constructivist view than 
‘Governmental’ thesis (Lupton, 1999) (4.3.2), as it acknowledges that real danger, or 
risk, exists in the world, but its major arguments are concerned with how risk is 
“politicalized” (Douglas, 1992, p. 29). Additionally, a cultural perspective of risk is 
indicative of a functional structuralist approach as it focuses on the attitudes or 
convictions of social aggregates and analyses their risk selection to address how to 
mitigate social deviance and strengthen social order (Lupton, 1999).  
In this thesis, a cultural risk perspective is harnessed as a transdisciplinary means to 
address conflictual and oppositional socio-cultural expectations and values (Horlick-
Jones & Sime, 2004; Sampford, 2009). It facilitates public engagement and 
democratic participation in a communicative and dialogic effort among the regime of 
polylogic  water governance against the backdrop of water scarcity. The next section 
briefly explains the interrelationship between several related themes including risk 
management, risk object, accounting and hybrids, from a cultural perspective of risk. 
 A cultural perspective of risk for critical accounting research 4.4
It is argued by a number of critical accounting researchers that contemporary risk 
management practices, with their aim of ‘taming’ incalculable uncertainty into 
calculable therefore manageable risks, have become “almost synonymous with ideals 
of good management” (Miller et al., 2008, p. 43; see also Power, 2007). What cannot 
be overlooked here is the “institutional rationality” that underpins the management 
of risk (Moerman & van der Laan, 2012, p. 111). 
According to Power (2007, p. 5), the separation of risk from uncertainty implies a 
social expectation for “decidability” and “actionability” about the future, and 
constructs a new area of responsibility and accountability. As such, uncertainty 
becomes risk when it is expected to be manageable. There is a need, both “functional 
and political ... to maintain perception of control and manageability” (Power, 2007, p. 
5). Therefore, whether all risks are able to be managed is not the core issue. As 




or in the future? No we cannot, but yes we must act as if we do” - for that reason, 
organisations “must be seen to act as if the management of risk is possible” (Power, 
2007, p. 6). Risk management, therefore, has turned into a major strategy of 
corporations for managing risks for themselves (Miller et al., 2008; Moerman & van 
der Laan, 2012).  
It is important to understand the role of accounting in risk management and the 
important notion of hybrids. According to Miller et al. (2008), risk management is a 
set of practices that are prevalent in both private and public sector organisations. In 
spite of its different manifestations in varied fields, risk management generally can 
be considered as “an overlapping family” of measuring and calculating methods for 
risk that is rooted in statistics (Power, 2007, p. 13). A further investigation of risk 
management reveals a broad range of ‘hybrids’ (Miller et al., 2008; Power, 2007) 
which are defined by Miller et al. (2008, p. 943) as “new phenomena produced out of 
two or more elements normally found separately”. Such cases can be exemplified by 
accounting, as accounting techniques, practices and expertise have largely drawn 
from other domains and disciplines (Miller, 1994; Miller et al., 2008). Management 
accounting, for example, has drawn its calculative contents from disciplines such as 
economics and engineering, including discounted cash flow, fixed and variable costs 
and standard costing (Miller et al., 2008). Moreover, not only have the core 
calculative practices of accounting, but also its rationales, have been adopted from 
elsewhere, e.g. science and economics, for other purposes (Miller, 1994, 1998; 
Miller et al., 2008). According to Miller (1994, p. 3),  
[t]he term rationales can be used to designate this aspect of accounting as a social 
and institutional practice ... it is these rationales ... that mobilize the calculative 
technologies of accounting. 
The hybridisation of accounting is accompanied by the inter-organisational and intra-
organisational coordination and cooperation in which sharing expertise and 
transferring inter-professional knowledge often result in the creation of “new bodies 
of expertise” and the emergence of the “novel metric” (Miller et al., 2008, p. 962; 
Moerman & van der Laan, 2012). It is through these hybridising processes, practices 




through this “newly formed object” that managing risk is made possible (Miller et al., 
2008, p. 952; Moerman & van der Laan, 2012).  
Indeed, the power of the hybridised accounting technique lies in its role as a 
‘boundary object’ (Miller et al., 2008; Moerman & van der Laan, 2012; Power, 2005; 
Power, 2007). Bowker and Star (1999, p. 297) note that: 
Boundary objects are those objects that both inhabit several communities of 
practice and satisfy the informational requirements of each of them. Boundary 
objects are thus both plastic enough to adapt to local needs and constraints of the 
several parties employing them, yet robust enough to maintain common identify 
across sites. 
By uniting disparate concerns and interests from diverse domains, accounting can be 
seen a “boundary-spanning activity” (Miller et al., 2008, p. 943) that facilitates the 
collaboration of multiple “interest groups and potential allies” (Power, 2007, p. 27) 
and makes the future uncertainty “calculable and manageable” (Moerman & van der 
Laan, 2012, p. 107). Miller and O’Leary (2007) for example, identify the 
microprocessor industry’s road-mapping practices and Moore’s Law, as hybrids and 
boundary objects from disciplines of finance and scientific technology that help to 
minimise risk by affiliating expectations among different firms. In a study of Finnish 
health care reforms, Kurunmäki (2004) suggests that the hybridisation between 
medical, financial and accounting expertise across organizational boundaries reduced 
the uncertainty arising from a new system of resource allocation. Moerman and van 
der Laan (2012, p. 107) examine how the hybridised accounting calculative 
technology was able to “manage, mediate, and facilitate the socialization of risk” in 
the context of liabilities arising from asbestos-related disease and compensation 
funding.  
In this thesis, GAB water related regulations and (accounting disclosure) practices 
from BHP OD and governments differ from classic financial accounting (disclosure) 
due to the multiple dimensions it embraces, such as economic, environmental and 
social (Chalmers et al., 2010; Plummer & Tower, 2010). Therefore, it can be 
understood as a hybrid form of techniques and practices, which falls between 
disciplines including engineering, accounting, environmental science and physics, 
economics and law (Plummer & Tower, 2010). Combining these different bodies of 




boundary object which is expected by BHP OD and governments to identify and 
measure water input, output, and usage in order to facilitate the decision making of 
allocation of scare water resources and consequently reduce water-related risks 
(Chalmers et al., 2010; Plummer & Tower, 2010).  
Apart from the investigation of the water risk regulations and management from 
BHP OD and governments, this thesis also analyses counter (accounting) disclosures 
from civil society, which challenge BHP OD and governments’ risk management 
with their construction of GAB water-related risk and the corresponding risk 
management. 
Risk is not understood as ‘real’ property in the world, therefore, risk management is 
underpinned by various logics and values (Krimsky & Golding, 1991). The focus of 
this thesis is on the social, cultural and institutional frames that shape our 
understanding and management strategies of risk (Power, 2007). Since most research 
with a techno-economic emphasis has treated risk as an object and comparatively 
unproblematic, there is a lack of attention and effort to examine the socio-cultural 
process whereby ‘risk objects’ are constructed (Hilgartner, 1992; Power, 2007). Risk 
objects are defined by Hilgartner (1992, p.41) as “things that pose hazards the source 
of danger, the entities to which harmful consequences are conceptually attached”. 
For example, in the phrase ‘the risk of smoking’, ‘smoking’ is the risk object. A 
simplified process of risk object construction involves making the linkage of harm to 
an object and defining it (Hilgartner, 1992; Power, 2007). According to Hilgartner 
(1992, p. 46), 
[t]his task is a rhetorical process, performed in texts that are displayed in 
specialized organisations or in public arenas, and it usually involves building 
networks of risk objects. 
These socio-technical networks consist of experts, resources, organisations and 
regulations through which particular risk control activities are constructed (Power, 




struggles over the control of a risk object are pervasive, generally through strategies 
of emplacing and displacing the risk object33.  
According to Power (2007, p. 26), “[a] focus on the sociotechnical networks which 
support, or destroy, risk objects requires definitions of risk to be endogenized, rather 
than treated abstractly”. The definition of risk-related concepts therefore is socially 
constructed, and any change in the definition could result in the redistribution of 
responsibility for risk, relocation in scope or decision making and a redetermination 
of an actor’s rights and obligations in dealing with danger or hazards (Hilgartner, 
1992). Linsley and Shrives (2014), for example, utilise cultural risk theory to analyse 
comments letters associated with the Financial Reporting Council’s (FRC) 
‘complexity of corporate reporting’ discussion paper. They identify three sets of 
institutional perceptions and constructions of risk - related issues with respect to the 
free market, regulation, the priority of stakeholder groups, justice and ethical actions. 
Each institution seeks to persuade others about the validity of their preferred way of 
life. 
This thesis concentrates on the “dynamics” of BHP OD’s GAB water extraction as 
the risk object in “organizing definitions and descriptions of a practice and its 
constituent elements” (Power, 2007, p. 26). It investigates the socio-cultural 
constructed nature of the debate arising from the GAB water related risk, by 
emphasising the different institutional views on risk and sustainability related 
concepts, and their corresponding normative ideals of risk resolution. As risk 
management crucially depends on “management systems of representations ... [and] 
instruments for framing objects for the purpose of action and intervention” (Power, 
2007, p. 4), this thesis analyses “the manner in which [GAB water risks] are 
presented and constructed” (Power, 2007, p. 8) through contested disclosure 
documents from BHP, governments and civil society.  
 Summary 4.5
This chapter discussed the methodological issues of risk research and the application 
for accounting studies. Positivist research with a techno-economic focus has viewed 
                                                 
33 Hilgartner (1992, p. 48) notes that “construction risk objects is a two-way process, propelled by efforts to emplace risk 
objects within, and displace them from, sociotechnical networks.” Emplacement can be conducted through “construction” of 




risk as an object and is insufficient to understand the entire risk profile related to 
water resource issues (Baleta, 2012; Horlick-Jones & Sime, 2004). This thesis adopts 
a cultural risk perspective as a transdisciplinary approach to investigate different 
institutional positions towards the GAB water related social and environmental risks 
manifest in disclosure documents. It emphasises the culturally constructed nature of 
this debate on risk-based sustainability related concepts to facilitate public 
engagement and participation for the complex problem of water governance. The 
next chapter presents the research method to analyse the GAB water-related 





CHAPTER 5 METHOD 
  Introduction  5.1
The previous chapter discussed methodological issues in risk studies and their 
implications for accounting research. A cultural perspective of risk was presented as 
the appropriate methodology to examine different institutional stances towards the 
Great Artesian Basin (GAB) water related economic, social and environmental risks 
in contested water disclosures. This thesis adopts cultural risk theory (Douglas, 1970; 
Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982) as a theoretical framework (Chapter 6). According to 
the framework, two relatively stable centre institutions (market made up of 
individualistic solidarity, and hierarchy made up of hierarchical solidarity) and 
border (made up of sectarian/egalitarian solidarity) institutions exist and for this 
thesis these are: the market (BHP Billiton (BHP) and BHP Billiton Olympic Dam 
Corporation Pty Ltd (BHP OD)), hierarchy (Australian Federal government and 
South Australian government) and border institutions (Non-Government 
Organisations (NGOs), environmental activists and Aboriginal groups). Contrary to 
the usual practice of presenting the theoretical frame first, this chapter explicates the 
research method used to examine how the GAB water risk debate is manifest 
through cultural practices. It is through this method that the various notions of risk-
based sustainability from cultural risk theory are identified and (re)structured 
(Chapter 6, Section 6.3) to further enable the interpretations of contested institutional 
discourses. 
This thesis employs a critical accounting approach to acknowledge divergent 
ideologies and interests among different stakeholder groups to promote democratic 
participation through genuine ‘dialogue’. It explores the GAB water risk debate from 
BHP OD’s water extraction by compiling and analysing corporate sustainability 
reports and other public statements; government regulatory documents; and 
alternative public disclosures obtained from civil society. It examines whether the 
ideology or value system inscribed in corporate water disclosures is aligned with 
and/or differs from the governmental regulatory disclosures and how it is resisted 
and challenged by the NGOs, environmental activists and Aboriginal groups. 
Consistent with a social constructivist ontology and epistemology, this thesis 




disclosures/accounts for the GAB water debate. It investigates discourses within 
documents issued by BHP OD, governments and civil society through a textual 
approach termed “interpretive structuralism” (Phillips & Hardy, 2002, p. 24). An 
interpretive structuralist approach is primarily concerned with how social and 
cultural meanings are constructed through discourses and texts. In this study, the 
particular emphasis is on rhetoric. Rhetoric is a technique of using discourse for 
persuasive effect, and this study examines how rhetoric is used by three institutions 
as a strategic resource.  
To interrogate institutional documents, Burkean rhetorical criticism (Stillar, 1998) is 
adopted as a specific method. While rhetorical criticism is considered as a relatively 
broad interpretive tool to discover how people ‘particularise’ social situations with 
the attempt to influence others through language (Gill & Whedbee, 1997; Selzer, 
2004), Burkean rhetorical criticism is a specific method with an assumption that 
rhetoric is one of the symbols used to constitute the world, give it meaning and 
express common interests required for achieving social unity (Burke, 1950, 1966, 
1969).  
Burkean rhetorical criticism incorporates three levels of analysis - grammar, rhetoric 
and logology (Stillar, 1998). The grammatical analysis focuses on texts within the 
documents issued by institutions and the rhetorical situation from which the 
production of those texts arise. Rhetorical analysis deals with how the public, as 
audiences, are invited by each institution to share and believe in different risk 
assumptions regarding GAB water related risks. Logology analysis is concerned with 
social conditions and the consequences of “terministic screens” (Burke, 1966, p. 50). 
In different institutions, texts and discourses function to condense GAB water related 
risks by highlighting certain aspects for public attention and engagement. 
This chapter begins with an overview of a critical accounting approach (Section 5.2), 
discourse (Section 5.3) discourse in documents (Section 5.4), and text and textual 
analysis (Section 5.5) with reference to an interpretive structuralist approach. This is 
followed by a general discussion of rhetoric (Section 5.6) and rhetorical criticism 
(Section 5.7). A Burkean perspective of rhetorical criticism (Section 5.7.1) is 




logological analyses. The documents used as data in this study are then presented 
(Section 5.8) before a final description of the process of data analysis (Section 5.9).  
 A critical accounting approach 5.2
As explicated in Chapter 3, this thesis adopts a (critical) counter-accounting 
approach to explicitly acknowledge divergent interests and engage ideological 
contestations among different stakeholder groups in order to engender/foster genuine 
dialogue and democratic participation for promoting progressive and emancipatory 
change (Brown, 2009; Brown & Dillard, 2013; Dey et al., 2011; Gallhofer et al., 
2006). 
Analysing ‘polylogic’ accounting reports are argued to facilitate the shift of the 
narrow form of accountability from an organisationally or institutionally centred 
framework to a more encompassing and democratic form of accountability (Brown 
& Dillard, 2013; O’Dwyer, 2004); offer opportunities for an open dialogue among 
company and its heterogeneous stakeholders (Dey, 2003); and present emancipatory 
potential in fostering “counterhegemonic” (Brown & Dillard, 2013, p. 15). 
This thesis explores the GAB water risk debate from BHP OD’s water extraction by 
compiling corporate sustainability reports and other public statements; government 
regulatory documents; and alternative public disclosures obtained from civil society. 
It investigates whether the ideology or value system inscribed in corporate water 
disclosures is aligned with and/or differs from the governmental regulatory 
disclosures and how it is resisted and challenged by the NGOs, environmental 
activists and Aboriginal groups. This thesis therefore is in line with a genre of 
studies termed ‘counter accounting’ that problematises and destabilises the 
normalised nature and taken-for granted assumptions of business and sometimes 
government (Dey et al., 2011). As a result, it facilitates the articulation of and 
reflection upon different styles of accountability from the perspective of industry, 
government and civil society (Buhr, 2001; Rodrigue, 2014). It therefore echoes the 
call for a dialogical approach to accounting which enables democratic participation 




 Discourse  5.3
This thesis performs a discourse analysis approach to collate and analyse accounts 
for the GAB water debate. Fairclough (2003, p. 2) describes language as “an 
irreducible part” of social life and it is “dialectically interconnected” with other 
elements in social life. Discourse is a linguistic term covering extended samples of 
spoken or written language. It emphasises the interaction between writer and reader 
or speaker and addressee, thus emphasising the production and interpretation 
processes of talk and text, as well as the situational context (Fairclough, 1992). 
While there are various definitions of discourse among the literature, the most 
common one refers to “the actual practices of talking and writing” (Phillips & Hardy, 
2002, p. 3).  
In social theory and social analysis, discourse is used widely to refer to “different 
ways of structuring areas of knowledge and social practice” (Fairclough, 2003, p. 3). 
This stance is attributed to Foucault’s (1976, 1980 in Alvesson & Karreman, 2000) 
assumption that discourses constitute both subjects and objects, and arrange and 
naturalise the social world in a particular way to inform social practices. These 
practices construct specific forms of subjectivity to manage human subjects. These 
certain forms are considered as rational and self-evident (Alvesson & Karreman, 
2000). Discourse, from this perspective, does not just represent or reflect social 
entities. Instead, it constitutes the foundation of a social construction process upon 
which social reality depends (Hardy & Phillips, 1999). In Fairclough and Wodak’s 
(1997, p. 258) words, discourse does not simply mirror “reality”, but rather 
constitutes “situations, objects of knowledge, and the social identities of and 
relations between people and groups of people”. 
It is important to note here that it is an intermediate version of social constructivism 
of discourse that this thesis takes. According to Fairclough (1992, p. 66), 
the discursive constitution of society does not emanate from a free play of ideas 
in people’s heads but from a social practice which is firmly rooted in and 
oriented to real, material social structures. 
In other words, although people may construe (e.g. represent and imagine) the social 
world in some particular way, whether such a construal or representation has an 




contextual factors, such as “the way social reality already is, who is construing it, 
and so forth” (Fairclough, 2003, p. 9). Indeed, there are various orientations that 
social reality and social practice exhibit, such as economic, cultural, political and 
ideological. Discourse might be implicated in all the above dimensions “without any 
of them being reducible to discourse” (Fairclough, 1992, p. 66). As such, discourse 
is regarded as “a form of social practice” instead of merely a reflection of situational 
variables or an individual activity (Fairclough, 1992, p. 63).  
There is an implied dialectical relationship between social practice and social 
structure (Fairclough, 1992). Generally speaking, the latter acts both as an effect of 
and a condition for the former. On one hand, discourse, as a form of social practice, 
is constrained and shaped by social structure in the broadest sense and at different 
levels. Depending on structural determination, discursive events vary in accordance 
with the particular institutional framework or social domain from which they are 
generated. On the other hand, discourse contributes to the construction of all the 
dimensions of social structure which constrains and shapes it directly and indirectly 
in terms of its own conventions and norms, as well as social identities, relations and 
institutions which underpin it (Fairclough, 1992). In this sense, discourse is a social 
practice “signifying the world, constituting and constructing the world in meaning” 
(Fairclough, 1992, p. 64). 
While discourse is considered as a particular way of representing some area of the 
world or a possible world with projected change in some directions, there are often 
alternative and competing discourses, consistent with different social identities, 
positions and social relationships with others (Fairclough, 2003). These discourses 
differ in the representation of social events in terms of their inclusion or exclusion, 
the abstractness or concreteness, and the specification of social actors, their relations, 
time, space and processes of the events (Fairclough, 2003). Despite these differences, 
a particular discourse is always connected to other discourses which were produced 
earlier in the context, as well as those which are produced subsequently and 
synchronically (Fairclough & Wodak, 1997, p. 277).  
In this thesis, discourse is considered as a mode of institutional and political practice. 




competing and complementary discourses emanate out of interactions between BHP 
OD, governments and civil society around the water intake of BHP OD for Olympic 
Dam Expansion Project (ODEP). These discourses differ significantly in terms of 
their representations of several dimensions of this water issue, and they are related to 
different cultural and institutional risk perspectives regarding the relations people 
have to nature, and social relations (Fairclough, 2003). 
 Discourse in documents 5.4
This study uses documents issued by three institutions - market, hierarchy, and 
border as data sources to construct and analyse accounts which comprise three 
different sets of institutional discourses emerging from the GAB water debate. 
According to Sharp and Richardson (2001), documents are sources in which 
different discourses are manifest. Since documents are both nestled within and 
represent a set of discursive practices (Phillips & Hardy, 2002), documents are 
considered as situated products rather than fixed and stable artefacts (Prior, 2003).  
According to Prior (2004, p. 376), each document enters “social interaction in a dual 
manner” as both “a receptacle of content” and “an functioning agent in its own right”. 
It is the second function of documents, their mediation of social relationships that 
this study focuses upon. Documents define and specify things, classify events and 
describe processes. They also structure identity and circumstance, set boundaries of 
expertise and social networks, and make objects visible and therefore manageable 
(Prior, 2004).  
As such, documents are not merely passive and inert items operated by human 
beings. Rather, they actively influence the actions of human agents (Prior, 2004). As 
Prior (2003, p. 2) asserts, documents should be considered in terms of “fields, frames 
and networks of action”. The status of documents depends primarily on the way in 
which they are produced and consumed. It is also important to note that those who 
consume the documents are not just passive agents in the communicative process, 
but also active in the document production processes as well (Prior, 2003). 
In this study, fields of networks involve market, hierarchy, and border institutions 
and the broad setting of the GAB water-related risks. These three realms are 




emerging from the GAB water debate. The documents issued by market and 
hierarchy institutions are largely “recruited as allies” (Prior, 2003, p. 13) to support 
each other’s actions (except in some special cases - for example, see Chapter 9), 
while border institutions tend to view these documents as “an enemy” (Prior, 2003, p. 
3) that need to be challenged and transformed. This dynamic of production and 
consumption of various documents assimilates different risk perspectives into 
cultural and institutional water practices, which is “the key to understanding the 
process of [social] fabrication” (Prior, 2003, p. 10). 
 Text and textual analysis 5.5
Text is considered as one dimension of discourse, and the spoken and written 
product of the text production process (Fairclough, 1992). Apart from written texts 
and spoken words, the variety of textual forms also covers pictures, symbols, sounds 
and artefacts (Grant, Keenoy & Oswick, 1998; Kress, Leite-Garcia & van Leeuwen, 
1997). Since discourses are both embodied and enacted in various texts, texts can be 
regarded as “a discursive ‘unit’ and a material manifestation of discourse” (Phillips 
& Hardy, 2002, p. 4). This thesis analyses textual discourses in documents. 
According to Phillips and Hardy (2002), texts are the emergence site of the 
complexity of social meanings produced in a particular history. Texts record, in 
partial ways, the history of who participated in the production of the text and how the 
institutions were brought into play. In other words, texts name and arrange 
participants, processes and circumstances. They construct perspectival and temporal 
conditions through linguistic resources (Stillar, 1998). Texts, in this sense, are indeed 
“a partial history of the language and social system” arising from the structuring of 
relations between participants (Phillips & Hardy, 2002, p. 4). According to  
Fairclough (2003, p. 8), texts can be seen as “elements of social events” since one 
way for people to act and interact in social events is to write or speak. 
When texts are approached as elements of social events, texts are concerned with an 
interactive process of meaning - making (Fairclough, 2003). As Phillips and Hardy 
(2002, p. 4) contend,  
[t]exts are not meaningful individually, it is only through their interconnection 
with other texts, the different discourses on which they draw, and the nature of 




There are various approaches to discourse analysis. Alvesson and Karreman (2000) 
for example, propose four versions centred on organisational studies from a micro-
discourse approach to a mega-discourse approach. Micro-discourse approaches 
emphasise social texts to form a detailed study of language use in a specific micro-
context. A meso-discourse approach, while relatively sensitive to texts, focuses more 
on the broader patterns and similar local contexts, beyond the details of texts. A 
grand discourse approach draws on an assembly of discourses which are ordered and 
presented as an integrated framework to constitute organisational reality. A mega-
discourse approach is concerned with a universal connection of discourse material. It 
typically addresses somewhat standardised ways of constituting or referring to a 
certain type of phenomenon. 
Phillips and Hardy (2002) also classify four main perspectives in respect of discourse 
analysis: interpretive structuralism; social linguistic analysis; critical discourse 
analysis; and, critical linguistic analysis based on a combination of text and context 
scale and constructivist and critical scale. Interpretive structuralism emphasises the 
understanding of the broader social and institutional context and its supported 
discourse. Instead of analysing individual texts on a micro-level, texts are collected 
and investigated with a primarily constructivist concern of how “discourse contexts 
come into being and the possibilities to which they give rise…without a direct 
concern with power” (Phillips & Hardy, 2002, p. 24).  Social linguistic analysis is 
constructivist and based mainly on individual texts, only marginally referring to its 
context. The goal of this analysis is to understand how texts organise and construct 
social phenomena. Critical discourse analysis emphasises the role of discursive 
practice in constructing, legitimating and sustaining unequal power relations and 
analyses dialogical struggles in privileging one particular discourse and 
marginalising others. Critical linguistic analysis, like social linguistic analysis, 
focuses on individual texts. However, this analysis also entails a strong interest in 
power dynamics that surround the text. It shares the concern of critical discourse 
analysis but emphasises more the micro-dynamics of texts. 
This thesis takes the interpretive structuralist approach to analyse discourse and text 
in documents with regards to the GAB water related risks. While it is concerned with 




analysis of institutional communications in their context, without necessarily 
analysing “the interplay between the text and the discursive context” referred by 
critical discourse analysis (Laine, 2009, p. 1049). As such, an interpretive 
structuralist approach can be considered as studying “discourse in text”, where 
discourses have existence and coherence beyond the text (Sharp & Richardson, 2001, 
p. 195). This thesis thus does not intend to deconstruct texts in institutional 
documents from a linguistic perspective either. Instead, it examines different 
institutional accounts regarding the way how discourses of the GAB water debate are 
manifest in documents issued by BHP OD, governments and civil society.  
The interpretive structuralist approach has been adopted by a number of accounting 
researchers in their studies of business discourse of sustainable development. Milne 
et al. (2009), for example, employ an interpretive structuralist analysis to critical 
examine both visual and textual (re)presentations of sustainable development from a 
New Zealand business association. They found that these business reports present “a 
pragmatic and middle-way discourse” characterised by a largely instrumental and 
utilitarian view of the natural environment (Milne, Tregidga & Walton, 2009, p. 
1211). Such representations facilitate particular actions while constraining and 
silencing alternative perspectives. Tregidga and Milne (2006) investigate 
sustainability reporting from a New Zealand water utility, a leading reporter on 
social and environmental effects. Through interpretive structuralist analysis, the 
authors identify the organisation’s evolving construction of itself from a sustainable 
resource manager to a sustainable development practitioner.  
By deploying a similar ‘interpretive textual analysis”, Laine (2005, 2009, 2010) has 
conducted a genre of studies to critically assess the social constructed process of 
sustainable development through corporate disclosures in the context of Finnish 
listed companies. In one study (Laine, 2005, p. 402), sustainable development is 
constructed as “compatible and mutually reinforcing” with economic growth, which 
is attainable without the radical restructuration of the prevailing social order. In 
another studies (Laine, 2010, p. 247), the conceptualisation of sustainable 
development has transformed from “revolutionary” to “evolutionary” during 1987-




device, reflective and adjusted to changing institutional pressures for legitimacy in 
society (Laine, 2009). 
This thesis explores how discursive formations in the form of texts construct 
meanings of the GAB water risk related concept and how these concepts are utilised 
in the GAB water debate manifest in contested disclosures issued by different 
institutions. By doing so, it flushes out the alternative interpretation from civil 
society as a counterpoint to business entities and governments, and leads to the 
“possible radical edge” (Laine, 2005, p. 408) of sustainability and risk-based 
concepts in water accounting studies. 
 Rhetoric  5.6
In this study, different institutional documents can be understood as a bundle of 
exchanges that give shape to the GAB water debate through the strategic nature of 
their discourses. In other words, documents from each institution are considered as 
media involving rhetorical arguments through which each institution attempts to 
influence society at large through its position on the GAB water-related social and 
environmental issues.  
Rhetoric is a method of persuasion, or the technique of using discourse for effect. It 
is normally “located on a political stage” (Gill & Whedbee, 1997, p. 157) where 
language, including metaphors, symbols, expressions have been consciously selected 
to (re)present a certain institution to other institutions and public in a particular light 
(Craig & Amernic, 2004; Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006; Livesey, 2001; Suddaby & 
Greenwood, 2005). As such, rhetoric is largely “instrumental” (Gill & Whedbee, 
1997, p. 157) in “persuad[ing] others to change their attitudes, beliefs, values or 
actions” (Cheney, Christensen, Conrad & Lair,  2004, p. 79), and rhetoric more 
broadly emphasises the strategic function of language as a vehicle to shape both 
means and ends of human action (Green, 2004). 
Rhetoric originates from education, philosophy and political systems of the ancient 
Greeks and Romans (Cockcroft & Cockcroft, 2005), and is inevitably involved in 
everyday communication and interaction (Hartelius & Browning, 2008). From an 
Aristotelian perspective, classical rhetoric is categorised by three unique but non-




1985; Haskins, 2004). These three elements identify distinct dimensions of 
persuasive appeals and uncover the characteristics of good arguments (Holt & 
Macpherson, 2010). 
According to Cheney, et al. (2004), rhetorical studies have emerged in different 
disciplines such as sociology, physics and economics. The principal symbols 
including metaphors, models and images in each case have been examined for their 
persuasive effects (Simons, 1990). In the same vein, accounting symbols are claimed 
to be essentially rhetorical by their nature and accounting terminology, calculative 
practices and narratives have been studied to reveal how they frame and convey 
particular understandings of the social and environmental realm, and therefore 
socially construct reality (Hines, 1988; Laine, 2005, 2009; Moerman & van der Laan, 
2007; Tregidga & Milne, 2006; Walters-York, 1996).  
This study goes beyond the rhetorical influence of an organisational or institutional 
rhetoric to encompass symbolic actions from three distinct but complementary 
institutions in respect of the GAB water risks. It analyses accounts in the form of 
institutional discourses as dialectical processes that link texts, institutional actors and 
rhetorical situations. In other words, this study investigates how different institutions 
utilise rhetoric to proactively frame and shape rhetorical situations or respond to such 
rhetorical situations.  
Indeed, the strategic or political nature of institutional rhetoric is raised by Cockcroft 
and Cockcroft (2005), who draw on Michael Billig’s (1996) Arguing and Thinking 
and assert that the value of rhetoric is embedded in dialogue, rather than a 
monologue, as it offers a typical model of human thinking. This is manifest in all 
levels of public discussions and debate throughout contemporary society, and serves 
to either avoid conflict or resolve conflicts after they arise (Brennan & Merkl-Davies, 
2014; Cockcroft & Cockcroft, 2005). Consistent with cultural risk theory, this study 
views different discourses of market, hierarchy and border institutions manifest 
through documents as rhetorical by their very existence as they are disseminated to 
create and privilege different risk perspectives in the GAB water risk debate. In 




arguments “implicitly, if not explicitly” (Cockcroft & Cockcroft, 2005, p.2) opposed 
by the border institutions’ counter arguments. 
 Rhetorical criticism 5.7
This study adopts rhetorical criticism as a broader approach to analyse rhetoric. 
Rhetorical criticism, in the modern era, is understood as an interpretive tool to 
discover and analyse how people ‘particularise’ social situations with the attempt to 
influence others’ understanding of the social fabric through language (Gill & 
Whedbee, 1997; Moerman & van der Laan, 2007; Peterson, 1997; Selzer, 2004). It 
requires us to identify, describe and dismantle textual structures to investigate how 
they shape understanding, privilege and silence particular interests (Gill & Whedbee, 
1997). 
Consistent with various approaches to discourse analysis, approaches to rhetorical 
criticism vary along a continuum between two extremes. At one level, analyses 
concentrate on texts more than contexts, while at the other end, context is the major 
focus rather than text (Selzer, 2004). The former approach emphasises significant 
features of a text, such as “structure and temporality, argument, metaphor and 
iconicity” (Gill & Whedbee, 1997, p. 17). This model of textual analysis, albeit 
involving a detailed discussion of instrumental operations of particular texts, is 
necessarily limited as the authors’ intentions, audiences’ response and any 
unintended consequences can only be speculated (Cheney et al., 2004; Moerman & 
van der Laan, 2007).  
The latter approach as a model of contextual analysis focuses on a series of texts to 
create and recreate a thick description of “the social circumstances that call rhetorical 
events into being and that orchestrate the course of those events” (see also Cheney et 
al., 2004; Selzer, 2004, p. 292). Contextual analysts understand that social practices 
in general, and communications in particular, reflect attitudes and values of different 
communities. They seek to expose the intention and role of actors, their persuasive 
tactics and appeals for legitimacy, the power relations between them, and intended 
and unintended consequences (Cheney et al., 2004; Fairclough, 2003; Moerman & 




In accordance with most approaches to discourse analysis, rhetorical criticism is 
generally understood as both textual and contextual in nature, and most rhetorical 
analysts not only passively decode a particular text, but also actively understand the 
context from which the text arises (Gill & Whedbee, 1997; Moerman & van der 
Laan, 2007; Selzer, 2004; van Dijk, 1997). Since this study investigates how the 
GAB water risk debate between market, hierarchy and border institutions manifests 
in cultural practices and how this debate is conducted through various discourses in 
documents/accounts, a full appreciation of the interplay between context and text is 
required, especially as texts often embrace important clues about context (Selzer, 
2004), and texts operate to name and rename the context (Gill & Whedbee, 1997).  
 Burkean rhetorical criticism 5.7.1
Kenneth Burke is an American literary philosopher and theorist who has had a 
significant impact in the disciplines of philosophy, linguistics, literature, sociology 
and economics throughout the twentieth century (Foss, Foss & Trapp, 2002; Toye, 
2013). As a specialist in rhetoric theory and criticism, Burke deviated away from 
traditional notions of rhetoric and oriented his writing of language towards the social 
context. He recognises that language involves more than just logic and grammar, and 
the social context of language goes beyond the principles of pure reason (Hansen, 
1996). Burke is best known for his idea of rhetoric as an art of persuasion (Foss et al., 
2002). His principle works include Permanence and Change (Burke, 1984b), 
Attitudes Toward History (Burke, 1984a), A Grammar of Motives (Burke, 1969), A 
Rhetoric of Motives (Burke, 1950), and Language as Symbolic Action (Burke, 1966). 
From a Burkean perspective, symbols are related to the material world dialectically. 
That is, symbols do not simply mirror the world. Instead, they constitute the world 
and give it meaning. Reality for Burke (1966, p. 5), is indeed  
[a] cluster of symbols about the past combined with whatever things we know 
mainly through maps, magazines, newspapers, and the like about the present…a 
construct of our symbol systems.  
Burke (1950, p. 43) defines rhetoric as “the use of language as a symbolic means of 
inducing cooperation in beings that by nature respond to symbols”. For him, the 
primary means of persuasion is identification between the rhetor and audience. 




achieving social unity (Burke, 1950, 1966, 1969). Drawing upon the meaning-
making function of language, Burkean rhetorical criticism emphasises the human 
relationship to language as a symbolic system. Such a symbolic system allows us to 
shape and interpret a world of experience as we actively construct our ways of 
knowing and acting through symbols. At the same time, the symbolic system and 
structure constrains the symbol using by defining us as social agents and constituting 
our ways of being in the world (Peterson, 1997; Stillar, 1998). As Burke (1969, p. 33) 
asserts: 
Dialectically considered men are not only in nature. The cultural accretions made 
possible by the language motive become “second nature” with them…. 
[s]ymbolic communication is not a merely external instrument, but also intrinsic 
to men as agents. Its motivational properties characterise both “the human 
situation” and what men are “in themselves”. 
A Burkean scope of rhetoric is vast and goes beyond formal discourse to include 
“[l]ess traditional forms of discourse such as sales promotion, courtship, social 
etiquette, education, hysteria, witchcraft and works of art such as literature and 
painting” (Foss et al., 2002, p. 194). Although non-verbal elements are not strictly 
speaking rhetoric themselves, rhetoric is considered “apparent” in their meaning 
(Foss et al., 2002, p. 194). In Burke’s (1950, p. 172) view: “where there is 
persuasion, there is rhetoric. And wherever there is ‘meaning’, there is ‘persuasion’”. 
Burke’s rhetorical criticism was adopted widely as a method in the research field of 
communication studies due to an increasing influence of rhetorical and discourse 
analysis (e.g. Appel, 1987; Boyd, 2004; Kuseski, 1988; Moore, 1992; Olson & 
Olson, 2004). For example, Appel (1987) applies Burke’s philosophy of dramatism 
and the pentad (see Section 5.6.1.1) as a method to analyse the tragic-symbol 
televised preaching of an American religious figure Reverend Jerry Falwell. This 
study finds that Falwell’s discourse is strongly dramatic given his true believers are 
bent on the changing society he projects. Livesey (2002b) analyses texts published 
by ExxonMobil regarding climate change by drawing upon the Burkean method of 
dramatism in general and the pentad in particular. She focuses on the purposeful act 
of the rhetor and ethical effects of the rhetoric in maintaining organisational 
legitimacy. However, such applications of Burkean rhetorical criticism as a method 




Burkean method developed by Stillar (1998) to analyse the rhetoric deployed by 
market, hierarchy and border institutions with regards to the GAB water risk debate. 
According to Stillar (1998), this systematic framework for rhetorical  criticism is 
based on Burke’s idea of grammar, rhetoric and logology. Centred on language as 
symbolic action, this method complements and extends the social function of 
discourse analysis. Grammatical analysis focuses on vocabularies and structure of 
texts used to construct the motive. It is also an analysis or criticism of “dramatism” 
(Burke, 1968, p. 445), since language is perceived as both motive and act. Rhetorical 
analysis deals with the role of language in identifying and classifying or categorising 
social agents on one hand and providing a point of unity on the other. The exchange 
of discourse is viewed as the principal model through which construction and 
transformation of social order are attained through symbolic action. Logological 
analysis is concerned with social conditions and consequences of symbolic action. It 
deals with implications of symbolic action which is “conditioned by the negative and 
by the attendant forms of transgression that are invited by the implicit ‘perfection’ of 
various semiotic order” (Stillar, 1998, p. 62). It is important to note that while 
Burke’s grammatical, rhetorical and logological analyses are outlined in separate 
sections, they “all share in the substance of symbolic acts” (Stillar, 1998, p. 88). The 
next section explicates this Burkean framework of rhetorical criticism in more detail.  
5.7.1.1 Grammatical analysis 
Burke’s grammatical analysis deals with language in its own terms rather than in a 
traditional linguistic sense. It emphasises the way language patterns index, construct 
and embrace motives (Stillar, 1998). This method is termed “Dramatism” by Burke 
(1968, p. 445), and it is  
a method of analysis and corresponding critique of terminology designed to show 
that the most direct route to the study of human relations and human motives is 
via a methodological inquiry into cycles or clusters of terms and their functions. 
As such, dramatism considers language as “primarily a species of action, or 
expression of attitudes, rather than an instrument of definition” (Burke, 1968, p. 447). 
In other words, it is concerned with the purposive use of language by agents to 
motivate or block certain understandings, shape attitudes and predispositions toward 




Dramatism aims to make replicable and explicit statements with regards to the 
function of combined language units and operates with a consistent and coherent set 
of terms to derive a descriptive analysis (Stillar, 1998). This method provides a 
means for analysing features of the texts and the relationship among them in respect 
of a rhetorical situation. Burke (1969, p. xv) named this means “the pentad”. This 
pentadic model embodies five terms - scene, agent, act, agency and purpose to 
discern the structure and functions of symbolic action. According to Burke (1969, p. 
xv), 
in a rounded statement about motives, you must have some word that names the 
act (names what took place, in thought or deed), and another that names the scene 
(the background of the act, the situation in which it occurred), also you must 
indicate what person or kind of person (agent) performed the act, what means or 
instruments he used (agency), and the purpose. 
The pentadic analysis helps us to understand how language represents ‘reality’ 
through investigating how a text interprets those five elements. It is important to note 
that such a representation is “attitudinal and motivated” since it is the “situated social 
practice of real social agents who necessarily construct ‘reality’ with reference to 
their practices and the terminology that are a part of them” (Stillar, 1998, p. 64). As 
Burke (1966, p. 45) asserts: “even if a given terminology is a reflection of reality by 
its very nature as a terminology, it must be a selection of reality.” 
Therefore, a particular textual pattern from a pentadic analysis selectively reflects a 
reality (Stillar, 1998). In this case, texts within the documents issued by market, 
hierarchy and border institutions and the rhetorical situation from which the 
production of those texts arises are the principal focus of grammatical criticism. 
Language as symbols is chosen by three different institutions, with different risk 
assumptions and values to define and redefine various concepts and control their 
meanings within the GAB water risk debate and thus produce a different ‘reality’ in 
respect of this dimension of an environmental crisis.  
5.7.1.2 Rhetorical analysis  
Rhetorical analysis focuses on the overriding function of language as symbolic 
action (Stillar, 1998). There is one key term in Burkean rhetorical criticism - 




both natural and social beings - we are divided in attitude, ability, interest and access 
to resources and so forth (Burke, 1984a). Rhetoric under this condition is “a 
moralising process” implied in all socialising processes to overcome division and 
reinforce unity (Burke, 1962, p. 563). According to Burke (1969, p. 20): 
A is not identical with his colleague, B. But insofar as their interests are joined, A 
is identified with B. Or he may identify himself with B even when their interests 
are not joined. If he assures that they are, or is persuaded to believe so. 
Burke (1966, 1969) indicates that any identification is contextualised by some sense 
of social order which sets the conditions for determining the legitimate terms of 
substance for consubstantiality. Substances are constructed through production and 
reproduction of identities, attributes and classes by symbolic action. Burke (1969, p. 
21), also explains the ambiguities of substance. 
In being identified with B, A is “substantially one” with a person other than 
himself. Yet at the same time he remains unique, an individual focus of motives. 
Thus he is both joined and separate, at once a distinct substance and 
consubstantial with another. 
As such, identification with something or someone is to construct reality “in the 
same terms as another…as united by similar substance” (Stillar, 1998, p. 73). When 
rhetoric draws upon grammatical resources that function in respect of substances 
pertinent to a particular hierarchy, identification becomes possible (Stillar, 1998). 
It is important to note that “hierarchy” and “order” are another two primary concepts 
related to rhetorical analysis (Stillar, 1998, p. 76). For Burke (1969, p. 279), 
hierarchy can be understood as a product of symbolic action. 
[I]n any order, there will be mysteries of hierarchy since such a principle is 
grounded in the very nature of language, and reinforced by the resultant diversity 
of occupational classes. That claim is the important thing, as regards the ultimate 
reaches of rhetoric. The intensities, morbidities, or particularities of mystery 
come from institutional sources, but the aptitude comes from the nature of man, 
generically, as a symbol-using animal. 
To be invited to identify with some particular substances (classes, identities and 
attributes) represents the inherent tensions within discourses of social orders. The 
rhetorical acts seek to gather audiences who share interests and have a common stake 
in those social orders (Stillar, 1998). To overcome a division through identification 




seen in terms of what” (Stillar, 1998, p. 74). Therefore, members from a social group 
“promote social cohesion by acting rhetorically upon themselves and one another” 
(Burke, 1962, p. 522) (Appendix A provides an example used by Stillar (1998)  to 
illustrate differences between grammar and rhetoric). 
In this case, while grammatical analysis is concerned with the way market, hierarchy 
and border institutions’ risk-related worldview is defined, developed and sustained 
as a part of a process to challenge other worldviews; rhetorical analysis investigates 
how the public as audiences are invited by each institution to share and believe in 
different risk assumptions through identification regarding the GAB water risks. The 
texts and discourses from various institutional documents, from a Burkean 
perspective, are considered as rhetorical acts seeking to “transcend and transform” 
both “literal” and “symbolic” division (Stillar, 1998, p. 75) with regards to GAB 
water risk assumptions. 
For example, centre institutions construct a social order around the mysteries of 
science, technology and market, to transcend the cultural differences of the border 
institutions and the general public, to become consubstantial with their scientific, 
technological and efficient market practices. The implicit hierarchy within such an 
order is that science and technology are superior to any other alternative practice. 
5.7.1.3 Logological analysis 
Logological analysis discusses social conditions and consequences of symbolic 
actions. It is a study of how symbolic systems constrain social practices of “vision 
and division” and structure social consequences such as “guilt, imperfection, 
hierarchical psychosis-of living in terms of symbolic systems” (Stillar, 1998, p. 59). 
While grammatical and rhetorical analysis emphasises the dynamic process of 
symbolic action by drawing upon the elements in symbolic acts and characterising 
them as pentad, identification, hierarchy, order and transformation, logological 
analysis extends such analyses to symbolic systems themselves. It delves into social 
functions of logonomic systems. A logonomic system is a term derived from Hodge 
and Kress’s (1988) Social Semiotics. According to Hodge and Kress (1988, p. 4), a 




the Greek logos, which means a thought or system of thought, and also the words 
or discourse through which the thought is presented, and nomos, a control or 
ordering mechanism. A logonomic system is a set of rules prescribing the 
conditions for production and reception of meanings; which specify who can 
claim to initiate (produce, communicate) or know (receive, understand) meanings 
about what topics under what circumstances and with what modalities (how, 
when, why). 
As such, logonomic systems include the system of language, discourses, 
intertextuality and other meaning-making systems (Stillar, 1998). An instance of text 
or discursive practices that involves the exchange of texts does not only have 
recourse to logonomic systems but, in itself, form a logonomic system which 
confines its potential meaning. All symbolic actions are attained through interaction 
with logonomic systems (Stillar, 1998). To characterise logonomic systems, we draw 
on the records -in the form of texts of symbolic action to analyse the evidence used 
to construct “the terms, features and functions of elements of logonomic systems” 
(Stillar, 1998, p. 78 ). 
Burke (1970) describes texts as sources to understand the nature of language as a 
motivational system. In other words, words and discourses in a logonomic system 
order and control its subjects. 
It is our “logological” thesis that…will provide us with good insight into the 
nature of language itself as motive. Such an approach also involves the tentative 
belief that, even when men use language trivially, the motives inherent in its 
possible thorough use are acting somewhat as goods, however vague (Burke, 
1970, p. vi).  
 Logology, therefore, is concerned with language as motive by focusing on 
conditions and consequences of logonomic systems upon which they shape and order 
social practices. While characterising logonomic systems through logology can be 
abstract, logonomic systems themselves are intrinsically social phenomena arising 
from “situated, historical and mediated” symbolic practices (Stillar, 1998, p. 79). 
According to Burke (1984b, p. 182),  
vocabularies [of a particular logonomic system] are not words alone but the 
social textures, the local psychoses, the institutional structures, the purposes and 
practices that lie behind the words.  
As such, logology complements grammatical (dramatistic) and rhetorical analysis 




logonomic systems act as a link as well as a screening of the ‘reality’ (Stillar, 1998, p. 
80). 
According to Burke (1966, p. 50), life is lived through the “terministic screens”:  
We must use terministic screens, since we can't say anything without the use of 
terms; whatever terms we use, they necessarily constitute a corresponding kind of 
screen; and any such screen necessarily directs the attention to one field rather 
than another. Within that field there can be different screens, each with its way of 
directing the attention and shaping the range of observations implicit in the given 
terminology. 
In other words, the effect and scope of our symbolic action is conditioned and 
constrained by a variety of terministic screens (terminology). These terministic 
screens function by highlighting certain aspects for our attention and engagement 
(Stillar, 1998). According to Stiller (1998, p. 77), while symbolic action and its 
rhetorical effect produces and reproduces various social orders that are appropriate to 
different hierarchies, hierarchies in turn “calibrate” the social order and value it by 
evaluating and ranking words, things, people, acts and so on. This is achieved with 
reference to institutional practices, relations, social norms and expectations, as well 
as terministic screens - the forms of symbolic action that “articulate, reproduce and 
legitimate” them (Stillar, 1998, p. 77). As such, symbolic systems are considered as 
“perfect” since the resources and rules are combined in a logical way appropriate to 
the system itself (Burke, 1989, p. 263). 
However, although a terministic screen facilitates a construction of its objects by 
highlighting relevant aspects through naming, it also makes the situation manageable 
and constrains our capacity to entertain other perspectives by obscuring or silencing 
them (Hart, 1997; Peterson, 1997; Stillar, 1998). As Burke (1984b, p. 49) says, “[a] 
way of seeing is also a way of not seeing”. 
[I]mplications of the particular terminology in terms of which the observations 
are made … maybe but the spinning out of possibilities implicit in our particular 
choice of terms (Burke, 1966, p. 46). 
Logological analysis therefore, by investigating the selecting and deflecting nature of 
terministic screens reminds us that the efficacy of the symbol is imbedded in its 
relationship to other terms, not in its essential accuracy in evaluating the symbolised 




particular, create bases for identification and consubstantiation, its intrinsically 
hierarchising and separating effects produce and reproduce inequities and divisions 
in social systems regarding certain debates or controversies (Livesey, 2001; Stillar, 
1998). These paradoxes and ambiguities inherent in logonomic systems open doors 
for resistance and change (Livesey, 2001).  
In this case, scientific and technology-related discourse from centre institutions’ 
water accounts boosts the value of objectivity through quantification. In other words, 
“its rhetoric of non-rhetoric”, is considered by border institutions as “exploitative 
and combative” in their alternative accounts, since it dissociates feelings and 
thoughts and rejects morality in terms of social and environmental responsibility 
(Hart, 1997, p. 265). Such terministic screens articulate, legitimate and reproduce 
centre institutions’ expectations that humans can achieve an absolute control over 
nature by continuing scientific and technological progress. As Selzer (2004, pp. 264-
265) contends: “Scientism…needs to be counterbalanced by [other terministic 
screens from border institutions with] a stress on ‘intuition’, ‘imagination’, ‘vision’ 
and ‘revelation’.” 
To conclude, Burkean rhetorical criticism comprises grammatical, rhetorical and 
logological analysis as a method and enables the researcher to identify structures, 
features, relationships, functions and implications of symbolic action. As a method 
adopted in this thesis, it helps to “construct objects of analysis by picking out 
elements of discourse for our attention” (Stillar, 1998, p. 89). 
  Scope and data  5.8
As described in previous sections, the purpose of this study is to collate and compile 
accounts for the GAB water risk debate to investigate the culturally and 
institutionally constructed nature of GAB water related risks, and how it is 
conducted through strategic discourses in documents. In line with cultural risk theory, 
three institutions - market, hierarchy and border institutions actively engage in this 
constructive process and in the meantime, privilege different risk perspectives and 
corresponding risk mediation or management. 
As the GAB water risk debate in this study is centred upon BHP OD’s entitlement to 




2005, the year in which BHP acquired WMC, established BHP OD and applied for 
ODEP. It extends to October 2011, when the final decision from Commonwealth 
Federal Government, South Australian and Northern Territory Government about the 
ODEP was made. 
Since this study is concerned with the contested domain of discursive construction of 
GAB water related risks, social and environmental accounting disclosure documents 
that have been produced in respect of the GAB water debate from BHP, BHP OD, 
WMC and other mining related associations; regulatory documents from the Federal 
government, South Australian government 34  and their scientists; and counter 
accounting disclosure related documents from civil society are analysed. These are 
scrutinised initially for their relevance before the compilation of contested accounts. 
It is important to recall that while BHP OD’s direct involvement into the GAB water 
risk debate started from 2005, the debate has been evolving since WMC, BHP OD’s 
predecessor, discovered and started operating the Olympic Dam mine in 1978. 
Therefore, historic documents issued back then that are not covered by the timeline 
of the study, but are highly relevant to the GAB water controversy are also selected 
for analysis (The dataset of documents used in this study is also contained in 
Appendix C). 
Since the BHP and BHP OD’s water accounts represent the official corporate talk, 
the information was collated through mainly organisational and institutional websites 
and library archives using publicly available data produced directly by market 
institutions, which include: 
BHP and BHP OD 
Olympic Dam Environmental Management and Monitoring Report (1 July 2005- 
30 June 2006) 
Olympic Dam Environmental Management and Monitoring Report (1 July 2006- 
30 June 2007) 
Olympic Dam Environmental Management and Monitoring Report (1 July 2007- 
30 June 2008) 
                                                 
34  The Northern Territory government is primarily concerned with the radioactive pollution of uranium ore from a 




Olympic Dam Environmental Management and Monitoring Report (1 July 2008- 
30 June 2009) 
Olympic Dam Environmental Management and Monitoring Report (1 July 2009- 
30 June 2010) 
Olympic Dam Environmental Management and Monitoring Report (1 July 2010- 
30 June 2011) 
Olympic Dam Environmental Management and Monitoring Report (1 July 2011- 
30 June 2012) 
 
Environmental Management Program FY 11-13, 2012 
Environmental Management Manual FY 11-13, 2012 
Monitoring Program - Great Artesian Basin (GAB) FY 11-13, 2012 
Environmental Management Program FY 08-10, 2008 
Environmental Management Manual FY 08-10, 2008 
Monitoring Program - Great Artesian Basin (GAB) FY 08-10, 2008 
 
Great Artesian Basin Wellfields Report (1 July 2007- 30 June 2008) 
Great Artesian Basin Wellfields Report (1 July 2008- 30 June 2009) 
Great Artesian Basin Wellfields Report (1 July 2009- 30 June 2010) 
Great Artesian Basin Wellfields Report (1 July 2010- 30 June 2011) 
Great Artesian Basin Wellfields Report (1 July 2011- 30 June 2012) 
 
Olympic Dam Project: Draft EIS 2009 
Olympic Dam Project: Supplementary EIS 2011 
 
BHP Billiton Sustainability Report 2006 
BHP Billiton Sustainability Report 2007 
BHP Billiton Sustainability Report 2008 
BHP Billiton Sustainability Report 2009 




BHP Billiton Sustainability Report 2011 
BHP Billiton Sustainability Report 2012 
 
Sustainable Water Use at Olympic Dam 2009 
 
WMC (Western Mining Corporation) 
Olympic Dam Project Draft Environmental Impact Statement 1982 
Olympic Dam Project Supplement to the Draft Environmental Impact Statement 
1983 
Assessment of Exploration and Post - European settlement significance of the 
Mound Springs of South Australia 1984 
Olympic Dam Expansion Project Environmental Impact Statement 1997 
 
Australian Uranium Association 
BHP Billiton’s Olympic Dam Mine- Issues Briefing 2009 
 
MCA (Minerals Council of Australia) 
Draft Advice on Water Charge Rules for Recovery of Planning and Management 
Costs 2009 
MCA response to National Water Initiative 2009 Biennial Assessment of 
Progress 2009 
 
ICMM (International Council on Mining and Metals) 
Water Management in Mining: a selection of case studies 2012 
 
Media 





For the Australian Federal government and South Australian governments’ water 
accounts representing hierarchy institutions’ perspective on the GAB water risks, 
GAB water governance and regulation related documents are accessed and 
interrogated electronically through both governments’ (and their agents’) website 
and public release. They include: 
Federal Government  
(Bureau of Rural Sciences) 
The Great Artesian Basin, Australia 1980 
(Australian Bureau of Statistics) 
Water Account Australia 2010-11 
(National Water Commission) 
Regional Water Resources Assessments 2009 
 
South Australian Government 
Water Allocation Plan for the Far North Prescribed Wells Area 2009 
 
Roxby Downs Indenture Arrangements for water management 2002 
Roxby Downs (Indenture Ratification) Act 1982 
Roxby Downs (Indenture Ratification) (Amendment of Indenture) Amendment Act 
2011 
 
Parliamentary Debates (Hansard) 2005 
Parliamentary Debates (Hansard) 2010 
Parliamentary Debates (Hansard) 2011 
 
Frequent Asked Questions (ODEP EIS) 2011 






ACCC (Australian Competition and Consumer Commission) 
Water Charge Rules for Water Planning and Management Draft Advice 2009 
 
SAALNRM (South Australian Arid Lands Natural Resources Management (Board)) 
Water Allocation Plan for the Far North Prescribed Wells Area 2009 
Proposed amendments to the Regional Natural Resources Management Plan 
2009 
 
Public Release (of governments’ approval decision for ODEP) 
Olympic Dam Mine Expansion Approved 2011 
BHP’s $30b Olympic Dam Expansion Approved 2011 
 
For the civil society’s water accounts representing border institutions’ perspectives 
on the GAB water risks, publicly available and externally constructed information 
was confined to public submission to Draft EIS of ODEP, independent academic 
research, web documents from NGOs, and media outlets. It is important to note that 
while Aboriginal people didn’t release their perspectives directly, they are 
represented through disclosures from other members of border institutions. These 
channels of information, in which many of them share same contents, portray civil 
society’s perceptions on BHP OD’s GAB water related impact, and allow adequate 
scoping of the thesis by providing relevant and comparative information dynamics, 
which include:  




7 Anti- Nuclear Alliance of W. A. 
                                                 
35 According to BHP (2011a), there are 74 public submissions in total address the issue of BHP OD’s GAB water intake and its 




8 Arid Lands Environment Centre 
10 Australian Conservation Foundation 
11 Australian Conservation Foundation-form letter 
13 Australian Greens 
24 Conservation Council of South Australia 
35 Environment Centre NT 
37 Environment Tasmania Inc. 
42 Friends of the Earth 
44 Friends of the Earth Adelaide 
46 Hastings Area Nuclear Free Alliance 
55 National Farmers’ Association 
57 Nature Conservation Society of South Australia 
62 Outback Areas Community Development Trust 
65 People for Nuclear Disarmament 
77 Roxstop Action 
85 The Macleay Nuclear Free Alliance 
88 United Nations Association of Australia South Australia 
92 Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom 
95 Worms SA 
97 Ms Jess Abrahams 
99 Miriam Amery-Gale 
102 Ms Christine Arnold 
105 Ms Yvonne Badger 
114 Ms Antoinette Bentley 
116 Ms Cath Blakey 
125 Ms Jamie Brideson 
136 Ms Catherine Cox 
138 Ms Helen Crawford 
146 Mr John Denlay 
147 Mr Andrew Derrick 
159 Ms Renee Engl 




180 Ms Sophie Green 
185 Mr Anthony Hack 
189 Ms Lisa Hall 
196 Ms Kristy Henderson (also represents Aboriginal group’s interests) 
199 Ms Kellie higginbottom 
204 Ms Lyn Hovey 
206 Ms Madeline Hudson 
216 Ms Dawn Jecks 
217 Mr Harry Johnson 
224 Mr S Keyes 
233 Mr Al Lad (also represents Aboriginal group’s interests) 
241 Ms Joanne and John Lewis 
244 Mr Alan, Jenny, Antony and Natalie Luesby 
247 Ms Michele Madigan 
248 Ms Petrina Maizey 
254 Ms Janet Mayer 
255 Mr Chris McBride 
258 Ms Ella Mckinley 
287 Ms Susanna Pearson 
288 Hon Liz Penfold 
289 Mr Joseph Philippa 
292 Mr John H Pope 
297 Mr Richard Quilty & Willem Vervoort 
299 Ms Eva Rainow 
304 Ms Georgia Roberts 
306 Ms Amanda Rowe 
309 Ms Angela Rozali 
313 Ms Gabrielle Scarman 
315 Ms Rachel Scarman 
328 Mr Daniel Spencer 
331 Ms Alys Stevens 




337 Ms Rebecca Taylor 
343 Ms Miriam Tonkin 
345 Mr Andrea Tschirner 
351 Ms Janelle Veitch 
352 Ms Narelle Walker 
353 Mr Tim Walsh 




Independent Academic Research References 
The Plutonic Waters of the Great Artesian Basin (Endersbee, 2000b) 
The Great Artesian Basin Management of Water resources after 100 Years of 
Development (Hillier, 1996) 
Mound Springs of the Great Artesian Basin in South Australia: A case study 
from Olympic Dam (Mudd, 2000) (also represents Aboriginal group’s interests) 
The Sustainability of Use of Groundwater from the South-Western Edge of the 
Great Artesian Basin with Particular Reference to the Impact on the Mound 
Springs of the Borefields of Western mining Corporation (Keane, 1997) (also 
represents Aboriginal group’s interests) 
 
Web Documents from NGOs 
(Great Artesian Basin Protection Group) 
Impact of Olympic Dam/ Roxby Downs 2009 
Management History 2009 
Submission 2009  
Government Documents 2009 
 
(Save the Basin) 




BHP Billiton Assertion 2011 
Read What the Minister for water says 2011 
 
(Friend of the Earth) 
Campaign: Expansion of Roxby Downs 2011 
 
(Friend of the Earth Australia) 
Watered Down Negotiations - WMC Picks Both Sides 1996 
Summary + Articles re Olympic Dam Mine Expansion 2011 
 
(Friend of the Earth Adelaide) 
Above the Law? Roxby Downs and BHP Billiton’s Legal Privileges 2006 
 
Media 
‘Corporate Abuse’ hits Great Artesian Basin 2009 
Protect the Great Artesian Basin! Stop Olympic Dam! 2011(also represents 
Aboriginal group’s interests) 
BHP gets Approval for World’s Largest Open Pit Mine 2011 
S.A. Government and BHP Billiton sign Olympic Dam Deal 2011 
Industry Welcomes Uranium Mine Expansion 2011 (also represents Aboriginal 
group’s interests) 
S.A. Greens fault BHP’s Olympic Dam safeguards 2011 
Greens leader Mark Parnell has Welcomed 2011 
In an effort to improve benefits for South 2011 
 
Australian Greens’ Public Release: 
Mark Parnell Speech (Parliamentary Debates) 




Greens Bill: Roxby Downs (Indenture Ratification) (Application of Acts) 
Amendment Bill 2007 
South Australia, Legislative Council, Parliamentary Debates 2011 
 
While the use of market institutions’ social and environmental disclosures and 
hierarchy institutions’ regulatory disclosures help to ameliorate the researcher bias, 
this bias seems to prevail more in the alternative disclosures representing the 
perspectives of civil society. To mitigate this bias, information was captured from a 
wide range of media outlets which are syndicated sharing identical contents. These 
articles were then scrutinised with tracing of further references before information 
was selected based on its relevance to the BHP OD’s mining operation and its social 
and environmental effects on the GAB groundwater system. To further augment 
editorial bias, the selected information was paraphrased closely or quoted directly to 
compile the alternative accounts. It is important to note that while these accounts 
comprised of externally sourced and web-based information can also be biased, 
subjective and partisan (Spence, 2009), they are argued to perform a “balancing view 
in the face of the considerable resources that organisations have at their disposal” 
(Gibson, Gray, Laing & Dey, 2001, p. 1) and “will be almost bound to improve on 
the accounts that the average company will prepare on and by itself” (Medawar, 
1976, p. 394). 
  Method and approach  5.9
The data analysis for this study is an iterative process, which occurs both during and 
after the data collection. It includes six stages. At the first stage, a wide range of 
publicly available disclosure documents related to the GAB water risk debate were 
searched, gathered and read through so as to generate a broad picture for identifying 
important sustainability issues and major stakeholder groups. The complete dataset 
consists of 37 documents from market institutions, 17 documents from hierarchy 
institutions and 101 documents from border institutions (Section 5.8). 
At the second stage, the emphasis was on a discussion of whether the GAB 
groundwater system is ‘replenishable’ or ‘inrechargeable’ (see Chapter 7); a public 
dispute over the economic, social and environmental benefits deriving from BHP 




potential social and environmental consequences (re) allocated to different 
institutional groups within society triggered by GAB water resource management 
and planning activity led by government agencies (see Chapter 9).  Relevant excerpts 
from these discussions are collected into three databases, one for each institution. It 
is notable that these three major debates had been narrowed down and developed 
into three themes for data analysis in the fifth stage. 
At the third stage, the focus was on rhetorical effects of risk-related reasoning and 
argumentations employed by three institutions - the market (BHP, BHP OD, WMC 
and other mining related associations); the hierarchy (the Australian Federal 
government, South Australian government and their scientists), and the border (civil 
society). Burkean rhetoric criticism was applied to cultural risk theory (Chapter 6, 
Section 6.3) to identify features, functions and implications of each institutional risk 
discursive practices. Making those theoretical elements explicit in turn provides 
analytical scaffolding against which the compilation and evaluation of three different 
sets of accounts could be facilitated. 
There are nine risk-based sustainability notions which form major concepts of 
cultural risk theory (see Chapter 6, Table 6.1). They are ‘preferred learning style’ 
(feature), ‘view of nature’ (function), ‘property of knowledge ideal’ (implication), 
‘attitude towards technology’ (feature), ‘view of risk’ (function), ‘resolution of risk’ 
(implication), ‘cause of ecological crisis’ (feature), ‘view of justice and fairness’ 
(function) and ‘property of desired system’ (implication). These nine concepts were 
specifically identified for the GAB water risk debate arising from BHP OD’s mining 
operation, and they enable researcher to align contents of the market institution’s 
water accounts to those from hierarchy institutions and border institutions. 
At the fourth stage, three databases were re-read individually to highlight and code 
contents that are reflective of and consistent with those nine concepts of cultural risk 
theory. The close paraphrasing and/or the direct quote from these contents (excerpts) 
are recorded and collated into three sets of accounts - one for market institutions, one 
for hierarchy and one for border institutions. The purpose of this stage is to handle an 
otherwise unmanageable body of text to compile parallel (aligned and/or counter) 




At the fifth stage, both cultural risk theory and the comparative information in three 
sets of accounts were read through for numerous rounds to facilitate the 
interpretation of different institutional risk discursive practices against nine risk-
based sustainability theoretical concepts. This iterative analysis aided the 
development of a taxonomy (categorisation and formation) of three somewhat 
coherent stories/themes (Chapter 7, 8, 9) - on how the ideology or value system 
inscribed in corporate disclosure is aligned with or differs from that in governmental 
regulatory disclosures, and how these normalised and taken-for-granted assumptions 
of business and (sometimes) government are resisted and challenged by the NGOs, 
environmental activists and Aboriginal groups from civil society.  
At the final stage, the interpretation of corporate narratives and governmental 
narratives, juxtaposed with the counter-narratives from civil society for three themes 
were scrutinised and reorganised individually (with the guidance of supervisors), for 
further discussions of implications on three critical accounting themes - ‘concept of 
control’ (see Chapter 7, Section 7.4); ‘stewardship’ (see Chapter 8, Section 8.4) and 
‘economic consequences’ (see Chapter 9, Section 9.4). Accountability ‘gaps’ were 
also identified -  between managerial accountability (from corporate claim); 
administrative accountability (from governmental talk) and moral accountability 
(from counter-narrative), corresponding to the social and environmental impacts that 
BHP OD’s mining operation has on the GAB groundwater system. This thesis 
therefore echoes the call for a dialogical accounting approach to accounting which 
promotes democratic participation in a ‘polylogic’ society (Brown, 2009; Gray, 
1992). 
 Summary 5.10
This chapter presented the method adopted, the relevant data and process of data 
analysis used in this thesis. This thesis explores the GAB water risk debate by 
compiling and analysing three sets of accounts from market, hierarchy and border 
institutions’ disclosures respectively, resonant with a critical accounting approach. 
The interpretive structuralist approach to discourse analysis explicitly emphasises the 
subjective nature of the sense-making and interpretive process. The method of 




different levels - grammar, rhetoric and logology with a focus on concepts such as 
the pentad, identification, hierarchy, order and terministic screens.  
Given that allocative hydro-politics are necessarily discursive due to contending 
articulated concerns (Allan, 2005), discourse analysis in general and rhetorical 
criticism in particular are considered as the appropriate research method for this 
thesis to investigate accounting and alternative (including counter) accounting 
information and discourse dynamics of this political contest with regard to the GAB 
water debate. In practice, data collection and analysis was conducted through 
numerous rounds of reading and organising major themes of disclosure documents 
from three institutions, based on the cultural risk theory. The next chapter introduces 
a cultural risk theory (Douglas, 1970; Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982) to assist the 





CHAPTER 6 CULTURAL RISK THEORY 
 Introduction 6.1
The previous chapter explained the research method used in the thesis to examine 
how the contested Great Artesian Basin (GAB) water disclosure is manifest through 
cultural risk perceptions and practices. Given the methodological assumption in 
Chapter 4, risks are recognised and selected by cultural norms, standards and 
constraints (Cheit, 1983; Park, 2010). This chapter introduces cultural risk theory 
(Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982) to facilitate an interpretation of institutional discourse 
with  respect to the GAB water risk. 
The cultural risk theory informed by the Grid/Group typology (Douglas, 1970) and 
the Risk and Culture model  (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982), and further developed by 
Thompson et al., (1990), Schwarz and Thompson (1990) and Thompson and Rayner 
(1998) provides four (including three active, one inert and passive) institutional 
typologies and explicates different institutional positions and responses towards the 
GAB water governance related politics, technology and social choice within a 
context of sustainable development. According to cultural risk theory, it is these 
different risk perspectives that trigger the debate in the form of contested water 
disclosures. Therefore, each institutional risk discourse can be understood as 
rhetorical in nature. 
Since Burkean rhetorical criticism outlined in Chapter 5 identifies and interprets the 
features, functions and implications of discursive practices (Stillar, 1998), applying 
this framework to cultural risk theory allows the researcher to identify various 
notions of conceptualising risk-based sustainability, its associated features, functions 
and implications of each institutional groups’ risk discourse. In this thesis, these are: 
preferred learning style (feature); view of nature (function); properties of knowledge 
ideal (implication); attitude towards technology (feature); view of risk (function); 
resolution of risk (implication); cause of ecological crisis (feature); view of justice 
and fairness (function); and, properties of desired system (implication).  
These nine concepts in turn are linked to three accounting and accountability related 
themes. Preferred learning style, view of nature and property of knowledge ideals 




accounting concept of control with associated accounting recognition and 
measurement rules. Institutional assumptions about the attitude towards technology, 
and a view of risk and risk resolution, facilitate the understanding of the stewardship 
debate from both mainstream and critical accounting perspectives. Institutional 
perceptions of the cause of the ecological crisis, view of justice and fairness and 
property of desired system enable an analysis of resource allocation issue and its 
associated economic consequences arguments, to further understand accounting and 
accountability. 
This chapter first introduces cultural risk theory in general (Douglas, 1970; Douglas 
& Wildavsky, 1982) (Section 6.2). The three fold Burkean framework of rhetorical 
criticism is then applied to cultural risk theory to tease out the theoretical elements 
for each institutional risk discursive practice (Section 6.3). Three critical themes 
derived from these institutional discourses are finally discussed with an implication 
for accounting research and practice (Section 6.4).  
 Cultural risk theory 6.2
A cultural theory of risk suggests that any particular view or position of individuals 
towards risk is shaped by the beliefs and values of the cultural group to which they 
belong (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982; Tansey & O'Riordan, 1999). Risk therefore, 
can be seen as a social choice and cultural selection which is constructed for 
defending a particular way of life (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982; Moerman & van der 
Laan, 2012; Reddy, 1996). In this thesis, a cultural risk perspective is used to 
critically explore the underlying assumptions for contentious water related 
disclosures and accountability discourses. Cultural theories of risk originally derived 
from the early studies of ritual in tribal communities (Krimsky, 1992; Rayner, 1992; 
Renn, 1992). American anthropologist Mary Douglas, with her colleagues, 
investigated ‘forbidden’ activities in tribal societies and identified several generic 
value clusters and cultural patterns that form early organizational principles in tribal 
groups (Douglas, 1966; Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982). According to these principles, 
different groups develop particular risk positions and strategies to reinforce the 




Like African tribal communities, organisations, social groups or societies in 
contemporary western society use the notion of risk as a modern strategy to 
“establish and maintain conceptual boundaries between self and other” (Lupton, 
1999, pp. 24-25). As the role of taboo in tribal cultures is to protect the tribe from 
certain destabilising behaviour, the symbolic aspects of perceptions about purity, 
pollution and otherness are linked to risk and serve to bolster social cohesion and 
fend off threats of disorder (Douglas, 1966; Lupton, 1999). Risk is understood from 
a cultural perspective as the offence or violation of cultural values and expectations. 
Emotions such as anger, fear, desperation or hatred are manifestations of risk 
(Lupton, 1999). 
Cultural risk frameworks were developed to explain various risk phenomena, such as 
how different social and cultural structures influence individual risk perceptions and 
accepted levels of risk e.g. Grid/Group typology (Douglas, 1970; Douglas, 1985; 
Thompson, 1980) and institutional-biased political debate and policy decision-
making e.g. Risk and Culture model (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982). In this thesis, the 
institutional debate of GAB water related risks from BHP OD’s GAB water 
extraction and its proposed ODEP are analysed, using the combination of 
Grid/Group typology and Risk and Culture model. The unit of analysis is an 
‘aggregate of individuals’ i.e. the institutional group. According to Douglas (1985, p. 
67), culture is  
[the] actively invoked conventional wisdom...[and] the publicly shared collection 
of principles and values used at any one time to justify behaviour...[and] uphold 
the forms of institutional life.  
In this sense, people who live in a particular social institution are affected and 
monitored by its norms, standards and constraints (Cheit, 1983; Park, 2010). It is 
these institutional processes and cultural dynamics that mediate “social patterns and 
relationships” (Moerman & van der Laan, 2012, p. 110) and determine risk selection 
(Bowen, 1995; Elliott, 1983).  
[T]he choice of risks to worry about depends on the social forms selected. The 
choice of risk and the choice of how to live are taken together. Each form of 
social life has its own typical risk portfolio. Common values lead to common 
fears... This cultural bias is integral to social organization. Risk taking and risk 




to organize social relations. For to organize means to organize some things in and 
other things out (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982, p. 8). 
As such, culture is considered as “the coding principle” (Douglas, 1985, p. 68) 
through which risks are recognised, selected and framed, usually inseparable from 
public ideas and issues associated with justice, power and legitimacy (Moerman & 
van der Laan, 2012; Tansey & O'Riordan, 1999). These predefined codes or 
categories constitute and stablise sets of meaning to facilitate communication and 
decision-making of any new phenomenon within society (Douglas & Wildavsky, 
1982).  
The Grid/Group typology has been developed from ethnographic studies (Douglas, 
1970). According to the Grid/Group typology, there are four principal ways of 
perceiving and structuring human relations (Douglas, 1970). Each cultural unit 
unfolds in contradistinction to one another which constitute a continuous “cultural 
dialogue” (Linsley & Shrives, 2014, p. 757) of which ways of defining, valuing and 
resolving social issues should be supported (Ney & Thompson, 2011). In Douglas’ 
(2013, p. 290) words, “[a]t all times, a culture is responding to the individual culture 
bearers and how they are dealing with each other.” 
The Grid scale measures the extent of role differentiation and social classification 
that individuals as social actors are constrained. Group scale, by contrast, is 
concerned with the degree of collective commitment to which those social beings are 
subjected (Douglas, 1970; Ney & Thompson, 2011; Schwarz & Thompson, 1990). A 
high-grid state stands for a significant bundle of social constraints on interacting 
social members. Distribution of roles here are dependent on the explicit social 
stratification, such as gender, age, colour, hierarchical position, and so on (Douglas, 
1970; Linsley & Shrives, 2009; Ney & Thompson, 2011).A low-grid state indicates 
the weak limits of classificatory differentiation on the range of social activities and 
options open to social members. Social roles here can be chosen freely without 
prejudice, depending on either personal capacities of competing or negotiating for 
them; or formal policies ensuring equal opportunity for competition (Linsley & 
Shrives, 2009; Ney & Thompson, 2011). 
A high-group state designates that there are strongly shared aims and tight social 




with little or no cohesion between people and sparse sense of interdependence 
(Linsley & Shrives, 2009; Ney & Thompson, 2011).Overall, the Grid/Group 
typology gives rise to four cultural solidarities: individualists (low grid, low group), 
hierarchists (high grid, high group), egalitarians (low grid, high group) and fatalists 
(high grid, low group). 
 
 
Figure 6.1 Grid/Group Model 
Source: Douglas (1982, in Linsley & Shrives, 2009, p. 495) 
Individualistic solidarity emphasises the individual autonomy and the resultant 
freedom to transact with each other. The principal motivation underlying such 
alliance is to gain resources with no binding loyalty to others (Linsley & Shrives, 
2009, 2014). As Douglas (2003, p. 1358) asserts, individualists are “expected to go 
forth entrepreneurially, get new ideas, work hard, and compete for esteem and 
income”. 
Hierarchical solidarity respects hierarchical values and procedural rules (Douglas, 
1985). Social roles within such solidarity are well-defined; where customs and 
traditions constitute an important component of institutional life (Linsley & Shrives, 
2009). Being faithful to stability, hierarchical solidarity emphasises maintaining 
boundaries, both internally and externally (Linsley & Shrives, 2009). 
Egalitarian solidarity stresses the wellbeing of the group and the level of 
commitment, which results in a constraint on human self-interested behaviours, with 




close-knit nature of such solidarity, social roles for individuals are unrestricted and it 
is difficult to establish and assert authority (Linsley & Shrives, 2014). 
Fatalist solidarity is the final classification where individuals are highly restricted 
with respect to the selection of social roles and little opportunity for self-
determination (Linsley & Shrives, 2009). In addition, members of this solidarity are 
relatively inert, isolated and alienated with little sense of community (Linsley & 
Shrives, 2014). 
Built upon Grid/Group typology, the further development of Risk and Culture model 
(Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982) assumes that cultural theory can also be applicable to 
the analyses of policy actors beyond individuals and their social context. In this 
model, institutional values equalise the concept of individual risk perception (Cheit, 
1983). 
According to Douglas and Wildavsky (1982), a social system embraces ‘the centre’ 
and ‘the border’. The centre institutions consist of market (individualistic) and 
hierarchy (hierarchical) cultures, whereas the border institutions are characterised by 
sectarian (egalitarian) interests. These three types of institutions have distinct ideas 
and theories regarding proper or improper social organisation (Park, 2010), and they 
participate in public debate and decision-making either through exerting power or 
monitoring the powerful (Cheit, 1983; Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982). 
It is notable that it is only these three active solidarities - the individualistic, the 
hierarchical and the egalitarians are explicitly and positively involved in policy-
setting through different but complementary ways (Ney & Thompson, 2011; 
Schwarz & Thompson, 1990). Fatalists, in contrast, are those passive individuals 
whom each active solidarity seeks to mobilise in order to advance their cause 
(Schwarz & Thompson, 1990). Market institutions made up of individualists 
champion the system of free market and seek to maximise utility (Douglas & 
Wildavsky, 1982). They believe in “a means-end rationality” (Douglas, 1985, p. 87) 
which results in implicit controls and favours self-regulation (Lupton, 1999; Park, 
2010). Viewing economic risks as the most significant threat, market institutions 
value fair play and protected contracts in an exchange system, and introduce 




(Moerman & van der Laan, 2012) to solve common problems. However, risks are 
not necessarily regarded as negative, as they also offer opportunities (Douglas & 
Wildavsky, 1982; Linsley & Shrives, 2009; Moerman & van der Laan, 2012). 
Market institutions are oriented towards the present, and therefore assume a short-
term perspective of risk (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982). 
Within hierarchy institutions comprising hierarchists, the system of justice rewards 
loyalty and punishes unorthodox attitudes and behaviours through regulations 
(Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982; Elliott, 1983; Linsley & Shrives, 2009). Hierarchies 
tend to have “multiple... vague... [and] modest” objectives, and correspondingly the 
decision making process is “incremental; remedial and serial” (Douglas & 
Wildavsky, 1982, p. 93). Actions, such as foreign attacks that undermine 
institutional order and rules, are deemed most threatening. Economic risks are 
acceptable to the degree that they are manageable within standardized operating 
procedures (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982; Jaeger, Renn, Rosa & Webler, 2001). As 
such, hierarchies are often dependent on professional knowledge and expertise 
(Linsley & Shrives, 2009; Moerman & van der Laan, 2012). 
Despite divergent views between market and hierarchy institutions, they adopt 
similar ideas and understandings of risk and danger (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982), 
and coexist and collaborate to some extent as the ‘centre’ (Elliott, 1983; Linsley & 
Shrives, 2009). When interests of both institutions intersect, their power becomes 
formidable (Linsley & Shrives, 2009; Moerman & van der Laan, 2012), and risks are 
considered “properly managed” within the centre, “unless social disorder exists” 
(Durkin, 1990, p. 5). 
Border or periphery institutions consist of sectarian (egalitarian) groups, which 
recruit and bind members in opposition to the centre organisations (Douglas & 
Wildavsky, 1982). Concepts such as equality and justice reside in the border 
(Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982; Linsley & Shrives, 2009) and often criticise the 
injustice and inequity perpetuated by the centre institutions (Douglas & Wildavsky, 
1982; Moerman & van der Laan, 2012; Tansey & O'Riordan, 1999) e.g. the 




individuals “align themselves with the border”, the centre institutions are seen as 
failing to manage risks and these “risks become social” (Durkin, 1990, p. 5). 
Fatalist solidarity, on the other hand, incorporates passive outsiders for both centre 
and border institutions. These marginal members of society perceive the world as 
‘capricious’ and human beings as untrustworthy (Ney & Thompson, 2011; Schwarz 
& Thompson, 1990). The resulting submissive towards risk and fairness therefore is 
that there can be no control over any event and themselves resign as merely victims 
of fate (Linsley & Shrives, 2009, 2014). For fatalists, “[s]preading democracy and 
peace around the world maybe a lofty endeavour, but it is not a realistic goal… 
everyone has to fend for themselves, which the devil takes the hindmost”36(Ney & 
Thompson, 2011, p. 38). 
Although fatalist solidarity is found to produce no policy suggestion, they still 
remain relevant to these potential policies. As Schwarz & Thompson (1990, p. 10) 
contend: 
They are the great risk absorbers, enduring with more or less dignity, greater or 
lesser ignorance, whatever comes their way: a social sponge that the active 
policy-makers, in their different ways, publicly wring their hands over and 
privately make good use of. 
As such, without fatalists, the rest of the society would not be capable to implement 
their favoured policies (Schwarz & Thompson, 1990).The combination of 
Grid/Group typology and Risk and Culture model provides a theoretical framework, 
not only to explicitly acknowledge the diverse institutional responses to manage 
risks, but also to answer questions about the policy decision-making process (Park, 
2010, p. 82) - [w]hy policy makers and stakeholders support different policies; how 
the policy agenda changes; why different societies focus on different policy issues, 
and so on”. Cultural risk theory has also been expanded by other scholars to 
synthesise a more recent intellectual development in natural resource ecology and 
anthropology, to further conceptualise politics; technology; and, social choice 
                                                 
36 According to Ney and Thompson (2011, p. 40), however, “this ‘non-story’ also contains a kernel of truth. Sometimes, a 
social ill – however pressing it may seem or feel - maybe unsolvable for instance due to its sheer complexity. In fact, it may 
happen that any attempts to address the issue end up making matters worse. In those cases, the resignation that this way of life 





against a backdrop of sustainable development (e.g. Schwarz & Thompson, 1990; 
Thompson & Rayner, 1998). 
This theoretical framework enables an analysis of different positions taken by market 
institutions (represented by BHP Billiton Olympic Dam Corporation Pty Ltd (BHP 
OD)); hierarchy institutions (represented by Federal, and South Australia 
governments); and border institutions (represented by civil society), regarding GAB 
water related risks from BHP OD’s GAB water extraction and its further proposal of 
Olympic Dam Expansion Project (ODEP) (Justifications are provided in Chapter 7, 8, 
and 9). BHP and BHP OD are identified as market institutions since they 
demonstrate an overriding goal of profit maximisation and shareholder value. The 
hierarchy institutions are identified being represented by the Australian Federal and 
South Australian governments that regulate the GAB water allocation regimes and 
corporate activities. The border institutions are identified as members from civil 
society, including Non-Government Organisations (NGOs), environmental activists 
and Aboriginal groups who are high-profile GAB conservationists protesting against 
BHP OD’s water intake for its mining operations. There are no identified responses 
and positions from fatalist solidarity - such a result from data collect has also, 
unsurprisingly, reflected and reinforced the theoretical suggestion and expectation. 
Table 6.1 Main Representors of Centre and Border Institutions 
Centre Border 
Market Institutions Hierarchy Institutions Border Institutions 
BHP & BHP OD Australian Federal Government 




This cultural risk theory (Douglas, 1970; Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982) facilitates an 
understanding of how “risk-related discourse and strategies” operate within centre 
institutions, and how they are “negotiated and resisted by those who are the subject 
of them [mainly members from border institutions]” (Lupton, 1999, p. 102). The 
next section presents three themes of cultural risk theory, with the application of the 




 Application of Burkean rhetorical criticism to cultural risk theory  6.3
As explicated in Chapter 5, the Burkean framework of rhetorical criticism comprises 
three complex but complementary vocabularies to enable researcher to identify 
structures, features, relationships, functions and implications of symbolic action. 
While grammatical analysis emphasises the way language patterns index, construct 
and embrace motives, rhetorical analysis focuses on the overriding function of 
language - to overcome division and reinforce unity as symbolic action (Stillar, 
1998). Logological analysis on the other hand, discusses social conditions and 
consequences of symbolic actions (Stillar, 1998). This three-fold theoretical 
framework as a method enables the identification and interpretation of “significant, 
salient features and functions” of symbolic actions or discursive practices (Stillar, 
1998, p. 88). 
Cultural theory of risk considers positions of risk as they are shaped by cultural 
beliefs and values (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982). Different meanings of risk are 
manifest through three institutional risk discourses, to facilitate communication and 
decision-making within society. Each institutional risk discourse or symbolic action 
can be understood as rhetoric in nature, since distinctive risk perspectives are viewed 
as social choice and cultural selection constructed for defending a particular way of 
life (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982). Applying the three-fold Burkean framework of 
rhetorical criticism to cultural risk theory allows a researcher to identify features, 
functions and implications of each institutional risk discursive practice. Teasing out 
these theoretical concepts explicitly in turn, provides an analytical scaffolding to 
facilitate an interpretation of the GAB water risk debate (Chapter 7, 8, 9). 
There are nine concepts of risk-based sustainability, representing features, functions 
and implications of three institutional discourses (Table 6.2). According to Stillar 
(1998), Burkean grammatical analysis focuses on vocabularies and the structure of 
texts used to construct motive. In the case of cultural risk theory, market, hierarchy 
and border institutions represent diverse learning styles, attitudes towards technology 
and causes of ecological crisis to motivate or block certain understandings and shape 
predispositions toward cooperative action (Livesey, 2002a; Peterson, 1997). 
Drawing on grammatical resources, Burkean rhetorical analysis deals with the role of 




point of unity on the other (Stillar, 1998). In the case of cultural risk theory, market, 
hierarchy and border institutions, by representing diverse learning styles, attitudes 
towards technology and causes of ecological crisis, identify different social orders 
related to views of nature, risk, justice and fairness. These institutions gather 
audiences who share interests and have a common stake in those social orders 
through rhetorical acts (Stillar, 1998). 
Burkean logological analysis complements grammatical and rhetorical analysis with 
concerns about the social conditions and consequences of symbolic action (Stillar, 
1998). In the case of cultural risk theory, market and hierarchy (centre) institutions’ 
symbolic actions, whilst representing their preferred learning style, attitudes towards 
technology and causes of ecological crisis and identifying certain social orders 
related to views of nature, risk and justice and fairness; create hierarchising and 
separating effects, which produce and reproduce divisions and inequities in social 
systems (Livesey, 2001; Stillar, 1998). These hierarchising and separating effects are 
derived in respect of properties of knowledge ideal, resolution of risk and properties 
of a desired system. The paradoxes and controversies (see Chapter 5, Section 5.6.1.3) 
inherent in the centre institutions’ logonomic system in general, and terministic 
screens in particular, open doors for resistance and transformation by border 
institutions. In Selzer’s (2004, pp. 264-265) words, logonomic systems and 
terministic screens of the centre institutions need to be “counterbalanced” by those 
from border institutions.  
In this section, the major concepts of cultural risk theory are presented in Table 6.1 





Table 6.2 Application of Burkean Rhetorical Criticism Framework to Cultural Risk 
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Adapted from: Schwarz and Thompson (1990, pp. 66-67, see also Ney & Thompson, 2011; 
1990; Thompson, 1980; Thompson et al., 1990; Thompson & Rayner, 1998) 
 Preferred learning style, View of nature and Properties of knowledge ideal 6.3.1
In this study, market, hierarchy and border institutions represent diverse learning 
styles to motivate certain understandings of sustainable development and shape 
attitudes towards cooperative action. These different learning styles, in turn, identify 
different social orders regarding the view of nature and revealed through different 
sets of discourses. These discourses are symbolic actions of market and hierarchy 
(centre) institutions. They have hierarchising and separating effects in respect of 
properties of their knowledge ideals. These paradoxes and controversies are 




6.3.1.1 Grammatical analysis - Preferred learning style 
Contested learning styles in the broader context of sustainable development are 
constructed by market, hierarchy and border institutions through discursive practices. 
Market institutions are agents who support the development of modern science as 
agency against the backdrop of modernisation (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982). Since 
scientific knowledge “make[s] us modern…[and] advanced statistics enable us to 
calculate [the risks]” (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982, p. 29), market institutions’ 
purpose is to control and manage natural resources and “rule the world” (Douglas & 
Wildavsky, 1982, p. 30) through acts which prompt “bold experimentation in the 
face of uncertainty” (Thompson et al., 1990, p. 27). Quantification is constructed by 
market institutions as “a method of stating problems” (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982, 
p. 101). A trust in quantification is manifest through the construction of risk 
probability (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982). 
However, although science is said to have broadened the area of the unknown to a 
certain degree, scientific development such as probabilistic risk analysis is 
characterised by market institutions as an ever-evolving process, and therefore is 
subject to error and uncertainty (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982). For example, 
scientific efforts are said to entail possibly negative results due to false assumptions, 
defective measures, faulty data, and poorly-conducted experiments (Douglas & 
Wildavsky, 1982). In this thesis, border institutions believe that the centre 
institutions’ assumption of the ‘rechargeability’ of the GAB is flawed and BHP 
OD’s modelling studies are faulty due to simplistic models and limited data (Chapter 
7, Section 7.3.1). 
Hierarchy institutions construct themselves as agents that know about the boundary 
line between nature’s equilibrium and disequilibrium zones, in respect of human 
intervention (Thompson et al., 1990). Since hierarchy institutions believe that the 
ecosystem can only be stable within certain limits of human interaction - neither 
‘unbridled interference’ nor the ‘tiptoe response’ is the moral concern (Thompson et 
al., 1990). Therefore expert knowledge, based on the assumption that certified 
experts can generate objective and true knowledge (Ney & Thompson, 2011) 
becomes the agency for determining limits and predicting certainty, matched within 




As such, hierarchy institutions construct an unshakable faith in expert predictions for 
“a comprehensive, objective and balanced view of the subjective matter” (Ney & 
Thompson, 2011, p. 65). While this view reflects “the mainstream academic 
literature and are supported by thousands of scientists” (Ney & Thompson, 2011, 
p.66), this hierarchical way of processing ‘valid information’ is congruent with that 
of the market, both believing in the authority of science and expertise.  
As noted by Douglas and Wildavsky (1982), hierarchists believe in the limitations of 
calculations. They therefore construct professional knowledge as subject to a 
continuously evolving and updated process. This view is consistent with the trial and 
error learning style of the market institutions.  
Again, and for different reasons, their bias on risks coincides. Hierarchists can 
take free- lance entrepreneurs and brokers for advisers because there is sufficient 
understanding between them (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982, p. 100). 
Border institutions construct themselves as agents whose act is characterised by 
“timorous forbearance” which necessitates “effective sanction” for prevention of any 
possible catastrophe (Thompson et al., 1990, p. 27). Border institutions believe that 
the act of bold experimentation and continuous trial and error processes from centre 
institutions are a way of regulating institutional life that is culpable and more likely 
to cause irreversible damage (Thompson et al., 1990). Border institutions insist that 
holistic knowledge, as the agent, is the key to understanding and protecting a fragile 
nature with depleting resources (Ney & Thompson, 2011). Therefore, border 
institutions tend to collect, organise and reveal hidden assumptions, flawed 
experiments and limited data which are usually excluded from market and hierarchy 
(centre) institutions’ disclosures to the public (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982).  
As constructed by border institutions, the degree of knowledge completeness does 
not only require the acknowledgement of non-scientific knowledge, but also 
embraces that knowledge beyond the field of formal scientific inquiry. Aboriginal 
knowledge for example, has taught that life in all kinds of forms are connected 





6.3.1.2 Rhetorical analysis - View of nature 
Based on a view of science as the appropriate agency for learning style, market 
institutions believe they are intelligent and informed human agents who conquer and 
improve nature based on ingenuity (Ostrander, 1982). This is enacted by market 
institutions by framing public interest in “a wonderfully robust and bountiful natural 
world” with abundant resources (Ney & Thompson, 2011, p. 48). A hierarchy or 
social order between nature and humans is subsequently constructed. Market 
institutions promptly advocate the myth of a “[b]enign” nature (Ney & Thompson, 
2011, p. 48), which is “morally neutral” (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982, p. 29), 
resilient and able to accommodate change (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982; Ney & 
Thompson, 2011). In Douglas and Wildavsky’s (1982, p. 63) words, “Mother Nature 
[is] merely secreting a healthy amount of dirt”.  
Drawing upon expert knowledge as the agency for learning style, hierarchy 
institutions exploit the strategy of identification with public interest by constructing 
themselves as responsible human agents who protect nature within ecological 
boundaries (Thompson et al., 1990). Hierarchy institutions consequently establish a 
hierarchy or social order discursively. Nature is constructed as a scarce, albeit stable, 
resource with “precise and knowable limits” (Schwarz & Thompson, 1990, p. 65). 
When pushed beyond those limits, nature becomes vulnerable to catastrophic 
consequences (Thompson et al., 1990). Human society and nature are said to be 
inseparable from each other. Indeed, their synthesis is seen as ‘in harmony’ and 
“necessary to everyone’s wellbeing” (Ostrander, 1982, p. 26). 
Although hierarchies acknowledge that irresponsible human behaviour has affected 
ecosystems negatively, they believe that humankind can still remedy this matter by 
using natural resources more sustainably (Ney & Thompson, 2011). This is similar 
to the border institutions view; except that the hierarchy believe that ecosystems are 
stable when human beings interfere with them within the boundaries discovered and 
determined by experts (Ney & Thompson, 2011). 
While constructing holistic knowledge as the appropriate agency for learning style, 
border institutions promote identification with the public by framing themselves as 




1990), permitting “life in its varied and beautiful forms to continue” (Douglas & 
Wildavsky, 1982, p. 135). 
Border institutions identify the acts from the market and hierarchy institutions as 
guilty and culpable because human activities have brought disastrous physical 
consequences that have accelerated the extinction of countless species (Ney & 
Thompson, 2011). This catastrophic environmental degradation also confronts and 
threatens human wellbeing (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982). Border institutions depict 
humankind as “standing on the very edge of the abyss of environmental catastrophe” 
(Thompson & Rayner, 1998, p. 294). 
Border institutions therefore construct a hierarchy and social order distinct from 
market and hierarchy institutions. ‘Ephemeral’ nature (Thompson et al., 1990), 
where nature is constructed as fragile with depleting resources, is prevalent (Schwarz 
& Thompson, 1990). Border institutions suggest that everything in the natural and 
social world is interconnected intricately (Ney & Thompson, 2011), and that this 
web of life is “so complicated that even small changes could have great importance” 
(Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982, p. 62). For border institutions, nature and society are 
said to be in equal position (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982). This is a utopian 
worldview of a balanced and harmonious ecosystem in which life of all forms exists 
“without political, economic and technological restraints” (Douglas & Wildavsky, 
1982, p. 136). 
6.3.1.3 Logological analysis - Properties of knowledge ideals 
While constructing science as an agent and identifying nature as having abundant 
resources, market institutions establish ‘objectivity’ as the terministic screen or 
“symbolic god-term” (Livesey, 2002b, p. 132) with respect to the properties of their 
knowledge ideal and to legitimate their preferred learning style and view of nature. 
According to Douglas and Wildavsky (1982), what underpins any scientific method 
is ostensible objectivity. Probabilistic risk calculation for instance, conveys the 
delusion of a value-free practice. As Douglas and Wildvasky (1982, p. 71) contend:  
Objectivity means preventing subjective values from interfering with the 
analysis. Put the figures in, work out the probabilities, crank the handle, and the 




probabilities that are put into the calculation reflect the assigner's confidence that 
the events are likely to occur. Since the risk analyst who feeds the machine its 
data is only human, he cannot focus on all prospects with an equally steady gaze. 
As such, market institutions create hierarchising and separating effects producing 
and reproducing social divisions and inequalities in evaluating risks. According to 
Douglas and Wildavsky (1982), market institutions’ scientific experimentations are 
inadequate for judging whether some risks are ‘properly managed’ while others are 
worth taking due to the subjective value of the risk analyst (Douglas & Wildavsky, 
1982).  
Furthermore, scientific risk analysis, more often than not, “decontextualizes and 
dissocialises” human problems through quantification (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982, 
p. 80). Throughout the process of measuring, organising (including discriminating) 
and calculating, the market institution creates areas with “closely scrutinized and 
ordered” details, in contrast to the discriminated shadowed spots “in which nothing 
can be seen and no questions asked” (Douglas, 1986, p. 69). According to Douglas 
and Wildvasky (1982, p. 81), “science and risk assessment… explicitly try to 
exclude moral ideas about the good life. Where responsibility starts, they stop”. 
Hierarchy institutions, by constructing expert knowledge as the agent and identifying 
nature as stable within boundaries, use ‘procedural validation’ as the terministic 
screen with regards to properties of their knowledge ideal for legitimating their 
preferred social order and learning style. As Douglas (1986) contends, while 
hierarchy institutions insist their processes of gaining knowledge (along with that of 
market institutions) is consistent with mainstream science, it is extremely difficult to 
widen the field of knowledge, especially because it prefers to remain silent on those 
scientific inquiries which are in tension or contradictory. According to Douglas 
(1986, p. 77), “[o]ften when a new scientific discovery has been rejected and left to 
lie inert until later, it is precisely an idea which lacked formulaic interlocking with 
normal procedures of validation.” As such, hierarchists construct and control 
institutional memory by bringing certain knowledge events to its members’ minds 
while encouraging them to forget others (Douglas, 1986). 
This case can be exemplified by US governments’ position of economic hegemony 




representatives suggest that ‘global warming’ science is no more than a stumbling 
hypothesis to the complex questions of climate change. Human activity, from this 
perspective, is merely a tiny and possibly insignificant component within a colossal 
system. Climate change may be beneficial to promote forest and crop growth. This 
position from the US government creates the antagonistic relations between 
industrialised and developing economies in IPCC climate negotiations (Livesey, 
2002b). 
Evidently, hierarchy institutions create hierarchising and separating effects which 
(re)produce social divisions and inequities while determining what type of expert 
knowledge is legitimate and what kind of scientific evidence counts as credible (Ney 
& Thompson, 2011). According to Rayner (2012, p. 110), “institutionalised 
forgetfulness” is crucial to maintain institutional arrangements, and public memory 
as the storage system is for establishing the “social order” (Douglas, 1986, p. 70). 
The paradoxes and controversies inherent in the hierarchising and separating effects 
derived from properties of market and hierarchy (centre) institutions’ knowledge 
ideal provide opportunities for border institutions to resist and transform. Through 
the construction of holistic knowledge as agency and identification of nature as 
ephemeral and fragile, border institutions establish ‘imperfection’ as the terministic 
screen with respect to properties of their knowledge ideal, to legitimate their 
preferred social order and learning style. 
Since border institutions’ knowledge ideal is morally explicit, they acknowledge the 
“polarized and politicized” scientific community itself and make the frustrations over 
scientific disputes visible (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982, p. 65). From a border 
institution’s perspective, market and hierarchy (centre) institutions highlight some 
‘facts’ while obscuring others based on selective principles (Douglas, 1986). 
There is so much still out there [about the physical nature] capable of being 
established by objective scientific inquiry. Science works wonderfully; it has 
organized some of the facts. For the sake of coherence, the intellectual energy 
that develops a theoretical scheme makes grand leaps over abysses when the facts 
are thin. At the same time, it relegates to the background yesterday's facts, which 
belong in yesterday's theories (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982, p. 72). 
In other words, scientists from the centre institutions consign unused theoretical 




Wildavsky, 1982). As such, “feasible limits depend not on what nature will 
withstand but on what people will stand for” (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982, p. 64). 
While the distinctive value of centre institutions generates the basic scientific 
techniques of organisation, calculation and discrimination, this pertinent social order, 
from the perspective of the border institution, inevitably gives rise to “myopia” 
(Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982, p. 75). That is, non-knowledge or non-
acknowledgement of the known as “uncomfortable knowledge” (Rayner, 2012, p. 
107), serves as a political and ideological tool for centre institutions to impose 
‘involuntary risk’ on society (Douglas, 1986; Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982; Rayner, 
2012). “Involuntary risk” is those risks and damages caused by individuals who 
profit from others’ ignorance. This differs from voluntary risk undertaken by 
individuals knowingly in order to gain benefits (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982, p. 19). 
There are various cases showing that wilful non-disclosure is due to “economic self-
interest” and research funding and investments “serve to hide the truth” of potential 
environmental risks and pollution (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982, p. 59). Therefore, 
from a border institutions’ perspective, it is extant mainstream knowledge systems 
that causes environmental harm and fails to take prompt action (Douglas & 
Wildavsky, 1982). 
 Attitude towards technology, View of risk and Resolution of risk 6.3.2
Market, hierarchy and border institutions discursively represent diverse attitudes 
towards technology to motivate certain understandings of sustainable development 
and shape attitudes towards cooperative action. These different attitudes towards 
technology, in turn, lead to the identification of a different social order regarding the 
view of risk through different sets of discourse. These discourses or symbolic actions 
from market and hierarchy (centre) institutions have hierarchising and separating 
effects with respect to their resolution of risk. These paradoxes and controversies are 
challenged by border institutions through ‘counter’ discourses or symbolic actions 




6.3.2.1 Grammatical analysis - Attitude towards technology 
Contested attitudes towards technology in the broader context of sustainable 
development are constructed by market, hierarchy and border institutions through 
discursive practices. Market institutions are open to the view that technology is the 
agent of  social distinction and wealth generation (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982) 
because the unpredicted force of technological progress will mitigate unforeseeable 
harms (Thompson et al., 1990), and render the present ‘fuss’ over the environmental 
risk irrelevant in the near future (Thompson & Rayner, 1998). Market institutions’ 
purpose is to tackle environmental risks through technology and to increase the scale 
of economic production. This increased scale is said to, in turn, generate more 
economic (and environmental) benefits to enlarge the volume and velocity of the 
technology as well as widen the dissemination of innovation (Thompson & Rayner, 
1998). Technology is argued to facilitate “standard measures” and calculation, such 
as risk utility analysis (or cost-benefit analysis), in a “monetarised” economic system 
under the protection of legislation (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982, p. 95). 
Hierarchy institutions protect both economic growth and the environment (Douglas 
& Wildavsky, 1982). Like market institutions, technology as the agent is also 
favoured by hierarchy institutions (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982) and that a 
successful environmental policy can be carried out through technical adjustments to 
extant institutions (Thompson & Rayner, 1998). Hierarchy institutions prefer 
technology which demands specialised knowledge and expertise to set up and 
operate (Ney & Thompson, 2011). By doing so, they protect the standard measures 
introduced by market institutions (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982). 
Border institutions protest against technology as the agent supported by market and 
hierarchy institutions (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982). Since border institutions 
believe that modern technology is the main source of risk, they fear environmental 
pollution from dangerous technology. They insist that technologies tend to 
incorporate objectives, for example, economic facets only, and this solution creates 
difficulties when facing “social judgement” regarding environmental risks (Douglas 
& Wildavsky, 1982, p. 70).  Border institutions hold that natural resources are 
priceless and cannot be measured by any risk utility analysis (Douglas & Wildavsky, 




is the motto of the individualists in market institutions, they “are happy to operate at 
any size, to any technical specification, within their capabilities, providing it is cheap 
enough to make them a profit and cheerful enough to attract the punters” (Schwarz & 
Thompson, 1990, p. 11). Border institutions object to the ‘immoral’ exercise of the 
market and hierarchy (centre) institutions when nature is “bought and sold” (Douglas 
& Wildavsky, 1982, p. 67) and construct hidden dangers, emanating from 
technology, as an evil which will “enter and spoil” the centre institutions (Douglas & 
Wildavsky, 1982, p. 124). Technological pollution is representative of the “moral 
defects” (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982, p. 7) that manifest an “undemocratic 
unresponsiveness to individual needs” (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982, p. 149) and 
“unfeelingness for individual suffering” within society (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982, 
p. 127). 
6.3.2.2 Rhetorical analysis - View of risk 
Based on the construction of technologies as the appropriate agent with respect to 
risk attitude, market institutions are “the ingenious, inquiring and experimenting 
individual” (Thompson et al., 1990, p. 62), or informed agents who challenge and 
tackle environmental uncertainties boldly by transforming risks into opportunities 
(Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982). This role of agents is enacted by market institutions 
through the framing of public interest in terms of economic growth and suggests that 
citizens do not “lower standards of living by very much in order to reduce risk a little” 
(Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982, p. 67). Market institutions attempt to convince the 
public by constructing risk aversion as the main source of danger and risk avoiders 
as neglectful of “the danger[s] averted by new technology, or in advance of 
experience, the benefits or economic growth” (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982, pp. 27-
28).  
A hierarchy or social order between nature and risk attitudes is subsequently 
established. Market institutions construct nature as resilient and readily recoverable 
from any turbulence such as exploitation (Ney & Thompson, 2011), and reject the 
idea of limited natural resources as it perceives nature as “a raw material on which 
human skill, knowledge, and daring have been successfully focused” (Thompson et 
al., 1990, p. 62). Risk responses that fit into this environment are characterised as do 




said to be opportunities ready to be exploited by entrepreneurs for individual rewards 
(Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982; Ney & Thompson, 2011; Schwarz & Thompson, 1990; 
Thompson et al., 1990). 
Hierarchy institutions construct sustainable development as “meeting the needs of 
the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own 
needs” (Brundtland, 1987, p. 8). Although the market individualist risk-taking 
behaviour might be rational to meet human needs and wants, the overall outcome 
from economic growth is argued to be environmentally detrimental (Ney & 
Thompson, 2011; Thompson & Rayner, 1998). This statement coincides with the 
normative view of the border institutions, yet it differs in terms of the solution that it 
suggests (Thompson & Rayner, 1998). Accordingly, complete risk aversion 
responses are impractical. A “social upheaval” would only make things worse 
(Thompson & Rayner, 1998, p. 305). 
Hierarchy institutions consequently establish a hierarchy or social order which 
constructs risk as beyond those precise boundaries knowable to relevant experts 
(Schwarz & Thompson, 1990). The challenge for scarce natural resources for 
hierarchy institutions is not to stop economic development, but to find the 
appropriate rules, including legislation, for stronger governance to preserve the 
advantages of economic growth, while leaving sufficient resources for the 
community (Ney & Thompson, 2011). Decision-making in the hierarchy institution 
is “incremental, remedial and serial” (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982, p. 93). 
Hierarchies solve problems in sequence and allow a long time-span for decision-
making. 
While constructing market and hierarchy agents with their preferred agency - 
technology as guilty and culpable, border institutions promote identification by 
establishing themselves as moral agents who are unwilling to face irreversible 
catastrophic degradation (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982). For border institutions, the 
confidence brought by advanced scientific development has turned into a source of 
risk (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982). Irreversible risks are “explosive and unstable 
[with] each deviation growing larger until the environment is so altered it can never 




Wildavsky’s (1982, p. 23) words, there will be no future “if modern technology 
permits any fool or rogue to inflict irreversible damage”.  
Border institutions therefore construct a hierarchy or social order different from 
those from market and hierarchy institutions. Nature is constructed as dreadfully 
unforgiving (Schwarz & Thompson, 1990) where “unbridled economic growth” is 
said to exert harm on the natural environment and humankind (Douglas & 
Wildavsky, 1982, p. 67). Since border institutions are concerned with all possible 
damage and assess the long-run as “imminent” (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982, p. 122), 
a radical change is proposed through the immediate adoption of the precautionary 
principle in its strict version (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982). According to border 
institutions, this solution “has the added advantage of bringing us much nearer to the 
desired future-harmony with nature” (Schwarz & Thompson, 1990, p. 10). 
6.3.2.3 Logological analysis - Resolution of risk 
While constructing technology as an agent and identifying risk as opportunities, 
market institutions establish ‘economic growth’ as the terministic screen with respect 
to their resolution of risk and to legitimate their attitude towards technology and 
view of risk. Market institutions encourage the idea that expansion will solve all 
problems, including those of the environment, since its advantages are overwhelming 
(Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982). Market institutions are future-orientated in terms of 
economic benefit. They seek and take risk intentionally by calculating profits: 
[A]n individual can expect to get future rewards only if he can reasonably 
suppose that those in his debt will be in a position (and somehow obliged) to 
repay him…[For] people living together with graduated expectations for the long 
term,…[t]o maintain a rosy expectation of the long term they must exert 
continual vigilance in justifying the present system, with its delayed satisfactions 
(Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982, p. 86). 
For example, according to Douglas and Wildavsky (1982, p. 69), risk utility analysis 
(or cost-benefit analysis) is a common type of risk assessment for market institutions 
to compare risks “by placing their costs and benefits on a common economic plane”. 
In other words, it assumes an economic/market measure is the most appropriate for 
all valued objects, and that natural resources do not have any intrinsic value. This 




inequities. As Thompson and Rayner (1998, p. 329) contend, market institutions 
strongly focus on immediate returns on investments and activities, since 
competitive success depends largely on timing; planning for shifting market 
tastes, clinching deals at the right price, meeting delivery deadlines, or knowing 
when to sell pork-belly futures (Thompson & Rayner, 1998, p. 329). 
Such an emphasis on short-term expectations is at odds with environmental value, 
which is usually long-term focused (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982). As such, risk 
utility analysis masks the “moral ingredients” involved in market decision-making 
processes (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982, p. 70). 
Hierarchy institutions, by constructing a technical fix as the preferred act, and by 
identifying risks as needing to be controlled, use ‘regulation’ as the terministic 
screen with regards to their resolution of risk for legitimating their risk attitude and 
preferred social order. According to Douglas and Wildavsky (1982, p. 93), 
hierarchical decision-making involving multiple goals makes it relatively easy to 
“retrospectively rationalize whichever ones happen to be accomplished”. “[T]he 
need that seems most urgent in these conditions is the one whose solution is 
realistically feasible” (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982, p. 93). Standardised operating 
procedures or regulations facilitate this governing form and help hierarchies to 
“objectify, rank and manage” the potential threat (Ney & Thompson, 2011, p. 63). 
They “avoid attempting to know too much about future consequences” by limiting 
rather than of expanding data (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982, p. 93).  
More specifically, hierarchies resegregate and redefine potential damage by 
upgrading certain risk dimensions while downgrading and shifting others sideways 
(Ney & Thompson, 2011). This objectified notion of risk facilitates ignorance to 
certain alternatives so that attention is only given to “those best known and closest to 
existing prognoses” (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982, p. 93). In this sense, hierarchists 
and individualists have similar views towards risk. Both are fearful of those risks 
which threaten the system as a whole, as well as public confidence (Douglas & 
Wildavsky, 1982). 
As such, despite divergent views of risk between market and hierarchy institutions, 
both have “imperialist tendencies” which are evidenced in the expansion of the 




problems (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982, p. 97). Subsequently, these two institutional 
types can coexist and collaborate to some extent (Elliott, 1983; Linsley & Shrives, 
2009). According to Douglas (1990, p. 12), “market individualism needs a political 
base to assure its basic security...[while] hierarchical culture needs an economic 
base”.  
Hierarchy institutions with market institutions consequently create hierarchising and 
separating effects which (re)produce social divisions and inequities. As suggested by 
Douglas and Wildavsky (1982, p. 122), the construction and objectification of risk 
can be seen as an ideological tool used by the centre institutions to foresee 
“disturbances and setbacks in the normal course” and “weather” them (Douglas & 
Wildavsky, 1982, p. 188). 
Border institutions establish ‘low growth’ as the terministic screen with response to 
their resolution of risk to legitimate their preferred social order and risk attitude 
(Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982; Stillar, 1998).While border institutions assess risks, 
they reveal their moral commitments “explicitly and prominently” (Douglas & 
Wildavsky, 1982, p. 73), and they attempt to bring risks to public attention forcibly 
(Thompson et al., 1990). Underlying this perspective is the assumption of a zero-sum 
game. This outlook assumes one cannot benefit except at another’s’ expense. 
Following the reasoning of a trade-off, border institutions do not acknowledge 
economic measures from the market (and hierarchy) institutions. Therefore, border 
institutions do not believe in economic expansion as an environmental solution 
(Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982). This argument from the border institutions shifts 
attention to human needs and wants. From the perspective of the border institutions, 
real human needs are closely aligned with the cycle of the eco-system, and are 
defined in both material and spiritual terms (Thompson & Rayner, 1998). While 
material needs cover food, shelter and clothing, the spiritual aspect embraces 
personal development, self-realisation and harmony with nature. Technological 
development implies the promise of the satisfaction of endless wants in an age of 




 Cause of ecological crisis, Justice and fairness and Properties of desired 6.3.3
system 
Hierarchy and border institutions discursively represent diverse causes of the 
ecological crisis to motivate certain understandings of sustainable development and 
shape attitudes towards cooperative action. These different causes of the ecological 
crisis, in turn, identify different social orders regarding the view of justice and 
fairness, through different sets of discourse. These discourses or symbolic actions 
from market and hierarchy (centre) institutions have hierarchising and separating 
effects in respect of properties of their desired system. These paradoxes and 
controversies are challenged by border institutions through ‘counter’ discourses or 
symbolic actions. 
6.3.3.1 Grammatical analysis - Causes of ecological crisis 
Contested causes of the ecological crisis in the broader context of sustainable 
development are constructed by market, hierarchy and border institutions through 
discursive practices. For market institutions, the present “ballyhoo” over 
environmental issues represents “much ado about nothing” (Ney & Thompson, 2011, 
p. 47). Market institutions construct border institutions as ‘scare mongers’ who hold 
naïve but erroneous ideals that humans make the world better, and hierarchy 
institutions as misrepresenting matters in an attempt to increase their influence by 
expanding budgets (Ney & Thompson, 2011). 
Market institutions construct hierarchical interference as a major obstacle for 
achieving sustainable development (Thompson & Rayner, 1998). They consider 
hierarchy institutions’ prices for resources as distorted, often resulting from 
misguided government economic policy that is the cause of unsustainable 
development and subsequent ecological crisis (Thompson & Rayner, 1998). This is 
an explicitly technical argument for environmental issues that focuses primarily on 
the natural resource price mechanism.  
Market institutions debate resource management with respect to the economic 
theories of “scarcity and cost” (Thompson & Rayner, 1998, p. 298). Accordingly, 
scarce natural resources should be valued highly to cover the increasing cost of 




the resource pricing scheme, influences users’ decision making because of effective 
market forces such as; technical innovation, substitution and structural alternation 
(Thompson & Rayner, 1998). In order to compete in the market, strategies need to be 
adopted and behaviours changed by resource users. 
Conversely, if a resource is undervalued, that is, its scarcity is not reflected through a 
resource pricing scheme, this resource will tend to be over-utilised. This is one 
reason why a failure to internalise environmental costs leads to environmental 
degradation. Market institutions therefore protect the environment through accurate 
and equal resource pricing mechanisms/instruments. This price 
mechanism/instrument is said to allocate both economic and environmental 
resources to users while tackling the resource degradation through increasingly 
efficient use. Therefore, institutional regulations or hierarchical interventions that 
align with the objectives of an unfettered market are advocated by market institutions 
(Ney & Thompson, 2011). Such regulations are said to support competition, prevent 
resource loss (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982) and therefore bring overall social 
benefits such as technological innovation which, in turn, enlarges the production 
scale (Thompson & Rayner, 1998).  
Hierarchy institutions construct the cause of the ecological crisis as a lack of 
governance and planning (Ney & Thompson, 2011). From the perspective of 
hierarchy institutions, economic life, in terms of resource allocation, production and 
consumption of goods or services, “should not be left to the free interplay of market 
forces” but rather subjected to the act of central planning (Ney & Thompson, 2011, p. 
61). The natural resource price mechanism is perceived as a bureaucratic structure 
that will rectify the myopia and greed of the free market and lead to sustainable 
water resource management in an incremental and carefully planned manner (Ney & 
Thompson, 2011). 
The purpose of governance, with regard to economic life and the environmental 
crisis, can be traced back to the hierarchists’ view of nature. They do not see nature 
as infinitely resilient despite the fact that it serves to meet human needs and wants. 
While utility-maximisation may be rational for individuals, the overall results of 




& Rayner, 1998). Because “hierarchies are afraid of upheavals which escape from a 
rational order and they fear for the life in the organisation” (Douglas & Wildavsky, 
1982, p. 91), they believe in rational management of both the economy and the 
environment to prevent the detrimental effects of excessive economic activity 
(Thompson & Rayner, 1998).  
A community works because the transactions balance out. The risk of free riding 
is controlled by the accounting system. The accounts are audited, and debts are 
collected by the way that God or nature punishes defaulters with disease and 
death (Douglas, 1986, p. 74). 
Border institutions consider the environmental crisis as a symptom of a wider social 
ill. The abuse of nature is said to be fundamentally related to social structures and 
values (Thompson & Rayner, 1998). From this perspective, the manner in which 
humans pillage natural resources recklessly is a significant indicator for social 
malaise such as racism, gender discrimination, social alienation and so on (Ney & 
Thompson, 2011; Thompson & Rayner, 1998). 
Border institutions construct centre institutions as “the ideological standard bearers” 
of a devastating socio-economic system (Thompson & Rayner, 1998, p. 304). A lack 
of proper governance, which is diagnosed as the root of environmental crisis from 
hierarchy institutions, is merely a symptom of underlying imbalances within the 
social world. Border institutions view the allocation of the GAB water resource in 
favour of market and government interests as the cause of ecological crisis. As 
Douglas and Wildavsky’s (1982, p. 150) assert, social and environmental issues are 
“a confrontation between corporate [and governmental] technocratic domination and 
decentralized community independence”. For that reason, border institutions believe 
that social equity is the agent to address the social imbalance in favour of justice, 
humanity and freedom from repression (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982; Thompson & 
Rayner, 1998). Border institutions’ purpose of blocking the ‘unjust’ allocation of 
natural resources is said not merely to safeguard themselves from any potential 
environmental crisis, but also to “break the stranglehold which they consider such 




6.3.3.2 Rhetorical analysis - View of justice and fairness 
Based on pricing regulation as the cause of the ecological crisis, market institutions 
are conveyed as competitive individuals that create extra wealth to benefit 
themselves and others (Thompson et al., 1990). This identity is characterised by a 
laissez-faire attitude that emphasises individual autonomy and freedom with respect 
to needs and wants (Ney & Thompson, 2011; Schwarz & Thompson, 1990). 
Market institutions frame public interest as embodied in a competitive free market 
that will “select the best and reject the worst” (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982, p. 99). 
In Thompson and Rayner’s (1998, p. 300) words, “what is good for market 
efficiency is good for the environment, increased efficiency means less waste and a 
more careful use of resources”. A hierarchy or social order regarding a certain view 
of fairness and justice is subsequently constructed. Market institutions prefer rules 
for fair-play (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982) and construct fairness as “those who put 
the most in get the most out” (Ney & Thompson, 2011, p. 37). 
Drawing upon a lack of central planning and control as the cause of ecological crisis, 
hierarchy institutions exploit the strategy of identification with the public interest 
through plans to limit present consumption and to accumulate capital for long-run 
benefits in terms of social and environmental justice and balance (Thompson et al., 
1990). Hierarchy institutions believe fair distribution is ranked by needs (Ney & 
Thompson, 2011), and have confidence in “sacrificing the few for the good of the 
whole” (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982, p. 101). Therefore, priority is given to the 
solidarity and maintenance of the system as a whole (Ney & Thompson, 2011). In 
the hierarchical worldview, nobility obliges. That is to say, differences of rank, status, 
influence, and wealth exist and are quite acceptable, as long as those at the top make 
a concerted, genuine effort to shelter those at the bottom from the vagaries of life 
(Ney & Thompson, 2011, p. 66).  
While constructing an inequitable social system as the cause of ecological crisis, 
border institutions promote identification between themselves and the public by 
framing themselves as moral agents who support policies to protect the environment 
without “exploitative values…and dehumanised relationships” (Douglas & 




of the current social system and inegalitarian life-style (Thompson et al., 1990). 
They consequently establish another hierarchy and social order differing from those 
of market and hierarchy institutions.  
Border institutions construct justice and fairness with regard to both human and 
nature interactions and social relations. They contend that human fate is inextricably 
connected to that of the planet earth (Ney & Thompson, 2011). For border 
institutions, social relationships are said to be fundamentally dependent upon 
“fraternal and sororal cooperation” and therefore should be “voluntaristic and 
egalitarian” (Schwarz & Thompson, 1990, p. 7). Encroachment of a differential 
social status from a hierarchical lifestyle and unequal distribution of wealth and 
power from market institutions threatens this ideal state of justice of border 
institutions (Thompson et al., 1990). 
6.3.3.3 Logological analysis - Properties of desired system 
While constructing government intervention as the cause of ecological crisis and 
identifying the concept of justice and fairness as the equality of opportunity, market 
institutions establish the ‘free market’ as the terministic screen in respect of 
properties of their desired system to legitimate their preferred style of justice and 
fairness and cause of ecological crisis.  
According to Thompson and Rayner (1998), the underlying market institutions’ 
diagnosis of an environmental crisis is linked to a capitalist system that goes hand in 
hand with environmental protection and necessary growth for attaining sustainable 
development (Thompson & Rayner, 1998). It is consistent with the assertion of Ney 
and Thompson (2011, p. 37): “Adam Smith’s invisible hand ensure[s] that people 
only do well when others also benefit”. 
Yet market institutions, as such, do not take any responsibility for individual failures: 
Its risk portfolio does not carry heavy fixed liabilities for pensioners, widows, 
and orphans. It holds people responsible for their own misfortunes; stupidity and 
neglect explain their losses (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982, p. 101). 
Personal failures, therefore, are attributed to individual incompetence and/or bad 





Since market institutions espouse individual success and care for the ‘bottom line’ 
only, temporary inequalities within social groups are accepted as long as fair 
competition and free exchange systems are not hampered (means-end rationality). 
According to Douglas and Wildavsky (1982, p. 179): 
[Market institutions’] fundamental justification is not faith in the value of the 
individual but faith in the freedom to exchange… [l]ong term concentrations of 
wealth make it impossible to give honest answers to the challenge of envy: with 
wealth stabilised, the premise of equality is flouted. 
In other words, market institutions value free competition, not the “relational niceties” 
of members within society (Schwarz & Thompson, 1990, p. 6).  
Hierarchy institutions, by constructing loss of government control as the cause of the 
ecological crisis and identifying their concept of justice and fairness as equality 
before law, use ‘governance and planning’ as the terministic screen with regards to 
properties of their desired system, for legitimating their preferred social order and 
perceived cause of ecological crisis.  
Although hierarchy institutions prefer to use direct instrumental rules/bureaucratic 
means to allocate resources by physical quantities to facilitate a top-down 
reallocation (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982; Thompson et al., 1990), they tend to 
“adopt a limited redistributive ethic…limiting exchange so as to limit losers” 
(Thompson et al., 1990, p. 61).  
Hierarchy relies on explicit controls…[s]o long as information is tightly 
controlled, there is not much worrisome contradiction among the founding 
principles or incompatibility between them and the way of life they justify 
(Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982, p. 180). 
For example, hierarchy institutions behove the affluent e.g. industrial sectors to 
assist vulnerable sectors for addressing environmental issues (Ney & Thompson, 
2011). Therefore, hierarchy institutions tend to punish sectors responsible for 
economic value creation (such as industrial sectors), and reward sectors with less 
economic success (Ney & Thompson, 2011). 
Social equity, from the perspective of hierarchy institutions, is neither possible nor 
necessary. Social groups are bound to each other “in an orderly and ranked 




violating status differentials” (Schwarz & Thompson, 1990, p. 6). What they attempt 
to create is “a procedural rationality that is more concerned with the proprieties of 
who does what than with trying to evaluate the outcome” (Schwarz & Thompson, 
1990, pp. 6-7). 
Through an inequitable system as the cause of ecological crisis, and the 
identification of justice and fairness as necessary for equality of conditions and 
results, border institutions establish ‘social and environmental equity’ as the 
terministic screen with respect to properties of their desired system for legitimating 
their preferred social order and cause of ecological crisis. 
Border institutions believe that environmental pollution does not only occur in a 
physical and technical sense as it is divided between the moral and the immoral, 
purity and impurity, innocence and guilty to “sustain the vision of good society” 
(Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982, p. 37). For border institutions, pollution “carries the 
idea of moral defect” (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982, p. 36) that endangers humankind 
(Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982, pp. 10-11): 
Put into secular terms, worldliness appears in big organization, big money, and 
market values all deny equality and attack goodness and purity; conspiracy 
includes factions plotting secret attack, transporting evil into an essentially good 
world. 
Border institutions therefore commit to bring equality to all humankind through the 
guiding principle and a belief in “human goodness and the supreme value of the 
individual” (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982, p. 177). Hence, border institutions’ 
desired system demands that individuals begin as equal and end up equal (Ney & 
Thompson, 2011). 
 Critical themes 6.4
By applying a Burkean framework of rhetorical criticism to cultural risk theory, 
three accounting and accountability related themes are identified. They are the 
concept of control (Chapter 7, Section 7.4), stewardship (Chapter 8, Section 8.4), and 
economic consequences (Chapter 9, Section 9.4). 
Accounting recognition and measurement relies on the concept of control. 




of relevant assets and liabilities in financial reports are contestable when, what is 
traditionally considered a public good, becomes a resource for profit. Cultural risk 
theory, by suggesting different assumptions of market, hierarchy and border 
institutions with respect to preferred learning style, view of nature and properties of 
knowledge ideals shaped by institutional beliefs and interests, provide us with a 
critical lens to understand the contested nature of the accounting concept of control 
with subsequent accounting measurement and recognition rules. 
Stewardship is one objective of financial reporting, derived from property rights, and 
is based on the idea of a principal and agent relationship. Like the concept of control, 
stewardship is contestable when companies are held accountable for natural 
resources which they control, while their business activities have environmental 
impacts (Jones, 2010). Cultural risk theory, by contrasting distinctive institutional 
assumptions of attitude towards technology, view of risk and risk resolution, 
provides us with the rationale to understand the debate of stewardship from both 
mainstream and critical accounting perspectives. 
Economic consequences are understood as “the results of the reallocative outcomes” 
of a policy standard (Fogarty, Hussein & Ketz, 1994, p. 25). It is the economic 
consequences argument that is used by various constituents to push through their 
interests and value to influence income redistribution or resource allocation policies 
(Zeff, 1978). Cultural risk theory, by suggesting different institutional assumptions 
of the causes of ecological crisis, view of justice and fairness and properties of 
desired system, provides us with a critical lens to analyse the natural resource 
allocation debate with its related economic consequences arguments, and the further 
implications for accounting practices.  
The application of Burkean rhetorical criticism to cultural risk theory to determine 





Table 6.3 Application of Burkean Rhetorical Criticism Framework to Cultural Risk 



































Pro-technology Technical Fix Anti-Technology 
Rhetorical analysis 
















Loss of Control Inequitable System 
Rhetorical analysis 













Adapted from: Schwarz and Thompson (1990, pp. 66-67, see also Ney & Thompson, 2011; 
1990; Thompson, 1980; Thompson et al., 1990; Thompson & Rayner, 1998) 
 Summary 6.5
This chapter represented cultural risk theory in general and the application of the 
Burkean framework of rhetorical criticism to cultural risk theory in particular with 
the implications of critical themes for accounting and accountability research. 
Cultural risk theory suggests that any individual risk position is influenced by 
cultural beliefs and values (Douglas, 1970; Douglas, 1985; Douglas & Wildavsky, 
1982). This thesis utilises Douglas and Wildavsky’s (1982) Risk and Cultural model 
to analyse institutional-biased political debate of the GAB water governance and 




not only explicitly acknowledge diverse risk responses from different institutions but 
also explains policy decision-making process with respect to contested perceptions 
towards risk management.  
This thesis investigates different positions taken by market institutions (represented 
by BHP and BHP OD); hierarchy institutions (represented by Australian Federal and 
South Australian government); and border institutions (represented by civil society), 
regarding the GAB water related risks from BHP OD’s GAB water extraction and its 
further proposal of ODEP.  Cultural risk theory informs an exploration of the 
underlying assumptions of the contentious water related disclosure and 
accountability discourses by three institutions and analyses their role in incorporating 
economic, social and environmental accountability into a transdisciplinary dialogue. 
Since cultural risk theory is concerned with how risk is mediated and “politicalized” 
through cultural patterns and beliefs (Douglas, 1992, p. 29), it provides us with an 
enabling and emancipatory conceptualisation to understand why different institutions 
(BHP and BHP OD; Australian Federal and South Australian government; and civil 
society) support different GAB water governance policies and why they focus on 
different policy issues regarding risk-based GAB water sustainability. Specifically, it 
facilitates an understanding of how risk discourses and strategies are operated within 
centre institutions (e.g. BHP, BHP OD, Australian Federal and South Australian 
governments), and how they are negotiated and resisted by the border institutions 
(e.g. civil society). 
In this chapter, the three-fold Burkean framework of rhetorical criticism is applied to 
cultural risk theory to identify features, functions and implications of each 
institutional group’s risk discourses. Major concepts of cultural risk theory are 
thereby made explicit. They are preferred learning style (feature), view of nature 
(function), property of knowledge ideal (implication), attitude towards technology 
(feature), view of risk (function), risk resolution (implication), cause of ecological 
crisis (feature), view of justice and fairness (function) and property of desired system 
(implication).  
These nine concepts are also linked to three accounting and accountability themes - 




institutions help to understand the contested nature of accounting concept of control 
with associated accounting recognition and measurement rules. Institutional 
assumptions about the attitude towards technology, and a view of risk and risk 
resolution, facilitate the understanding of the stewardship debate from both 
mainstream and critical accounting perspectives. Institutional perceptions of the 
cause of the ecological crisis, view of justice and fairness and property of desired 
system enable an analysis of the resource allocation issue and its associated 
economic consequences arguments, to further understand accounting and 
accountability. These theoretical concepts with accounting themes provide analytical 
scaffolding which facilitates interpretation of the GAB water risk debate in Chapter 7, 





CHAPTER 7 PREFERRED LEARNING STYLE, VIEW OF NATURE AND 
PROPERTY OF KNOWLEDGE IDEAL 
 Introduction 7.1
The preceding chapter introduced cultural risk theory (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982), 
with the application of a Burkean framework of rhetorical criticism that supports the 
analysis and interpretation of institutional disclosures in respect of the Great Artesian 
Basin (GAB). This chapter applies three major concepts from cultural risk theory-
preferred learning style, view of nature and properties of knowledge ideal to analyse: 
market - BHP Billiton (BHP) and BHP Billiton Olympic Dam Corporation Pty Ltd 
(BHP OD); hierarchy - Australian Federal and South Australian government; and, 
border institutions’ - civil society viewpoints manifest in their disclosure documents 
in the context of GAB water-related risks.  
According to Burkean grammatical analysis, institutions display heterogeneous 
learning styles to understand nature as they retain certain knowledge while omitting 
other (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982). According to Burkean rhetorical analysis, these 
different learning styles subsequently establish “self-consistent version[s]” of nature 
and inform a corresponding social order (Rayner, 2012, p. 107). In the logological 
analysis, symbolic actions in the form of discourse from market and hierarchy 
(centre) institutions give rise to hierarchising and separating effects with  respect to 
the property of their knowledge ideals, which “direct our attention toward certain 
features of our environment and away from others” (Thompson et al., 1990, p. 28).  
The purpose of the analysis is to identify different institutional perspectives with 
regard to preferred learning style, view of the GAB groundwater system and 
property of knowledge ideal. This analysis has implications for an understanding of 
the accounting concept of control with respect to natural resources from both a 
mainstream and critical perspective. This concept and the subsequent recognition 
and measurement of relevant assets and liabilities in financial reports are contestable 
when what is considered a public good becomes a resource for profit. The three-
levelled analysis of different institutional perspectives and critical themes of 





Table 7.1 Preferred Learning Style, View of Nature, Properties of Knowledge Ideal and Concept of Control 
 Market Institutions Hierarchy Institutions Border Institutions 














Science (Trial and Error) Expertise Holism 
Implement modelling studies subject to evolving 
learning process to control the potential decline of 
spring flows for sustainable GAB water extraction 
Trust expert knowledge and use scientific research to 
understand rechargeability of the GAB  and 
determine its water balance 
Believe the assumption of rechargeability of the GAB is flawed and 
BHP OD’s modelling studies are faulty due to simplistic models and 






BHP OD’s GAB water extraction does not entail a ‘liability’ as the potential water extraction related risk is 
trivial and uncertain, sanctioned by South Australian government 
BHP OD has responsibility for environmental damage, such as 
declining spring flow 









e Cornucopian and Abundant Stable within boundaries Ephemeral and Fragile 
GAB is rechargeable and BHP OD’s GAB water 
extraction only makes up of a small part of total GAB 
water storage. Humans are masters of nature 
GAB is rechargeable with a slow recharge rate. The 
current GAB water extraction from BHP OD is within 
‘sustainable yield’. Significant cultural synthesis of the 
GAB with the wellbeing of the inhabitant 
GAB is a fragile and non-rechargeable water resource. It intricately 
connects to the wellbeing of human and non-human inhabitants. BHP 





 GAB water intake for BHP OD’s mining operation not recognised as an asset because South Australian 
government grants it the water licence without charge. Unmeasurable ‘asset’ is unidentifiable in monetary terms 
Recognition and presentation of the obligation that BHP OD has 
towards the GAB water extraction. Disclosure of the likelihood of a 
non- rechargeable GAB 

















Objectivity Procedural Validity Imperfection 
Ostensible objectivity underlying scientific method is 
achieved by ignoring moral and ethical dimensions of 
the GAB water extraction 
Procedural validity underlying scientific method is 
achieved by silencing contradictory scientific studies 
about the likelihood of non-rechargeability of the GAB 
Scientific and expert knowledge as limited and incomplete because 
of its evolving nature. BHP OD and governments’ wilful ignorance 






 Mainstream accounting system serves as an ideological tool for a vested interest to overuse non-renewable 
resources and downplay the ecological impacts 
Critical accounting requires GAB water extraction related risks as a 
(contingent) liability to be recognised in BHP OD’s financial reports, 









Managerial accountability Administrative Accountability Moral Accountability 
Social and environmental benefits and costs are 
immaterial, unquantifiable and unmeasurable in the 
free market 
Increasing concern with economic growth thus passing 
more power to the market 
A more encompassing form of accountability to acknowledge a 
relationship of obligation to or responsibility for the other which 
cannot be discharged by mere reference to one’s economic interest. It 
cultivates openness and dialogue for social and distributive justice 
rather than scientific economic reasoning 





The chapter begins with an analysis of the preferred learning style, view of nature 
and property of knowledge ideal of the market and hierarchy (centre) institutions 
(Section 7.2) before the explication of those of the border institutions (Section 7.3). 
The concept of control and associated issues of accountability is then discussed with 
insights for financial accounting-standard setting in the era of impending 
environmental crisis (Section 7.4). 
 Preferred learning style, View of nature and Property of knowledge ideal 7.2
of the centre institutions 
As documents issued by BHP OD and Australian Federal and South Australian 
governments are cross cited and overlapping to a great extent, perspectives from 
market and hierarchy institutions are combined to provide a consistent view from 
centre institutions. As Douglas and Wildavsky (1982) argue, centre institutions 
incorporate market and hierarchy cultures with only a few exceptions in this case. In 
regards to preferred learning style, both market and hierarchy institutions believe in 
expert knowledge to control risk, such as mainstream science, (Douglas & 
Wildavsky, 1982; Ney & Thompson, 2011) which is subject to continuous trial and 
error in an evolving process (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982). In terms of the view of 
nature, market institutions advocate an image of a robust natural world with 
abundant resources which can be utilised by human ingenuity (Ney & Thompson, 
2011; Ostrander, 1982), while hierarchy institutions stipulate a stable and resilient 
nature when the natural resource is used sustainably within knowable limits (Ney & 
Thompson, 2011; Schwarz & Thompson, 1990). In respect of property of knowledge 
ideals, the market institutions’ faith in risk probability quantification excludes the 
moral dimension of the risk (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982), whereas hierarchy 
institutions adopt a similar bias in determining what type of expert knowledge is 
legitimate and what kind of scientific evidence counts as credible (Ney & Thompson, 
2011). 
 Grammatical analysis - Preferred learning style of centre institutions 7.2.1
Contested learning styles in the broader context of sustainable development are 
constructed by market, hierarchy and border institutions through discursive practices. 
According to Douglas and Wildavsky (1982), the centre institutions have a preferred 




control risks. Hierarchy institutions construct themselves as agents whose role is to 
identify the boundary between equilibrium and disequilibrium zones, since it 
believes that the ecosystem is stable within certain limits through human interaction 
(Thompson et al., 1990). In this case, the concept of rechargeable GAB water 
aquifers is crucial for Australian Federal and South Australian governments to 
reinforce the ideal of a manageable system for water extraction. 
Governments trust experts to discover and determine natural limits and predict 
certainty (Schwarz & Thompson, 1990), Therefore, their learning style tends to 
collude with that of BHP OD since the market institutions support the development 
of modern science as the agency to control GAB water extraction related water risks 
(Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982). 
Scientific studies have supported GAB’s rechargeability and demonstrated that it is 
an open system with continuous flow that is evidenced by the progressive ageing of 
water from the recharge to discharge area  (South Australia, Legislative Council, 
2005). For example, The Hon. T.G. Roberts (South Australia, Legislative Council, 
2005, p. 3417) verifies that: 
A considerable body of research has been conducted by the Bureau of Rural 
Sciences in Canberra, on its [the GAB’s] recharge, flow and discharge processes 
and hydrochemistry, which indicates that it is an open system and recharge is 
occurring. Ongoing research and investigation into the recharge processes is 
being conducted in Queensland and this study also shows modern recharge is still 
occurring. 
More specifically, the Queensland Government website presents a diagram (Figure 
7.1) to demonstrate how the GAB aquifer is refilled by rainfall. Diagram or “visual 
epigraph”, according to Davison (Davison, 2011, p. 129), has rhetorical effects. It is 







Figure 7.1 Why an Artesian Bore Flows 
Source: Queensland Department of Natural Resource (DNR) ( in Endersbee, 2000b, n.p.) 
Following this diagram, the explanation confirms that: 
‘Artesian’ water is underground water confined and pressurised within a porous 
and permeable unit, an aquifer. The aquifers of the Great Artesian Basin consist 
of permeable sandstones. These aquifers are recharged by rainfall infiltrating into 
the uplifted and exposed sandstones on the edge of the basin. Recharge waters 
slowly move down through the sandstone, filling the aquifer to the level of the 
intake area. As the aquifer is confined by an overlying impermeable unit, the 
water becomes pressurised. When a bore is drilled into the aquifer, the water will 
rise due to this pressure (Queensland Department of Natural Resource (DNR) in 
Endersbee, 2000b, n.p.). 
As such, Australian Federal and South Australian governments are ‘undaunted’ by 
scientific research in an effort to understand GAB’s hydrogeochemistry and 
rechargeability. This implies an unshakable faith in expert predictions for “a 
comprehensive, objective and balanced view of the subjective matter” (Ney & 
Thompson, 2011, p. 65). Such a learning style is based on the assumption that 
certified experts can generate objective and ‘true’ knowledge on which they often 
agree (Ney & Thompson, 2011) that is consistent with various scientific results that 




For example, with regard to the GAB water balance, there was “a revised numerical 
assessment of the groundwater flow characteristics of the GAB” published by the 
Bureau of Rural Sciences in 2000 which showed that “the steady-state water balance 
was calculated at 3.21 GL/d [Giga-litre/day]” (Welsh, 2000 in BHP Billiton Olympic 
Dam Corporation Pty Ltd., 2012a, p. 2). This balance was “in close agreement with 
the results of the previous major basin-wide groundwater flow model that indicated a 
recharge rate of 3.02GL/d” (Habermehl, 1980 in BHP Billiton Olympic Dam 
Corporation Pty Ltd., 2012a, p. 2). Based on these research results, the South 
Australia groundwater budget is determined: 
The Water Allocation Plan (WAP) describes the groundwater budget set for the 
GAB resource in South Australia. The WAP estimates 471 ML/d as inflow into 
South Australia with estimated outflows in 2003 of 66 ML/d from springs, 128 
ML/d from wells, vertical leakage into overlying sedimentary formations of 274 
ML/d per day and 3 ML/d from horizontal flow (South Australian Arid Lands 
Natural Resources (SAALNRM) Board, 2009, in Torrisi & Trotta, 2009, p. 195).  
It is important to note here that BHP OD also cites research from both Australian 
Federal and South Australian governments, which indicates that centre institutions 
process ‘valid information’ from the authority of science and expertise (Douglas & 
Wildavsky, 1982; Ney & Thompson, 2011).  
Consistent with the government’s learning style, BHP OD also relies on existing 
expert/scientific knowledge (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982) to privilege the 
rechargeability aspect of the GAB. Based on the assumption of an 
equilibrium/steady-state condition, BHP OD has developed modelling studies and 
corresponding programs to control and manage the potential decline rate of the 
spring flow to achieve sustainable GAB water extraction. These acts are 
characteristic of the “bold experimentation in the face of uncertainty” seen in market 
institutions (Thompson et al., 1990, p. 27). Quantification is constructed as “a 
method of stating problems” (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982, p. 101) that is manifest 
in the construction of risk probability (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982). This type of 
learning style is subject to a continuously evolving and updated process (Douglas & 
Wildavsky, 1982) that is sanctioned by the South Australian government as it also 
relies on professional knowledge to determine the limits of water extraction within 




Modelling studies commissioned by the government are relied on and used to further 
the argument for BHP OD. For example, a Technical Works Program required by the 
then SA Minister Weatherhill to enhance Olympic Dam’s “existing hydrogeological 
understanding, monitoring and model by means of review and improvement” is cited 
by BHP OD (2010a, p. 62). In response, BHP OD indicates that in order to 
“stimulate groundwater flow in the south-west GAB and the influence of the 
wellfields supplying water to Olympic Dam and Roxby Township”, it has created 
“several groundwater models, from the initial GAB 95 model, through successive 
improvements and more and better data to the ODEX model families” for more than 
15 years (BHP Billiton Olympic Dam Corporation Pty Ltd., 2012f, p. 10). 
Computer modelling combined with water monitoring and management data are 
used to control the negative effects of GAB water extraction from wellfields A and B 
on the GAB springs within hydrogeological zones (Torrisi & Trotta, 2009). BHP OD 
in its Environmental Impact Statements of 1982 37 and 1997 made predictions of the 
extent of spring flow reductions due to the wellfield operation (BHP Billiton 
Olympic Dam Corporation Pty Ltd., 2012b). According to Douglas and Wildvasky 
(1982), scientific development is subject to trial and error due to false assumptions, 
defective measures, faulty data, and poorly conducted experiments. In this case, BHP 
OD’s modelling is limited to a hydrogeological understanding at the time of the 
estimation and is therefore prone to error in predictive models.  
For example, in Kinhill Engineers Pty Ltd’s38  (thereafter Kinhill) (1982) ODEP 
Draft EIS, a computer-generated model was applied to predict the artesian flow 
reductions in response to water abstraction from Olympic Dam wellfields. According 
to the Draft EIS, 33 ML/day was expected to be extracted from wellfields A and B. 
However, just one year later, Kinhill’s (1983, p. 60) ODEP Supplementary EIS 
recognised the limitations of hydrogeological and ecological knowledge:  
                                                 
37 Kinhill (1982) Draft EIS, Kinhill (1983) Supplementary EIS and Kinhill (1984) are closely associated documents. The 
computer model used for spring flow prediction in Kinhill (1982) therefore, is supposed to be the one used in Kinhill (1983) 
and Kinhill (1984) without major revision. It is also evident in the predicted spring flow presented in Table 4 “Estimates of 
Reduction in Bore Discharge, 1982” (Keane, 1997, p. 43), Table 5 “Estimates of Reduction in Spring Discharge, 1982”(Keane, 
1997, p. 44) and Table 7 “Predicted and actual impacts on WMC monitored spring groups and observed impacts on endemic 
mound spring fauna” (Keane, 1997, p. 46) and BHP OD is supposed to take actions if monitoring evidence show those 
predictions are exceeded (BHP Billiton Olympic Dam Corporation Pty Ltd., 2010a). 
38 Kinhill Engineers Pty Ltd, used to be under the name of Kinhill-Stearns Roger or Kinhill Stearns Pty Ltd is an American 
company which prepared EIS and SEIS of ODEP 1982 and 1997 for the then western Mining Corporation (Olympic Dam 




Joint Venturers recognize that concern exists in respect of the effect of the water 
supply borefields on the mound springs. They have therefore in consultation with 
the relevant specialists prepared a programme that will enable a more detailed 
assessment of these effects. It is recognized that the present level of knowledge 
of both hydrogeological and ecological aspects of the springs and the southern 
portion of the GAB is limited. 
Despite this limited knowledge and insufficient data, wellfield A was developed and 
operations were commenced in the vicinity of the mound springs (Keane, 1997). 
More than a decade later, in Kinhill’s (1997, p. 18) ODEP EIS summary, it was 
acknowledged that BHP OD’s water extraction had caused adverse impact on certain 
groups of mound springs: “[r]ecently, water abstraction by WMC has been identified 
as the probable cause of an adverse habitat change at the Bopeechee and Hermit 
Springs spring groups.” This environmental harm is evident in Table 7.2 (sourced 
from Keane (1997, p. 46), which shows the difference between the predicted flow 





Table 7.2 Predicted and Actual Impacts on WMC Monitored Spring Groups and 
Observed Impacts on Endemic Mound Spring Fauna  
Source: ODO Expansion Project EIS (1997, in Keane, 1997, p. 46) 
From the above table, the spring flow prediction in 1984 indicated that the discharge 
rate of mound springs from the Bopeechee spring group would decline 20-30% over 
the following decade. In the actual data reported in 1995, however, the discharge rate 
for Bopeechee spring group had declined by 43%. Therefore, it is clear that BHP 
OD’s knowledge and learning style is characterised by uncertainty, which is likely to 




Apart from the limitations in hydrogeological and ecological knowledge, Kinhill 
(1997) reports that the initial modelling studies used for predicting spring flow 
decline rate in the Draft EIS for ODEP 1982 (Kinhill, 1982) was based on an 
extraction rate of 6 ML/d from Wellfield A. Yet in reality, the extraction rate was up 
to 15 ML/d. To remedy this impact, “the reinjection of water adjacent to these spring 
groups and a reduction since November 1996 in water abstraction in Borefield A 
from 15 ML/d to 6 ML/d” has been implemented (Kinhill,  (ODEP EIS Summary) 
1997, p. 18). The hydrogeological relationship has been revised to cover “a planning 
period of twenty years to the year 2016…using an updated hydrogeological model 
and recently acquired data to assess compliance with requirements of the special 
water licences” (Kinhill, (ODEP EIS Summary) 1997, p. 10; see also BHP Billiton 
Olympic Dam Corporation Pty Ltd., 2012b). 
Available disclosures suggest that the on-going monitoring program presents both 
consistent and inconsistent results within the predicted trend against the benchmark 
of predicted declines of spring flow made in Kinhill (1984) and Kinhill (1997). 
Consistent results are documented by BHP OD, such as “[t]he GAB spring flow 
rates in the area remained stable or rose slightly during the reporting period, and 
remain consistent with historical averages” (BHP Billiton Olympic Dam Corporation 
Pty Ltd., 2008a, p. 25; 2009a, p. 29; see also BHP Billiton Olympic Dam 
Corporation Pty Ltd., 2010a; 2012a).  
Uncertainties also arise from the enhanced, but still incomplete knowledge about 
hydrogeology and ecology. For example, “[s]pring flow is naturally variable and 
inherent conditions make accurate flow measurements difficult” (BHP Billiton 
Olympic Dam Corporation Pty Ltd., 2012b, p. 9).  
As a result, inconsistent monitoring data falling outside historical trends also exist. 
For example, in respect of the Spring flow rate recorded by HBS004, a monitoring 
bore to measure Beatrice spring flow, BHP OD (2008a, pp. 47-48) indicates that; 
[d]ue at least in part to changes in the flow measurement method and the 
morphology of the spring, the recorded flow rate at HBS004 since monitoring 
resumed is significantly less than that previously recorded. The recorded flow 




According to BHP OD (2009a, p. 52), “[t]he recorded flow rate in April 2009 was 
again lower than previous measurements by Land Use Consultants”. Therefore, 
uncertainty regarding the potential impact on the spring flow from the Olympic Dam 
wellfields is likely to occur due to the ever-evolving understanding of the 
hydrogeological and ecological relationship.  
To conclude the grammatical analysis, the hierarchy institutions - the Australian 
Federal and South Australian governments trust expert knowledge and use scientific 
research to understand the rechargeability of the GAB and to determine its water 
balance. As a sound basis, the market institution (BHP OD) implements modelling 
studies to control the potential decline of spring flows for its sustainable GAB water 
extraction. While both governments and BHP OD support the development of 
modern science to control and manage the GAB water related risks, both accept that 
this is an evolving learning process and therefore subject to trial and error (Douglas 
& Wildavsky, 1982). 
 Rhetorical analysis - View of nature of centre institutions 7.2.2
Based on the information from science and experts as the appropriate agency of 
learning style, centre institutions - Australian Federal and South Australian 
governments and BHP OD establish the view that the GAB is an open system that is 
replenished through rainfall. 
BHP OD, as the market institution, frames the public interest as consistent with “a 
wonderfully robust and bountiful natural world” (Ney & Thompson, 2011, p. 48) 
with abundant water resources from the GAB. Torrisi and Trotta (2009, p. 195) for 
example, despite describing South Australia as “the driest state of the driest 
inhabited continent in the world”, assert that GAB underground water storage is “a 
completely unexpected feature for such an arid climate”. Accordingly, BHP OD 
(2012a, p. 2 also 2008a, 2009a, 2010a, 2011a, 2013a) describes the GAB as “one of 
the world’s largest groundwater reservoirs, covering a total area in excess of 1.7 
million km², of which approximately 350,000 km² lies in South Australia”. 
Hierarchy institutions - Australian Federal and South Australian governments, on the 
other hand, construct the GAB as a scarce resource (Schwarz & Thompson, 1990) in 




movement. For example, according to the SAALNRM Board (2009a, p. 1), 
“Olympic Dam is located in the arid region of South Australia with low, erratic and 
infrequent rainfall”. It is an area where “[l]ong dry periods occur. Evaporation is 
extremely high, ranging from 2400 to over 3700 Millilitre/y…[which] significantly 
exceeds rainfall”.  
The South Australian government acknowledges that the GAB water resource has 
become increasingly scarce due to increasing water demands for expanding mineral 
exploration and development. For example, Natural Resources Committee member 
Mr Van Holst Pelle-Kaan states that;  
[d]evelopment projections indicate the GAB will account for 10 per cent of all 
water use in South Australia by 2016 -— which, as we know, is not very far 
away - Current board projects indicate the resource is in decline over the long 
term; with recharge lower than discharge. (South Australia, House of Assembly 
2011a, p. 3227) 
This higher discharge rate compared to the recharge rate of the GAB is evidenced in 
a more recent report issued by Bureau of Rural Sciences, claiming that “[the GAB’s] 
recharge rates range from 0.5mm to 10mm per year, with a maximum of 
approximately 40mm per year” (Habermehl et al., 2009,  in Great Artesian Basin 
Protection Group, 2009c, n.p.).  
Regarding the South Australia proportion of the GAB, the SAALNRM Board (2009a, 
p. 13) mentions that the water balance components are not actually ‘balanced’- as the 
“basin-wide outflows still exceed the inflows”.  
In addition, the SAALNRM Board (2009a, p. 28) emphasises that, since the impact 
of increased GAB water discharge, the low-hydraulic conductivity of “the 
‘sustainable yield’ should not strictly be equated to the basin recharge”. 
By recognising the GAB water resource as scarce, Australian Federal and State 
governments introduce the concept of controllability. In other words, hierarchy 
institutions exploit the strategy of identification with the public interest by 
constructing a view of responsible agents that protect nature within ecological 
boundaries (Thompson et al., 1990). In this case, the GAB water system has the 




the market institution (BHP OD’s) construction of a resilient and “[b]enign” (Ney & 
Thompson, 2011, p. 48) GAB water system where water extraction generally does 
not have an overall negative impact while under the management arrangement it has 
with government. 
According to The Hon. T.G. Roberts (South Australia, legislative Council, 2005, p. 
3417), “hydrogeological understanding of the Basin is … accepted as a sound basis 
for the setting of water use and management arrangements for the Basin.” The Hon. 
G.E. Gago (South Australia, Legislative Council, 2011, p. 4) refers to the WAP 
(Water Allocation Plan) for the Far North Prescribed Wells Area issued by the 
SAALNRM Board (2009a), to illustrate that “at least 350 mega litres per day of 
water can be sustainably extracted from the South Australia section of the GAB. The 
BHP B[illiton] allocation is well within that range.” 
Representing the voice of BHP OD, the Australian Uranium Association (2009) 
suggests that BHP OD’s total water extraction only comprises a very small if not 
negligible amount of total water stored within the GAB. For example; 
[h]istorically, Olympic Dam has been a relatively large user of ground water 
drawn from the GAB, but using small amounts in absolute terms when 
considering the size of the reservoir… Olympic Dam’s daily extraction limit of 
42ML/d represents a small percentage - less that 3% - of the natural daily outflow 
from the Basin; and a tiny proportion of the overall volume of the GAB  
(Australian Uranium Association, 2009, p. 5).  
For hierarchy institutions, nature and human society are constructed as inseparable 
with the synthesis of nature and culture in harmony and “necessary to everyone’s 
wellbeing” (Ostrander, 1982, p. 26). The SAALNRM Board (2009a, p. 15), for 
example, contends that the mound springs of the GAB “are of immense cultural 
importance” and they “have been a focus for human activity throughout history.” 
These mound springs play a very important role for Aboriginal people both 
economically and culturally. 
Traditionally, Aboriginal people have a strong connection with their land and the 
resources found within it. Water is an important aspect of this connection, 
providing food in the form of fish, mussels and plants, a source of drinking 
water…Commonly associated with the mound spring are rich complexes of 
archaeological sites and intricately woven webs of myth and song, which 
demonstrate that these springs were, and are, a vital part of the cultural landscape 




Additionally, mound springs have been “inextricably entwined with the livelihoods 
and social structure of the inhabitants of the land” since early European settlement, 
and they are “critical” to “the viability of the pastoral, mining and tourist industries 
in the region” (SAALNRM Board, 2009a, p. 1).  
According to Schwarz and Thompson (1990, p. 65) and Thompson et al. (1990, p. 
28), hierarchy institutions establish a myth of nature as “perverse/tolerant”. Since the 
South Australian government believes that the GAB water system is both delicate 
and resilient, it acknowledges that irresponsible water extraction could affect GAB 
water ecosystems negatively. However, this matter can still be remediated by using 
the water resource more sustainably. For example, to ensure secure environmental 
flows to GAB springs, the Roxby Downs (Indenture Ratification) Act 1982 was 
issued by the South Australian government to regulate the Olympic Dam mine 
(Torrisi & Trotta, 2009). This Act requires the implementation of a monitoring 
program with respect to the GAB spring flow. The purpose of the program is to 
“[d]etermine the extent of flow change at GAB springs within each hydrogeological 
zone of impact that may be attributed to water abstraction from Wellfields A and B” 
(BHP Billiton Olympic Dam Corporation Pty Ltd., 2010a, p. 55).  
As a response, BHP OD agrees that water extraction from the GAB is likely to affect 
the spring flow in local areas of wellfields through reduced artesian pressure if not 
managed properly (BHP Billiton Olympic Dam Corporation Pty Ltd., 2008b, 2012b). 
Therefore, the monitoring program implemented by BHP OD under legislative 
requirements conveys the market institution’s image of an intelligent and informed 
agent that conquers and improves natural resources based on ingenuity (Ostrander, 
1982). For example, according to BHP OD (2013a, p. 46, see also BHP Billiton 
Olympic Dam Corporation Pty Ltd., 2012a): 
A core group of 41 GAB springs in the vicinity of the wellfields are monitored 
every six months…[to] [d]etermine the extent of flow change at GAB springs 
within each hydrogeological zone of impact that may be attributed to water 
abstraction from Wellfields A and B. 
This statement of ‘a core group’ implies that some springs are more significant than 




acknowledgement of the cultural significance of the mound springs. For example, as 
SAALNRM (2009a, p. 15) demonstrates: 
A number of springs in South Australia are recognised for their ecological and 
social value - namely the Dalhousie, Coward, Hermit Hill and Neales River 
Spring Complexes, all of which have been listed on the register of the National 
Estate, reflecting their national significance. 
This indicates that humans are capable of privileging some elements of nature, and 
that some elements can be separated from others. This instrumental view of nature 
silences a more holistic spiritual and cultural value of the mound springs from 
Aboriginal groups. While preserving some mound springs, they are, at the same time, 
preparing the public/society for the loss of some ‘unimportant’ springs in exchange 
for economic benefits that the mining industry brings (Keane, 1997). 
This attitude is also evident with regard to those relatively ‘significant’ monitored 
springs: “[Out of 41 monitored springs] 15% of the 41 springs contribute 77% of the 
total flow. 60% of the monitored springs contribute less than 5% to the total flow” 
(BHP Billiton Olympic Dam Corporation Pty Ltd., 2013a, p. 2). However, “overall 
variation in reported spring flows appear to be large for small flows and decrease 
with increasing reported flows” (BHP Billiton Olympic Dam Corporation Pty Ltd., 
2013a, p. 48). That is, “errors/uncertainties in small spring flows, relative to the 
reported values, are considerably higher for small springs” (BHP Billiton Olympic 
Dam Corporation Pty Ltd., 2013a, p. 2). Therefore, “there is…an opportunity to 
analyse and report spring flow and bore data in a more integrated way, possibly 
concentrating on the large spring flows initially” (BHP Billiton Olympic Dam 
Corporation Pty Ltd., 2013a, p. 2). 
To conclude the rhetorical analysis, the centre institutions - both BHP OD and 
Australian Federal and South Australian governments - construct a rechargeable 
GAB. The governments hold that the GAB water resource is controllable within 
limits - and the current level of BHP OD’s water extraction is within a ‘sustainable 
yield’ range. This supports BHP OD’s view that its water extraction only makes up 
of a very small part of the total GAB water storage. Furthermore, the South 
Australian government emphasises the significance of the cultural synthesis of the 




OD’s perspective that humans are the masters of nature, this position allows the 
centre institutions to decide which parts of the natural environmental are preserved 
and also the best use of GAB water for economic benefits. 
 Logological analysis - Properties of knowledge ideal of centre institutions 7.2.3
While constructing science and expertise as agency and identifying nature as 
resilient and knowable within boundaries, centre institutions establish ‘objectivity’ 
and ‘procedural validation’ as terminstic screens. With respect to the property of 
their knowledge ideal, this perspective legitimates their preferred learning style and 
view of nature. 
While the hierarchy insists on gaining knowledge about the rechargeability of the 
GAB that is consistent with mainstream science, it is difficult for it to widen its field 
of knowledge (Douglas, 1986). As Douglas (1986) asserts, hierarchy institutions 
prefer to silence those scientific studies that are in tension or contradictory. Mudd 
(2000) for example, points out that the assumption of a ‘rechargeable GAB’ is based 
on current hydrogeological understanding, where “the recharge areas are known to 
be at full piezometric pressure, suggesting abundant and continuous recharge…[but] 
no quantitative field studies of recharge are yet available”. Therefore, estimates of 
total inflow are merely derived from “some analytical techniques, assumed 
hydrogeological properties and observed artesian pressures” (Mudd, 2000, p. 465). 
Since the inflow data obtained to date is inconclusive and can only be understood as 
estimates, it may be subject to significant errors. For example, Mudd (2000, p. 466) 
draws on Hillier (1996) and cautions that “the perceived steady-state condition may 
be a balance between outflow and transmission of water through the GAB aquifers 
rather than recharge.” 
However, this assumption of a ‘non-rechargeable’ GAB is notably absent in 
Australian Federal or South Australian governments’ documents (more details see 
Section 7.3.1). According to Douglas (1986, p. 77), “[o]ften when a new scientific 
discovery has been rejected and left to lie inert until later, it is precisely an idea 
which lacked formulaic interlocking with normal procedures of validation.” As such, 
hierarchy institutions construct and control “institutional memory” (Rayner, 2012, p. 




GAB while ignoring others. Evidently, hierarchy institutions create hierarchising and 
separating effects which (re)produce social divisions and inequities while 
determining what type of expert knowledge constitutes a legitimate fact and what 
kind of scientific evidence counts as credible (Ney & Thompson, 2011). According 
to Rayner (2012, p. 110), the “institutionalised forgetfulness” is crucial to maintain 
institutional arrangements and public memory as the storage system for establishing 
the “social order” (Douglas, 1986, p. 70). 
Likewise, what underpins the market institutions’ scientific methods is ostensible 
objectivity (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982). BHO OD’s modelling studies for 
predictions of declined spring flow, for example, convey the image of an objective 
and value-free practice for ‘proper management’ of GAB water extraction. A trust in 
quantification is also manifested through the scientific process of monitoring, 
measuring, organising and calculating. As Douglas and Wildvasky (1982, p. 71) 
contend:  
Objectivity means preventing subjective values from interfering with the 
analysis. Put the figures in, work out the probabilities, crank the handle, and the 
answers will come out. … Far from being objective, the figures about 
probabilities that are put into the calculation reflect the assigner's confidence that 
the events are likely to occur. Since the risk analyst who feeds the machine its 
data is only human, he cannot focus on all prospects with an equally steady gaze. 
As such, market institutions create hierarchising and separating effects producing 
and reproducing social divisions and inequalities through the techniques of risk 
analysis. According to Douglas and Wildavsky (1982), market institutions’ scientific 
experimentations are inadequate for judging whether some risks are ‘properly 
managed’ while others are worth taking due to the subjective value of the risk 
analyst (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982).  
Furthermore, scientific risk analysis more often than not, “decontextualizes and 
dissocialises” human problems through quantification (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982, 
p. 80). Throughout the process of measuring, organising (including discriminating) 
and calculating; BHP OD creates areas with ordered and scrutinised details, while 
discriminates “shadowed” spots with nothing to see and no questions to ask 
(Douglas, 1986). Such shadowed spots include holistic views and moral concepts 




sacrificed for the economic benefits that the mining industry brings. According to 
Douglas and Wildvasky (1982, p. 81), “science and risk assessment… explicitly try 
to exclude moral ideas about the good life. Where responsibility starts, they stop”. 
To conclude the logological analysis, an ostensible objectivity and procedural 
validation that underpins scientific methods is achieved by silencing contradictory 
scientific studies about the likelihood of a state of non-rechargeability of the GAB by 
hierarchy institutions (Douglas, 1986). In the process, moral and ethical dimensions 
of GAB water extraction by the market institution is ignored (Douglas, 1986; 
Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982). 
 Preferred learning style, View of nature and Property of knowledge ideal 7.3
of the border institutions 
This section outlines the border institutions’ learning style, view of nature, and 
property of knowledge ideal and demonstrates the difference from those of the centre 
institutions - BHP OD and the Australian Federal and South Australian governments. 
The evidence of these interests is drawn from public submissions to ODEP EIS 
(BHP Billiton, 2009), media articles and academic references, as they represent the 
border institutions’ holistic learning style (grammatical analysis) (Ney & Thompson, 
2011), view of a fragile nature with depleting resources (rhetorical analysis) 
(Schwarz & Thompson, 1990), and property of knowledge ideal characterised by 
imperfection (logological analysis) (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982). This documentary 
evidence is often in the form of critical comments to: the assumed rechargeability of 
the GAB; the evolving nature of scientific knowledge to understand the impact of 
BHP OD’s existing GAB water extraction; and, the proposed increased extraction 
amount for ODEP on this groundwater resource and related ecosystem (BHP Billiton, 
2009, 2011a). This evidence often uses more subjective language. It is not 
unexpected that some media articles (e.g. Great Artesian Basin Protection Group, 
2009c; Serve the people, 2008) cite scientific inquiry that is contradictory to the 
scientific results of those accepted by the centre institutions (e.g. Endersbee, 2000b), 
as border institutions prefer to reveal the “polarized and politicized” scientific 
community itself to make their frustrations over scientific disputes visible (Douglas 




 Grammatical Analysis - Preferred learning style of border institutions 7.3.1
Border institutions construct themselves as agents whose acts are characterised by 
“timorous forbearance” which necessitate an “effective sanction” for prevention of a 
possible catastrophe (Thompson et al., 1990, p. 27). 
With the belief that the GAB groundwater resource is depleting, it is difficult for the 
border institutions to accept scientific experimentation and continuous trial and error 
processes from centre institutions (Thompson et al., 1990) as the proper knowledge 
type and learning style. From this perspective, any uncertainty or error is considered 
likely, therefore, to cause irreversible damage (Thompson et al., 1990) and is 
therefore unacceptable. Lad A (CL 233, n.p.) notes that evolving scientific 
knowledge is subject to errors and believes that it is about “making a hypothesis and 
then trying to prove it right or wrong.” As a result, “[h]istory is riddled with ‘experts’ 
presenting facts that are later proven to be wrong”. 
Lad A (CL 233, n. p.) also emphasises that, although trial and error processes are 
widely accepted by industry as “a recognised pathway to achieve a particular 
outcome”, with respect to BHP OD’s impact on the GAB water system, “proceeding 
with projects [e.g. ODEP] based on current understanding rather than fact” is more 
likely to have “major, usually irreversible” consequences (Lad A, CL 233, n.p.). 
Other documentary evidence from the border institutions directly questions the 
assumption of rechargeability suggested by the hierarchy.  
The border reveals flawed experiments and limited data (Douglas & Wildavsky, 
1982) arising from BHP OD’s modelling studies for predicting declined spring rate 
due to the operation of wellfields. For example, the Great Artesian Basin Protection 
Group (2009b, 2009c) suggests that the Australian Federal and South Australian 
governments are unable to comprehend the ‘real’ non-rechargeability situation of the 
GAB. The reason lies in a flawed key assumption of a commonly applied 
mathematical model of groundwater. Endersbee39 (2000b, n.p.) also points out that 
                                                 
39 Professor Endersbee’s research represents scientific inquiry that is contradictory to the scientific results of those accepted by 
the centre institutions. Endersbee (e.g. 2000b) assert that the GAB is a closed system with finite plutonic water resources and 
this finding is often cited in publicly-available documents from the border institutions (e.g. Great Artesian Basin Protection 




the concept of rechargeability from rainfall is “wrong and encourages waste, thereby 
seriously harming the long term yield of this resource of water”40. 
According to Endersbee (2000), the GAB water is a plutonic resource.  
The sediments [of the GAB] are normally consolidated. The water that was in 
these sediments at the time of deposition has been slowly squeezed out over 
geological time …Sediments derived from sands consolidate into sandstones. 
Even though a bed of sand may originally have an open structure, the processes 
of consolidation reduce the porosity. Waters derived from the consolidation of 
other sediments may enter the free spaces and precipitate other minerals, and the 
sand structure deforms under the increasing stresses (Endersbee, 2000b, n.p.). 
Therefore, all computer programs or models derived from this flawed assumption of 
a rechargeable GAB are “potential traps for the unwary” (Endersbee, 2000b, n.p.).  
 From the border institutions’ perspective, the models have “many unknown 
components” (Taylor R, CL 337, n.p.). Keane (1997, p. 44) suggests that the 
hydrogeological model used in the ODEP 1982’s EIS is “simplistic” and the 
subsequent results represent “a very slim understanding and appraisal of the impact 
on the mound springs (See Table 7.2).”41 The “significant deficiency in the amount 
of knowledge” and limited availability of hydrogeological data have made the 
models “at best very rough estimates” (Keane, 1997, p. 50). 
Moreover, Mudd42 (2000) demonstrates numerous factors that are likely to influence 
the observed rate of a spring flow. And he emphasises that “these factors are hard to 
account for quantitatively and are typically ignored in compiling variations and long-
term changes in spring flow rates” (Mudd, 2000, p. 468). As such, those “unresolved” 
                                                 
40 Endersbee (2000b, n.p.) further categorises and elaborates several aspects of the ‘false impression’ that the Queensland 
government ‘rechargeable’ aquifer diagram (see Figure 7.1) conveys. First, he considers the vertical scale of intake beds in the 
diagram that shows “intake beds as strata lying in an almost vertical direction with the beds exposed to the rainfall”. Endersbee 
(2000b, n.p.) reveals the rhetorical effect of the image (Barthes, 1977; Davison, 2011) and contends that it is misleading as “the 
beds are virtually horizontal” around these so-called “recharge” regions. 
Second, Endersbee (2000b, n.p.) asserts that rocks in those regions are “sound and impervious” which makes it impossible for 
the surface rainfall to enter and percolate underground for thousands of kilometres. 
Third, Endersbee (2000b, n.p.) is concerned about the relative density of the rock (2.6) and the water (1.0). The Queensland 
government diagram does not consider such differences, instead it implies an impossible physical phenomenon - “the pressure 
head of the seepage water from the intake beds, less friction losses all the way, would be sufficient to overcome the stresses in 
the rock at the base of the borehole” (Endersbee, 2000b, n.p.). 
Fourth there is a concern about the claimed “water-bearing porous sandstones” at the bottom of sedimentary rocks. Such porous 
sandstones could only exist under fairly high water pressure, which has to be “comparable to the stresses in the rock”. Such 
water pressure shows “a plutonic source of water from the bedrock below the strata” (Endersbee, 2000b, n.p.). 
41 For example, according to Keane (see also Great Artesian Basin Protection Group, 2009a; 1997, p.471)“By the early 1990s it 
was apparent that impacts on the mound springs were underestimated in Kinhill (1982)… By 1990 the spring vents at Priscilla 
and Venables had ceased flowing, and there were visible reductions in flows and wetland area at other spring complexes, 
notably Hermit Hill, Beatrice and Bopeechee.” 
42 Dr. Mudd is a scientist whose scientific views are contradictory to the scientific results of these accepted by the centre 




aspects of the models “give rise to uncertainty in the predictions” (Mudd, 2000, p. 
470). 
From BHP OD’s perspective, the modelling studies are prone to errors and are 
subject to an evolving process (Section 7.2.1). However, for the border institutions, 
those assessment approaches and improved modelling studies adopted by ODEP 
1997 EIS still contain “some gross inadequacies that need to be corrected by 
collection of data and independent analysis” (Keane, 1997, p. 50). Keane (1997) 
points out that problems remain in accurately measuring the flows from the springs 
and the pressures in bores over several years period to determine if the GAB 
underground water system is in equilibrium43.  
Holistic knowledge characterises the ideal learning style for border institutions (Ney 
& Thompson, 2011), and it is considered as the key to understanding and protecting 
a fragile GAB underground water system with depleting water resources. This 
degree of completeness does not only require the acknowledgment of scientific 
debate, but also embraces Aboriginal knowledge beyond the field of formal scientific 
inquiry (Ney & Thompson, 2011). For example, the Great Artesian Basin Protection 
Group (2009d) contends that our current knowledge of the groundwater system is 
still poor, especially when considering the “long-time scales associated with shifts in 
the condition of many groundwater systems” (Great Artesian Basin Protection Group, 
2009d, n.p.). Professor Endersbee (2000b, n.p.) points out that while scientific 
research activities have become increasingly specialised in our society and has led to 
“an increasing narrower concentration of effort”, what is really needed is “free and 
open” scientific inquiry and more “learned debate”.  
                                                 
43 Keane (1997, p. 49) specifies some significant flaws embedded in the computer model used in ODEP 1997 EIS : “The recent 
figures are derived from a computer model used by Berry and Armstrong. Several comments on this model will be made:” 
(Keane, 1997, p. 49) 
“The estimates are based on 50% of the South Australian portion of the GAB. The inflow into this reduced portion is 
approximated at 76 ML/day. This is a very small estimate when compared to 425 ML/day for the water balance of South 
Australia as a whole.” (Keane, 1997, p. 49)  
“It underestimates vertical leakage, leading to higher groundwater flow through the aquifer units. This results in an over-
estimate of the potential bore flows that actually occur in the field.” (Keane, 1997, p. 49) 
“The analysis of the Lake Eyre portion of the basin in South Australia puts the ODO water extraction into proper perspective. It 
shows it as being 18% of the total water movement in the local region. If the ODO usage expands to 42 ML/day as planned, 
this will represent 55% of the water movement through the region.” (Keane, 1997, p. 49) 
“The model incorporates an assumption that GAB is in steady state, ie. there are no changes over time. This is based on the 
classic Habermehl paper of 1980 (Habermehl, 1980), which claimed that the basin is in equilibrium - “provided no new major 
developments occur which will affect this equilibrium situation, discharge and potentials will not change significantly”. In the 
seventeen years since this statement was made many large scale developments have occurred in South Australia and the basin 
as a whole. The assumption of equilibrium let alone steady state needs much scrutiny and critique. Equilibrium, unlike steady 





Apart from scientific inquiry, serve the people (2008, n.p.) argues that Aboriginal 
knowledge of the GAB water resource is rich because of “the accumulation of many 
tens of thousands of years of practical experience in surviving and maintaining 
communities on the driest continent in the world.” According to an Aboriginal miner, 
for example, “water in the centre of Australia…is like a spider’s web of streams 
under the ground, and [Aboriginal people] knew where to dig for it.” (Serve the 
people, 2008, n.p. ) This is consistent with Ney and Thompson’s (2011, p. 41) 
argument that Aboriginal knowledge has taught that life in all kinds and forms are 
connected vitally- “everything is connected to everything else”. To conclude the 
grammatical analysis, border institutions believe that the assumption of 
rechargeability is flawed and BHP OD’s modelling studies are faulty due to 
simplistic models and limited data. Holistic knowledge that acknowledges both 
counter scientific inquiry and Aboriginal knowledge is desirable. 
 Rhetorical analysis - View of nature of border institutions 7.3.2
While constructing holistic knowledge as the appropriate agency of learning style, 
border institutions promote identification with the public by framing themselves as 
moral agents who seek to treat the ecosystem with great care (Schwarz & Thompson, 
1990), permitting “life in its varied and beautiful forms to continue” (Douglas & 
Wildavsky, 1982, p. 135). Border institutions therefore construct another hierarchy 
and social order distinct from market and hierarchy institutions. The myth of an 
‘Ephemeral’ nature is recommended (Thompson et al., 1990); where nature is 
constructed as fragile with depleting resources (Schwarz & Thompson, 1990). 
Contrary to the view from centre institutions, border institutions construct the GAB 
water system as a scarce and vulnerable water resource in an arid environment. For 
example, “South Australia is the driest state in the driest inhabited continent” 
(Amery-Gale M, CL 99, n.p.) “with evapotranspiration generally exceeding rainfall 
by an order of magnitude or more” (Mudd, 2000, p. 465). From the border 
institutions’ perspective, the GAB groundwater system is an interconnected system 
and part of an intricate ‘web of life’ (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982; Ney & Thompson, 
2011). According to Mudd (2000, p. 468), “the mound springs are the only 
permanent source of water in the arid interior of South Australia and a delicate yet 




“contain many endemic and rare species that have undergone genetic differentiation 
and speciation.” As such, reduced flows from mound springs are very likely to have 
detrimental effects on those rare species (Henderson K, CL 196; Great Artesian 
Basin Protection Group, 2009d, n.p.). The border institutions perceive the natural 
world as closely linked to the human world and they hold a utopian view that life of 
all forms is in an equal position and exists in a balanced and harmonious ecosystem 
(Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982). For example, the outflow of groundwater from the 
GAB plays a “vital” (Mudd, 2000, p. 468) role for Aboriginal people who have 
inhabited this “desert region” (Keane, 1997, p. 23) for “many thousands of years and 
remain so to this day” (Mudd, 2000, p. 468). In addition, “it is impossible in modern 
times to predict, with any confidence, that an individual mound spring does not have 
any significance due to similarities with other springs in an area.” (Mudd, 2000, p. 
468). 
Springs from the Lake Eyre region “are recognised as being under the traditional 
custodianship of the Arabanna people” (Mudd, 2000, p. 468). This is supported by 
the evidence that “abundant stone chips, grinding stones, other traditional tools in the 
vicinity of the springs, and … the rich mythological and oral history of the springs in 
Aboriginal culture” (Mudd, 2000, p. 468). Keane (1997, p. 23) gives an example that 
“the Bubbler [spring] is described by Aboriginal people as the convulsions of the 
ganmari snake which was killed by a Guyani ancestor”. Therefore, all the mound 
springs have a fundamental importance to traditional inhabitants, and the 
deterioration of any group of springs could cause significant distress to some 
Aboriginal people, regardless of their direct or indirect associations with the sites 
(Hercus and Sutton, 1985, cited in Keane, 1997; Mudd, 2000). Border institutions 
identify the acts from market and hierarchy (centre) institutions as “guilty” (Livesey, 
2002b, p. 127), since they believe human activities have brought along disastrous 
physical consequences on the natural world (Ney & Thompson, 2011). In this case, 
human beings have exerted negative impacts on the GAB groundwater system for 
centuries, which has led to depleting water resources. Mudd (2000) suggests that the 
GAB spring flows and artesian pressures were relatively high before European 
settlement. “[E]xcessive development” of the GAB by European activity over the 




The volume of BHP OD’s proposed increased water extraction from its expansion 
project is also contested. For example, Keane (1997, p. 34) illustrates that the agreed 
GAB water extraction limit of 42ml/d for Olympic Dam is a large amount which 
“accounts for 9-25% of the total artificial extraction from the south western portion 
of the GAB”. Public submissions to ODEP EIS (BHP Billiton, 2009) and media 
articles also present the view that both existing and proposed GAB water extraction 
is immense for South Australia as a “tragically dry state” (e.g. People for Nuclear 
Disarmament (WA), CL 65, n. p.).  
To conclude the rhetorical analysis, border institutions view the GAB as a fragile 
water system with increasingly depleting water resources. Furthermore, it is very 
likely to be a non-rechargeable, therefore, non-renewable resource. The border 
institutions’ holistic view holds that nature is intricately connected and closely linked 
to the wellbeing of human and non-human inhabitants (Ney & Thompson, 2011). 
While maintaining a utopian view that all life forms are equal and exist in a 
harmonious ecosystem (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982), the border institutions argue 
that human activities such as BHP OD’s water extraction have had negative impacts 
on the GAB water system.  
 Logological analysis - Property of knowledge ideal of border institutions 7.3.3
The paradoxes and controversies inherent in the hierarchising and separating effects 
derived from the properties of centre institutions’ knowledge ideal, provide 
opportunities for border institutions to resist and transform. Through the construction 
of holistic knowledge as agency and identification of nature as ephemeral and fragile, 
border institutions establish ‘imperfection’ as the terministic screen. With respect to 
the property of their knowledge ideal, this is in order to legitimate their preferred 
social order and learning style. 
Since border institutions’ knowledge ideal is morally explicit, they acknowledge a 
“polarized and politicized” scientific community to make scientific disputes visible 
(Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982, p. 65). From the border institutions’ perspective, the 
centre institutions highlight scientific ‘facts’ while obscuring other information 
(Douglas, 1986) with regard to the notion of a rechargeable GAB and manageable 




the rechargeability” of the GAB (Endersbee, 2000b, n.p.), along with the subsequent 
“wilful ignorance” of the opposite position (Owen, 2009, p. 2), have contributed to 
immense wastage of the GAB water resource (Endersbee, 2000b; Great Artesian 
Basin Protection Group, 2009b). 
For example, Endersbee (2000b, n.p.) admits that he feels alone as he “seem[s] to be 
the only person in Australia who was saying that the Great Artesian Basin was 
definitely not being recharged from surface rainfall”, while his colleagues and 
friends are “apprehensive”. And, it is surprising to see “the intensity of the 
opposition” which “attempt[ed] to persuade ATSE [Australian Academy of 
Technological Sciences and Engineering] not to publish … [his] paper,” especially at 
the level of State government. The State government44  even told the Australian 
Geological Survey Organisation to “keep out of groundwater studies, as that was a 
state responsibility.” In its broader context, Endersbee (2000b, n.p.) argues that it 
represents a “warning light” that demonstrates that scientific inquiry is not always 
“free and open” in Australia; especially where “[t]he struggle for funds” gives rise to 
“an increasingly narrower concentration of effort.” Apart from the wilful ignorance 
of the debatable nature of the GAB at the State government level, the current water 
extraction from BHP OD’s wellfields and the proposed continuous and even 
increased GAB water extraction amount, according to Greens Parliamentary Leader 
Mark Parnell, is “more culpable” (South Australia, Legislative Council 2011, p. 62) 
for “the extinction of Mound Springs and the harm to a number of others.” (South 
Australia, Legislative Council 2011, p. 6). It is evidenced by Keane (1997, p. 64) that 
it appears that BHP OD has “ignor[ed] the expert advice” regarding the potential 
environmental and ecological impact in the first place. 
From the perspective of the border institutions, such wilful non-disclosure from 
centre institutions can be attributed to “economic self-interest”; where research 
funding and investment “serve to hide the truth” of potential environmental risks and 
pollutions (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982, p. 59). For example, the Great Artesian 
Basin Protection Group (2009b, n.p.) suggests that this purposeful ignorance may 
derive from “big money at stake”:  
                                                 
44 Endersbee (2000b) does not name the state government which prevented his paper from publication. Yet from the context of 
the GAB water related debate for BHP OD’s mining operation, it can be inferred that such ‘wilful ignorance’ represents the 




[G]overnments receive a lot of revenue from mining, and mines are huge users of 
GAB water. The GAB water entitlement for Olympic Dam mine alone is 42 
million litres a day. It is likely that governments would be reluctant to admit they 
were allowing a finite resource to be squandered in this way. Much better to 
assure everyone that it is recharging (Great Artesian Basin Protection Group, 
2009b, n.p.) 
In addition, Keane (1997, p. 62) suggests that BHP OD made “a mockery” of the 
process of the EIS “in the name of short term cost reduction”. Despite BHP OD’s 
(2008a, 2009a, 2010a, 2011a, 2012a, 2013a) claim that its modelling studies and 
field investigations have undergone peer-review process and assessment by both 
Australian Federal and South Australian government experts. It is argued that such a 
peer-review assessment is flawed as “the government is very reliant on data that 
comes from the company” (Cleary, 2011, n.p.). 
While centre institutions generate the basic scientific techniques of organisation, 
calculation and discrimination; from the perspective of the border institutions this 
social order inevitably gives rise to “myopia” (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982, p. 75). 
In this case, the border institutions’ opinion is that the government and BHP OD’s 
reliance on certain scientific information and advice inevitably imposes ‘involuntary 
risk’ on a society which is both ironic and unethical (Douglas, 1986; Douglas & 
Wildavsky, 1982; Rayner, 2012). For example, Endersbee (2000b, n.p.) asserts that 
the perpetration of the replenishable GAB myth from the government “promote[s] a 
gross deception of the public”. Owen (2009, n.p.) argues that South Australia, “the 
state at the end of the Great Artesian Basin … will bear the brunt of this apathy, this 
neglect, this wilful ignorance by those who hold the policy levels.” (Owen, 2009, 
n.p.). 
To conclude this logological analysis, border institutions view scientific and expert 
knowledge as limited and incomplete because of its evolving nature (Douglas & 
Wildavsky, 1982). The terministic screen of imperfection is demonstrated in border 
institutions’ holistic knowledge ideal. From this perspective, centre institutions - 
Australian Federal and South Australian governments and BHP OD’s wilful 
ignorance of counter scientific inquiries and expert advice in the pursuit of economic 




GAB water wastage and endangered the GAB springs and imposed an involuntary 
risk on a society that will bear the costs of the mistake.  
 Concept of control 7.4
Accounting recognition and measurement relies on the concept of control, not 
necessarily ownership. This view is represented in accounting standards such as the 
International Accounting Standard Board’s (IASB) (2001) Framework for the 
Preparation and Presentation of Financial Statements (thereafter the Framework). 
According to the IASB (2001, IASB Framework para.16), “[t]he financial position 
of an entity is affected by the economic resources it controls45”, and the elements 
such as assets and liabilities are “directly related to the measurement of financial 
position” (IASB 2001, IASB Framework para.49). These elements should be 
recognised46 if:  
(a) it is probable that any future economic benefit associated with the item will 
flow to or from the entity; and  
(b) the item has a cost or value that can be measured47 with reliability” (IASB 
2001, IASB Framework para.83) 
However, this control concept and the subsequent recognition and measurement of 
relevant assets and liabilities in financial reports is contestable when what is 
traditionally considered a public good becomes a resource for profit. In this case, the 
debate over the appropriate learning style to understand the nature of the GAB water 
resource and the property of knowledge ideal based on cultural risk theory (Douglas 
& Wildavsky, 1982) provides an opportunity to explore this theme. 
As a public good, the GAB can be considered as communally owned. Although it is 
non-exclusive in use, it can be rival in consumption. In rhetorical analysis, while 
endorsing the centre institutions’ construction of a robust and resilient nature within 
natural limits and boundaries (Ney & Thompson, 2011), the BHP OD and South 
Australian government assert that the GAB water resource is rechargeable and BHP 
                                                 
45 According to the IASB (2001, IASB Framework para.57), “[m]any assets, for example, receivables and property, are 
associated with legal rights, including the right of ownership. In determining the existence of an asset, the right of ownership is 
not essential; thus, for example, property held on a lease is an asset if the entity controls the benefits which are expected to flow 
from the property”. 
46 According to the IASB (2001, IASB Framework para.82), “[r]ecognition is the process of incorporating in the balance sheet 
or income statement an item that meets the definition of an element and satisfies the criteria for recognition”. 
47 According to the IASB (2001, IASB Framework para.99), “[m]easurement is the process of determining the monetary 





OD only extracts a small amount to process minerals. These assumptions legitimate 
BHP OD’s water extraction sanctioned by South Australian government. The 
disclosure of GAB water in social and environmental reports from BHP and BHP 
OD and GAB water regulatory statements and policies from the Australian Federal 
and South Australian government can be considered as “ a means of bundling or 
packaging uncertainty into an acceptable form” to facilitate the distribution of 
market institution’s rights and obligations (Moerman & van der Laan, 2012, p. 107). 
According to IASB (2001, IASB Framework para.49), “[a]n asset is a resource 
controlled by the entity as a result of past events and from which future economic 
benefits are expected to flow to the entity”. This past event includes the water 
licence granted to BHP OD from South Australian government “as part of a program 
to encourage economic growth in an area” (IASB 2001, IASB Framework para.58). 
However, although the GAB water resource is controlled as an asset by BHP OD for 
mining operations, this asset is not shown in the BHP OD’s balance sheet because 
conventional accounting only “capture[s] and measure[s] business transactions” 
(Jones, 2010, p. 130). In IASB’s (2001, IASB Framework para.89) words,  
[a]n asset is recognised in the balance sheet when it is probable that the future 
economic benefits will flow to the entity and the asset has a cost or value that can 
be measured reliably48.  
In this case, BHP OD does not recognise the GAB water intake for its mining 
operation as an asset because South Australian government grants it the water 
licence without charge. This ‘asset’ is unmeasurable therefore unidentifiable in 
monetary terms. This controlled GAB water resource will only become an asset 
when BHP OD is sold. By that time, it will be realised and recognised as purchased 
‘goodwill’. 
The BHP OD and the South Australian government also match the centre institutions’ 
worldview that expert knowledge such as modern science as agency makes it 
possible for humans to control and manage natural resources (Douglas & Wildavsky, 
1982; Schwarz & Thompson, 1990) through calculation, quantification and 
                                                 
48 According to the IASB (2001, IASB Framework para.34), “[m]ost financial information is subject to some risk of being less 
than a faithful representation of that which it purports to portray. This is not due to bias, but rather to inherent difficulties either 
in identifying the transactions and other events to be measured or in devising and applying measurement and presentation 
techniques that can convey messages that correspond with those transactions and events. In certain cases, the measurement of 




prediction (Gray, 1992; Power, 2007). In the grammatical analysis, the discourses of 
the centre demonstrate that BHP OD’s GAB water extraction does not have 
excessive negative impacts that affect the stable and resilient GAB water system 
because the wellfields operation is well controlled within the most updated scientific 
knowledge and expertise. Following this assumption, BHP OD does not see that its 
GAB water extraction entails a ‘liability’ as the potential water extraction related risk 
is trivial, uncertain and sometimes non-severable from impacts due to other sources 
other than BHP OD’s wellfields. This non-recognition of ‘liability’ is also consistent 
with IASB’s Framework. According to IASB (2001, IASB Framework para.49): 
A liability is a present obligation of the entity arising from past events, the 
settlement of which is expected to result in an outflow from the entity of 
resources embodying economic benefits.  
And,  
[a] liability is recognised in the balance sheet when it is probable that an outflow 
of resources embodying economic benefits will result from the settlement of a 
present obligation and the amount at which the settlement will take place can be 
measured reliably (IASB 2001, IASB Framework para.91) 
Such non-recognition of GAB water intake as an asset and the consequent water 
extraction related risks as a liability in financial reports for BHP OD, is supported by 
South Australian government. Risk, from both market and hierarchy institutions’ 
perspective, is properly managed and controlled within the centre (Douglas & 
Wildavsky, 1982). Centre institutions’ perspectives reflect managerial and 
administrative accountability. Managerial accountability is based on the dominant 
neo-classical economic supposition that social and environmental benefits and costs 
are immaterial, thought to be unquantifiable therefore unmeasurable in the domain of 
free market (Freedman & Stagliano, 1990). Administrative accountability, on the 
other hand, is increasingly concerned with economic growth, therefore “passing 
more power to the market” (Spence et al., 2010, p. 78). 
This non-recognition of both asset and liability disseminates and legitimates the 
centre institutions’ construction of an abundant GAB water resource and scientific, 
trial and error learning style as the most appropriate learning style to understand and 




of neutrality described in IASB’s Framework para 36, which requires the 
information in financial statements to be neutral: 
Financial statements are not neutral if, by the selection or presentation of 
information, they influence the making of a decision or judgement in order to 
achieve a predetermined result or outcome (IASB 2001, IASB Framework 
para.36). 
According to Maunders and Burritt (1991, p. 12), incomplete or absence of 
“representation of uncertain positions may be particularly inappropriate where an 
omitted outcome constitutes ecological ‘ruin’”. That is, the accounting system in its 
current form, serves as an ideological tool for a vested interest to overuse non-
renewable resources and downplay ecological impacts (see also Hines, 1989; Jones, 
2010). In the logological analysis of disclosures from the centre institutions, 
‘objectivity’ and ‘procedural validation’ are the ‘terministic screens’ that underpin 
scientific methods. This is achieved by silencing contradictory scientific studies 
regarding the likelihood of non-rechargeability and ignoring the moral and ethical 
dimensions of the GAB water extraction by the BHP OD (Douglas, 1986; Douglas & 
Wildavsky, 1982). 
According to Buhr (2001) and Lehman (1995), managerial accountability from 
market institutions and administrative accountability from hierarchy institutions 
constitute the most common forms of accountability in current western liberal 
societies. They subscribe to ‘business-as-usual’ and ‘middle-of-the-road’ cases for 
sustainable development. These approaches focus on the scientific and technical 
dimensions of accountability and subsequently neglect the full social and 
environmental cost of corporate activity (Andrew, 2007; Beder, 1997; Dumay et al., 
2010). This critical perspective is consistent with the border institutions’ 
construction of the GAB water system, their preferred learning style, and the 
corresponding property of knowledge ideal. 
Public submissions to the ODEP EIS (BHP Billiton, 2009), several media articles 
and academic studies support the border institutions’ primary concern for a fragile 
nature with depleting natural resources (Schwarz & Thompson, 1990) and the 
incompleteness and limitedness of scientific knowledge and expertise as an authority 




GAB water resource is constructed as non-rechargeable and the corresponding 
scientific knowledge advocated the centre as contradictory and flawed. This 
imperfect concept is due to incomplete and limited hydrogeological and 
hydrochemical knowledge and the uncertainty arising from the use of evolving 
modelling studies characterised by a trial and error learning process.  
Therefore, managerial and administrative accountability from centre institutions 
manifest an ostensible objectivity with both “positive and negative sanctions” that 
make “the image of events that counts” (Roberts, 1991, p. 363). These forms of 
accountability entail “unintended and unacknowledged…environmental 
consequences that spill out from the pursuit of strategic objectives” (Roberts, 1991, p. 
367). In this case, the South Australian government’s permission for BHP OD’s 
GAB water intake has had detrimental impacts on this fragile GAB water system. 
Following on from the border institutions’ argument, while controlling the GAB 
water resource, BHP OD also has responsibility for environmental damage, such as 
declining spring flow.  
From an accounting perspective, these assumptions affect the relevance and 
reliability ideal of disclosures related to GAB water as a ‘controlled’ economic 
resource. According to the IASB (2001, IASB Framework para.29), the relevance of 
information is closely related to its nature and materiality. In the context of the GAB, 
the non-rechargeable nature and ecosystem damages exerted by BHP OD’s 
wellfields supports the borders recognition of the obligation that BHP OD has 
towards the risks associated with GAB water extraction. From the border institutions’ 
perspective, BHP OD should, sooner or later, disclose the likelihood of a non-
rechargeable GAB in its notes, explanatory material or supplementary schedules49, 
and account for its GAB water extraction related risks as a liability, or at least a 
contingent liability or a provision50. This requirement to participate in a form of 
                                                 
49 According to IASB (2001, IASB Framework para.88), “[a]n item that possesses the essential characteristics of an element but 
fails to meet the criteria for recognition may nonetheless warrant disclosure in the notes, explanatory material or in 
supplementary schedules. This is appropriate when knowledge of the item is considered to be relevant to the evaluation of the 
financial position, financial performance and cash flows of an entity by the users of financial statements.” 
According to IASB (2001, IASB Framework para.21), “notes and supplementary schedules and other information…may 
contain additional information that is relevant to the needs of users about the items in the balance sheet and income statement. 
They may include disclosures about the risks and uncertainties affecting the entity and any resources and obligations not 
recognised in the balance sheet (such as mineral reserves).” 
50 According to IASB (2001, IASB Framework para.64), “[s]ome liabilities can be measured only by using a substantial degree 
of estimation. Some entities describe these liabilities as provisions. In some countries, such provisions are not regarded as 




moral accountability is more encompassing and acknowledges “a non-instrumental 
relationship” to the other. In other words, a relationship of obligation to our 
responsibility for the other that cannot be discharged by reference merely to one’s 
economic interest (Shearer, 2002). 
The stability of the centre is disrupted by the ‘noisy’ border institutions. In this case, 
the market institution is requested to disclose more information to facilitate 
information about the “socialization of risk” (Moerman & van der Laan, 2012, p. 107) 
related to the GAB water. This suggested (extra) information increases “the public 
awareness of risk” (Moerman & van der Laan, 2012, p. 115) and allows the 
(re)definition and (re)location of risk management to (re)establish a stable centre 
institution while fulfilling the interests of the border institutions to settle the “moral 
problems about social inequality” (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982, p. 177).  
After all, if the current GAB water resource allocation is based on the limited 
understanding of the renewability of the GAB water resource itself and trial and 
error modelling studies from BHP OD, whose primary goal is profit-making without 
independent confirmation from South Australian government, there is a danger for us 
as a collective to face an [un]expected and unwanted economic, environmental and 
cultural loss which may threaten our basic living standards. Border institutions 
embrace an ethical concern regarding “the moral status of economic collectivities, 
including the scope of the moral community and the good that this community seeks” 
(Shearer, 2002, p. 541).  
If GAB water extraction related risks were represented as a (contingent) liability in 
BHP OD’s financial reports it would define and communicate a different 
construction of the GAB water system as fragile and depleting (rhetorical analysis). 
The prevailing mainstream scientific model would no longer be the taken-for-granted 
method to understand and control the GAB water resource (grammatical analysis). 
The form moral accountability required by the border institutions consequently 
cultivates openness and dialogue for social and distributive justice rather than 
scientific and economic reasoning (Messner, 2009). In Schweiker’s (1993, p. 224) 
                                                                                                                                          
the need to make estimates. The definition of a liability in paragraph 49 follows a broader approach. Thus, when a provision 





words, “[w]hat we account for and our substantive notions of what is good are bound 
up with these relations to others and ourselves”. Moral accountability as such, 
requires face-to-face communication and acknowledges mutual understanding in the 
absence of power dynamics, especially seeks to make the voice of the vulnerable to 
be heard (Messner, 2009; Roberts, 1991). 
According to the logological analysis, the centre institutions - Australian Federal and 
South Australian governments and BHP OD’s - wilful ignorance of counter scientific 
inquiries and expert advice in the pursuit of economic self-interest is unethical 
(Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982), as it has caused immense water wastage, endangered  
GAB springs and imposed an involuntary risk on society. 
According to Hines (1989, p. 62), accounting practice is a political activity “by 
selecting and reflecting materialist aspects of society”. Cultural risk theory, by 
suggesting that assumptions such as the preferred learning style, view of nature and 
property of knowledge ideal are shaped by institutional beliefs and interests, 
provides us with a critical lens to analyse the politicised nature of accounting 
concept of control with subsequent accounting measurement and recognition rules. 
In this theme, the centre institutions - South Australian government and BHP OD’s 
assumptions of preferred learning style, view of nature and the property of their 
knowledge ideal has conferred institutional legitimacy on the non-recognition and 
non-presentation of the controlled natural resource as an asset and its consumption 
related risks as a liability in BHP OD’s financial reports. The border institutions, by 
challenging those taken-for-granted assumptions, provide us with the opportunity to 
reconsider this accounting concept of control and its indirect consequences in 
perpetuating environmental crises.  
 Summary 7.5
This chapter analysed the institutional debate of the GAB water risk through 
contested disclosures among market institutions - BHP and BHP OD, hierarchy 
institutions - Australian Federal and South Australian governments and border 
institutions - civil society, using three major concepts from cultural risk theory, with 
the application of Burkean rhetorical criticism. From this analysis, different 




GAB groundwater system and property of knowledge ideal and their implications for 
accounting concept of control and related accountability are elucidated. The 
following chapter analyses different institutional position in the GAB water risk 
debate using another three major concepts - attitude towards technology, view of risk 
and resolution of risk from cultural risk theory, and discuss their implications for 





CHAPTER 8 ATTITUDE TOWARDS TECHNOLOGY, VIEW OF RISK 
AND RESOLUTION OF RISK 
 Introduction 8.1
The preceding chapter applied three major concepts of preferred learning style, view 
of nature and property of knowledge ideal to analyse the institutional debate 
regarding the Great Artesian Basin (GAB) water - related risks and discussed the 
implications for the accounting concept of control and related accountability. This 
chapter applies three major concepts from cultural risk theory: attitude towards 
technology, view of risk and resolution of risk, to understand the concept of 
stewardship. 
According to Burkean grammatical analysis, intrinsic differences are embedded in 
attitudes towards the technology of institutional life (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982). 
These different attitudes toward modern technology subsequently generate a 
distinctive view of risk for Burkean rhetorical analysis. Finally in Burkean 
logological analysis, different institutions select a particular set of risks and 
foreground certain solutions instead of the others.  
The purpose of this analysis is to identify different institutional perspectives with 
regard to attitudes towards water efficiency related technology, a particular view of 
the GAB water risks and finally the resolution of risk. This analysis has implications 
for an understanding of the accounting concept of stewardship and provides insights 
for social and environmental accounting and reporting practices. The three - level 
analysis of institutional perspectives and critical themes of accounting and related 




Table 8.1 Attitude towards Technology, View of Risk, Resolution of Risk and Stewardship 
 Market Institutions Hierarchy Institutions Border Institutions 
















Pro-technology Technical Fix Anti-technology 
Adopt  BSC information technology for water management and 
water efficiency technology to tackle  risks 
Require water efficiency related technology as a 
technical adjustment to the extant GAB water use 
Water efficiency related technology focuses on techno-economic facets 
neglecting moral and environmental dimensions of the GAB water risks. These 
are moral defects as environmental value of the GAB water resource is 
incommensurable with a short-term economic value Constructed and objectified GAB water risks rendered by technology are to control the uncertainty of water sustainability. 







 Water efficiency related technologies are perceived as centre institutions’ stewardship mechanism to account for their 
financial, social and environmental responsibility 
Water efficiency related technologies do not satisfy the discharge of 
environmental responsibility. Centre institutions’ consideration of financial 
responsibility heavily outweigh that of environmental responsibility 








k Opportunity Controllability Need to Minimise 
Design monitoring programs and water efficiency programs to 
challenge GAB water risks and turn them into opportunities 
Establish the Indenture Act (1982) to govern BHP 
OD’s mining project 
Despite the implementation of monitoring programs and water efficiency 
programs, BHP OD’s mining operation has irreversible risks. Radical change 
like an outright ban on the BHP OD’s GAB water extraction  is advocated 






p The general fulfilment of managerial stewardship is reflected in the South Australian government and BHP OD’s dual 
objectives. Both financial, environmental and social responsibility has been charged through BHP OD’s monitoring and 
water efficiency programs 
BHP OD’s GAB water monitoring program and water efficiency program do not 
fulfil its environmental responsibility. Radical change is needed to discharge 
centre institutions’ managerial stewardship 










k Economic Growth Regulation Low Growth and Invasiveness 
Assume economic and market measures are the most 
appropriate for valuing objects or concepts 
Protect standardised operating procedures or regulation 
as the realistically feasible solution to manage potential 
threat 
Economic expansion is not constructed as an environmental solution. The ODEP 
is general and the water efficiency related technology in particular imply the 
promise of the satisfaction of endless wants for capitalist interests without 
satisfying the real human needs Imperialist tendency - ODEP as the best operational solution to sustainable development in general, and water efficiency 








 The continuous improvement of the water efficiency indicator legitimates the managerial stewardship of BHP OD for its 
extant operation and the proposed ODEP, sanctioned by South Australian government. Social and environmental aspects 
of the GAB water risks are shifted sideways 
Social and environmental responsibility covered by centre institutions’ 
managerial stewardship can only be discharged through requirements for 









Managerial Accountability Administrative Accountability Moral Accountability 
Natural resources are treated as economic good and they are 
objectified for efficiency and profit maximisation 
Taking a social value base allegedly, the main concern 
is with economic development, with the pluralist 
political assumptions that the state pursues a neutral 
mediating role in conflict resolution 
Requires moral relations to others which necessitates mutual understanding 
beyond the giving and receiving of accounts through formal categories provided 
by managerial and administrative accountability. Political participation is 
important 
Focus on procedural and technical dimensions of accountability and perpetuate the status-quo without critically analysing 




In this chapter the market and hierarchy (centre) institutions (Section 8.2) are 
analysed before the explication of the border institutions (Section 8.3). The concept 
of stewardship and associated issues of accountability is then discussed with insights 
for social and environmental accounting and reporting practices (Section 8.4). 
 Attitude towards technology, View of risk and Resolution of risk of centre 8.2
institutions 
As documents issued by BHP Billiton Olympic Dam Corporation Pty Ltd (BHP OD) 
and the Federal and State government correspond to a great extent, both perspectives 
from market and hierarchy institutions are combined to highlight a consistent view 
from centre institutions. According to cultural risk theory (Douglas & Wildavsky, 
1982), centre institutions encompass both market and hierarchy cultures. In terms of 
attitude towards technology, both market and hierarchy institutions perceive 
technological advancement as the solution for economic development without 
unacceptable environmental risks (Ney & Thompson, 2011; Schwarz & Thompson, 
1990; Thompson & Rayner, 1998). In regards to the view of risk, while hierarchy 
institutions support carefully planned and designed policies to ensure sustainable 
development for both economic growth and environmental management (Ney & 
Thompson, 2011; Thompson & Rayner, 1998); market institutions advocate 
economic development and believe that environmental risks can be transformed into 
opportunities by challenging and tackling them boldly (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982; 
Ney & Thompson, 2011; Schwarz & Thompson, 1990; Thompson et al., 1990). In 
respect of the resolution of risk, while market institutions’ technologies imply that 
market and economic measures are the most appropriate for valuing objects 
(Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982), hierarchy institutions sanction such technologies as 
“realistically feasible” solutions to their needs for sustainable development (Douglas 
& Wildavsky, 1982, p. 93). This constructed and objectified notion of risk facilitates 
technological and operational expansion without consideration of the long-term 
environmental risks (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982). 
 Grammatical analysis - Attitude towards technology of centre institutions 8.2.1
At this level, contested attitudes towards technology in the broader context of 
sustainable development are constructed by market, hierarchy and border institutions 




Wildavsky, 1982; Ney & Thompson, 2011; Thompson & Rayner, 1998), centre 
institutions favour technology, which is dependent on specialised knowledge and 
expertise to establish and operate. Hierarchy institutions construct themselves as 
agents whose acts are to protect both economic growth and the environment 
(Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982). Technology, as agency, is favoured by hierarchy 
institutions (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982), because they believe that a successful 
environmental policy can be executed through technical adjustments to extant 
institutions (Thompson & Rayner, 1998)  
In this case, water efficiency related technology is advocated by the South Australian 
government to control GAB water risks. For example, according to the South 
Australian Arid Lands Natural Resources Management (SAALNRM) Board (2009a, 
p. 29), “one key” approach to management is using water judiciously, as it is the 
government’s responsibility to “eliminate waste and to maximise social and 
economic benefits in a manner that is environmentally sustainable.” Incorporation of 
water efficiency techniques and technologies and utilisation of industry best 
practices for all water users is an expectation from the hierarchy (SAALNRM Board, 
2009a).  
In response, BHP OD adopts ‘Best Practicable Technology’ (BPT) with assistance 
from “scientists, ecologists, engineers, hydrogeologists, operators and maintainers” 
to achieve sustainable management of water extraction from the GAB and “Zero 
Harm to the environment” (Torrisi & Trotta, 2009, p. 204). BPT is defined as 
“[t]echnology which minimises risks to people and the environment, now and in the 
future, that can reasonably be implemented taking social and economic factors into 
account” (BHP Billiton Olympic Dam Corporation Pty Ltd., 2012d, p. 14). This is 
consistent with Douglas and Wildavsky’s (1982) assertion that market institutions 
construct themselves as agents open to the view that technology is the symbol for 
social distinction and wealth generation.  
Market institutions tackle environmental risks by using technology to increase the 
scale of economic production (Ney & Thompson, 2011; Schwarz & Thompson, 
1990). In this case, for BHP OD, the GAB water risks are treated as “technical 




water use efficiency (Torrisi & Trotta, 2009, p. 200). One example is related to the 
water flow in the hydromet.  
The hydromet, according to Torrisi and Trotta (2009), is sensitive to change in liquor 
chemistry and is closely linked to water quality. A principal variable which 
influences the amount of uranium recovered is the concentrate of chloride. That is, 
an elevated chloride concentration level reduces uranium recovery. Any recycled 
tailings liquor or lower quality water added to the metallurgical plant to substitute 
GAB water will increase the level of chloride concentration in the hydromet (BHP 
Billiton Olympic Dam Corporation Pty Ltd., 2011b, 2012f; Torrisi & Trotta, 2009). 
This procedure “places an upper constraint on water qualities” that can be fed into 
the plant to substitute GAB water (Torrisi & Trotta, 2009, p. 200).  
To overcome this technical barrier, BHP OD has developed a SYSCAD model for 
the hydromet plant to improve an understanding of the impact of chloride on 
uranium recovery. This model determines a maximum operating level of chloride 
concentration that simultaneously optimises GAB water input (Torrisi & Trotta, 
2009). According to Torrisi and Trotta (2009, p. 200), “[t]his project is a good 
example of Olympic Dam using appropriate technology to improve GAB water use 
efficiency.” 
In addition to particular water efficiency technologies, Torrisi and Trotta (2009) also 
describe the Balance Scorecard (BSC) approach as an information technology that 
BHP OD has adopted for water management. This approach aims to reduce water 
demand in each step throughout the (internal) ore production process and includes 
the setting and achievement of water use targets. It emphasises the basic cycle of 
continuous water efficiency improvement “where targets are set, plans put in place, 
actions carried out and measurements taken to confirm any deviations from target 
and opportunity to set improved targets” (more details of the BSC information 
technology in BHP OD regarding sustainable water management in Appendix B) 
(Torrisi & Trotta, 2009, p. 198). 
From the perspective of cultural risk theory, BSC information technology adopted by 
BHP OD is a managerial instrument of control in terms of turning the uncertain and 




Ersson, Gröjer & Yang Wallentin, 2007; Power, 2007). More specifically, this 
information technology translates both the objectives of economic growth and 
environmental protection into actions such as setting targets, identifying performance 
drivers, measuring performance, analysing variance and rectifying variance to make 
the risk object - water demand for ore production predictable, measurable and 
therefore manageable (Hilgartner, 1992).  
The implementation of a BSC approach to water management is consistent with 
BHP OD’s expectation of “decidability” and “actionability” about the future (Power, 
2007, p. 26). The unpredicted force of technological progress regarding water 
efficiency will render the present “fuss” over GAB water risks irrelevant in the near 
future (Thompson & Rayner, 1998, p. 48). This adoption of BSC information 
technology is also consistent with the ideal governing form of hierarchy institutions, 
in which standardised operating procedures help to “objectify, rank and manage” 
(Ney & Thompson, 2011, p. 63) GAB water related risks.  
BSC information technology is utilised by BHP OD to introduce “standard measures” 
(Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982, p. 96) and facilitate the valuation of GAB water in a 
“monetarized” economic system (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982, p. 95). For example, 
while water consumption data is presented using the Production Information 
Management System (PIMS) to track actual water usage against targets (Torrisi & 
Trotta, 2009); the water usage variance for the operation of individual units is 
measured by volume and efficiency. This approach is similar to “that used in cost 
management accounting which can separate cost variances due to volume, efficiency 
and price” (Torrisi & Trotta, 2009, p. 199). Figure 8.1 provides the formula for 
calculating the total variance of water usage from a target, where  
 
Figure 8.1 Total Variance of Water Consumption 




V is the volume of water expressed as kilolitres 
e is water consumption efficiency expressed as kilo litres per unit of production 
driver 
T is the production driver, commonly throughput tonnes in a given period 
(Torrisi & Trotta, 2009, p. 199). 
As Torrisi and Trotta (2009) explain, the first term in Equation 3 illustrates the 
volume of water consumption which varies according to efficiency changes in 
underlying processes, while the second term demonstrates the volume of water 
consumption variance related to throughput change in production.  
It is important to note here that the BSC approach modifies various water 
consumption measurements through variance analysis into a water use efficiency 
indicator (Catasús et al., 2007). And this water efficiency indicator is introduced by 
BHP OD as a combination of “standard measures” (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982, p. 
96) to legitimate existing ore production and the proposed Olympic Dam Expansion 
Project (ODEP) with increased GAB water extraction. For example, according to 
Torrisi and Trotta (2009), analysing the water consumption variance allows water 
consumption drivers to be managed for setting targets, identifying possible further 
improvement for water demand and efficiency, and at the same time, enable other 
projects to deliver increasing production volume. Figure 8.2 is an example of 
industrial water use efficiency at Olympic Dam from Financial Year 04-Financial 






Figure 8.2  Industrial Water Use Efficiency at Olympic Dam, FY04 to FY09 
Source: Torrisi and Trotta (2009, p.200) 
According to Figure 8.2, from 2000 to 2009, GAB water extraction from BHP OD’s 
wellfields has remained relatively constant despite increased mine production. Since 
June 2004 to June 2009, there has been an industrial water efficiency improvement 
of 15 percent from 1.27 KL/ton to 1.07 KL/ton of ore milled (Torrisi & Trotta, 2009, 
p. 201). It is notable that the diagram or “visual epigraph” has a rhetorical effect 
(Davison, 2011, p. 129), and is used in BHP OD to promote the image/construction 
of continuous improvement in water efficiency. 
This process of modification of “measurements into indicators”, according to 
Catasús et al (2007, p. 508), reflects an organisation’s aim to “distinguish a number 
that is used as an input in the managerial process from a number that chiefly aims to 
represent the organisation.” In this case, the water efficiency indicator represents the 
economic achievement and environmental protection of BHP OD as a proxy for how 
much water is used (and saved) in producing one ton of ore.  
According to Torrisi and Trotta (2009), from 1991 to 2009, ore production increased 
by 490% while the volume of abstracted GAB water increased by 215%. This 




for BHP OD (Torrisi & Trotta, 2009, p. 203). By using this indicator, BHP OD 
demonstrates that more ore could be produced. This is consistent with the market 
institutions’ belief that technological advancement can mitigate environmental risks 
while boosting production scale (Ney & Thompson, 2011; Schwarz & Thompson, 
1990; Thompson & Rayner, 1998). As such, BHP Billiton claims that “[w]hile future 
growth may result in an overall increase in water usage, GAB water will be used 
efficiently so that growth is sustainable” (BHP Billiton, 2007b, p. 225; see also BHP 
Billiton, 2010).  
The advocacy and protection afforded by the standardised measures introduced by 
BHP OD’s BSC information technology and water efficiency technology is explicit 
in legislation from the hierarchy institution - the South Australian government (Ney 
& Thompson, 2011). For example, according to the Roxby Downs (Indenture 
Ratification) Act 1982 (the Indenture) (p. 31) and Roxby Downs (Indenture 
Ratification) (Amendment of Indenture) Amendment Act 2011 (p. 49), BHP OD  
shall, to the extent that it is reasonably practical and economic for …[it] to do so, 
design, construct and operate or cause to be designed, constructed and operated 
all plant so as to ensure the most efficiency use of all water sources. 
To conclude the grammatical analysis, while the South Australian government 
requires water efficiency related technology as a technical adjustment (Thompson & 
Rayner, 1998) to extant GAB water use, BHP OD has also adopted BSC information 
technology to tackle the GAB water risks with skill and confidence (Ney & 
Thompson, 2011; Schwarz & Thompson, 1990). The objectified GAB water risks 
rendered by technological advancement are used by centre institutions to control the 
uncertain and contingent nature of water sustainability (Catasús et al., 2007; Douglas 
& Wildavsky, 1982; Power, 2007). The technological achievement for both 
productivity boost and reduced water risks (Ney & Thompson, 2011; Schwarz & 
Thompson, 1990; Thompson & Rayner, 1998) is manifested through a standard 
measure in the form of a water efficiency indicator mandated by the South 
Australian government in legislation. 
 Rhetorical analysis - View of risk of centre institutions 8.2.2
Drawing upon their image of technology with respect to risk attitude, hierarchy 




moral imperative to satisfy human needs while protecting the environment with 
carefully planned and designed policies (Ney & Thompson, 2011; Thompson & 
Rayner, 1998), they identify as ensuring sustainable development. 
In this case, the South Australian government has two main objectives for both 
economic growth and protection of GAB water. First, hierarchy institutions construct 
sustainable development as “meeting the needs of the present without compromising 
the ability of future generations to meet their own needs” (Brundtland, 1987, p. 8). 
Although the market individualists’ risk-taking behaviour might be rational to meet 
human needs and wants, the overall outcome from economic growth is argued to be 
environmentally detrimental (Ney & Thompson, 2011; Thompson & Rayner, 1998). 
While this view coincides with the border institutions’ normative aspect, it differs in 
terms of the solution that it promotes (Thompson & Rayner, 1998). Complete risk 
aversion responses are impractical, and indeed, “social upheaval” would only make 
things worse (Thompson & Rayner, 1998, p. 305). 
For example, the South Australian government acknowledges explicitly that BHP 
OD’s continued GAB water extraction for mining operation is likely to cause 
declined potentiometric surface of the basin and negatively affect mound spring 
flows and the associated eco-systems (Government of South Austrlia, 2011b; 
SAALNRM Board, 2009a). However, the challenge for the government is to 
preserve advantages of economic growth while leaving sufficient water for the 
environment and community (Roxby Downs (Indenture Ratification) (Amendment 
of Indenture) Amendment Act 2011; Roxby Downs (Indenture Ratification) Act 
1982).  
BHP OD expresses a similar position with regard to the relationship between 
economic growth and environmental protection with the South Australian 
government. Following the Brundtland (1987) definition of sustainability, BHP 
OD’s engineers Torrisi and Trotta (2009, p. 195) define sustainable development in 
the context of the GAB as; 
[d]evelopment that meets the needs of GAB natural springs hosting flora and 
fauna, pastoral, mining, petroleum, energy industries and cultural, community, 
tourism and other users without compromising the ability of future generations 




That is, the sustainability of BHP OD’s development relies on using GAB water 
responsibly while ensuring the mining operation remains viable (BHP Billiton, 
2011a, 2012). It is important to note that this is an example of intertextuality. 
Intertextuality is defined by (de Beaugrande & Dressler, 1981, p. 10) as “the factors 
which make the utilisation of one text dependent upon knowledge of one or more 
previously encountered texts”. In this case, this definition is drawn on that of the 
Brundtland report (1987), which seeks communicative and institutional legitimacy 
(Slembrouck, 2011). This intertextuality is authoritatively informed and has 
rhetorical effect (Young, 2003). It portrays BHP OD as a responsible corporate agent 
under the governance of a hierarchy institution. The challenge of scarce natural 
resources for hierarchy institutions is not to stop economic development with its 
future expansion, but to find the appropriate rules for stronger governance (Ney & 
Thompson, 2011).  
In this case, the Indenture was established as a legal framework to govern BHP OD’s 
extant and future/proposed mining project (Government of South Austrlia, 2011a). 
From BHP Billiton’s (2009, p. 208) view, this contractual framework allows BHP 
OD to make significant investment decisions with “confidence” while ensuring “the 
continuation…of a safe and environmentally acceptable operation capable of 
providing major economic benefits to South Australia and Australia.” 
In terms of BHP OD’s GAB water intake in general, the Indenture provides a model 
of management “based on acceptable or allowable impacts on the groundwater 
resource and dependent ecosystems”. That is, it sets a 5 metre default value of 
drawdown for existing designed areas around Wellfield A and B, which has been 
adopted to date51 (Power, 2002). And a particular “lower value of 2.2 metres was set 
for part of the boundary for Wellfield A in a more sensitive area near the Hermit Hill 
spring complex” (Power, 2002, n. p.). Two special water licences are granted to BHP 
                                                 
51  “[T]he designated area shall be that area from which it is reasonably expected that the abstraction of water therefrom by the 
relevant Joint Venturers or an associated company for the thirty year period next ensuing will not reduce the potentiometric 
pressure by more than five metres (or such other pressure reduction as may be agreed between the relevant Joint Venturers or 
an associated company and the Minister of Water Resources) at the boundary of the designated area” (Roxby Downs (Indenture 
Ratification) Act 1982 p. 28). 
“If the Minister of Water Resources has reason to believe that the continued abstraction of water by the Joint Venturers from 
the designated area will be detrimental to the water resource or that there is a reasonable possibility of a complete or partial 
failure of the water supply therefrom, he may issue to the relevant Joint Venturers a notice requiring them to restrict the 
abstraction of water from the designated area to the limit set out in the notice, or, if appropriate, to establish another wellfield 





OD for  GAB water extraction under the criteria of acceptable drawdown rate 
(Roxby Downs (Indenture Ratification) (Amendment of Indenture) Amendment Act 
2011; Roxby Downs (Indenture Ratification) Act 1982). 
In particular, BHP OD is required to “design, install and maintain an appropriate 
monitoring system” to manage GAB water resources, including total extraction 
volume from production wells, water pressure of all wells and designated areas of 
the wellfields and water qualities in each well (BHP Billiton Olympic Dam 
Corporation Pty Ltd., 2012d, p. 8; see also: Power, 2002; Roxby Downs (Indenture 
Ratification) Act 1982). The Indenture also focuses on a judicious use of water.  
BHP OD is required to submit an annual report by a competent hydrogeologist, to 
define the aquifers’ response to water extraction, resources ability to maintain the 
water supply and strategies for future water exploration, production and management 
(Roxby Downs (Indenture Ratification) Act 1982; BHP Billiton Olympic Dam 
Corporation Pty Ltd., 2012b, 2012d; ). It is worth noting that this report is used as a 
mechanism for BHP OD to discharge managerial accountability and facilitate 
administrative accountability for the government (see Section 8.4). As such, the 
Indenture manifests a desire for mining development and GAB water protection as 
“incremental…remedial and serial” (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982, p. 93). 
A hierarchy or social order between nature and risk attitudes is subsequently 
established by market institutions. The GAB water resource is constructed as 
resilient and able to recover from fluctuations (Ney & Thompson, 2011) such as 
extraction. A sustainable water management system is implemented to control GAB 
water risks such as “scarcity… potential environmental impact, operating costs, 
production constraints, and the influence of a social licence to operate” (Torrisi & 
Trotta, 2009, p. 203).  
According to Gray, Owen and Maunders (1988, p. 13), this ‘social licence’ is 
considered “the rule of the game in which the organisation chooses to play”. In this 
case, BHP OD’ managerial accountability is based on the requirements of 
government legislation and therefore conveys corporate legitimacy (see Section 8.4). 
It is assumed that  corporate compliance with legislation is “wholly embedded in the 




p. 13). The ‘social licence’ is also an example of the rhetorical effect of 
‘intertextuality’, as it draws on legislation as authority.  
BHP OD submits an annual Environmental Management and Monitoring Report 
(EMMR) and an annual GAB Wellfields Report to the South Australian Department 
of Primary Industry and Resources (PIRSA) (BHP Billiton, 2009, 2011a). While 
EMMR documents general annual environmental achievements and challenges the 
Environmental Management Program (EMP), the Wellfields Report presents detailed 
data regarding BHP OD’s GAB water supply to assess legal compliance. This 
includes comparisons between actual impacts of the wellfields’ operation against 
expectations and predictions made in the Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) 
1997 (Kinhill, 1997). In addition, evaluation of the GAB aquifers’ drawdown 
response, delineates drawdown effects on environmental flows and pastoral water 
supplies. A contingency plan is maintained to address unexpected drawdown and 
spring flow decline around Olympic Dam wellfields (BHP Billiton, 2009, 2011a). As 
such, the market institution BHP OD constructs “the ingenious, inquiring and 
experimenting” institution (Thompson et al., 1990, p. 62) or informed agents that 
challenges and tackles environmental uncertainties “boldly” (Ney & Thompson, 
2011, p. 47) through “exhaustive monitoring, analysis, modelling and reviews by [an] 
independent expert” (Torrisi & Trotta, 2009, p. 203). 
It is also worth noting that by adopting water efficiency technology for ODEP, BHP 
OD constructs the GAB groundwater resource as “a raw material on which human 
skill, knowledge and daring have been successfully focused” (Thompson et al., 1990, 
p. 62). In other words, new combinations of expertise and technology are constructed 
to mitigate the unforeseeable risks and to take care of the future (Thompson et al., 
1990). 
Therefore, market institutions frame public interest in economic growth and suggest 
that citizens do not have to “lower standards of living by very much in order to 
reduce risk a little” (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982, p. 67). Market institutions attempt 
to convince the public by constructing risk aversion as the main source of danger, 
where risk avoiders neglect “the danger averted by new technology, or in advance of 




28). In this case, BHP OD has implemented “continuous improvement initiatives” 
(Torrisi & Trotta, 2009, p. 201), which are said to successfully turn risks into 
opportunities (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982; Ney & Thompson, 2011; Schwarz & 
Thompson, 1990; Thompson et al., 1990). 
To conclude the rhetorical analysis, both BHP OD and the South Australian 
government have the dual objectives of economic growth and GAB water protection. 
While the South Australian government established the Indenture Act (1982) as a 
carefully planned legal framework (Ney & Thompson, 2011; Thompson & Rayner, 
1998) to govern BHP OD’s extant and proposed/future mining project, BHP OD, in 
response, has designed monitoring programs and water efficiency programs and has 
implemented improvement initiatives to challenge the water-related risks of its 
mining operations and turn these risks into opportunities (Douglas & Wildavsky, 
1982; Ney & Thompson, 2011; Schwarz & Thompson, 1990; Thompson et al., 1990). 
 Logological analysis - Resolution of risk of centre institutions 8.2.3
While constructing technology as an agent and identifying risk as opportunities, 
market institutions establish ‘economic growth’ as the terministic screen with respect 
to their resolution of risk to legitimate their attitude towards technology and view of 
risk. According to Douglas and Wildavsky (1982, p. 69), a market institution’s risk 
assessment compares risks “by placing their costs and benefits on a common 
economic plane”. In other words, it assumes economic or market measures are the 
most appropriate for valuing objects regardless of their comparability (Douglas & 
Wildavsky, 1982). The water efficiency indicator (see 8.2.1) represents an implied 
risk assessment technique and it is a “technocratic” answer to how much water 
resource should be sacrificed for how much wealth produced (Douglas & Wildavsky, 
1982, p. 150). 
However, according to Douglas and Wildavsky (1982), a technical solution preferred 
by market institutions places too much emphasis on immediate returns or 
profitability on investments activities.  In this case, BHP OD seeks economic growth 
by taking its GAB water extraction related risks intentionally through its monitoring 
and water efficiency programme. According to Douglas and Wildavsky (1982, p. 86), 




must exert continual vigilance in justifying the present system, with its delayed 
satisfactions.”  
As Douglas and Wildavsky (1982) further argue, market expectations are short-term 
and at odds with environmental value which is usually long-term focused (Douglas 
& Wildavsky, 1982). In this case, BSC information technology and water efficiency 
technology mask the “moral ingredients” (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982, p. 70) in 
decision-making processes.  
According to Douglas and Wildavsky (1982), the market institutions’ advocacy for 
technology and absence of consideration for long-term environmental risks is 
consistent with the preference of the hierarchy institutions. Hierarchy institutions 
identify risks as something that needs to be controlled and use ‘regulation’ as the 
terministic screen with regards to their resolution of risk and legitimation of their 
risk attitude and preferred social order.  
According to Douglas and Wildavsky (1982, p. 93), hierarchy decision-making 
involves multiple goals which make it relatively easier to “retrospectively rationalize 
whichever ones happen to be accomplished”. “[T]he need that seems most urgent in 
these conditions is the one whose solution is realistically feasible” (Douglas & 
Wildavsky, 1982, p. 93). Standardised operating procedures or regulations facilitate 
this governing style and assist hierarchies to “objectify, rank and manage” a potential 
threat (Ney & Thompson, 2011, p. 63). In this case, BSC information technology 
and water efficiency technology are considered as “realistically feasible” solutions to 
the South Australian governments’ “most urgent” need of economic growth without 
‘unacceptable’ environmental effects (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982, p. 93). They 
assist the governments in avoiding attempts “to know too much 
about …[environmental] consequences” by limiting instead of expanding available 
data (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982, p. 93).  
This point is evident from a Hansard extract of the confrontation between Australian 
Greens Leader Hon. M. Parnell and Hon. G.E. Gago52  and his statement that the 
                                                 
52 The Hon. G.E. GAGO is the Minister for Agriculture, Food and Fisheries, Minister for Forests, Minister for Regional 





BHP OD’s water extraction had “no adverse impact” on the GAB mound springs 
(South Australia, Legislative Council 2011, p. 5): 
The Hon. M. PARNELL: .... Can the minister first of all confirm that, over the 
history of this mine, mound springs have been negatively impacted and continue 
to be negatively impacted? In fact, my understanding is that at least one or two of 
those mound springs are only maintained artificially by additional pumping of 
water (South Australia, Legislative Council 2011, p. 6). 
The Hon. G.E. GAGO: I think I have already put this on record, that after 25 
years of operation there are no impacts on sensitive receptors in the environment 
that are in excess of those considered and approved in the earlier state and federal 
[ODEP] environmental impact statements of 1982 and 1987 (South Australia, 
Legislative Council 2011, p. 6).  
Furthermore, according to the Hon. P. Holloway (South Australia, Legislative 
Council 2011, p. 3675): 
[T]he South Australian government already ensures that [BHP OD’s] mining 
operations conform to world's best practice principles, including…[water] 
management practices. As such, the government is committed to ensuring that all 
aspects of an expanded Olympic Dam also conform to these principles. 
From the above Hansard extracts, the South Australian government implies that BHP 
OD’s water management system including BSC information technology and water 
efficiency technology is a satisfactory solution to meet the government’s 
requirements of sustainable development. These overlapping views from BHP OD 
and the South Australian government reflect the centre institutions’ view towards 
risk resolution. According to Douglas and Wildavsky (1982), both hierarchy and 
market institutions are fearful of those risks which threaten the system as a whole, as 
well as public confidence. Both have tendencies towards imperialism, that is, both 
see expansion of current operational area through technology as the best solution to 
organisational and institutional problems. 
According to Douglas and Wildavsky (1982), market institutions encourage the idea 
that expansion solves problems such as limited economic growth. The “imperialist 
tendencies” (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982, p. 97) from both market and hierarchy 
institutions mean that BHP OD and South Australian government collaborate (Elliott, 
1983; Linsley & Shrives, 2009). According to Douglas (1990, p. 12), a “market 
individual needs a political base to assure its basic security…[while] hierarchy 




power becomes formidable (Linsley & Shrives, 2009; Moerman & van der Laan, 
2012), and risks are considered “properly managed” within the centre (Durkin, 1990, 
p. 5).  
Hierarchy institutions with market institutions consequently create hierarchising and 
separating effects which (re)produce social divisions and inequities. In this case, 
BSC information technology regarding water management and water efficiency 
technology from BHP OD, required and sanctioned by the South Australian 
government is an ideological tool used by the centre institutions to foresee 
“disturbance and setbacks in normal course” and “weather” them (Douglas & 
Wildavsky, 1982, p. 122). As a result, BHP OD and the South Australian 
government do not embrace “the structure and goals of the environmental movement” 
regarding GAB water risk (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982, p. 188). 
To conclude the logological analysis, while market institutions assume economic and 
market measures are the most appropriate for valuing objects or concepts (Douglas 
& Wildavsky, 1982), hierarchy institutions protect standardised operating procedures 
or regulation as the “realistically feasible” solution to manage the potential threat 
(Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982, p. 93). Centre institutions therefore have an 
imperialist tendency that both BHP OD and the South Australian government 
perceive ODEP (BHP Billiton, 2009) as the best operational solution to sustainable 
development in general, and water efficiency related technologies to generate more 
economic and environmental benefits in particular (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982; 
Thompson & Rayner, 1998). The long-term GAB water value and risks, on the other 
hand, are not incorporated into the centre institutions’ risk resolution (Douglas & 
Wildavsky, 1982). 
 Attitude towards technology, View of risk, and Risk resolution of border 8.3
institutions 
This section outlines the border institutions’ attitudes towards technology, view of 
risk and risk resolution and demonstrates the difference from those of the centre 
institutions - BHP OD and the South Australian government. The evidence of border 
institutions’ interests is drawn from public submissions to ODEP EIS (BHP Billiton, 
2009), media articles and academic references. Border institutions construct modern 




spoil[ing]” the centre institutions (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982, p. 124). The view of 
risk is perceived as impending and irreversible and imposed by excessive economic 
growth (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982). Risk resolution is characterised by ‘low 
growth’ (Schwarz & Thompson, 1990). This documentary evidence is often in the 
form of comments critical of the sustainable mining development of BHP OD and its 
water efficiency related technology and often uses subjective rather than scientific or 
pseudo-scientific objective language.  
 Grammatical analysis - Attitudes towards technology of border institutions 8.3.1
Border institutions protest against the technology supported by market and hierarchy 
institutions because they perceive it as the main source of risk from environmental 
pollution (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982). In this case, although BHP OD has applied 
BSC information and water efficiency technology to GAB water management, from 
the perspective of border institutions, they are to some degree “deceptive” (Save the 
basin, 2011c). For example, according to Quilty R and Vervoort W (CL 297, p. 3), 
there is a “double standard” regarding BHP OD’s environmental commitments. On 
one hand, BHP OD intends to improve its water use efficiency to achieve a reduction 
by 18% for the ODEP with respect to the amount of water consumption per tonne of 
ore processed (BHP Billiton (Chapter 25), 2009). On the other hand, it plans to 
increase GAB water extraction by approximately 9 ML/d, which is equal to 14% of 
the maximal amount permitted under the current licence (BHP Billiton, 2009). 
Additionally, BHP OD’s commitment to environmental principles is questionable 
considering the proposal to build a desalination plant to replace the mine’s water 
demand entirely. According to BHP Billiton (2009), the water demand for the 
proposed ODEP will be 322 ML/d for the next 40 years plus. As Quilty R and 
Vervoort W (CL 297) assert, since such an amount is more than 20% of the total 
output for all water users in the GAB, it is not surprising that BHP Billiton (2009) 
does not want BHP OD identified as the single largest water extractor from the GAB: 
We are confident that the company would have made these kind of assessments 
when choosing the political reality of a desalination plant over a much more 
simple, but massive, expansion of its demand on the GAB limited resource and 
the likelihood that an extended licence for such a level of GAB extraction would 




A desalination plant is proposed which is capable of producing 40% above the 
required amount for ODEP. For border institutions, this plant with large excess 
production capacity, “clearly establishes a belief in the company that the 
environmental and financial costs of a very large plant are manageable” (Quilty R & 
Vervoort W, CL 297, p. 3). From the perspective of Quilty R and Vervoort W (CL 
297) and the Australian Conservation Foundation (CL 10), the replacement of GAB 
water with desalination water will have substantial environmental, social and 
national economic benefits, which is in accordance with the long run interests of 
border institutions. 
However, the ODEP EIS (BHP Billiton, 2009), indicates that not a “single drop” 
from the proposed desalination plant will offset BHP OD’s GAB water demand 
(Save the basin, 2011c, n.p.). The failure of the EIS to address any potential 
conservation opportunity of the GAB challenges BHP OD’s environmental 
commitment and its ‘high standard’ environmental policies and practices (Quilty R 
& Vervoort W, CL 297).  
From the border institutions’ perspective, both water efficiency related technology 
and the desalination related technology emphasises a techno-economic solution to 
sustainable development. This solution will confront difficulties when faced with the 
“social judgement” (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982, p. 70) arising from the GAB water 
risks.  
Indeed, border institutions believe that ‘appropriate technology’ is the motto of 
market institutions that “are happy to operate at any size, to any technical 
specification, within their capacities, providing it is cheap enough to make them a 
profit” (Schwarz & Thompson, 1990, p. 11). BHP OD’s reliance on BSC 
information technology and water efficiency technology is consistent with this 
border institutions’ perspective of the cheapest alternative. For example, Quilty R 
and Vervoort W (CL 297) assert that one of the most apparent rationales for the 
implementation of water saving (technologies) rather than a desalination plant is 
because the GAB is considered a cheaper water source. This commercial 





The direct ignorance of biological and cultural value of the GAB mound springs 
together with the environmental health of the GAB for economic gain in the short 
term, is “irresponsible” (Henderson K, CL 196, n.p.), especially since long-term 
environmental value and short-term economic value are fundamentally 
incommensurable. 
In all of the environmental changes through which Australia will pass during the 
long life of this proposed mine, conservation of the GAB national resource 
requires considerably more than today's measure of the value of the processed 
resources against the cost of GAB water used for that processing. Putting a dollar 
value on the end product of any process which makes demand on the GAB 
demeans the word 'conservation'; such a raw economic yardstick is most certainly 
not the measure by which to ensure that the GAB will meet the challenges of the 
future (Quilty R & Vervoort W, CL 297, p. 5). 
Thus, BHP OD’s BSC information technology and water efficiency technology has 
no place in the border institutions’ argument. Border institutions object to 
‘commensurability’ and the “immoral” exercise of the market institution’s belief that 
resources can be “bought and sold” (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982, p. 67). According 
to Mackenzie (2009, p. 451), border institutions hold “a bleak, essentialised view of 
capitalism, as inherently irresponsible and environmentally damaging”. Border 
institutions reinforce that the value of the GAB water resource cannot be measured 
merely by the eco-efficiency indicator for ore production (profit), as “narrowly 
conceived” by economics (MacKenzie, 2009, p. 453) (see Section 8.2.1). 
According to cultural risk theory, while hierarchy institutions’ support a “technical 
fix” it adopts the market institutions’ advocacy for technological advancement 
(Schwarz & Thompson, 1990, p. 93). Border institutions construct hidden dangers 
emanating from technology as an evil which will “enter[s] and spoil[s]” the centre 
institutions (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982, p. 124). Technological pollution is 
representative of “moral defects” (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982, p. 7). For example, 
in the words of Parnell (Australian Greens, 2007, n.p.) and Takver (2011, n.p.), BHP 
OD has promised “weak commitments” that have been sanctioned by the South 
Australian government for years. These commitments, manifested through 
technology, “seem to be business as usual and are expanded to up to the maximum 
that BHP can get away with” (Australian Science Media Centre, 2011, n.p. see also 




‘social licence’ (see Section 8.2.2) as a normative model with an explicit value 
system. It is “clearly at variance with the terms of what is normally accepted to be 
the status quo” (Gray et al., 1988, p. 12) by the centre institutions. Consistent with 
Gray et al.’s (1988, p. 13) argument, the ‘social licence’ from the centre institution 
accepts legislation as “a full specification of the rules of the game” without 
acknowledgment of “the role played by the State and/or the current and historical 
distribution of power in the society”. Therefore, border institutions are against “big 
technology” (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982, p. 49). In this case, the majority of 
submissions suggest that the GAB water should not be wasted on unnecessary 
mining projects such as ODEP (e.g. Anti-Nuclear Alliance of W.A. (ANAWA), CL 
7; Derrick A, CL 147; Henderson K, CL 196). And BHP OD should be required to 
cease its extraction from the GAB as soon as the desalination plant is established (e.g. 
Australian Greens, CL 13; Conservation Council of South Australia, CL 24; 
Environment Tasmania Inc., CL 37; Friends of the Earth, CL 42). 
To conclude the grammatical analysis, border institutions perceive centre institutions’ 
water efficiency related technology as focusing only on the techno-economic facets 
of sustainable mining development, while neglecting moral and environmental 
dimensions of GAB water risks. The failure of BHP OD to address any potential 
water saving opportunity of the GAB water resource, from its proposed desalination 
plant (BHP Billiton, 2009), reflects the centre institutions’ focus on commercial 
considerations. From the border institutions’ perspective, water efficiency related 
technologies are “immoral” exercises (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982, p. 67) that 
represent the “moral defects” (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982, p. 7) of the centre 
institutions. The environmental value of the GAB is fundamentally 
incommensurable with the short-term economic value manifested through BHP 
OD’s water-efficiency technology for its ore production and ODEP.  
 Rhetorical analysis - View of risk of border institutions 8.3.2
Border institutions construct a hierarchy or social order different from those from the 
centre institutions. Nature is constructed as dreadfully unforgiving (Schwarz & 
Thompson, 1990). According to Douglas and Wildavsky (1982, p. 67), “unbridled 
economic growth” has exerted harm on the natural environment and humankind. 




monitoring programs and a water efficiency program, the mining operation has had 
adverse impacts on the long-term sustainability of the GAB water resource as the 
company incrementally expands its operations (Keane, 1997). Border institutions, 
unlike the market institutions, do not perceive risk as an opportunity (Schwarz & 
Thompson, 1990). In particular, BHP OD’s mining operations have risked “precious” 
mound springs (Environment Tasmania Inc., CL 37, n.p.). Anecdotal evidence has 
been obtained by Keane (1997, p. 21) from interviews with local residents which 
shows that “the drilling of wells has definitely reduced the spring discharges in the 
South Australia portion of the GAB.” And a few of those springs are “only 
maintained artificially by additional pumping of water” (South Australia, Legislative 
Council 2011a, p. 6).  
For border institutions, these impending dangers are irreversible. Irreversible risks 
are “explosive and unstable [with] each deviation growing larger until the 
environment is so altered it can never return to its original state” (Douglas & 
Wildavsky, 1982, p. 21). In this case, public submissions contend that the quantities 
of water extracted by BHP OD for mining operations is “far too large” in this driest 
continent, especially taking into consideration climate change (Luesby Al, Luesby J, 
Luesby An, Luesby, CL 244, n.p.; see also Roberts Georgia, CL 304, n.p).  
Madigan M (CL 247, n.p.) uses the example of water restrictions in some Australian 
states to highlight the excessive water intake currently proposed by BHP OD: 
No matter how much domestic households at the Government's request and 
legislation, attempt to cut back on water use there is nothing that can save the 
scarce water resources of the state while an incredible 100,000 litres of water 
every minute is being used by BHP Billiton.  
Border institutions therefore align with the public by establishing themselves as 
moral agents who are unwilling to face irreversible catastrophic degradation with no 
chance of turning back (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982). As Douglas and Wildavsky 
(1982, p. 23) assert, there will be no future if economic development “permits any 
fool or rogue to inflict irreversible damage”. 
Border institutions are concerned with all possible damage and assess the long-run as 
fairly close. Consequently, the future will be different as the continuity of the status 




example, centre institutions acknowledge the need for stringent licensing and strict 
monitoring and reporting because of the potential risks associated with GAB water 
extraction (Save the basin, 2011b, 2011c). However, public submissions in respect of 
the proposed ODEP, urge the Federal and State government to look back at the “past 
disastrous government policies concerning the inland river systems, lakes and 
wetlands” (Great Artesian Basin Protection Group, 2009c, n.p.), and to give serious 
consideration to the ODEP, as the environmental damages will extend beyond the 
life of the mine (Bentley A , CL 114).  
From the border institutions’ perspective, there needs to be a radical change to a 
‘business-as-usual’ (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982; Schwarz & Thompson, 1990) 
approach through an immediate adoption of the precautionary principle, in its strict 
version, for the management of the GAB. The precautionary principle states that 
“unless policy actors can prove that a particular activity is innocuous to the 
environment, they should refrain from it” (Ney & Thompson, 2011, p. 42). In the 
GAB, it is expressed as “where we see a serious threat to the environment, a lack of 
scientific certainty shouldn't prevent us taking precautions” (Penfold L, CL 288, n.p.). 
Regarding mining operations in general, this principle promotes the “transitioning to 
green industry and jobs” (Georgia R, CL 304, n.p.). For BHP OD in particular, this 
principle implies that the Federal and State governments should acknowledge that it 
is very likely that the GAB is a plutonic and non-rechargeable resource 53  (see 
Chapter 7, Section 7.3.2), and alter their water management policies accordingly so 
as to “conserve and utilise the remaining water in the Basin” (Great Artesian Basin 
Protection Group, 2009c, n.p.).  
Therefore, border institutions urge policy makers “not to delay action until further 
scientific evidence is available” (Thompson & Rayner, 1998, p. 294), because trial 
can only be tolerated when there is the certainty of no error (Schwarz & Thompson, 
1990). According to the border institutions, asking BHP OD and the South 
Australian government to extract less GAB water for current mining operations and 
the ODEP is not enough. What is needed is to preserve GAB springs as well as this 
groundwater resource itself. For example, it is suggested that BHP OD should 
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undertake “[a]n environmentally conscientious operation” (Conservation Council of 
South Australia, CL 24, p. 15). That might include an independent and thorough 
assessment of the GAB groundwater resource sustainability with a special focus on 
an extensive historical review of BHP OD’s wellfields’ impacts on mound springs 
and investigations to address remedial options for affected springs (Keane, 1997, see 
also Walsh T, CL 353; Mudd, 2000).  
According to cultural risk theory, border institutions aim to “bring man back into 
balance with the environment” (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982, p. 137) without 
“exploitative values, destructive technologies, and de-humanised relationships” 
(Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982, p. 135). For example, according to Johnson H (CL 
217), “[a] genuinely viable economy is based on ecological integrity, not the other 
way around”.  
Therefore, restoring the GAB ecosystem and freeing this groundwater resource, “has 
the added advantage of bringing us much nearer to the desired future-harmony with 
nature” (Schwarz & Thompson, 1990, p. 10). Border institutions call for an outright 
ban on BHP OD’s GAB water extraction. It is recommended that “[e]very effort 
must be undertaken to minimise potential and real losses of water” from the BHP 
OD site (National Farmers’ Federation, CL 55). It could be investigations for an 
alternative source of water supply, eradication of the waste and eventually 
decommission of the use of the GAB water (National Farmers’ Federation, CL 55; 
Conservation Council of South Australia, CL 24; Environment Tasmania Inc., CL 
37). This conservation ideal of the border institutions needs to “become part of a 
process of ‘social learning’…in which institutions to mitigate…[GAB water risks] 
are created, evaluated and reshaped” (MacKenzie, 2009, pp. 453-454).  
To conclude the rhetorical analysis, border institutions perceive that BHP OD’s 
mining operation has created an irreversible risk to the long-term sustainability of the 
GAB water resource and related ecosystem, despite the implementation of 
monitoring programs and water efficiency programs. Although it is undeniable that 
mining development has brought economic benefits, these benefits need to be 
considered against environmental risks. Border institutions therefore call for a 




centre institutions’ GAB water management policy. An outright ban on the BHP 
OD’s GAB water extraction by the South Australian government is advocated by 
border institutions as the only solution for risk mitigation. 
 Logological analysis - Resolution of risk of border institutions 8.3.3
The paradoxes and controversies inherent in the hierarchising and separating effects 
derived from market and hierarchy (centre) institutions’ risk resolutions provide 
opportunities for border institutions to resist and transform. Through a construction 
of anti-technology as an act and identification of risk minimisation, border 
institutions establish ‘low growth’ as the terministic screen to legitimate their 
preferred social order and risk attitude. 
When border institutions assess risk, they reveal their moral commitments “explicitly 
and prominently” (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982, p. 73) and attempt to bring these 
risks to public attention forcibly (Thompson et al., 1990). For example, Quilty R and 
Vervoort W (CL 297) analyse BHP OD’s intention for continuous GAB water 
extraction alongside the implementation of the proposed desalination plant. They 
infer that the 18% water saving proposed in the EIS will reduce BHP’s operating 
costs rather than saving the limited GAB water resource. This is not only an 
environmental issue, it is also an ethical issue (Save the basin, 2011a, Quilty R & 
Vervoort W, CL 297): 
If a mining company has a commercially viable alternate source of water 
available to meet the needs of its operations then should it be allowed to access 
GAB water for those operations [?] (Quilty R & Vervoort W, CL 297, p. 5) 
Underlying this perspective is the assumption of a zero-sum game. This outlook 
assumes one cannot benefit except at the expense of another. Following the 
reasoning of trade-off, the border does not tend to take the economic measures from 
the market (and hierarchy) institutions seriously. Therefore, border institutions do 
not believe in economic expansion as an environmental solution (Douglas & 
Wildavsky, 1982). 
In this case, several public submissions suggest that although it is undeniable that the 
BHP OD has brought economic benefits, such benefits need to be considered against 




economic stimulus arising from the mining industry “aids the state coffers”, the 
question needs to be asked is “should this take precedence over ecological integrity”? 
As such, any further GAB water extraction for proposed expansion is “unsustainable 
and indefensible” (Wells J, CL 363, n.p.). 
This argument from border institutions shifts the attention to human needs and wants. 
For border institutions, real human needs are closely bound with the cycle of the eco-
system, and are defined in both material and spiritual terms. While material needs 
cover food, shelter and clothing, the spiritual aspects embrace personal development, 
self-realisation and harmony with nature (Thompson & Rayner, 1998). In this case, 
water efficiency technology for ore production implies the promise of satisfaction of 
endless wants in an age of consumerism which fails to satisfy human needs 
(Thompson & Rayner, 1998). For example, according to Johnson H (CL 217) and 
Madigan M (CL 247), our fundamental needs for health, wellbeing and democratic 
rights are based on pure water, clean air, uncontaminated soil and diversity of 
species, which should not be “compromised for the monetary gain of big business” 
(Higginbottom K, CL 199, n.p.). 
According to Thompson and Rayner (1998, p. 296),  
Wants…are mere chimeras shaped by commercial interests and packaged by 
advertising agencies. These chimerical wants then function to ensure continued 
economic growth by creating demand for unnecessary and wasteful products. 
In this case, border institutions identify BHP OD and South Australian governments’ 
capitalist imperative for endless ore production as a major reason for the over 
extraction of GAB water. To maintain the desired profit margin, vested interests 
pursue unsound environmental practices with no regard to the cost on the natural 
world (Thompson & Rayner, 1998). For example, Mudd (2000, p. 473) asserts that it 
seems that BHP OD and South Australian State government have outlined the most 
fundamental principles for GAB groundwater management with “very little” 
emphasis on the GAB resource management to “sustain minimum environmental 
flows” of the GAB springs. 
For border institutions, excessive development of mineral resources in general and 
water efficiency related technologies in particular, count as unnecessary and wasteful 




does not signify an improved quality of life. Instead, BHP OD’s entitlement to the 
immense extraction of GAB water represents an unfulfilled human need. The living 
environment has been damaged by those environmentally irresponsible and 
unsustainable activities (Ney & Thompson, 2011; Thompson & Rayner, 1998). For 
example, as Derrick A (CL 147, n. p.) asserts, “we do not need mining and 
development at any cost”. According to Luesby AL, Luesby J, Luesby An, Luesby N 
(CL 244, n.p.), “water is more precious to us than uranium income or jobs.” If the 
BHP OD’s mining water usage from the GAB exceeds the renewal rates (if there is 
any), “we are literally robbing from our children their right to access …water” (Ella, 
CL 258, n.p.). As such, BHP OD’s BSC information technology for water 
management and specific water efficiency technology from the border institutions’ 
perspective manifests an “undemocratic unresponsiveness to individual needs” 
(Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982, p. 149), and demonstrates an “unfeelingness for 
individual suffering” within society (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982, p. 127).  
To conclude the logological analysis, border institutions do not construct economic 
expansion as an environmental solution (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982). The ODEP in 
general and the water efficiency related technology in particular implies the promise 
to satisfy endless wants for the capitalist interests of centre institutions without 
satisfying real human needs (Thompson & Rayner, 1998). Border institutions 
therefore are against GAB water extraction for “unnecessary” mining projects like 
ODEP even with water efficiency related technology (Schwarz & Thompson, 1990, 
p. 9) . 
 Stewardship 8.4
There are two basic views of the objectives of financial reporting adopted by 
accounting standard setters. One is decision-usefulness and the other is stewardship 
(International Accounting Standard Broad (IASB) 2001, IASB Framework para. 12; 
13; 14). Stewardship is derived from property rights and is based on the idea that 
managers as agents look after the assets or resources which are entrusted to them by 
the owners (IASB 2001, IASB Framework para.14). The concept of stewardship has 
evolved through historical development from traditional custodial relationship to the 
modern concept of managerial performance (O'Connell, 2007; Pannell, 1979). 




responsibility to immediate owners-shareholders’ interest, but also social 
responsibility. In other words, it requires managerial accountability to not only 
embrace the “resolution of agency problems between management and owners” 
(Shearer, 2002, p. 562), but also extend to the stewardship of environmental assets. 
The competing views of stewardship hinges on an understanding or disclosure of 
that which a company is said to control. Companies should become accountable for 
the natural resources which they control and their business activities’ environmental 
impacts (Jones, 2010). As such, the needs for social and environmental reporting can 
be considered as originating from the broader notion of managerial stewardship 
(O'Connell, 2007). 
However, as some critical accounting researchers (e.g. Adams et al., 1998; 
Broadbent, 1998; Gray, 2006; Roberts & Scapens, 1985) contend, the current social 
and environmental reporting practices reinforce ‘business-as-usual’ and ‘middle of 
the road’ approaches, and do not provide sufficient and comprehensive information 
to meet the needs for achieving environmental and social sustainability. This 
argument is evident when managerial stewardship of a natural resource or public 
good, e.g. the GAB, is contested. Cultural risk theory, by contrasting the distinctive 
assumptions of attitude towards technology, view of risk and risk resolution from 
market, hierarchy and border institutions, provide us with the rationale to understand 
this debate from both mainstream and critical accounting perspectives.  
In rhetorical analysis, according to Ney and Thompson (2011) and Thompson and 
Rayners (1998), centre institutions support a well-planned and designed policy to 
integrate economic growth with environmental management, and they assert that 
environmental risks can be reduced and mitigated through the transformation of risks 
into opportunities in the advancement of economic development (Ney & Thompson, 
2011; Schwarz & Thompson, 1990; Thompson et al., 1990). In this case, the general 
fulfilment of managerial stewardship from the perspective of centre institutions is 
reflected in the South Australian government and BHP OD’s dual objectives for both 
mining development and the GAB water conservation.  
While the South Australian government represents societies’ interests to grant BHP 




Act (1982) as a carefully planned legal framework (Ney & Thompson, 2011; 
Thompson & Rayner, 1998) to govern mining development. BHP OD management 
has become, not only a steward for tis shareholders, but also the steward of the GAB 
water system for civil society as a whole. From the perspective of centre institutions, 
both financial, environmental and social responsibility has been discharged through 
BHP OD’s monitoring and water efficiency programs since these programs control 
the GAB water extraction related risks to an acceptable level according to legislation.  
This perspective reinforces the managerial accountability of market institutions and 
administrative accountability of hierarchy institutions. Under managerial 
accountability, natural resources are treated as an economic good and they are 
objectified for efficiency and profit maximisation (Shearer, 2002). Administrative 
accountability, albeit taking a social value base, has been mainly concerned with 
economic development (Spence et al., 2010). It is also founded on the pluralist 
political assumptions that there is no profound social conflict and “the state pursues a 
neutral mediating role in conflict resolution” through regulation (Tinker et al., 1991, 
p. 29). 
It is important to note that in the grammatical analysis, sustainable development 
from centre institutions is constructed as a technical issue which can be solved by the 
power of modern technology (Ney & Thompson, 2011; Schwarz & Thompson, 1990; 
Thompson & Rayner, 1998). In this case, while the South Australian government 
believes that a successful environmental policy can be carried out through technical 
adjustments manifested through water efficiency technology; BHP OD considers 
water efficiency technologies as able to tackle the GAB water risks with skill and 
confidence while increasing the scale of ore production. Therefore, BHP OD has 
adopted BSC information technology and the specific water efficiency technology to 
construct and objectify GAB water risks to facilitate management in accordance with 
the legislation. These water efficiency related technologies are used by the centre 
institutions’ as a stewardship discharging mechanism to account for their financial, 
social and environmental responsibility. In particular, BHP OD has introduced 
various water demand and consumption measures and modified them into a water 




In the logological analysis, continuous improvement of the water efficiency indicator 
legitimates managerial stewardship of BHP OD for its extant mining operation and 
the proposed ODEP. It constitutes a “realistically feasible” solution to sustainable 
mining development from the South Australian government’s perspective (Douglas 
& Wildavsky, 1982, p. 93).  
However, according to Douglas and Wildavsky (1982), the centre institutions tend to 
ignore long-term environmental risks. While market institutions assume economic 
and market measures are the most appropriate for valuing objects or concepts 
(Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982), the hierarchy institutions prefer to segregate and 
define ‘sustainable development’ by upgrading certain dimensions of risks while 
downgrading others (Ney & Thompson, 2011). In this case, BHP OD’s water 
efficiency related technology and the water efficiency indicator advocated and 
supported by the South Australian government reflect the market institution’s belief 
in economic measures as appropriate for GAB water and the hierarchy institutions’ 
preference of highlighting economic and technical aspects of the GAB water risks 
while shifting social and environmental aspects sideways.  
As Andrew (2007) asserts, managerial and administrative approaches to 
accountability largely focus on procedural and technical dimensions of 
accountability. They form a “strict liberal accountability” framework perpetuating 
the status-quo by simply providing information to allow efficient utilisation of scarce 
resources without critically analysing what the market institutions are doing to the 
environment and society (Lehman, 1999, p. 518). The ignorance of long-term GAB 
water risks from centre institutions has triggered a contest over BHP OD’s 
managerial stewardship from the border institutions’ perspective.  
According to the rhetorical analysis of cultural risk (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982; 
Schwarz & Thompson, 1990), border institutions do not see risks as opportunities. 
On the contrary, they hold that unbridled economic growth has exerted irreversible 
risks on the environment. In this case, border institutions believe that BHP OD’s 
mining operation has had significant adverse impacts on the long-term sustainability 
of the GAB water resource as the company continuously expands its operation. Such 




such, BHP OD’s GAB water monitoring program and water efficiency program 
which seem to objectively control GAB water risks to an ‘acceptable’ level does not 
fulfil its managerial stewardship regarding environmental responsibility from the 
border institutions’ perspective.  
This is consistent with Christie, Dyck, Morrill & Stewart’s (2013, p. 389) argument 
of accounting as a “part of the rationalizing form of [measurement and] calculation 
necessary to organise and give meaning to economic action”. In Adam’s (2004, p. 
732) words, the alignment of managerial accountability and administrative 
accountability brings into focus “sustainability of the business [and government] 
rather than [social and] environmental sustainability.” For that reason, border 
institutions advocate a radical change to ‘business as usual’ and ‘middle of the road’ 
approaches through an immediate adoption of the precautionary principle regarding 
the GAB water management policy to discharge centre institutions’ managerial 
stewardship towards the GAB groundwater resource and its related ecosystem. 
In the grammatical analysis, border institutions construct modern technologies as the 
main source of environmental risks (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982). In this case, 
border institutions perceive BHP OD’s BSC information technology and water 
efficiency technologies, encouraged and sanctioned by the South Australian 
government, as focusing merely on techno-economic facets of sustainable mining 
development. This is consistent with Gray’s (1992) assertion that managerial and 
administrative accountability internalises through numerical quantification, 
environmental management and reinforces an analytical, scientific and technical 
solution (see also Beder, 1997; Dumay et al., 2010). In particular, the failure of BHP 
OD to address any potential water saving opportunity of the GAB water resource 
associated with its proposed desalination plant and its plan for further increased 
GAB waster extraction for the ODEP, reflects the underestimation of full social and 
environmental costs (Beder, 1997). 
Water efficiency related technologies from the border institutions’ perspective 
therefore cannot be considered as a managerial stewardship discharging mechanism, 
but rather “immoral” exercises (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982, p. 67) with “moral 




efficiency indicator, supported by the South Australian government represents short-
term economic value for mining production, which is fundamentally 
incommensurable with the long-term environmental value of the GAB groundwater 
resource. This “monetarized” GAB water value (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982, p. 95), 
according to Jones and Solomon (2013, p. 677), does not “capture the environmental 
consequences of an organisation’s activity”, therefore does discharge environmental 
responsibility (Christie et al., 2013; Jones, 2010).  
In the logological analysis, as Thompson and Rayner (1998) assert, current economic 
development with the assistance of advanced technologies, implies the promise of 
the satisfaction of endless consumerist wants but fails to meet real human needs. In 
this case, border institutions consider excessive development of mineral resources 
with water efficiency related technologies as unnecessary and wasteful. This 
argument reflects border institutions’ moral accountability as it is concerned with the 
community within which private entities and governments are situated. A 
community that defines “whose needs count and whose goods are sought” (Shearer, 
2002, p. 546). Moral accountability requires relations to others and necessitates 
mutual understanding beyond the giving and receiving of accounts through the 
formal categories provided by managerial and administrative accountability 
(Messner, 2009). In this case, moral accountability calls for negotiation, explanation 
and articulation through processes of political participation in regards to mining 
development (Lehman, 1999) 
Criticisms from border institutions reflect a common viewpoint of critical accounting 
researchers. That is, the social and environmental reporting practices in the form of 
‘business-as-usual’ and ‘middle of the road’ approaches, instead of rendering 
organisational transparency and social and environmental sustainability, manifest as 
an obstacle to obfuscate antagonism and conflicts among different social segments 
(e.g. Spence, 2007).  
According to Cooper and Sherer (1984) and Roberts (1991), accounting and 
reporting practices are neither neutral nor objective but rather serve an ideological 
function to legitimate particular interests and behaviours. Cultural risk theory, by 




resolution are shaped by institutional beliefs and interests, provide us with a critical 
lens to analyse the contested nature of the managerial stewardship concept with its 
related financial, social and environmental responsibility. In this theme, the centre 
institutions-the South Australian government and BHP OD’s assumptions of risk 
attitude and the preferred technology has conferred institutional legitimacy on the 
fulfilment of managerial stewardship of the GAB water resource in terms of financial, 
social and environmental responsibility. The border institutions, by challenging those 
taken-for-granted assumptions, provide us with the opportunity to reconsider the 
mainstream managerial stewardship concept and its compliant role in attributing to 
the ecological degradation. 
 Summary 8.5
This chapter analysed the institutional debate of the GAB water risk through 
contested disclosures among Market (BHP, BHP OD), Hierarchy (Australian Federal 
and South Australian governments), and border institutions (civil society), using 
three major concepts from cultural risk theory with the application of Burkean 
rhetorical criticism. From this analysis, different institutional perspectives with 
respect to the attitude towards water efficiency related technology, view of the GAB 
water risks and resolution of risk, and their implications for accounting concept of 
control and related accountability are elucidated. The following chapters analyse 
different institutional positions in the GAB water risk debate using another three 
major concepts - cause of ecological crisis, view of justice and fairness and 
properties of desired system from cultural risk theory, and discuss their implications 




CHAPTER 9 CAUSE OF ECOLOGICAL CRISIS, VIEW OF JUSTICE AND 
FAIRNESS AND PROPERTY OF DESIRED SYSTEM 
 Introduction 9.1
The preceding chapter applied three major concepts - attitude towards technology, 
view of risk and resolution of risk to analyse the institutional debate with regard to 
the Great Artesian Basin (GAB) water related risks and discussed these implications 
in terms of the accounting concept of stewardship and related accountabilities. 
Stewardship is a function of the concept of control as discussed in Chapter 7. This 
chapter applies the three major concepts from cultural risk theory- the cause of 
ecological crisis, view of justice and fairness and property of desired system to 
understand the concept of economic consequences from an institutional perspective.  
As suggested by Douglas (1985, p. 92), different institutional structures identify 
some risks while obscuring others. In a Burkean grammatical analysis, institutions 
tend to clarify certain sets of problem, such as the cause of ecological crisis. These 
different perspectives toward the causes subsequently generate distinctive views of 
justice and fairness. These two concepts form various properties of a desired system 
that is explored in the Burkean logological analysis. This analysis provides insights 
to facilitate and justify government intervention in financial accounting and reporting 
practices in an era of looming environmental crisis. The three-level analysis of 
institutional perspectives and the critical theme of accounting and related 





Table 9.1 Cause of Ecological Crisis, View of Justice and Fairness, Properties of Desired System and Economic Consequence 
 Market Institutions Hierarchy Institutions Border Institutions 
















Government Intervention Loss of Control Inequitable System 
The proposed water levy as an inaccurate and 
misguided economic policy serving as a major 
obstacle to sustainable development. 
Plan and organise water planning and management activities to 
control market forces, and collect NRM water levy to fund these 
activities to prevent water resource degradation 
The free and over-extraction of the GAB water resource for 
mining operation is a symptom of a wider social imbalance. 
The allocation of the GAB water resource in favour of 
market and government short-term economic interests 














The government’s proposed water levy is ‘unequal’ 
and brings disastrous economic and social 
consequences, since it is a ‘disincentive’ to efficient 
water use 
The water levy proposed restricts mining activities by realigning 
the private, social and environmental cost to remedy the problem 
of externalities 
The wider social ill and imbalance manifested through legal 
exemptions granted to BHP OD brings detrimental social 
and environmental consequences 
















 Equality of Opportunity Equality before Law Equality of Condition and Result 
Believe fair-play in an unfettered market. Mining 
industry should not be required to pay the proposed 
water levy due to its investment in water planning and 
management services through regulatory and voluntary 
initiatives 
Believe a fair distribution ranked by a need for solidarity and 
maintenance of the system. Propose to increase the water levy on 
industrial users because of ‘the capacity to pay’ principle 
Favour a voluntaristic and egalitarian life-style. The current 
inegalitarian social system is manifest through unjust and 
unequal legal privilege that BHP OD is entitled. This 
‘dehumanised’ relationship needs to be stopped to protect 














 Take positive assumptions into consideration for an 
equal water levy proposal and assume common/public 
good as the outcome of the free exchange that can be 
achieved by pursuit of private interests 
Take normative values such as humanity and ethics into 
consideration of their proposal of an ‘unequal’ water levy for the 
common/public good 
Incorporate (more radical) ethical dimensions into account. 
Both water levy proposals from centre institutions exclude 
social and environmental costs, such as those of social 
solidarity and equity 
















 Free Market Governance and Planning Social and Environmental Equity 
A firm faith in a competitive free market and the 
survival of the fittest principle. It does not want to take 
responsibility for cost recovery failure from those less 
productive water using sectors 
Although hierarchical rules facilitate top-down (cost) reallocation, 
it attempts to punish sectors responsible for economic value 
creation and reward sectors with less economic success. Social 
equity is neither possible nor necessary 
The legal framework for operation and development of 
Olympic Dam points to the ‘moral defect’ of the socio-
economic system of the centre institutions. A belief in 
human goodness requires individuals begin as equal and end 













 Advocate an equal water levy to support the objectives 
of a competitive and economically efficient market. 
Not recognise nor realise GAB water conservation, the 
equal right to access of water and a strong bonded 
democratic society 
Propose an ‘unequal’ water levy to redistribute or reallocate a part 
of the wealth from mining industry to assist the vulnerable stock 
and domestic sectors for the management of GAB, in order to 
satisfy social needs and perception of doing the right thing 
Urge the charge and eventual phase out of BHP OD’s GAB 
water extraction for resource reallocation and wealth 









Managerial Accountability Administrative Accountability Moral Accountability 
Restrict social relations to economic terms portray 
human identity as purely economic subjects pursuing 
self-interests. It serves to negate the very obligation to 
broader social and environmental distributive justice as 
it does not account for costs beyond the monetary 
value 
Preservation of the GAB water resource in good condition so as to 
provide social and environmental benefits to the public in 
perpetuity. However it is vested in agreed procedures and rules 
supported by regulatory coercion, more concerning with political 
pragmatism and acceptance than social and environmental equity 
and justice 
A fundamental and more encompassing form of 
accountability to cover the ethical requirement of 
accountability to the other. It requires an identity answerable 
to wider social interest and it encompasses wider scope of 




This chapter begins with an analysis of the cause of the ecological crisis, view of 
justice and fairness and properties of desired system from the market and hierarchy 
(centre) institution (Section 9.2) before the explication of the border institutions 
(Section 9.3). The concept of economic consequences and associated issues of 
accountability are then discussed with insights for financial accounting and reporting 
practices. 
 Cause of ecological crisis, View of justice and fairness and Properties of 9.2
desired system of centre institutions 
In this chapter, BHP Billiton Olympic Dam Corporation Pty Ltd (BHP OD) and the 
Australian Federal and South Australian government’s risk perspectives are mainly 
represented through the Minerals Council of Australia (MCA) and government 
agencies including Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) and 
the South Australian Arid Lands Natural Resources Management (SAALNRM) 
Board. In the previous chapter, the risk perspectives of the market and hierarchy 
were combined as centre cultures (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982). However, as the 
evidence issued by market and hierarchy institutions are in opposition in this case, 
the risk perspectives from the centre institutions are analysed separately. 
With regard to the cause of the ecological crisis, hierarchy institutions perceive it 
that a lack of governance and planning has led to an inability to control unbridled 
economic growth (Ney & Thompson, 2011; Thompson & Rayner, 1998). In contrast, 
market institutions understand the ecological crisis as deriving from  misguided 
government economic policy (Thompson & Rayner, 1998). With respect to the view 
of justice and fairness, hierarchy institutions seek to coordinate social groups 
“without violating status differentials” (Schwarz & Thompson, 1990, p. 6), since fair 
distribution is ranked by needs (Ney & Thompson, 2011). Hierarchy institutions 
have confidence in “sacrificing few for the good of the whole” (Douglas & 
Wildavsky, 1982, p. 101). On the contrary, market institutions emphasise individual 
autonomy and prefer the rules of fair-play (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982; Ney & 
Thompson, 2011; Schwarz & Thompson, 1990). In respect of properties of a desired 
system, while hierarchy institutions “adopt a limited redistributive ethic…limiting 




accept social inequities among social groups as long as fair competition and free 
exchange systems are not hampered (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982). 
 Grammatical analysis - Cause of ecological crisis of hierarchy institutions 9.2.1
As Thompson and Rayner (1998) suggest, the importance and purpose of governance 
with regard to economic life and environmental crisis can be traced back to the 
hierarchy institutions’ view of nature. Despite the view that nature serves to meet 
human needs and wants, hierarchy institutions do not see nature as infinitely resilient 
(Thompson & Rayner, 1998). 
Hierarchy institutions are agents who construct the cause of ecological crisis as a 
lack of governance and planning (Ney & Thompson, 2011). From this perspective, 
economic life in terms of resource allocation, production and consumption of goods 
and services “should not be left to the free interplay of market force” but rather 
subject to central planning (Ney & Thompson, 2011, p. 611). To facilitate the 
implementation of the National Water Initiative (NWI) (see Chapter 2, Section 2.3.4), 
the Federal government established a NWI steering group which includes 
“representatives from federal, state and territory governments and some of their 
water pricing regulators” to plan and organise a wide range of water planning and 
management activities, aiming to support water use while maintain the health of the 
ecosystem (Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) 2009, p. 5).  
Broadly speaking, water planning and management activities include “the 
administration of water entitlements, developing plans and frameworks to allocate 
the resource, activities to address the impact of water use” (ACCC, 2009, p. ix). 
More specifically, they cover “implementing these plans/strategies frameworks and 
monitoring compliance against the plans”; “collecting and analysing data to gain a 
better understanding of the levels of extractions as well as the potential implications 
of extraction for the water system, and managing this data”; and “undertaking capital 
works, such as the modification of weirs to achieve environmental outcomes” 
(ACCC, 2009, p. 6). 
For example, the NWI steering group, as a hierarchy institution, undertakes water 
planning and management activities (ACCC, 2009). Some water planning and 




particular water user or group of water users”, for example, “a program to increase 
water use efficiency” (ACCC, 2009, p. 6); others are “undertaken mainly to benefit 
the environment”, for example, “setting a limit on water extraction for consumptive 
and [industry] use” (ACCC, 2009, p. 6). At times, “one activity may be undertaken 
to address a number of different needs” (ACCC, 2009, p. 6). Therefore, the hierarchy 
does not see utility-maximisation as the primary rational because unbridled 
economic growth can be harmful to the environment (Thompson & Rayner, 1998).  
In addition to national level policies, the SAALNRM Board, as the South Australian 
government agency, takes responsibility for implementing water planning and 
management activities. As a hierarchy institution, it is “afraid of upheavals which 
escape from a rational order and they fear for the life in the organisation” (Douglas 
& Wildavsky, 1982, p. 91). For example, the SAALNRM Board (2009b, p. 7) 
proposes a vision for the South Australian Arid Lands Region as “a healthy 
functioning ecosystem with sustainable industry and vibrant communities”, and it 
emphasises  
the need to monitor and evaluate [water] resource change over the short, medium 
and long term, at regional and local scales and to evaluate and adopt [water 
planning and management activities] accordingly (SAALNRM Board, 2009b, p. 
17).  
Similar to the NWI steering group, the SAALNRM Board, as a hierarchy institution, 
supports rational management of both the economy and the environment to prevent 
the detrimental effects of excessive economic activity (Thompson & Rayner, 1998). 
More specifically, it collects a Natural Resource Management (NRM) water levy 
based on the rationale that “the licence holder has an entitlement right to access the 
resource and should contribute to the cost of its management based on the size of 
their entitlement” (SAALNRM Board, 2009b, p. 13). Without this “ongoing [water] 
planning and management [activities], the water resource will deteriorate in both 
quantity and quality with ramifications to ecosystems and water users” (SAALNRM 
Board, 2009b, p. 14). 
According to cultural risk theory, this water pricing scheme/water levy charge can be 
seen as a mechanism to expand government control through its interference with 




“explicit control” upon which hierarchy institutions rely (Douglas & Wildavsky, 
1982, p. 180). By forming a “bureaucratic structure”, this water pricing mechanism 
will “rectify the short-termism and greed” of the market, and lead to sustainable 
water resource management (Ney & Thompson, 2011, p. 45).  
To conclude the grammatical analysis, while the NWI steering group centrally plans 
and organises a wide range of water planning and management activities to control 
“the free interplay of market force[s]” (Ney & Thompson, 2011, p. 611), the 
SAALNRM Board collects the NRM water levy to fund these water planning and 
management activities to prevent water resource degradation. This water levy charge, 
as a water pricing scheme, is considered as an instrument which forms a 
“bureaucratic structure” for governments to: expand their control through 
interference with corporations (Ney & Thompson, 2011, p. 45); to manage both the 
economy and the environment; and, to prevent the detrimental effects of excessive 
economic activity (Thompson & Rayner, 1998). 
 Grammatical analysis - Cause of ecological crisis of market institutions 9.2.2
Market institutions are agents that do not take environmental problems seriously 
(Ney & Thompson, 2011). For them, the present “ballyhoo” over environmental 
issues is considered “much ado about nothing” (Ney & Thompson, 2011, p. 47). In 
this case, from market institutions (BHP OD and the MCA) 54  perspective; the 
hierarchy institutions, the ACCC and the SAALNRM Board’s plans to raise funds 
for water planning and management are unnecessary and simply misrepresent the 
impact of the mining industry’s water usage. 
For example, while the MCA (2009a, n.p.) acknowledges that water is “a critical 
business input for all operations” in the mining industry, it describes itself and its 
members as “having a long-standing commitment to sustainable development and 
the effective management of Australia’s water resource”. From the MCA’s (2009a, n. 
p.) perspective, the mining industry is “a very small [water] consumer” which was 
“responsible for 2.4% of Australia’s net water consumption” during 2004-05, and is 
also “a temporary user of water, often in areas where there are no competing 
industrial uses” (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2012). Notwithstanding, “one of the 
                                                 
54 It is important to note that in Sections 7.2.3 and 7.2.4, BHP OD’s perspective partly represented through the voice of MCA, 




highest value users of that water” (Minerals Council of Australia, 2009a, n. p.). 
Table 9.2 below shows water consumption and industry gross value added by 
various industry for 2004-2005.  
Table 9.2 Water consumption and Industry Gross Value Added by Industry 














Agriculture $24,344 12,191 3 73 $2.00 
Forestry and 
fishing 
$2,347 51 0 0 $46.02 
Mining $64,223 413 8 2 $155.50 
Manufacturing $99,688 589 13 4 $169.25 
Water supply $7,407 2,083 1 13 $3.56 
Electricity and 
gas 
$14,444 271 2 2 $53.30 
Other industries $577,333 1,059 73 6 $545.17 
Total $789,786 16,657    
Source: ABS Data for 2004-2005 in MCA (2009a, n. p.)55 
Regarding GAB water consumption related productivity, Torrisi and Trotta (2009) 
draw on the National Water Commission (2009) and note that the total value of 
production from the GAB in 2009 was approximately AUD$4 billion with AUD$1 
billion from agriculture, AUD$1 billion from petroleum, and AUD$1 billion from 
mining and a small but increasing value from tourism. (Market institution - BHP OD 
as a small GAB water consumer is discussed in Chapter 5, Section 5.2.1). 
Furthermore, Torrisi and Trotta (2009, p. 196) point out that the GAB water 
                                                 
55 This data is consistent with the National Water Account (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2012). During 2010-11, the 
Australian economy has extracted 71.796 GL of water from the environment. Agriculture industry accounted for 54% of 
Australia’s total water consumption as the largest water users. The mining industry consumed 4% (540GL) of the total water 
volume, which is similar to 5% (651GL) of the total water consumption from the manufacturing industry. More specifically, 
Australian Bureau of Statistics (2012, n. p.) documents that: 
“[T]he mining industry consumed 10% more water in 2010-11 than it did in 2009-10. However the industry also recorded a 
total of [AUD] $243 million of gross value added per GL of water consumed, a 25% increase from 2009-10. Gross value added 
far outweighed the increase in consumption, demonstrating the efficient, high value-add proposition of the minerals sector’s use 
of water nationally…Compare this to the agriculture industry, which generated a total of [AUD] $4 million of gross value 
added (on average) for every GL of water consumed in 2010-11 and the manufacturing industry, which generated a total of 





demanded by BHP OD’s Olympic Dam Expansion Project (ODEP) would decrease 
in the long run: 
With coastal desalination the preferred option for water supply to the proposed 
expansion of Olympic Dam to open pit mining, the relative proportion of water 
demanded by Olympic Dam … is expected to decrease over time as other uses 
grow in demand particularly from other possible mining and geothermal 
operation.  
BHP OD has also described itself as a responsible and productive water user. For 
example, while being “acutely aware” that the GAB is “a scarce resource”, BHP OD 
has “a group of engineers dedicated to identifying and implementing initiatives that 
reduce water consumption” (Dornin, 2007, n.p.), so as to “progress… development 
in a sustainable way” (BHP Billiton, 2007a, p. 175). 
According to Thompson and Rayner (1998), the market institution perceives 
distorted prices for resources, as a result of misguided government economic policies, 
as the cause of the ecological crisis. In this case, the proposed unequal water levy by 
the SAALNRM Board is constructed by the MCA as government interference which 
serves as a major “obstacle” (Thompson & Rayner, 1998, p. 299) to achieving 
sustainable development. 
For example, MCA (2009a, n. p.), the capacity-to-pay principle outlined by the 
SAALNRM Board (2009b) has “contributed equally to the externalities being 
addressed” and “failed to recognise [that] the externalities for which the levies are 
proposed are already internalised for the minerals industry through other regulatory 
instruments”. This internalisation includes the costs for water planning and 
management activities borne by water users through the states’ regulatory 
instruments; and, business voluntary initiatives that “demonstrate leadership by 
internalising costs of environmental externalities” (Minerals Council of Australia, 
2009a, n. p.). For example, BHP OD is required to submit an annual Environmental 
Management and Monitoring Report (EMMR) and an annual GAB Wellfields 
Report to the South Australian Department of Primary Industry and Resources 
(PIRSA) for BHP OD’s operation (BHP Billiton, 2009, 2011a) (see Chapter 6, 
Section 6.2.1). BHP OD has also participated in the GAB Sustainability Initiative 
Program initiated by the Federal government and the South Australian government 




According to the MCA (2009a, n. p.), business investments generate products which 
are “provided directly to governments, to support their responsibilities for the 
sustainable management of water resources including planning activities” (Minerals 
Council of Australia, 2009a, n. p.). For example, BHP OD conducts groundwater 
monitoring quarterly and collects data about the hydrogeology of the GAB around 
the region of wellfields. This data set is shared with government authorities and 
researchers for reporting and study purposes (Torrisi & Trotta, 2009) (see Chapter 8, 
Section 8.2.2). Since these industry investments represent “a substantial contribution” 
to water planning and water management activities, “the pricing for access to water 
should appropriately reflect the investments made by industry” as long as these 
investments continue (Minerals Council of Australia, 2009a, n. p.). 
Therefore, from the MCA’s perspective, the cause of the ecological crisis emanates 
from an inaccurate water pricing mechanism. As Thompson and Rayner (1998) 
argue, this is an explicitly technical argument for environmental issues which 
focuses on a natural resource price mechanism. In other words, market institutions 
assume that markets occur naturally and the demand-supply-price mechanism is 
objective and value free (Hines, 1989). Market institutions, therefore, construct 
resource management as a debate of “scarcity and cost” (Thompson & Rayner, 1998, 
p. 298).  
In the case of water scarcity, the GAB groundwater resource should be valued highly 
to cover the increasing cost of water planning and management activities. If reflected 
accurately in the water levy, it should influence the decision making of water users 
because of the effect of market forces such as “substitution, technical innovation, and 
structural change” (Thompson & Rayner, 1998, p. 296). In order to compete in the 
market, strategies need to be adopted and behaviours have to be changed by water 
users to minimise costs. Conversely, if a resource is undervalued, that is, its scarcity 
is not reflected through the resource pricing scheme, this resource will tend to be 
over utilised (Thompson & Rayner, 1998).  
For the MCA, the unequal water levy represents a “disincentive” (Thompson & 
Rayner, 1998, p. 299) to efficient water use by providing free water access to stock 




degradation, the MCA raises “significant concerns that should water charging rules 
be applied in the same manner to all industries and users” (Minerals Council of 
Australia, 2009a, n. p.). Water levies, 
if enacted, would promote barriers to establishing efficient markets, and at worst, 
potentially provide windfall gains to stock and domestic users when a water 
market is established (Minerals Council of Australia, 2009a, n. p.). 
The failure to internalise environmental costs from the market institution’s 
perspective, contributes to environmental degradation, because the environment is 
only protected when the true (economic) value is achieved (Thompson & Rayner, 
1998). 
According to Ney and Thompson (2011), institutional regulations or hierarchical 
interventions that align with the objectives of an unfettered market are advocated by 
market institutions (Ney & Thompson, 2011). Such regulations support competition, 
prevent resource loss (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982) and therefore bring overall 
social benefits such as technological innovation which, in turn, enlarges production 
scale (Thompson & Rayner, 1998). In this case, the MCA (2009a) emphasises the 
importance of an equitable and economically efficient market, and its  focus is to 
“support the removal of barriers to trade, [and] promote sustainable development 
within the Basin” (Minerals Council of Australia, 2009a, n. p.).  
To conclude the grammatical analysis, the MCA and the BHP OD, as market 
institutions, perceive the ACCC and the SAALNRM Board’s plan to raise more 
funds for the water planning and management activities for the GAB water 
protection as “much ado about nothing” (Ney & Thompson, 2011, p. 47). The 
mining industry in general and BHP OD in particular, consider themselves as small, 
productive and responsible water users. With respect to the cause of the ecological 
crisis, the MCA views the proposed water levy by the SAALNRM Board as an 
inaccurate and misguided economic policy which serves as a major “obstacle” 
(Thompson & Rayner, 1998, p. 299) to sustainable development. It argues that the 
minerals industry has already borne the costs for water planning and management 
activities through the States’ regulatory instruments and business’ voluntary 
initiative. The unequal water levy is viewed as a “disincentive” (Thompson & 




access to stock and domestic users, and therefore encouraging overuse and water 
resource degradation. For that reason, the MCA advocates an equal water levy for all 
water users to support competition and prevent resource loss in accordance with 
objectives of an economically efficient market (Ney & Thompson, 2011). 
 Rhetorical analysis - View of justice and fairness of hierarchy institutions 9.2.3
Drawing upon their construction of a lack of central planning and control as the 
cause of the ecological crisis, hierarchy institutions exploit the strategy of 
identification with the public interest by promoting planning to limit present 
consumption and accumulate capital for benefits of social and environmental justice 
in the long-run (Thompson et al., 1990). The SAALNRM Board plans to collect 
funds from the current water levy to cover ongoing water planning and management 
activities to prevent water resource degradation. For example, according to the 
ACCC (2009), the SAALNRM Board has the power to charge a NRM water levy to 
water access entitlement holders through water licensing systems.  
Hierarchy institutions consequently discursively establish a hierarchy or social order 
with respect to a particular view of justice and fairness based on fair distribution 
ranked by needs (Ney & Thompson, 2011) funded in the confidence in “sacrificing 
few for the good of the whole” (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982, p. 101). The 
SAALNRM Board proposes an ‘unequal’ pricing mechanism to cover the cost of 
ongoing water planning and water management activities. Industrial users are 
required to pay a higher water levy due to their higher economic value creation 
(increased profit) while stock and domestic users are exempt. The reason for 
proposing a higher water levy on industrial users is the ‘capacity to pay’ principle. 
As the SAALNRM Board (2009b, p. 14) explains, 
the largest levy payer will be OZ Minerals with about [AUD] $291,000 per year. 
This company has started mining and processing gold and copper at Prominent 
Hill. It has spent around [AUD] $30m in providing suitable aquifer water to the 
site. The company expects to mine and process each year 104,000 tonnes of 
copper and 115,000 ounces of gold. At today’s prices this is a gross income of 
nearly [AUD] $660 million. Thus their levy is 0.05% of gross income. Another 
levy payer is expected to be Heathgate Resources - Beverley at an estimate 
[AUD] $11,000. Based upon present production levels this levy will be around 




As such, priority is given to the solidarity and maintenance of the system as a whole 
(Ney & Thompson, 2011).  
In the hierarchical worldview, nobility obliges. That is to say, differences of rank, 
status, influence, and wealth exist and are quite acceptable, as long as those at the 
top make a concerted, genuine effort to shelter those at the bottom from the 
vagaries of life (Ney & Thompson, 2011, p. 66). 
To conclude the rhetorical analysis, the SAALNRM Board as a hierarchy institution 
maintains a belief that a current sacrifice will lead to the future gain (Thompson et al., 
1990). They propose to increase the water levy on industrial users because of ‘the 
capacity to pay’ principle, to present fair distribution in society ranked on a need for 
solidarity and maintenance of the system (Ney & Thompson, 2011). 
 Rhetorical analysis - View of justice and fairness of market institutions 9.2.4
Since the pricing regulation is the cause of ecological crisis, market institutions are 
competitive actors that create extra wealth to benefit themselves and others 
(Thompson et al., 1990). This assumption is characterised by a laissez-faire attitude 
that emphasises individual autonomy and the resultant freedom with respect to needs 
and wants (Ney & Thompson, 2011; Schwarz & Thompson, 1990). 
Unlike hierarchy institutions, which are in favour of institutional rules, market 
institutions prefer rules for fair-play (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982). In this case, 
responding to the water planning and management activities and the proposed water 
levy from the SAALNRM Board, the MCA (2009a, n. p.) highlights “a critically 
important point of difference” between the mining industry and other water users. 
Unlike other users of water, the industry is heavily regulated in all aspects of 
water access, storage, use, reuse and disposal, and the intersection of the existing 
regulatory frameworks and the water reform process is yet to be understood and 
reconciled by governments (Minerals Council of Australia, 2009a, n. p.). 
Indeed, as the MCA (2009a, n. p.) demonstrates, the mining industry “invest[s] 
significantly” in water planning and water management services through “a variety 
of regulatory, co-regulatory and voluntary initiatives”. Many of these investments 
“are provided to governments to support their broader water management mandate”. 
According to the MCA (2009a, n. p.), while the mining industry “supports the user-




ACCC, it is “already paying through investments” in water planning and 
management activities such as: modelling, impact assessment and stakeholder 
engagement; metering and monitoring including volume, quality and community 
expectations; reporting, including data and records in the form of reports provided to 
all jurisdictions; and adaptive management including the intellectual capacity to 
improve water use efficiency and reduce or remediate negative environmental 
impacts arising from water use and ongoing research initiatives (Minerals Council of 
Australia, 2009a, n. p.).  
The MCA (2009a, n. p.) notes that there are also “capital and corporate service costs 
associated with” the above-mentioned activities. Capital costs include the provision 
of infrastructure and systems such as stream flow gauging stations, control weirs, 
monitoring bores, and water registers. Corporate services include corporate services 
delivery and corporate planning functions such as communication, human resources, 
legal, IT, financial management and records management, business and strategic 
planning and performance review against these plans (Minerals Council of Australia, 
2009a, n. p.) Referring to the user-pays principle as advocated by the ACCC (see 
Section 9.2.5), the MCA (2009a, n. p.) maintains that “these cost should be aligned 
with the activities to which they relate, rather than appearing as separate activities”. 
Such investments from the mining industry in water planning and management 
activities are evident in the BHP OD’s case. For example, Torrisi and Trotta (2009, p. 
204) indicate that “the supply of water to the mine and the continuous improvement 
in industrial water efficiency of demand incur a significant financial cost to the 
business”, and this “financial commitment” of the company is “a reflection of the 
accountability to deliver the sustainability of water use”. More specifically, 
according to BHP Billiton (2011a, p. 115), BHP OD has “invested significant capital 
development of the GAB wellfields and associated pumping stations and pipelines”. 
BHP OD also “committed significant quantities of operating and capital expenditure 
to engineering contractors to identify and implement water saving projects” (Torrisi 
& Trotta, 2009, p. 202). 
Apart from the mining operation itself, BHP has participated in the GAB 




Australian government between 1998 and 2004 (more detail see Chapter 2, Section 
2.4.1) (Torrisi & Trotta, 2009). It has “directly funded, project-managed or 
contributed to” the capping free-flowing bores, the installation of close-pipe 
reticulation systems, and bore remediation programs within the GAB (BHP Billiton, 
2011a, p. 114). A total fund of AUD$2.2 million was spent on these projects which 
has “resulted in savings of around 37 megalitres per day [ML/d] since 2004 in the 
vicinity of the Olympic Dam wellfields” (International Council on Mining and 
Metals (ICMM) 2012, p. 19). Again in 2009, BHP Billiton “purchased two pastoral 
properties in the north of the wellfield area and shut down several free-flowing bores” 
which has given rise to the “further savings of 5ML/d” (ICMM, 2012, p. 19). 
According to BHP Billiton, this overall amount of water saving  
is greater than the annual average GAB usage over the same period, and is also 
more than the amount of water currently extracted from the GAB for use at 
Olympic Dam and Roxby Down (currently 33 ML/d).  
Therefore,  BHP Billiton (2011a, p. 114) perceives the water levy imposed on the 
mining industry, is unfair and unjust. As Ney and Thompson (2011, p. 37) contend, 
fairness for market institutions mean that “those who put the most in get the most 
out”. The role of market agents is consequently enacted through framing public 
interest in competitive free markets which is constructed to “select the best and reject 
the worst” (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982, p. 99). Thompson and Rayner (1998, p. 
300) assert that, for market institutions, “what is good for market efficiency is good 
for the environment, increased efficiency means less waste and a more careful use of 
resources”.  
To conclude the rhetorical analysis, the market institution, the MCA believes that 
fair-play resides in an unfettered market (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982). Therefore, 
justice in the mining industry is achieved when they are not requested to pay the 
proposed water levy because of their substantial commitment to investment in water 
planning and water management services through a wide range of regulatory and 
voluntary initiatives.  
 Logological analysis - Properties of desired system of hierarchy institutions 9.2.5
Hierarchy institutions construct the loss of government control as the cause of 




law. Therefore they use ‘governance and planning’ as the terministic screen with 
regards to the properties of their desired system and to legitimate their preferred 
social order.  
According to Thompson, et al. (1990) and Douglas and Wildavsky (1982), hierarchy 
institutions prefer to use direct instrumental rules/bureaucratic means to allocate 
resources by physical quantities. In this case, the ACCC (2009) prefers to allocate 
NRM water levy charges according to an individual’s or groups’ water use. For 
example, the water levy charging principle, ACCC (2009, p. 21) indicates that “all 
costs associated with water planning and management must be identified” and 
“water planning and management charges are to be linked as closely as possible to 
the costs of activities or products”.  
For the ACCC, this user-pays principle enforces the importance of improved 
transparency for the cost and charges of water planning and water management 
activities. This user-pay approach could: 
advance the water charging objective of achieving pricing transparency in respect 
of cost recovery for water planning and management through the publication of 
increased and consistent information about water charges and the reporting and 
improved information about water planning and water management costs and 
cost recovery arrangements (ACCC, 2009, p. ix). 
Following the user-pay approach, the SAALNRM Board (2009b) proposed to 
increase the NRM water levy from 1c/kl in 2006/2007 to 6.5c/kl for industrial users 
(including the mining sector) issued with water licences. This increased water levy 
imposed on the mining industry is consistent with the speculation that “the need for 
water for mining is expected to increase significantly over the next 5-10 years” 
(SAALNRM Board, 2009a, p. 38).  
It is important to note that this increased water charge will have direct 
impacts/economic consequences for the ODEP. Although BHP OD has not been 
charged any GAB water cost due to the privileges under the Roxby Downs 
(Indenture Ratification) Act (1982)56, this proposed amendment to the water levy 
would come into effect as one part in the Roxby Downs (Indenture Ratification) 
                                                 
56 South Australian government has issued two water licences (Roxby Downs (Indenture Ratification) Act 1982) (see Chapter 6, 
Section 6.2.1) to BHP OD’s predecessor WMC to “provide certainty of water supply for the [mining] development” 




(Amendment of Indenture) Amendment Act (2011) for ODEP. In other words, it will 
increase BHP OD’s liability/expense and therefore negatively affect 
equity/capital/profitability when the ODEP takes place. 
According to Douglas and Wildavsky (1982, p. 180), notwithstanding that 
hierarchical rule facilitates top-down (cost) reallocation, it is not concerned about the 
“contradiction among the founding principles or incompatibility between them and 
the way of life they justify”. This is because hierarchical rules attempt to punish 
sectors responsible for economic value creation and reward sectors with less 
economic success (Ney & Thompson, 2011). In this case, despite the ACCC’s user-
pays principle and the proposed increased water levy on industrial users, the 
SAALNRM Board provides an “exemption from the levy for any water allocated for 
stock and domestic purposes”, as stock and domestic users have not been issued  
water licences 57 (SAALNRM Board, 2009b, p. 12). 
Hierarchy institutions therefore create and maintain hierarchising and separating 
effects which (re)produce social division. The various social groups, such as 
industrial, stock and domestic users are considered to be bound “in an orderly and 
ranked relationship”. The role of the hierarchy institution is to merely to coordinate 
these groups “without violating status differentials” (Schwarz & Thompson, 1990, p. 
6) through the water levy system. What the hierarchy institution attempts to create, 
therefore, is “a procedural rationality that is more concerned with the properties of 
who does what than with trying to evaluate the outcome” (Schwarz & Thompson, 
1990, p. 67). 
As can be seen from this case, the SAALNRM Board aims to “behoove” (Ney & 
Thompson, 2011, p. 67) the affluent industrial sectors to assist vulnerable stock and 
domestic sectors. This is done in an effort to improve adoptive water planning and 
water management regarding monitoring, evaluating and reporting capacities to 
ensure that the deterioration of water resources with its ramifications to ecosystems 
and water users can be overcome. As such, as a hierarchy institution, the SAALNRM 
                                                 
57 According to SA Murray-Darling Basin Natural Resources (2013a, p. 3) , “[w]ater used for stock and domestic purposes does 
not require a water licence. Stock use means watering stock, other than stock subject to intensive farming. Domestic purposes 
include water used for non commercial domestic purposes and irrigating up to 0.4 hectare of land used solely in connection 
with a dwelling, e.g. garden area.” “Water used for stock and/or domestic purposes… does not need to be metered. This 
includes water from any source, including a well, dam, watercourse or rainwater tank” (SA Murray-Darling Basin Natural 





Board “adopt[s] a limited redistributive ethic… limiting exchange so as to limit 
losers” (Thompson et al., 1990, p. 61).  
To conclude the logological analysis, the ACCC prefers to use hierarchical rule 
(Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982) to allocate a NRM water levy charge according to the 
amount of water used in accordance with the ‘user-pays-principle’. The SAALNRM 
Board implements these rules without regard to social equity (Schwarz & Thompson, 
1990) by proposing to increase the water levy on industrial users to assist the 
vulnerable stock and domestic sectors. 
 Logological analysis - Properties of desired system of market institutions 9.2.6
While constructing government intervention as the cause of ecological crisis and 
identifying the concept of justice and fairness as the equality of opportunity, market 
institutions establish ‘free market’ as the terministic screen with respect to the 
properties of their desired system and to legitimate their preferred style of justice and 
fairness.  
According to Thompson and Rayner (1998), the underlying market institutions’ 
diagnosis of an environmental crisis is linked to a capitalist system that goes hand in 
hand with environmental protection and necessary growth for attaining sustainable 
development. It is consistent with the assertion of Ney and Thompson (2011, p. 37): 
“Adam Smith’s invisible hand ensur[es] that people only do well when others also 
benefit”. 
Since market institutions have a firm faith that a competitive free market “select[s] 
the best and reject[s] the worst” (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982, p. 99), they do not 
take responsibility for individual failures (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982). In this case, 
the MCA (2009a, n. p.) maintains that the link between the user-pays principle and 
the investment made in water planning and management activities (either through 
water levies or planning and management services) is presently “not equal across all 
water users” and the user-pays principle is “twisted completely”. According to the 
MCA (2009a, n. p.), the ACCC and SAALNRM Board expect the mining industry to 
“pay twice” for water planning and water management functions. In other words, a 
discrepancy exists between the mining industry and other water users regarding 




of water consumption in the Great Artesian Basin”, domestic and stock users are 
“not required to monitor or report water use” while the mineral industry water users 
are under the concerns of policy makers to raise funds to cover the cost for water 
planning and management activities (Minerals Council of Australia, 2009b, p. 29).  
As a result, the MCA (2009a, n. p.) suggests “the relative contributions of users to 
the water planning process, investments in infrastructure, and water volume and 
quality…to be factored into pricing arrangements”. According to the MCA (2009b, p. 
29), “with greater consistency across water users regarding metering and use, better 
strategic water resource planning can be implemented”.  
The MCA, as a market institution, does not want to “carry heavy fixed liabilities” 
(Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982, p. 101) for a less productive water using sector. As 
Douglas and Wildavsky (1982, p. 101) assert, “it holds that people responsible for 
their own misfortunes, stupidity and neglect explain their losses”. As explained by 
Williams (1992), the existence and acceptance of a market system as the mainstream 
social economy is rooted in a fundamental assumption of human nature. That is, 
human beings are “self-seeking wealth maximisers” (Williams, 1992, p. 104). 
Another taken-for-granted assumption is that the industrial capitalist society is 
predicated on the fittest will survive principle (Hines, 1989). It is assumed that 
markets are arbitrated by an “invisible hand” of market forces in terms of free 
competition (Hines, 1989, p. 64). For market institutions, failures are attributed to 
individual incompetence and/or bad luck, while the competitive market remains 
smart and guiltless (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982). 
Market institutions therefore create hierarchising and separating effects producing 
and reproducing social divisions and inequities. Since market institutions espouse 
individual success and focus on the ‘bottom line’ only, temporary inequalities within 
social groups are accepted as long as fair competitions and free exchange systems 
are not hampered (means-end rationality). According to Douglas and Wildavsky 
(1982, p. 179): 
[Market institutions’] fundamental justification is not faith in the value of the 
individual but faith in the freedom to exchange… [l]ong term concentrations of 
wealth make it impossible to give honest answers to the challenge of envy: with 




In other words, market institutions value free competition, not the “relational niceties” 
of members within society (Schwarz & Thompson, 1990, p. 6).  
To conclude the logological analysis, as the MCA has a firm faith in a competitive 
free market and the survival of the fittest principle, it does not want to take 
responsibility for other cost recovery failure (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982) from 
those less productive water using sectors such as the stock and domestic users. 
As a result of the MCA’s (2009a, 2009b) comments on increased industrial water 
levy and water charge rules for water planning and water management activities in 
particular, and the border institutions comment through public submissions on BHP 
OD’s legal privileges under the Indenture Act (1982) (Section 9.3), an industrial 
water levy of 3c/KL58 has been approved by the SAALNRM Board (2009b). The 
stipulation of this water levy has come into effect as section 13(12) in the Roxby 
Downs (Indenture Ratification) (Amendment of Indenture) Amendment Act (2011) 
for ODEP. The GAB water charge will be based on this approved levy rate “capped 
at $0.101KL… for 30 years from the commencement of the project. The charge will 
then revert to the current NRM levy rate” (Government of South Austrlia, 2011a, 
n.p.; see also Roxby Downs (Indenture Ratification) (Amendment of Indenture) 
Amendment Act 2011 ). 
 Cause of ecological crisis, View of justice and fairness and Properties of 9.3
desired system of border institutions 
This section considers the border institutions’ perspective of the cause of the 
ecological crisis, view of justice and fairness and properties of a desired system and 
the differences from both market institutions - the MCA and the BHP OD and 
hierarchy institutions - the ACCC and the SAALNRM Board. Evidence of the 
interests of the border institutions’ is drawn from public submissions to ODEP EIS 
(BHP Billiton, 2009), media articles and academic references. These sources 
represent the view that: the cause of the ecological crisis is rooted in the socio-
economic system as a wider social ill (Ney & Thompson, 2011; Thompson & 
Rayner, 1998); justice and fairness as “voluntaristic and egalitarian” and dependent 
upon “fraternal and sororal cooperation” (Schwarz & Thompson, 1990, p. 7); and, a 
                                                 





desired system is characterised by ‘social and environmental equity’ (Schwarz & 
Thompson, 1990). This documentary evidence is often in the form of criticisms of 
the Indenture Ratification Act (1982) established between BHP and the South 
Australian government as a legal framework for the operation and development of 
Olympic Dam in general and BHP OD’s legal privileges granted by the Indenture 
Ratification Act (1982) in particular.  
  Grammatical analysis - Cause of ecological crisis of border institutions 9.3.1
Border institutions are agents who consider the environmental crisis as a symptom of 
a wider social ill. From the border institutions’ perspective, the abuse of nature is 
fundamentally related to social structures and values (Thompson & Rayner, 1998). 
This is consistent with Hines’ (1989) argument that markets, demands, supply, price 
and cost are socially constructed. By making markets appear to be natural and 
therefore inevitable and neutral, they can be viewed as “part of an ideology which 
perpetuate and legitimate a world capitalist and industrialist order” (Hines, 1989, p. 
64). It is this capitalist social order, from the border institutions’ perspective, where 
the imbalance emerges (Ney & Thompson, 2011; Thompson & Rayner, 1998).  
Therefore, environmental degradation can only be properly understood if it is seen as 
a symptom of a wider social ill. The way humans pillage natural resources recklessly 
is a significant indicator for other social malaise such as racism, gender 
discrimination, social alienation and so on (Ney & Thompson, 2011; Thompson & 
Rayner, 1998). In this case, an example of this social ill is evident in the way market 
(and hierarchy) institutions treat Aboriginal groups with regard to mining operations, 
as the Indenture Ratification Act (1982) is not restricted by the Aboriginal Heritage 
Act (1988) which is “designed to protect the health and wellbeing of the peoples” 
(Madigan M, CL 247, n.p.).  
As emphasised by Hon. M. Parnell (Australian Greens, 2007, n.p.), the Aboriginal 
Heritage Act (1988) is “one piece of legislation which does not apply to Roxby but 
which would apply to any other miner in South Australia”. It is also “the key 
legislative enactment aimed at protecting indigenous heritage in South Australia” 
(Friends of the Earth Adelaide, CL 44, p. 7). However, under the Indenture 




“a legal position to undertake any consultation that occurs, decide which Aboriginal 
groups they consult and the manner of that consultation” (Friends of the Earth 
Adelaide, CL 44, p. 8). As such, from the perspective of the border institutions, 
individualists and hierarchists in centre institutions are “the ideological standard 
bearers” of a devastating socio-economic system (Thompson & Rayner, 1998, p. 
304). Lack of proper governance is also the root of the environmental crisis from the 
hierarchy institution (see Section 9.2.1) and is a symptom of underlying imbalances 
within the social world. In this case, border institutions view the allocation of the 
GAB water resource in favour of market and government interests as the cause of the 
GAB risk of crisis. According to Douglas and Wildavsky’s (1982, p. 150), issues are 
“a confrontation between corporate [and governmental] technocratic domination and 
decentralized community independence.” This view is closely associated with a 
broad range of issues from: the endangered mound springs to the cultural and 
spiritual damage to Aboriginal groups; the unfair water distribution to the likely 
draining of the GAB; and, the consequent catastrophic future of water shortage. 
Border institutions construct social equity as the agent to address social imbalance in 
favour of justice, humanity and freedom from repression (Douglas & Wildavsky, 
1982; Thompson & Rayner, 1998). This is “a holistic view” of the “whole spectrum 
of social and cultural activity” when it comes to diagnosing environmental problems 
(Thompson & Rayner, 1998, p. 295). In this case, border institutions urge the South 
Australian government to relinquish the “outdated” (Environment Centre NT, CL 35, 
n.p.) or “anarchistic” (Friends of the Earth Australia, 2011, n.p.) legal exemptions for 
BHP OD under the Indenture Ratification Act (1982) for ODEP.  
Although the final decision of ODEP made by the Federal government and South 
Australian government requires BHP to “be levied for water extracted from the 
Basin, providing revenue that will enable the Government to better manage this 
precious natural resource” (News Release, 2011, n.p.), the Hon. M. Parnell is not 
completely satisfied with the hierarchy’s requirement to cap charges for 30 years, 
because it “really just shows how unique and favourable this arrangement is. No one 
else - no other user of water, no irrigators, no other mining companies gets this 
concession” (South Australia, Legislative Council, 2011, p. 5). Therefore, the border 




safeguard itself from any potential environmental crisis, but also to “break the 
stranglehold which they consider such interests have on society” (Douglas & 
Wildavsky, 1982, p. 150). 
To conclude the grammatical analysis, border institutions consider the ecological 
crisis- the free and over-extraction of the GAB water resource for BHP OD’s mining 
operation- is manifested through the legal exemptions that are granted to BHP OD 
under the Indenture Ratification Act (1982). From this perspective, the allocation of 
the GAB water resource in favour of market and government short-term economic 
interests which has been arranged under the Indenture Ratification Act (1982) will 
never resolve or relieve the GAB water-related environmental problem unless wider 
social issues in terms of humanity and equality are addressed. Border institutions 
therefore call for the relinquishment of the legal exemptions for BHP OD under the 
Indenture Act for ODEP. From this perspective, it is only through “a levelling of the 
fundamental inequity” (Ney & Thompson, 2011, p. 37) that is characteristics of the 
Indenture Ratification Act (1982) that the GAB water resource can be preserved. 
 Rhetorical analysis - View of justice and fairness of border institutions 9.3.2
While constructing an inequitable social system as the cause of the ecological crisis, 
border institutions promote identification with the public by framing themselves as 
moral agents who support policies to protect the environment without “exploitative 
values…and dehumanised relationships” (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982, p. 135). For 
them, social relationships are said to be fundamentally dependent upon “fraternal and 
sororal cooperation” and therefore should be “voluntaristic and egalitarian” 
(Schwarz & Thompson, 1990, p. 7). Encroachment of a differential social status 
from a hierarchical lifestyle and unequal distribution of wealth and power from 
market institutions threatens this ideal state of justice (Thompson et al., 1990). 
To highlight the border view of fairness and justice, the current and historic 
treatment of Aboriginal groups is used as a salient example. The Indenture 
Ratification Act (1982) constructs a “structural dependency” (Thompson & Rayner, 
1998, p. 296) for Aboriginal groups on BHP OD’s and its predecessor WMC’s 
mining operation and it is a serious impediment to sustainable GAB water 




WMC used “divide-and-rule tactics and exerted persistent, unwanted pressure until 
the mining company got what it wanted”.  
As Lad A (CL 233, p. 4) argues, Roxby Downs “began with the manhandling and 
forcible eviction of the Traditional indigenous elders [and this] speaks 
volumes…[about] this industry’s scant regard for what is right and respectful”. For 
example, in 1983, Kokatha men “had to defend a sacred site at Canegrass Swamp 
with guns from bigoted Roxby workers with a bulldozer building the Borefield Road” 
(Lad A, CL 233, p. 4)59.  
Friends of the Earth (CL 42, n.p.) describes another “particularly notorious incident 
in the history of the Olympic Dam mine” of laying a water pipe by WMC in the mid-
1990s on the land of Arabunna Traditional Owners. “The dispute over this pipeline 
led to violence, terrorism, imprisonment, and the death of one person” (Friends of 
the Earth, CL 42, n.p.). While BHP cannot be held responsible for WMC actions, “it 
seems little has changed, including BHP B[illiton]’s refusal to relinquish the 
overrides and exemptions it enjoys from the Aboriginal Heritage Act” (Friends of the 
Earth, CL 42, n.p.). As Friends of the Earth Adelaide (CL 44, p. 8) states, “BHP 
Billiton clearly cannot participate in decisions concerning the recognition and 
protection of Aboriginal sites without a gross conflict of interest.”  
Indeed, according to Henderson K (CL 196, n.p.), “BHP continues to consult with 
the Arabunna in a selective manner embodying the racism inherent in Indenture Act”. 
This “divide and conquer’ technique”, described by Henderson K (CL 196, n.p.) is 
“typical of corporate engagement strategies, which try to convince a usually 
unsatisfied and educated public that they have regard for environmental and social 
justice”: 
According the Aboriginal Community Centre in Marree, ran by the Arabunna, 
splinter pro mining groups of Aboriginal people have been handpicked for 
consultation, whilst the rest of the community is ignored and shafted. …For the 
Arabunna who have strong ties to the Mound Springs … this is greatly 
distressing, as it is also for those of the general public who work to achieve trust 
                                                 
59 According to Cooper (2010, p. 189), “[a]boriginal and environmental concerns about mining at Olympic Dam were first 
raised in 1979. In June 1980, it was alleged that clay pans adjacent to a proposed shaft site were of mythological significance. 
Such matters led Premier David Tonkin to note in November 1981 that only as a consequence of the Olympic Dam discovery 
was aboriginal interest attracted to the remote area. However, it was the construction of the bore field road across Canegrass 
Swamp, 50km north of Olympic Dam, in July 1982 that provoked the largest indigenous protest. It was only resolved in 
December after it was suggested that WMC might invoke the force majeure provision of their indenture and the Government 




between Aboriginal and white communities in order to foster a socially just 
future. (Henderson K, CL 196, n.p.) 
In Arabunna Elder Kevin Buzzacotts’ own words (ABC Premium News, 2011b, n. 
p.): “We don’t want that big great gaping hole in the desert… because it is a sacred 
site and we’re trying to protect our areas”. 
Like the Arabunna community, the Kokatha People’s Committee “has not had the 
opportunity to be involved in the investigation or to provide further information” 
(Lad A, CL 233, p. 4).  
Servethepeople (2008, n.p.) gives another example of the consultation process of 
BHP with the Kokatha people regarding the ODEP: 
At the moment, BHP is in a hurry to get signatures of approval for the expansion 
of the mine from a group of Kokatha elders who are being dragged into a meeting 
on December 14, 2008. However, there is some resistance from within this 
group. One source reports that some of the elders are not only reluctant to sign, 
but want to withdraw signatures already obtained from now deceased elders. 
BHP is confident that even one signature will suffice to provide evidence of 
consultation and consent. 
As a result, from border institutions’ perspective,  the Indenture Ratification Act 
(1982) allowing BHP OD and its predecessor WMC to consult with whichever 
Aboriginal group in whatever way it prefers, is seen as fundamentally unjust. 
Border institutions consequently establish another hierarchy and social order 
differing from those from market and hierarchy institutions. Border institutions 
construct the issue of justice and fairness with regard to the interaction between 
humans and nature and social relations. They contend that human fate is inextricably 
connected to that of Planet Earth (Ney & Thompson, 2011).  
To conclude the rhetorical analysis, border institutions favour voluntaristic and 
egalitarian life-styles (Thompson et al., 1990, p. 62). They believe that the depletion 
of the GAB water resource is a result of an inegalitarian social system (Thompson et 
al., 1990), an example of which is manifested through BHP OD’s unfair and 
undemocratic consultation with Aboriginal community, permitted under the 
Indenture Ratification Act (1982). Such unjust and unequal legal privileges have also 
allowed BHP OD a potential commercial gain over other miners and developers. 




“exploitative value” and “dehumanised relationships” (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982, 
p. 135) such as charging and eventually phasing out BHP OD’s GAB water 
extraction to protect the GAB water resource and related communities. 
 Logological analysis - Properties of desired systems of border institutions 9.3.3
The paradoxes and controversies inherent in the hierarchising and separating effects 
derived from properties of market and hierarchy (centre) institutions’ desired system 
provide opportunities for border institutions to resist and transform. Through the 
construction of an inequitable system as the cause of ecological crisis and 
identification of justice and fairness as equality of conditions, border institutions 
establish ‘social and environmental equity’ as the terministic screen with respect to 
properties of their desired system to legitimate their preferred social order. 
Border institutions believe that environmental pollution does not only occur in a 
physical and technical sense (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982). According to Douglas 
and Wildavsky (1982, p. 37), there are conceptual dualisms upheld by the pollution 
ideal such as moral and immoral, purity and impurity, innocent and guilty as a means 
to “sustain the vision of good society”. In this case, border institutions hold that the 
current and proposed intake of GAB water by BHP OD “may preclude other users by 
[sic] humans and the rest of the fragile ecosystems in those area for thousands and 
thousands of years” (Walsh T, CL 353, n. p.) (more details see Chapter 7, 8). They 
identify institutional mistrust and label GAB water degradation as a sign of the 
“moral defect” of the centre institutions (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982, p. 36). 
This moral defect is manifest in the form of the Indenture Act (1982) between BHP 
(and its predecessor WMC) and the South Australian government as a legal 
framework for operation and development of Olympic Dam (see Chapter 8, Section 
8.2.2). According to the Environment Centre NT (CL 35, n.p. see also Walker N, CL 
352), this Indenture Ratification Act (1982) “allows wide-ranging and totally 
indefensible exemptions from key laws” including the Environmental Protection Act 
(1993), the Natural Resources Management Act (2004) and Aboriginal Heritage Act 
(1988). As Hon. M. Parnell (Australian Greens, 2007, n. p.) indicates, the Indenture 
Act “was created to fast-track and protect the establishment and operation of the 




From the border institutions’ perspective, these “legal privileges” (Australian 
Conservation Foundation, CL 10, p. 3) are of a “sweeping nature” (Poppins, 2008, 
n.p.). For example, BHP OD’s GAB water intake is exempt from the regulations of 
either the Environmental Protection Act or the Natural Resources Management Act. 
Two special water licences (Roxby Downs (Indenture Ratification) Act 1982 ) are 
“issued under this indenture allowing WMC [and its successor BHP OD] to extract 
groundwater from the borefields up to agreed maximum drawdown levels” (Keane, 
1997, p. 42) (more details see Chapter 8, Section 8.2.2). 
For border institutions, the first unfair legal privilege is BHP OP’s “free 
consumption of water” (Rozali A, CL 309, n.p.). As Arid Lands Environment Centre 
(CL 8, n.p. ; see also Environment Centre NT, CL 35; Friends of the Earth, CL 42; 
People for Nuclear Disarmament (WA), CL 65; Roxstop Action, CL 77; Women’s 
International League for Peace & Freedom (Australian Section), CL 92) contends: 
The Roxby Downs Indenture Act allows BHP Billiton to extract massive 
unsustainable amount of water for free, despite the company posting profits of 
[USD] $ 17.7 billion dollars in 2007-08 [USD $ 13.01 billion in 2010 and USD 
$23.951 billion in 2011 (Friends of the Earth, 2011)].  
In Rozali A’s (CL 309, n.p.) words, “[t]his is not fair dinkum”. Although BHP 
claims that its bore-capping program has saved more water than the volume currently 
consumed by the mine (see Section 9.2.4), Friends of the Earth Australia (2011, p. 7; 
see also Friends of the Earth, CL 42) argue that: 
[w]ater extraction for the mine is localised and the adverse impacts are all too 
apparent to people who have monitored the Mound Springs over the past 20 
years. Likewise, the company’s bore capping program is small comfort to 
pastoralists who suffer reduced water flow from the localised effects of water 
extraction for the mine. 
The second unfair legal privilege is BHP OD’s exemption to any water restriction. 
According to Hon. M. Parnell (Australian Greens, 2007, n. p.); 
[w]hilst irrigators and householders are suffering water restrictions, BHP 
Billiton’s arrangements provide that … there is no risk to the quantities it can 
take. This is directly against the National Water Initiative [NWI] which says that, 
when we need to reduce allocations, we need to share the pain of those cuts 
around. This particular corporate operation does not need to share any of the pain 




As such, the Indenture Act is considered as “unfair and undemocratic” 
(Henderson K, CL 196, n.p.). 
For border institutions, ‘worldliness’ and ‘conspiracy’ have caused the 
environmental crisis that endangers humankind (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982, p. 10). 
Put into secular terms, worldliness appears in big organization, big money, and 
market values - all deny equality and attack goodness and purity; conspiracy 
includes factions plotting secret attack, transporting evil into an essentially good 
world.  
In this case, BHP OD’s decision to undertake ODEP from the border institutions’ 
perspective “has been justified on the basis of [economic] cost” regardless of the 
environmental cost (AAP General News Wire, 2011, n.p.; see also Friends of the 
Earth Australia, 2011; Whyalla News, 2011a). According to Organ K (CL 277, n.p.), 
for instance, the need for increased GAB water extraction for ODEP is: 
questionable and appears to be driven by extreme greed on the part of BHP 
B[illiton]. Should they continues to mine at Olympic Dam at their current 
volumes they will no doubt still make billions of dollars over a longer and more 
controlled period with no need to unnecessarily upgrade their water usage. It 
would seem to us that the unseemly haste with which BHP B[illiton] wishes to 
garner the riches of Olympic Dam verges on the obscene. 
For border institutions, the Indenture Ratification Act (1982) is “the subject of secret 
negotiations between the South Australian government and BHP B[illiton]” 
(Environment Tasmania Inc., CL 37, p. 4). The South Australian government’s 
stipulation and sanction of these legal privileges (see ection 6 and section 9 of the 
Indenture Ratification Act (1982) and Indenture Amendment (2012)) “makes a 
ludicrous farce of any governments claim to be taking…conservation issues 
seriously” (Maizey P, CL 248, n.p.). As speculated by Lad A (CL 233, p. 3), the 
South Australian government may think “it is more important to have a bullish 
economy rather than a healthy environment. That a rapacious BHP Billiton…is 
better value than ecological sustainability”.  
This attitude towards environmental problems is also closely related to how the 
South Australian government treat Aboriginal groups in the society. According to 
Burdon (2006, n.p.), for example; 
[t]he inclusion of the Aboriginal Heritage Act 1988 (AHA) in the Indenture Act 




our State Government treats indigenous rights and interests…Our Government is 
playing a dangerous balancing game with promises on one hand and contrary 
legislative action on the other. 
As such, “[South Australian] parliament has exposed the yawning gap between the 
government’s hyperbolic spin over the Roxby riches and the dark reality of this 
terrible deal” (Friends of the Earth Australia, 2011, n.p.). Border institutions 
therefore commit to bring equality to all humankind, and they have a particular 
philosophical underpinning to justify their idea. Such a guiding principle is a belief 
in “human goodness and the supreme value of the individual” (Douglas & 
Wildavsky, 1982, p. 177). Hence, border institutions’ desired system demands that 
individuals begin as equal and finish as equal (Ney & Thompson, 2011). 
In this case study, border institutions support charging for water use and the eventual 
phasing out of BHP OD’s rights to extract water to protect the GAB and related 
communities. For example, border institutions suggest that the GAB groundwater 
resource is “a resource owned by the whole of Australia and its people” (Crowford H, 
CL 138, n.p.). BHP OD “should be made to pay for its extraction of water and be 
working towards phasing out its use of this precious and finite resource” (Arid Lands 
Environment Centre, CL 8, n.p.; see also Women’s International League for Peace & 
Freedom (Australian Section), CL 92; Henderson K, CL 196; Blakey C, CL 116; 
Keyes S, CL 224).  
To conclude the logological analysis, border institutions believe that the Indenture 
Ratification Act (1982) between BHP and the South Australian government as a 
legal framework for operation and development of Olympic Dam points to the 
“moral defect” of the  socio-economic system of the centre institutions (Douglas & 
Wildavsky, 1982, p.36; Thompson & Rayner, 1998). Since border institutions 
believe in “human goodness and supreme value of the individuals” (Douglas & 
Wildavsky, 1982, p. 177), their desired system requires their individuals begin as 
equal and finish as equal (Ney & Thompson, 2011). 
 Economic consequences  9.4
Accounting and reporting practice and disclosure is said to provide information for 
decision-making to correct market asymmetries. However, due to an increasing 




recognised as objective, neutral nor a fair representation (Cortese et al., 2009; 
Fogarty et al., 1994; Zeff, 1978). In fact, it is influenced by “outside forces” (Zeff, 
1978, p. 56) that “have sought to impose their definition of reality, and the 
consequences of it, upon society” (Hines, 1988, p. 260). Such consequences are 
termed “economic (and/or social) consequences” (Fogarty et al., 1994, p. 25; Zeff, 
1978, p. 56). Economic consequences 60 can be understood as “the results of the 
reallocative outcomes” of a policy standard, and “form the central political outcome” 
(Fogarty et al., 1994, p. 25).  
Government policies, in terms of calculative standards, normally have an income 
redistribution or/and resource allocation function therefore entail economic (or/and 
social) consequences. Unsurprisingly, it is the economic (or/and social) 
consequences arguments that are used by various constituents to push through their 
interests and values to influence income redistribution or/and resource allocation 
(Zeff, 1978). It is normally argued that a certain outcome of redistributed wealth or 
resources is that it could “impose restrictions or costs on some while conferring 
benefits to others” (Solomons, 1978, p. 89). As such, policy-makers are advised to 
take these “allegedly detrimental consequences” into consideration when deciding on 
policy rules or standards (Zeff, 1978, p. 56). 
In this case, the debate over the NRM water levy is analysed by drawing on different 
institutional assumptions regarding the cause for the depletion of the GAB water 
resource, the pertinent issue of justice and fairness and the properties of a desired 
system. Cultural risk theory, by contrasting these distinctive assumptions from 
market, hierarchy and border institutions, provides a rationale to understand an 
economic consequences argument from the perspectives of managerial, 
administrative and moral accountability. 
In the grammatical analysis, the SAALNRM Board, as the South Australian 
government agency, proposed to collect funds from the NRM water levy to cover 
water planning and management activities of the Federal government agency through 
the NWI. The GAB water resource, from the perspective of the hierarchy institutions, 
                                                 
60 Economic consequences in accounting studies is defined as “impact of accounting reports on the decision-making behaviors 





is a common/public good which is perceived as necessary for the enhancement of 
both economic and social well-being of the nation (Barton, 2006; Pallot, 1992). 
Hierarchy institutions’ objective is to preserve public goods so as to provide social 
and environmental benefits to the public in perpetuity (Barton, 1999). The water levy 
is used to restrict mining activities by realigning the private, social and 
environmental cost to remedy the problem of externalities (Barton, 1999), and 
prevent the detrimental effects of excessive economic activity (Thompson & Rayner, 
1998).  
According to rhetorical analysis, the SAALNRM Board proposes to increase the 
water levy on industrial users because of ‘the capacity to pay’ principle while 
exempting stock and domestic users. The rationale for such preferred resource 
allocation and wealth distribution is from the hierarchical belief that fair distribution 
in society is ranked by a need for solidarity and maintenance of the system (Ney & 
Thompson, 2011) by “sacrificing a few for the good of the whole” (Douglas & 
Wildavsky, 1982, p. 101).  
It is important to note that hierarchy institutions take normative values such as 
humanity and ethics into consideration with their water levy proposal for the 
common/public good (Williams, 1992). According to Funnell (2003, p. 107), 
governments of Westminster traditions are said to be accountable to parliament and 
the people for “governing in the best interests of all citizens according to accepted 
conventions or legally prescribed processes”. The hierarchy institutions’ water levy 
proposal, therefore, incorporates a social value base influenced by social needs and 
perception of doing the right thing (Ball & Grubnic, 2007). From the logological 
analysis, since it is the “nobility”’s obligation to “make a conceited genuine effort to 
shelter those at the bottom from the vagaries of life” (Ney & Thompson, 2011, p. 66), 
the SAALNRM Board proposes to increase the water levy on industrial users to 
assist the vulnerable stock and domestic sectors. This proposed water levy policy 
will redistribute or reallocate a part of the wealth from mining industry for the 
management of GAB. Hierarchical risk assumptions of the cause of ecological crisis, 
view of justice and fairness and properties of desired system therefore legitimate the 




In grammatical analysis, to respond to the ACCC and the SAALNRM Board’s plan 
to raise more funds for water planning and management activities, the MCA and the 
BHP OD as market institutions perceive this proposed government policy as “much 
ado about nothing” (Ney & Thompson, 2011, p. 47). It is because market institutions 
do not take into account the existence of social and environmental costs (Freedman 
& Stagliano, 1990; Lehman, 1996), and restrict social relations to economic terms 
(Messner, 2009; Roberts, 1991). In this case, the MCA views the increased water 
levy proposal on industrial users as inaccurate and a misguided economic policy 
which serves as a major “obstacle” to sustainable development (Thompson & Rayner, 
1998, p. 299). It argues that the minerals industry is a small and responsible water 
user who has already borne the costs of water planning and management activities 
through the States’ regulatory instruments and voluntary initiatives. From a market 
institution perspective, this ‘unequal’ water levy would bring disastrous economic 
and social consequences, as it is considered as a “disincentive” (Thompson & 
Rayner, 1998, p. 299) to efficient water-using behaviour. Evidently, market 
institutions portray humans as economic subjects pursuing self-interests through 
motivations and rationales such as individualism, utilitarianism and instrumental 
value of good (Arrington & Francis, 1993; Messner, 2009; Roberts, 1991; Shearer, 
2002). This identity is characterised by a laissez-faire attitude that emphasises 
individual autonomy and the resultant freedom with respect to their needs and wants 
(Ney & Thompson, 2011; Schwarz & Thompson, 1990). 
As such, the MCA advocates an equal water levy for all water users to support the 
objectives of a competitive and economically efficient market (Ney & Thompson, 
2011). The intended economic consequence, arising from such an equal water levy, 
is that the mining industry is not requested to cover the cost of water planning and 
management activities for those from less productive water using sectors such as 
stock and domestic users. According to the logological analysis, the underlying 
rationale for this market institutions’ preferred wealth distribution, or resource 
allocation,  arises from the market institutions’ faith in a ‘free market’ and the fittest 
survive principle (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982; Hines, 1989).   
As explained by Hines (1989), when markets are implicitly assumed to be occurring 




free. Financial accounting and reporting practices, from this perspective, 
communicate the cost and price as emerging from this “impersonal” mechanism 
(Hines, 1989, p. 62). Following this argument, any government intervention in the 
free market play is considered as “unwarranted” unless such an intervention is 
consistent with the principle of an efficient market (Hines, 1989, p. 62). Moreover, it 
is assumed the most ‘efficient’ or ‘fittest’ firms are the “most profitable in financial 
accounting terms” since markets are arbitrated by an ‘invisible hand’ of market 
forces in terms of free competition (Hines, 1989, p. 64).  
It is important to note that these are positive assumptions that market institutions 
take into consideration in their equal water levy proposal. The hierarchical 
suggestion of “nobility”’s obligation (Ney & Thompson, 2011, p. 66) and the need 
for free market control (Ney & Thompson, 2011), from market institutions’ 
perspective, if incorporated, could hinder the development of a competitive and free 
market, and therefore should be excluded. It is notable here that market institutions 
assume common/public goods as the outcome of the free exchange that can be 
achieved by the pursuit of private interests (Benston, 1982). The issue that the 
interest of shareholders does not necessarily serve the collective or common good of 
the wider community is not visible (Shearer, 2002). 
Therefore, these ‘positivist’ assumptions affect mainstream accounting’s “ability to 
ask ethical questions about itself…by depriving its language of ethical meaning” 
(Williams, 1992, p. 104). Mainstream accounting practices, when considered as 
neutral and value-free, measure “efficiency”, “productivity” and “profitability” and 
only these properties are considered as “real” (Hines, 1989, p. 65). Others, such as 
GAB water conservation, the equal right to access of water, and a strongly bonded 
democratic society, are given little or no recognition and therefore are not realised. 
According to Schweiker (1993) and Shearer (2002), this managerial accountability 
serves to negate the very obligation to broader social and environmental distributive 
justice, as it does not account for costs beyond a monetary value. Market institutions 
are loathe to accommodate the proposed water levy from hierarchy institutions and 
take responsibility for other individual failures (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982) such 
as covering the cost of water planning and management activities for those from less 




It is notable that in this case, the market and hierarchy institutions are divided on this 
issue, which provides an opportunity for the border to gain traction for influencing 
the decision-making of the centre. Border institutions, according to the grammatical 
analysis, believe that BHP OD’s current free GAB water intake for its mining 
operation is a symptom of a wider social ill and imbalance (Ney & Thompson, 2011). 
This social imbalance is manifested through legal exemptions that are granted to 
BHP OD under the Indenture Act (1982). This moral defect arises from the 
alignment of managerial accountability and administrative accountability. From a 
border institutions’ perspective, while managerial accountability has an overriding 
focus on the individual and profitability (Schweiker, 1993; Shearer, 2002), 
administrative accountability is vested in agreed procedures and rules supported by 
regulatory coercion (Puxty et al., 1987) which is concerned with political 
pragmatism and acceptance more than social and environmental equity and justice 
(Tinker et al., 1991). 
Such a moral defect has brought: detrimental social and environmental consequences 
in terms of BHP OD’s unfair and undemocratic consultation with Aboriginal groups; 
BHP OD’s unjust and unequal legal privileges over other miners and developers; and, 
the depletion of the GAB water resource. From the border institutions’ perspective, 
managerial accountability at large, and administrative accountability to some extent, 
reflect “a sense of self as solidary and singular with no necessary connection to 
others” (Roberts, 1991, p. 358). They are unlikely to rectify social ills fundamentally 
caused by “waste, exploitation, extravagance, disadvantage or coercion” (Tinker et 
al., 1991, p. 29). In the rhetorical analysis, it was shown that the allocation of the 
GAB water resource in favour of market and government short-term economic 
interests which has been arranged under the Indenture Act (1982) will never resolve 
the GAB water-related environmental problems unless the social ill in terms of 
humanity and equality are addressed (Ney & Thompson, 2011; Thompson et al., 
1990). 
Border institutions therefore call for the relinquishment of the legal exemptions for 
BHP OD under the Indenture Act (1982) for ODEP. More specifically, border 
institutions urge the South Australian government to charge and eventually phase out 




preferred by border institutions, are to relieve and eventually resolve the GAB water 
crisis through “a levelling of the fundamental inequity” (Ney & Thompson, 2011, p. 
37) between BHP OD and the Aboriginal community and between BHP OD and 
other miners and developers. The rationale underpinning such intended economic 
(social and environmental) consequences is from the sectarian bias towards a 
voluntaristic and egalitarian life-style (Thompson et al., 1990, p. 62) without 
“exploitative value” and “dehumanised relationships” (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982, 
p. 135).  
Border institutions as such hold a wider concept of accountability. This form of 
accountability can be termed ‘moral accountability’ which is a fundamental and 
more encompassing form of accountability to cover the ethical requirement of 
accountability to the other (Messner, 2009; Shearer, 2002). As Robert’s (1991, p. 
358) asserts, moral accountability can enact “a sense of self which whilst 
individually confirming simultaneously acknowledges and expresses the 
interdependence of self and others”. 
According to the logological analysis, it is this “moral defect” (Douglas & 
Wildavsky, 1982, p. 36) of the capitalist social order within which mainstream 
accounting practices are embedded that fails to challenge the root cause of 
environmental problems (Beder, 1997; Gray, 1992; Jones, 2010). From the border 
institutions’ perspective, managerial and administrative accountability from centre 
institution is “a self-referential exercise” (Shearer, 2002, p. 559) which justify one’s 
actions for one’s own sake (Messner, 2009) and constructs social relations in a way 
that the moral obligation to others tend to be diminished if not silenced (Shearer, 
2002). 
Border institutions’ proposed water charge and eventual aim of phasing out BHP 
OD’s GAB water extraction, will first redistribute or reallocate part of the wealth 
from the mining industry for GAB water management, then relocate the GAB water 
resource to Aboriginal people, other miners and developers. As such, border 
institutions’ risk assumptions of the cause of ecological crisis and justice and 
fairness legitimate their preferred water levy charging policy and eventual aim of 




This proposed policy incorporates a (more radical) ethical dimension, as it is the 
“human goodness and the supreme value of the individual” that border institutions 
advocate (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982, p. 177), in their attempt to “avert disaster to 
humanity” for restoration of a democratic society (Hines, 1989, p. 65). Moral 
accountability therefore, requires an identity answerable to wider social interests and 
it encompasses wider scope of common/public good, apart from the private good 
(Schweiker, 1993).  
According to Solomons (1983, p. 108), the desirability of public policy “can only be 
evaluated in a normative model with a full set of assumptions”. More specifically, 
economic consequences arguments arising from the proposed policy or standard are 
often based on certain assumptions including a posited criteria of what counts as 
goodness (Solomons, 1983). Cultural risk theory, by suggesting assumptions such as 
the cause of ecological crisis, view of justice and fairness and properties of desired 
system are shaped by institutional beliefs and interests, provides us with a critical 
lens to analyse the water levy debate with its related economic (and social) 
consequences arguments, and the further implications for accounting practices. In 
this theme, the market institution - the MCA and BHP OD’s assumptions of the 
cause of ecological crisis, view of justice and fairness and properties of desired 
system have conferred institutional legitimacy on the positive economic 
consequences arguments for an equal water levy. Hierarchy institutions - the ACCC 
and the SAALNRM Board and sectarians from border institutions, by challenging 
those taken-for granted assumptions, albeit to a different extent, provide us with the 
opportunity to reconsider the ‘positive’ economic (and social) consequences and its 
implication for mainstream accounting to perpetuate ecological degradation and 
social inequity.  
 Summary 9.5
This chapter analysed the institutional debate of the GAB water risk through 
contested disclosures among market institutions - BHP and BHP OD, hierarchy 
institutions - Australian Federal and South Australian governments and border 
institutions - civil society, using three major concepts from cultural risk theory, with 
the application of Burkean rhetorical criticism. From this analysis, different 




related risk, view of justice and fairness, and property of desired system and their 
implications for accounting concept of economic consequences and related 
accountability were described and discussed. This chapter also provided insights to 
facilitate and justify government intervention in financial accounting and reporting 
practices in the era of looming environmental crisis. These different institutional 
positions in the GAB water risk debate drives different concepts of value presented 





CHAPTER 10 CONCLUSION  
This thesis investigates the contested domains concerning Great Artesian Basin 
(GAB) water governance and GAB water risks from BHP Billiton Olympic Dam 
Corporation Pty Ltd (BHP OD)’s mining operation. It examines the culturally 
constructed meanings of GAB risk by collating and analysing accounts and 
juxtaposing three sets of risk perspectives from industry, government and civil 
society. These different perspectives are manifested through mandatory and 
voluntary water accounting disclosures and policy debates from BHP, BHP OD, and 
its representative Minerals Council of Australia (MCA); the GAB water regulatory 
policy and proposals from the Australian Federal government and South Australian 
government; and alternative disclosures from civil society including Non-
Government Organisations (NGOs) (radical), environmentalists and Aboriginal 
groups. 
The context of this study is salient as it is concerned with the politicised control of 
the Australia’s largest groundwater resource-the GAB against the backdrop of water 
scarcity and the complex nature of the water governance issue. Such complexity, 
according to James et al. (2012) is a result of how water is perceived and valued by 
different socio-cultural institutions. This thesis explored the procedural, techno-
scientific and economic rationality of the industry and government and contrasted 
this with the social and environmental concerns from civil society to address the 
following question: 
How do disclosures of perceived risk impact on assumptions of accounting and 
accountability provided by industry, government and civil society in the case of 
contested water sustainability of the GAB? 
This thesis delved into the fraught terrain of accounting and associated issues of 
accountability. It conceives mainstream accounting as an authoritative and 
monologic discourse through which power is exercised and capitalist assumptions 
are imposed (Brown, 2009). Giving voice to alternative views and interests from 
socio-political constituencies other than those from industry and sometimes the 
government, this thesis aligns with a stream of ‘counter-accounting’ studies (Archel 




highlight the political struggles and social conflicts inscribed within the fundamental 
contradiction and exploitative dimensions of capitalist system. 
This thesis adopted a cultural risk perspective as a methodology which emphasises 
risk discourse from a social constructivist aspect and perceives the recognition and 
assessment of risk as an inherent socio-political activity infused with the 
(re)production of shared meaning and understanding of reality (Horlick-Jones & 
Sime, 2004). According to Head (2010, p. 10), contemporary water governance 
policies tend to be dominated by managerial efficiency and bureaucratic and 
authoritative procedures. These decontextualised and reductionist approaches in 
discipline-based risk research are found to be insufficient to understand the entire 
risk profile related to water resource issues (Baleta, 2012; Horlick-Jones & Sime, 
2004). A cultural risk perspective perceives risk as transdisciplinary, culturally 
nuanced, and focuses on the institutionally constructed nature of the conceptual 
debate on risk and sustainability issues (Lupton, 1999). It facilitates a dialogic and 
participatory approach to the GAB water governance to promote transparency and 
democracy. 
Consistent with a social constructivist methodology, the analysis used an approach 
that uncovered contradictions and gaps between corporate perspectives and 
stakeholders’ perspectives.  Burkean rhetorical criticism was adopted as a mode of 
inquiry. Consisting of a three levelled approach - the grammar, rhetoric and logology 
analysis - Burkean rhetorical criticism (Stillar, 1998) identifies and interprets 
features, functions and implications of discursive practices or discourses. It is based 
on the underlying assumption that rhetoric is one of the symbols to constitute the 
world to influence others to achieve social unity (Burke, 1950, 1966, 1969). This 
thesis examined how rhetoric is used by BHP, BHP OD, the Australian Federal and 
South Australian government and civil society through contested accountability 
disclosures. 
To advance social and environmental approaches to accounting, this thesis was 
informed by a cultural risk theory  (Douglas, 1970; Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982) 




border institutions. Applying Burkean rhetoric criticism with cultural risk theory 
informed the major sustainability related assumptions of the three institutions. 
In Chapter 7, the three major concepts from cultural risk theory-preferred learning 
style (grammatical analysis for discursive features), view of nature (rhetorical 
analysis for discursive functions) and property of knowledge ideal (logological 
analysis for discursive implications) were used to analyse market - BHP and BHP 
OD, hierarchy - Australian Federal and South Australian governments and border 
institutions’ - civil societies’ perspectives manifest in their discourse in the context 
of GAB water-related risks. This three-level analysis had implications for an 
understanding of the accounting concept of control regarding natural resources from 
both mainstream and critical perspectives. In the grammatical analysis, centre 
(market and hierarchy) institutions trust expert knowledge and use scientific research 
to understand the rechargeability of the GAB, determine its water balance and 
implement modelling studies subject to evolving learning process. On the other hand, 
border institutions believe that the centre institutions’ assumption of rechargeability 
is flawed and BHP OD’s modelling studies are faulty due to simplistic models and 
limited data. These different assumptions about a preferred learning style underpin 
mainstream and critical perspectives of the accounting concept of control of water 
resources. In this case, market institutions believe that GAB water extraction does 
not entail a ‘liability’ as the potential risk for water extraction is uncertain. This 
perspective is sanctioned by hierarchy institutions - the South Australian government. 
Border institutions - civil society, on the other hand, contend that BHP OD has 
responsibility for environmental damage, such as declined spring flow.  
In the rhetorical analysis, centre institutions believe that the current GAB water 
extraction from BHP OD is within ‘sustainable yield’. Border institutions believe 
that GAB is a fragile and non-rechargeable water resource. These different 
assumptions, regarding the view of nature, give rise to an understanding of the 
accounting concept of control. In this case, the market institutions - BHP and BHP 
OD do not recognise the GAB water intake for BHP OD’s mining operation as an 
asset in the financial report because a hierarchy institution - South Australian 
government grants it the water licence without charge. This ‘asset’ is unmeasurable 




insist on the recognition and presentation of the obligation that BHP OD has towards 
the GAB water extraction related risk.  
In the logological analysis, centre institutions silence contradictory scientific studies 
about the likelihood of the non-rechargeability of the GAB and ignore the moral and 
ethical dimensions to achieve procedural validity and the objectivity underlying a 
scientific method. Border institutions assert that the centre institutions’ knowledge 
ideal is limited and incomplete and unethical due to the wilful ignorance of counter 
scientific inquiries in the pursuit of economic self-interest. In this case, the centre 
supports an accounting system which serves to overuse non-renewable resources by 
downplaying ecological impacts. Border institutions, on the other hand, support 
recognition of GAB water extraction related risks as a (contingent) liability to be 
recognised in BHP OD’s financial reports and mandated by South Australian 
government.  
This analysis revealed different styles of accountability perceived by three 
institutions. Market and hierarchy institutions use managerial and administrative 
accountability that focuses on the techno-scientific dimensions of accountability that 
neglects the full social and environmental cost of water use. Border institutions, in 
contrast, adopt moral accountability and acknowledge a relationship of obligation to 
the other which cannot be discharged by mere reference to scientific reasoning and 
economic interest. 
In Chapter 8 the three major concepts from cultural risk theory-attitude towards 
technology (grammatical analysis for discursive features), view of risk (rhetorical 
analysis for discursive functions) and resolution of risk (logological analysis for 
discursive implications) were used to understand the accounting concept of 
stewardship. 
In the grammatical analysis, while centre institutions construct and objectify GAB 
water risks through water-efficiency technology to control the uncertainty of water 
sustainability, border institutions believe that water efficiency related technology 
focuses on techno-economic facets, neglecting the moral and environmental 
dimensions of the GAB water risks. In this case, water efficiency related 




stewardship discharging function in respect of their financial, social and 
environmental responsibility. Border institutions, on the other hand, believe that a 
technological solution does not satisfy the discharge of environmental responsibility.  
In the rhetorical analysis, centre institutions possess dual objectives of economic 
growth and water protection with the intention of turning risks into opportunities. 
Border institutions believe that the risk to the ecosystem from BHP OD’s mining 
operation is irreversible. In this case, centre institutions believe that the general 
fulfilment of managerial stewardship is reflected in the South Australian government 
and BHP OD’s objectives for both mining development and GAB water 
conservation. Border institutions, on the other hand, assert that the South Australian 
government’s water governance regime and BHP OD’s water efficiency program 
will not fulfil managerial stewardship regarding environmental responsibility unless 
radical change occurs. 
In the logological analysis, centre institutions have imperialist tendencies and see the 
Olympic Dam Expansion Project (ODEP) as the best operational solution to 
sustainable development in general by excluding the long-term value and risks from 
their risk resolution. Border institutions, in contrast, do not construct economic 
expansion as an environmental solution. From their perspective, the ODEP in 
general and the water efficiency related technology in particular imply the promise 
of the satisfaction of endless wants for capitalist interests without satisfying real 
human needs. In this case, the continuous improvement of the water efficiency 
indicator legitimates managerial stewardship of BHP OD for its extant mining 
operation and the proposed ODEP. Centre institutions treat the social and 
environmental aspects as less important. Border institutions, on the other hand, 
believe that social and environmental responsibility can only be discharged by 
ceasing GAB water intake to recover earlier damage and depletion..  
This three level analysis revealed different styles of accountability assumed by the 
three institutions. Market and hierarchy institutions assume managerial and 
administrative accountability that focuses on procedural and technical dimensions of 
accountability by treating GAB water reserves as an economic good and objectifying 




moral accountability that requires acknowledgement of relations to others which 
necessitates mutual understanding and political participation. 
In Chapter 9, the three major concepts from cultural risk theory - the cause of 
ecological crisis (grammatical analysis for discursive features), view of justice and 
fairness (rhetorical analysis for discursive functions), and properties of desired 
system (logological analysis for discursive implications) was used to understand the 
accounting concept of ‘economic consequences’.  
In the grammatical analysis, hierarchy institutions plan and organise water planning 
and management activities to control market forces and prevent water resource 
degradation, such as the NRM water levy to fund activities. Market institutions 
perceive this proposed water levy as an inaccurate and misguided economic policy 
serving as a major obstacle to ongoing sustainable development. Border institutions, 
on the other hand, believe that the free and over extraction of the GAB for mining 
operations is a symptom of a wider social imbalance. The allocation of the GAB 
water resource in favour of market and government short-term economic interests 
reflects wider social issues in terms of humanity and equality. The water levy 
proposed by hierarchy institutions to restrict mining activities by realigning private, 
social and environmental costs to remedy the problem of externalities, is perceived 
by the market as ‘unequal’ and will bring disastrous economic and social 
consequences, since it is a ‘disincentive’ to efficient water use. Border institutions, 
on the other hand, assert that the wider social ills and imbalance manifested through 
legal exemptions granted to BHP OD brings detrimental social and environmental 
consequences. 
In the rhetorical analysis, hierarchy institutions believe a fair distribution is 
reinforced by the need for solidarity and maintenance of the system. A water levy is 
proposed on industrial users because of ‘the capacity to pay’ principle. Market 
institutions believe that fair play resides in an unfettered market. Subsequently, the 
mining industry should not be required to pay the proposed water levy due to its 
investment in water planning and management services through regulatory and 
voluntary initiatives. Border institutions, on the other hand, favour a voluntaristic 




manifest in the unjust and unequal legal privilege that BHP OD is entitled. Further, 
this ‘dehumanised’ relationship needs to be phased out to protect the GAB water 
resource and related communities. These different assumptions of justice and 
fairness give rise to the accounting concept of economic consequences. In this case, 
while hierarchy institutions take normative values such as humanity and ethics into 
consideration in its proposal of an unequal water levy for the common/public good, 
market institutions take positive assumptions into account for an equal water levy 
proposal and assume the common/public good as the outcome of the free exchange 
that can be achieved by the pursuit of private interests. Border institutions, on the 
other hand, incorporate (more radical) ethical dimensions into account.  
In the logological analysis, hierarchy institutions believe in the impossibility and 
unnecessity of social equity and attempt to collect more water levy on sectors 
responsible for economic value creation and reward sectors with less economic 
success. Market institutions have a firm faith in a competitive free market and the 
survival of the fittest principle. Therefore, they do not want to take responsibility for 
cost recovery failure from those less productive water using sectors.  Border 
institutions, on the other hand, contend that the legal framework for the operation 
and development of ODEP points to a ‘moral defect’ of the socio-economic system.  
In terms of economic consequences, hierarchy institutions propose an ‘unequal’ 
water levy to redistribute or reallocate a part of the wealth from the mining industry 
to assist the vulnerable stock and domestic sectors in order to satisfy social needs and 
a perception of doing the right thing. Market institutions advocate an equal water 
levy to support the objectives of a competitive and economically efficient market. 
Border institutions, on the other hand, urge charging a levy and eventual phase out of 
BHP OD’s GAB water extraction for resource reallocation and wealth redistribution 
for restoration of a democratic society.  
This three level analysis revealed different styles of accountability. Hierarchy 
institutions assume administrative accountability, which is vested in agreed 
procedures and rules supported by regulatory coercion. Market institutions assume 
managerial accountability which restricts social relations to economic terms and 




institutions, in contrast, assume a moral accountability which is a fundamental and 
more encompassing form of accountability requiring an identification of the social 
interest and a wider definition of common/public good. 
  Contribution to the accounting literature 10.1
This thesis addresses GAB water governance from different socio-cultural 
institutions and the discursive significance of contested accounting and alternative 
(counter-accounting) disclosures involved in the GAB water debate arising from the 
BHP OD’s mining operation and the proposed expansion. 
Ideological splits in respect of risk-based sustainability issues between divergent 
interest groups has been keenly acknowledged by critical accounting researchers (e.g. 
Brown & Dillard, 2013; Dey et al., 2011; Dillard & Brown, 2012; Spence et al., 
2010). Although the current critical SEAR studies have identified that the modern 
corporate water accounting and reporting practices represent capitalist interest 
perpetuating the status-quo, there is a lack of water accounting studies that explicitly 
highlight the political struggles and social conflicts by including socio-political 
constituencies, other than those from the industry. In other words, the current 
literature on water related SEAR -practices tends to be organisational or industry-
focused without engaging with the construction of social and environmental values 
and positions from other perspectives, such as those from NGOs, environmental 
activists and Aboriginal groups. As Spence et al., (2010) contend, this apolitical 
problem of SEAR research undermines both its theoretical and practical agenda for 
social change. 
This thesis echoes this call and examines how BHP, BHP OD, Australian Federal 
and South Australian governments and civil society perceive ‘sustainable’ water 
governance in general and BHP OD’s entitlement to and management of the GAB 
water in particular. It compares water accounting disclosures in the form of 
mandatory and voluntary social and environmental reporting and policy debates from 
industry, water regulation related disclosures from governments and juxtaposing 
them with external alternative accounting disclosure from civil society. It is therefore 
aligned with counter-accounting studies which give voice to alternative views and 




capitalist system (e.g. Archel et al., 2009; Gallhofer et al., 2006).This thesis further 
interrogates three different styles of accountability (stewardship) and their 
corresponding underlying value schemes through the lens of water related 
accounting and alternative (counter-accounting) disclosures. Its makes a unique 
contribution to the extant literature by adopting a discursive and dialogical approach 
to accounting to create social and environmental visibilities, promote democratic 
participation, enhance transparency in decision-making and improve accountability 
(Bebbington et al., 2007; Brown, 2009; Brown & Fraser, 2006; Dillard & Brown, 
2012; Gray, 1992). 
 Contribution to methodology and method 10.2
As Brown and Dillard (2013) propose, there is a need for a more inclusive 
consideration of and approach to accounting to confront the prevalent power 
asymmetries to surface and support heterodox view, voices, visions and values from 
various interest groups. The methodology of a cultural risk perspective is a 
transdisciplinary approach encompassing multiple worldviews to constructing 
knowledge (Brown et al., 2010). 
Extant water accounting studies anchor managerial and economic accountability 
discourses through corporate disclosure mechanisms including mandatory and 
voluntary sustainability type reports. These approaches tend to be organisation-
centred rather than issue-centred, disciplinary rather than transdisciplinary, 
ontological homogenous rather than diverse. They downplay institutional and social 
dissents and conflicts (Brown & Dillard, 2013). By combining elements of various 
methodologies from both positive and normative risk disciplines in a single approach, 
a cultural risk perspective is used in this thesis to investigate ecological issues to 
“develop and implement pluralistic democratic processes that can help articulate and 
operationalize a progressive social and environmental agenda” (Brown & Dillard, 
2013, p. 9). This evolved transdisciplinary methodology therefore brings ‘hard’ 
(positive and objective) and ‘soft’ (normative and judgemental) knowledge together 
which “transcends ‘pure’ discipline” (Horlick-Jones & Sime, 2004, p. 444), and 
seeks to deliver and enhance public participation and engagement in water resource 
policy decision-making against the backdrop of water scarcity and complex water 




Accounting information in this thesis is conceived as discursive and rhetorical 
components of a dialogue (Frame & Brown, 2008). As Fairclough (2003, p. 3) 
contends, discourse is referred to as “different ways of structuring areas of 
knowledge and social practice”. In this thesis, discourse is considered as a mode of 
institutional and political practice. Consistent with a cultural risk perspective as 
methodology, both complementary and competing discourses emanate out of 
interactions between BHP OD, governments and civil society around the water 
intake of BHP OD for ODEP. These different sets of discourses are linked to 
different cultural and institutional risk perspectives in respect to the relationship 
individuals have to nature and their social relations. 
Rhetoric is the strategic technique of using discourse for persuasive effects. This 
thesis examines the culturally and institutionally constructed nature of the GAB 
water related risks and how it is conducted through discourse in accounting and 
accountability related documents by adopting a Burkean rhetorical criticism as a 
method (Stillar, 1998). With a Burkean assumption that rhetoric is one symbol to 
constitute the world, gives it meaning and expresses common interests to achieve 
societal unity (Burke, 1950, 1966, 1969), this method incorporates three levels of 
analysis - grammar, rhetoric and logology (Stillar, 1998) to identify features, 
functions and implications of discourses. By apply this Burkean rhetorical criticism 
to cultural risk theory allowed the researcher to establish theoretical concepts 
(Chapter 6) and provide analytical scaffolding to facilitate interpretation of the GAB 
water risk debate by drawing on three institutional discursive risk practices. 
  Contribution to theory 10.3
This thesis adopts cultural risk theory as a transdisciplinary approach to theorise 
social conflicts and dissentions and their implications for wider social engagement 
and dialogue (Brown & Dillard, 2013; Spence et al., 2010; Tinker et al., 1991). By 
defining problems from heterogeneous domains (Lawrence, 2010), cultural risk 
theory explores the underlying assumptions of the contentious water related 
disclosure and accountability discourses which manifest as the GAB water debate.  
Cultural risk theory (Douglas, 1970; Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982) perceives risk as 




institutions within society. Risk-based sustainability policies, from this perspective, 
result from a constant struggle among these participants to position their risk 
perspectives on the public agenda and impose it on others (Baleta, 2012). Cultural 
risk theory enables divergent interest groups, creates and enlarges institutional 
spaces of potentiality through which alternatives are facilitated to emerge/surface 
(Brown & Dillard, 2013). Accordingly, cultural risk theory is employed as a 
‘polylogic’ theory to democratic engagement and participation with an emphasis on 
socio-cultural expectations and value debates (Brown & Dillard, 2013; Horlick-Jones 
& Sime, 2004; Sampford, 2009).This thesis contributes to cultural risk theory by 
applying a Burkean rhetorical criticism framework to tease out major risk-based 
sustainability assumptions of three (active) institutions - industry, government and 
civil society, associated with features, functions and implications of each 
institutional group’s risk discourse. These assumptions to demonstrate the 
explanatory power of this theory for analysing contested discourses of the GAB 
water related disclosure from BHP OD, governments and civil society. These 
concepts which are made explicit in this thesis are preferred learning style (feature), 
view of nature (function), property of knowledge ideal (implication), attitude 
towards technology (feature), view of risk (function), resolution of risk (implication), 
cause of ecological crisis (feature), view of justice and fairness (function), and 
property of desired system (implication).  
These nine concepts in turn have implications to three accounting and accountability 
related themes. Preferred learning style, view of nature and property of knowledge 
ideals from three institutions facilitate the understanding of the contested nature of 
accounting concept of control with associated accounting recognition and 
measurement rules. Institutional perceptions of attitude towards technology, view of 
risk and risk resolution assist an understanding of the stewardship debate from both 
mainstream and critical accounting perspectives. Institutional assumptions of the 
cause of ecological crisis, view of justice and fairness and property of desired system 
enable the analysis of the natured resource allocation debate with its related 
economic consequences arguments, and further implication for accounting practices. 
This thesis also contributes to cultural risk theory by matching three different styles 




hierarchy and border institutions’ risk-based sustainability assumptions. It explicates 
managerial, administrative and moral accountability to enable a further 
understanding of why certain risk discourse and rhetorical strategies are operated 
within centre - market and hierarchy institutions and why they are resisted and 
negotiated by those from border institutions with alternative accounting disclosures. 
Cultural risk theory (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982), through the recognition of the 
existence of three (active) institutional solidarities, and the resultant cultural 
dialogues manifest in accounting and accountability discourse, is crucial for its 
significance in respect of the resolution of risk-based sustainability problems.  This 
thesis underlines and fosters conflictual and oppositional social groups (Brown & 
Dillard, 2013). It seeks to engage heterodox socio-cultural perspectives, surface the 
inevitably dissenting assumptions and values associated with accounts, and highlight 
the power relations which structure dialogical opportunities. As such, understanding 
of accounting is broadened from the formal organisational or institutional-centred 
perspectives, to acknowledge the demand for democratic engagement between 
diverse actors across various political arenas (Brown & Dillard, 2013). Cultural risk 
theory therefore, helps ‘resensitise’ accounting to “its critical and pluralistic roots by 
advocating a version of pluralism that is less ‘politically quiet’” (Brown & Dillard, 
2013, p. 9).  
 Thesis limitations 10.4
The limitation of the thesis can be categorised into both scope and methodology. The 
discursive practices or discourses are analysed only through public available 
documents from three institutions - market (BHP, BHP OD, MCA); hierarchy (the 
Australian Federal Government and South Australian government); and border 
institutions (civil society). In this case, the analysis of stakeholders’ interaction 
dynamics are confined to the nature of the documents collected and investigated for 
each institutional perspective; and, some stakeholder group perspectives (e.g. Fatalist 
solidarity) were excluded from the disclosure dynamics as a result of unavailability 
of data (Rodrigue, 2014). In addition, emphasising the disclosure production 
(account) and communication (rhetoric) has meant that the reception of the 




 While this study offers an in-depth understanding of micro-level information 
dynamics in the accounts, it restrains the generalisability of findings and conclusions 
(Rodrigue, 2014) from a broader context. This meso-level of analysis, is also 
incapable of addressing all the complexity and anomalies of pluralist and competing 
interests involved in the GAB water governance regarding BHP OD’s water intake 
for its mining operation or the macro-level context such as global capital.  
 Future research 10.5
There are some potentially fruitful areas for future research arising from this thesis. 
The case of the GAB water debate arising from BHP OD’s mining operation plays a 
pivotal role for understanding the water problems with contested water governance 
paradigms. To address the thesis limitation, other forms of discourse such as 
interviews could be conducted by the researcher with representatives from BHP, 
BHP OD, the Federal Australian government and South Australian government, the 
NGOs, radical environmentalists and Aboriginal groups.  
Additionally, on a macro level, this approach together with cultural risk theory as a 
‘polylogic’ framework can be applied to other political debates of water such as 
those from Great Artesian Basin Strategic Management Plan and the National Water 
Initiative (NWI) more broadly. On a meso or micro-level, it can be duplicated to 
other specific water dialogue or discussions for example coal seam gas mining in the 
Murray-Darling Basin. 
Apart from the water context, there are also opportunities to research other types of 
environmental issues including air and soil pollution and how these issues are 










APPENDIX A  An Example of differences between grammatical and rhetorical 
analysis 
Stillar (1998) exemplifies differences between grammar and rhetoric through an 
illustration of texts on a ‘Ancient Grains’ cereal box. 
 
Source: Stillar (1998, p.71) 
‘Too Good to be True” is the name for a series of low-calorie breakfast cereal 
manufactured by the President’s Choice product line (Stillar, 1998). 
There are two sections of text for the side panel. The first consists of a sentence 




of grains with a precise description with respect to their history. The first section 
(cereal manufacturer as agent) advocates the consumption of the cereal (the act) to 
preserve on-going cultivation (the purpose) (Stillar, 1998). 
The second section characterises grains as agents that possess noteworthy attributes 
that derive from their ancient geographical origins.  This scene constructs the grains 
as mysterious and powerful as a result of their origin and characteristics (Stillar, 
1998). 
These grammatical resources (act, purpose, agents, agency and scene) provide 
structures and features of symbolic action. The grammatical analysis is concerned 
with making replicable and explicit statements with regards to the use of combined 
language units and operates with a consistent and coherent set of terms to derive a 
descriptive analysis. 
The grammar resources form a basis for a rhetorical act. Rhetorical analysis focuses 
on an overriding function of language as symbolic action. Identification here is 
dependent on consubstantiality - sharing substance, in literal and symbolic terms. 
This rhetorical act aims to persuade, invite and unite the reader to consume the cereal 
to become a part of Ancient Grains consumer congregation literally and a part of 
‘ancient’ grains preserving congregation symbolically (Stillar, 1998). 
The rhetorical act embedded in the text therefore seeks to build a unity of addressees 
sharing interest and having a stake in conservational-characterised hierarchical social 
order (those who consume ‘ancient’ grains and those who do not; those who are 
insiders and those who are outsiders; those who are up compared to those down). 
What is constituted as ‘ancient’ and ‘exotic’ in terms of history and culture is 
presumed to be superior to those contemporary and commonplace grains; and 
addressees those who ‘connect’ themselves with ‘ancient’ grains as presupposed to 
be more environmentally, culturally conscientious and health conscious than those 





Appendix B Balance Scorecard (BSC) Information Technology in BHP OD’s 
Sustainable Water Management 
BSC (target setting and development of performance drivers) is an information 
technique used in the GAB water management. In order to control any of the water 
variables, a “meaningful target” needs to be set. However, because of the complex 
nature of the interlinked unit operations and the special water quality needs for each 
unit, determining a meaningful target is not straightforward. Apart from that, there 
are also other difficulties of setting the target. For example, traditional metrics such 
as water consumption per day might be appropriate for a long-term planning, but it is 
not appropriate for shorter frame such as daily and weekly which is necessary for 
feedback regarding operation. In addition, the target setting can be complex for water 
use as relation between water usage and mineral production is not linear due to, for 
example, seasonal or emergency reasons (Torrisi & Trotta, 2009).  
For such meaningful targets to be set, activities such as consulting with operational 
personnel, reviewing the instrumentation and process diagram, inspecting plant, 
measuring water flows manually and statistically analysing historical measured 
flows were conducted to understand water consumption drivers at Olympic Dam. 
The climate and production drivers are obtained for some 91 water consumption 
points across the operation and a model to predict the water consumption of each 
point was developed. Key water consumption drivers on a daily basis were found. 
They are flotation tailings thickener underflow density, mill throughput, copper 
concentrate produced from rotation, Smelter anode production, smelter feed rate, 
acid production, relative humidity and ambient temperature (Torrisi & Trotta, 2009). 
The approach for setting targets is practical and time efficient. Instead of using 
theoretical principle for water consumption and identifying the basic demand for 
water by each operational unit, majority of targets were simply set on the basis of 
historical use excluding those from random events. It is believed that targets on 
historical data provide more realistic predictions. The application of various water 
consumption models to planned production on daily basis helps to calculate daily 
water targets for consumption in terms of individual streams. This allows collective 
targets for unit operations to be made. It also helps to forecast future water demand 




BSC (performance measures) 
The GAB water use is metered at various locations to obtain the balance between 
overall extraction and operational and domestic (Roxby Down) usage. The volume 
of extracted water from all production bores at the wellfields and the volume 
delivered to BHP OD site were recorded by flow meters. The majority of them are 
magnetic tube meters and approximately 90 percent of GAB use is explainable using 
those meters (Torrisi & Trotta, 2009). 
There is a daily water supply balance through which the daily water demand can be 
determined. Volume balancing for water supplied, water demanded and net storage 
changes is achieved using ‘Production Balance by Honeywell’ - a “specially 
designed and configured software”(Torrisi & Trotta, 2009, p.198). Data collection is 
almost automated and daily data are automatically retrieved through flow meters 
connected to “the Ethernet PLC process control system and attached data acquisition 
system”. They are then totalised and fed into the Production Balance of the software. 
According to Torrisi and Trotta (2009, p.198), such information is “invaluable to the 
operations and management teams by allowing real time decision making to reduce 
operating costs by minimising the water demand by the unit operations.” 
BSC (water consumption and variance analysis) 
According to Torrisi and Trotta (2009, p.199), data of water consumption are 
presented on BHP OD’s intranet using database of Production Information 
Management System (PIMS) to track actual water usage against the target. Data are 
available for various time frames ranging from individual streams and site totals and 
expressed in both efficiency and volumetric basis. Traffic lights are used in the 
report to indicate whether the actual water consumption is above, below or close to 
the target. Such a report is discussed at integrated management meetings daily, 
weekly and monthly. Regarding analysing the variance, the water usage variance for 
operation of individual unit is analysed in integrated management reporting by 
volume variances and efficiency variances (more details see section 6.2.2) (Torrisi & 





BSC (rectification of variance) 
According to Torrisi and Trotta (2009), improved operating discipline leads to the 
achievement in water use efficiency. Operating discipline is defined by Olympic 
Dam as “the adherence to operating procedures for the prevention and timely 
rectification of safety, environmental and production variance.” Within Olympic 
Dam, many of unit operations are “ISO 9001 and ISO 14001 Quality systems 
certified with extensive controls in place to ensure compliance” (Torrisi & Trotta, 
2009, p.202). 
Torrisi and Trotta (2009) give an example of recycling water recovered from Smelter 
Concentrate Filtration to Grinding. There are occasions such as during a shutdown, 
the water cannot be accepted at Grinding and therefore must be disposed in the 
tailings storage facility. In this situation, water losses approximately equals to 2 
ML/d. Such loss was quite frequent and often unnecessarily occurs because of poor 
planning, little operational discipline and a lack of communication between 
departments of production. Changes have been made to a situation where production 
departments work closely to ensure water is recycled and a plan for shutdowns. 
Moreover, some manual valves to divert the water to disposals are “locked closed to 
allow control over their operation” by the coordinator of the concentrator production. 
The disposal water is now “limited to an absolute last resort” (Torrisi & Trotta, 2009, 
p.203). 
BSC (Learning + Development) 
The BSC approach also incorporates an aspect of learning and development to 
facilitate improved water consumption efficiency. According to Torrisi and Trotta 
(2009, p.202), the accountability for sustainable GAB water management is 
maintained “throughout the organisation from the President Uranium through to 
Technicians who have hour to hour control of the water demanded by the operation”. 
The position description of every employee demonstrates “responsibilities for 
achieving Zero Harm to the environment through the sustainable use of water in 
recognition of the supply from the GAB” (Torrisi & Trotta, 2009, p.202). 
Water budgets are set for major operational sections (BHP Billiton Olympic Dam 




discussed at production meetings on a daily and weekly basis. Key water 
consumption drivers are represented graphically for awareness and education 
purposes (Torrisi & Trotta, 2009). In order to align organisation behaviour to 
sustainable GAB water extraction and usage, water key performance indicators are 
included in BHP OD’s Reward and Recognition Scheme. It includes a proportion of 
the reward for employees for achieving water efficiency targets quarterly and 
annually. To further reinforce appropriate water use behaviour by management and 
supervisory teams, water consumed by each production department is “internally 
priced and charged to the end user by the infrastructure Department”. Such priced 
water encourages managers to “drive water efficiencies and hence lower reportable 
operating expenditure for their area” (Torrisi & Trotta, 2009, p.202). In addition, 
BHP OD also establishes a water steering committee “with representatives from all 
departments, to ensure a coordinated approach to…water management across site” 






AAP General News Wire 2011, SA: Greens fault BHP's Olympic Dam safeguards, 
Australian Associated Press Pty Limited, viewed 20 May 2012, 
<http://proxy.uow.edu.au/docview/884661921?accountid=15112>. 
ABARES 2011, 'June quarter 2011', Australian commodities, vol. 18 no. 2. 
ABC Premium News 2011b, Industry welcomes uranium mine expansion, Australian 
Broadcasting Corporation, viewed  20 Jul 2013, 
<http://proxy.uow.edu.au/docview/897034735?accountid=15112>. 
ABS 2006, Australia's environment: Issues and trends, 2007 viewed 2 Jun 2012, 
<http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/7d12b0f6763c78caca257061001c
c588/330bc8fdfd50bee4ca2573c6001049f9!OpenDocument>. 
ACCC 2009, Water charge rules for water planning and management Draft advice, 




Adams, C. A. 2004, 'The ethical, social and environmental reporting-performance 
portrayal gap', Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, vol. 17 no. 5, 
pp. 731-757. 
Adams, C. A., Hill, W.-Y. and Roberts, C. B. 1998, 'Corporate social reporting 
practices in Western Europe: Legitimating corporate behaviour', The British 
Accounting Review, vol. 30 no. 1, pp. 1-21. 
Adams, J. 1995, Risk, UCL Press, London, UK. 
AGBoM 2007, Six years of widespread drought in southern and eastern Australia 
November 2001, Australian Government Bureau of Meteorology, Melbourne. 
Aho, J. 1985, 'Rhetoric and the invention of double entry bookkeeping', Rhetorica: A 
Journal of the History of Rhetoric, vol. 3, pp. 21-43. 
Allan, J. A. 2005, 'Water in the environment/socio-economic development discourse: 
Sustainability, changing management paradigms and policy responses in a 
global system', Government and Opposition, vol. 40 no. 2, pp. 181-199. 
Allan, T. 2003, IWRM/IWRAM: a new sanctioned discourse? Occasional Paper 50: 
SOAS Water Issues Study Group, School of Oriental and African 
Studies/King’s College London, University of London. 
Alston, M. and Mason, R. 2008a, 'Who determines access To Australia’s water? 
Social flow, gender, citizenship and stakeholder priorities in the Australian 
water crisis', Rural Society, vol. 18 no. 3, pp. 214-219. 
Alston, M. and Mason, R. 2008b, 'Who turns the taps off? Introducing social flow to 
the Australian water debate', Rural Society, vol. 18 no. 2, pp. 131-139. 
Alvesson, M. and Karreman, D. 2000, 'Varieties of discourse: On the study of 
organizations through discourse analysis', Human Relations, vol. 53 no. 9, pp. 
1125-1149. 
American Accounting Association 1966, A statement of basic accounting theory, 
American Accounting Association, Sarasota, FL, USA. 
Andrew, J. 2000, 'The accounting craft and the environmental crisis: Reconsidering 
environmental ethics', Accounting Forum, vol. 24 no. 2, pp. 197-222. 
Andrew, J. 2007, 'Prisons, the profit motive and other challenges to accountability', 




Appel, E. C. 1987, 'The perfected drama of reverend Jerry Falwell', Communication 
Quarterly, vol. 35 no. 1, pp. 26-38. 
Archel, P., Husillos, J., Larrinaga, C. and Spence, C. 2009, 'Social disclosure, 
legitimacy theory and the role of the state', Accounting, Auditing & 
Accountability Journal, vol. 22 no. 8, pp. 1284-1307. 
Arnold, P. J. 1990, 'The State and political theory in corporate social disclosure 
research', Advances in Public Interest Accounting, vol. 3, pp. 177-181. 
Arrington, E. and Francis, J. R. 1993, 'Giving economic accounts: Accounting as 
cultural practice', Accounting, Organizations and Society, vol. 18 no. 2, pp. 
107-124. 
Australian Bureau of Statistics 2012, Water Account Australia, 2010-11, Australian 
Government, viewed 29 Jun 2015, 
<http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/Products/4610.0~2010-
11~Main+Features~Introduction+and+Main+findings?OpenDocument>. 
Australian Government 2009, Australian citizenship our common bond, National 
Communications Branch of the Department of Immigration and Citizenship, 
Canberra, ACT. 
Australian Greens 2007, Greens Bill: Roxby Downs (Indenture Ratification) 
(Application of Acts) Amendment Bill, Mark Parnell MLC, viewed 14 Apr 
2014, <http://www.markparnell.org.au/speech.php?speech=173>. 
Australian Greens. 2011c, Greens campaign - Olympic Dam mine expansion, Greens, 
viewed 15 Apr 2014, 
<http://www.markparnell.org.au/campaign_prn.php?campaignn=29>. 
Australian Science Media Centre 2011, Rapid Reaction: Olympic Dam mine 
expansion approved - experts respond, viewed 18 Jan 2014, 
<http://www.smc.org.au/2011/10/rapid-reaction-olympic-dam-mine-
expansion-approved-experts-respond/>. 
Australian Uranium Association 2009, BHP Billiton's Olympic Dam mine - Issues 
briefing, Australian Uranium Association, Melbourne, VIC. 
Baleta, H. 2012, Water scarcity risk in the public and private sector: Theories and 
concepts, University of Cape Town, viewed 21 Dec 2015, 
<http://www.ewisa.co.za/literature/files/ID33%20Paper243%20Baleta%20H.
pdf>. 
Ball, A. and Grubnic, S. 2007, 'Sustainability accounting and accountability in the 
public sector', in Unerman, J., Bebbington, J. and O'Dwyer, B. (Eds.), 
Sustainability accounting and accountability, Routledge, London, pp. 243-
265. 
Barnett, T. P. and Pierce, D. W. 2008, When will Lake Mead go dry?” Water 
Resources Research, University of California,San Diego. 
Barrett, D. 2011, Mining is currently a major driver of the Australian national 
economy, viewed 2 May 2012, <http://www.aprs.com.au/australian-
environment-news/water-in-the-mineral-industry>. 
Barthes, R. 1977, 'The rhetoric of the image', in Image-Music-Text, trans. S. Heath., 
Hill and Wang, New York, pp. 32-51. 
Barton, A. 1999, 'Public and private sector accounting - The non-identical twins', 
Australian Accounting Review, vol. 9 no. 18, pp. 22-31. 
Barton, A. D. 2006, 'Public sector accountability and commercial-in-confidence 
outsourcing contracts', Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, vol. 




Bates, B. C., Kundzewicz, Z. W., Wu, S. and Palutikof, J. P. 2008, 'Climate change 
and water', in IPCC (Ed.), Technical paper VI of the Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change, Geneva. 
Bebbington, J., Brown, J., Frame, B. and Thomson, I. 2007, 'Theorizing engagement: 
The potential of a critical dialogic approach', Accounting, Auditing & 
Accountability Journal, vol. 20 no. 3, pp. 356-381. 
Bebbington, J. and Thomson, I. 2007, 'Social and environmental accounting, 
auditing, and reporting: A potential source of organisational risk 
governance?', Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy, vol. 25 
no. 1, pp. 38-55. 
Beck, U. 1992a, 'From industrial society to the risk society: Questions of survival, 
social structure and ecological enlightenment', Theory, Culture & Society, vol. 
9 no. 1, pp. 97-123. 
Beck, U. 1992b, Risk society: Towards a new modernity, Sage, London. 
Beck, U. 1994, 'The reinvention of politics: Towards a theory of reflexive 
modernization', in Beck, U., Giddens, A. and Lash, S. (Eds.), Reflexive 
modernization: Politics, tradition and aesthetics in the modern social order, 
Polity Press in associaton with Blackwell Publishers, Cambridge, pp. 1-55. 
Beck, U. 1995, Ecological politics in an age of risk, Polity Press, Cambridge. 
Beck, U. and Beck-Gernsheim, E. 1995, The normal chaos of love, Blackwell, 
Cambridge, UK. 
Beder, S. 1997, 'The environment goes to market', Democracy and Nature, vol. 3, pp. 
90-106. 
Benston, G. J. 1982, 'Accounting and corporate accountability', Accounting, 
Organizations and Society, vol. 7 no. 2, pp. 87-105. 
BHP Billiton 2005, BHP Billiton announces US$7.3 billion cash offer for WMC 




BHP Billiton 2007a, Financial Statement, BHP Billiton, viewed 29 Jan 2015, 
<http://www.bhpbilliton.com/home/investors/reports/Pages/Roll%20up%20P
ages/2007%20BHP%20Billiton%20Annual%20Report.aspx>. 




BHP Billiton 2009, Olympic Dam Project: Draft EIS, viewed 7 Aug 2011, 
<http://www.bhpbilliton.com/home/aboutus/regulatory/Pages/default.aspx>. 
BHP Billiton 2010, Sustainability Supplementary Information, BHP Billiton, viewed 
29 Jan 2015, 
<http://www.bhpbilliton.com/home/investors/reports/Documents/sustainabilit
ySupplementaryInformation2010.pdf>. 
BHP Billiton 2011a, Olympic Dam Project: Supplementary EIS, viewed 07 Aug 
2011, 
<http://www.bhpbilliton.com/home/aboutus/regulatory/Pages/default.aspx>. 






BHP Billiton Olympic Dam Corporation Pty Ltd. 2008a, Great Artesian Basin 
Wellfields Report, BHP Billiton Olympic Dam Corporation Pty Ltd., viewed 
29 Jan 2015, <www.pir.sa.gov.au/__data/assets/.../env08950-
v06_r200800358.pdf>. 
BHP Billiton Olympic Dam Corporation Pty Ltd. 2008b, Environmental 
Management Program FY08-10, BHP Billiton Olympic Dam Corporation 
Pty Ltd., viewed 29 Jan 2015, 
<https://sarigbasis.pir.sa.gov.au/WebtopEw/ws/samref/sarig1/image/DDD/E
NV08732-V08_R200800225.pdf>. 
BHP Billiton Olympic Dam Corporation Pty Ltd. 2009a, Great Artesian Basin 
Wellfields Report, BHP Billiton Olympic Dam Corporation Pty Ltd., viewed 
29 Jan 2015, 
<https://sarigbasis.pir.sa.gov.au/WebtopEw/ws/samref/sarig1/image/DDD/E
NV08950-V06_R201000033>. 
BHP Billiton Olympic Dam Corporation Pty Ltd. 2010a, Great Artesian Basin 
Wellfields Report, BHP Billiton Olympic Dam Corporation Pty Ltd., viewed 
29 Jan 2015, 
<http://www.pir.sa.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0011/156386/GAB_Wellfie
lds_Report_July_2009_-_June_2010.pdf>. 
BHP Billiton Olympic Dam Corporation Pty Ltd. 2011a, Great Artesian Basin 
Wellfields Report, BHP Billiton Olympic Dam Corporation Pty Ltd., viewed 
29 Jan 2015, 
<http://www.pir.sa.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0010/168994/GAB_Wellfie
lds_Report_1_July_2010_-_30_June_2011.pdf>. 
BHP Billiton Olympic Dam Corporation Pty Ltd. 2011b, Environmental 
Management and Monitoring Report, BHP Billiton Olympic Dam 
Corporation Pty Ltd., viewed 29 Jan 2015, 
<http://www.pir.sa.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0006/179187/FY12_EMM
R.pdf>. 
BHP Billiton Olympic Dam Corporation Pty Ltd. 2012a, Great Artesian Basin 
Wellfields Report, BHP Billiton Olympic Dam Corporation Pty Ltd., viewed 
29 Jan 2015, 
<http://www.pir.sa.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0005/179186/GAB_Wellfie
lds_Report_1_July_2011_-_30_June_2012.pdf>. 
BHP Billiton Olympic Dam Corporation Pty Ltd. 2012b, Monitoring Program-Great 
Artesian Basin (GAB) FY11-13, BHP Billiton Olympic Dam Corporation Pty 
Ltd., viewed 29 Jan 2015, 
<http://www.pir.sa.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0011/175529/EPMP_FY11-
13.pdf>. 
BHP Billiton Olympic Dam Corporation Pty Ltd. 2012d, Environmental 
Management Manual FY11-13, BHP Billiton Olympic Dam Corporation Pty 
Ltd., viewed 07 Feb 2015, 
<http://www.pir.sa.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0011/175529/EPMP_FY11-
13.pdf>. 
BHP Billiton Olympic Dam Corporation Pty Ltd. 2012f, Environmental 
Management and Monitoring Report, BHP Billiton Olympic Dam 






BHP Billiton Olympic Dam Corporation Pty Ltd. 2013a, Great Artesian Basin 
Wellfields Report, BHP Billiton Olympic Dam Corporation Pty Ltd., viewed 
29 Jan 2015, < 
http://sarigbasis.pir.sa.gov.au/WebtopEw/ws/samref/sarig1/image/DDD/MC
RA1919065.pdf) >. 
Billig, M. 1996, Arguing and thinking: A rhetorical approach to social psychology, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
Bowen, W. M. 1995, 'Tests on a theory of risk and culture', Regional Science 
Perspectives, vol. 1, pp. 19-42. 
Bowker, G. C. and Star, S. L. 1999, Sorting things out: Classification and its 
consequences, MIT, Cambridge, Mass. 
Boyce, G. 2000, 'Public discourse and decision making: Exploring possibilities for 
financial, social and environmental accounting', Accounting, Auditing & 
Accountability Journal, vol. 13 no. 1, pp. 27-64. 
Boyd, J. 2004, 'Organizational rhetoric doomed to fail: R. J. Reynolds and the 
principle of the oxymoron', Western Journal of Communication, vol. 68 no. 1, 
pp. 45-71. 
Bradbury, J. A. 1989, 'The Policy implications of differing concepts of risk', Science, 
Technology & Human Values, vol. 14 no. 4, pp. 380-399. 
Brennan, N. M. and Merkl-Davies, D. M. 2014, 'Rhetoric and argument in social and 
environmental reporting: The dirty laundry case', Accounting, Auditing & 
Accountability Journal, vol. 27 no. 4, pp. 602-633. 
Broadbent, J. 1998, 'The gendered nature of “accounting logic”: Pointers to an 
accounting that encompasses multiple values', Critical Perspectives on 
Accounting, vol. 9 no. 3, pp. 267-297. 
Brown, J. 2009, 'Democracy, sustainability and dialogic accounting technologies: 
Taking pluralism seriously', Critical Perspectives on Accounting, vol. 20 no. 
3, pp. 313-342. 
Brown, J. and Dillard, J. 2013, 'Agonizing over engagement: SEA and the “death of 
environmentalism” debates', Critical Perspectives on Accounting, vol. 24 no. 
1, pp. 1-18. 
Brown, J. and Fraser, M. 2006, 'Approaches and perspectives in social and 
environmental accounting: An overview of the conceptual landscape', 
Business Strategy and the Environment, vol. 15 no. 2, pp. 103-117. 
Brown, V., Harris, J. and Russell, J. 2010, Tackling wicked problems: Through the 
transdisciplinary imagination Earthscan, London. 
Brundtland, G. H. 1987, Our common future, World Commission on Environment 
and Development, Oxford. 
Buhr, N. 2001, 'Corporate silence: Environmental disclosure and the North American 
free trade agreement', Critical Perspectives on Accounting, vol. 12 no. 4, pp. 
405-421. 
Burdon, P. 2006, Above the law? Roxby Downs and BHP Billiton’s Legal Privileges, 
Friends of the Earth Adelaide, viewed 25 May 2012, 
<http://www.foe.org.au/anti-nuclear/issues/oz/u/roxby/indenture>. 
Burke, K. 1950, A rhetoric of motives, Prentice-Hall, New York. 
Burke, K. 1962, A rhetoric of motives, Meridian Books, Cleveland OH (orginal 
version published in 1950). 
Burke, K. 1966, Language as symbolic action: Essays on life, literature, and method, 




Burke, K. 1968, 'Dramatism', in Sills, D. (Ed.), The international Encyclopedia of 
the Social Sciences Macmillan, New York, pp. 445-452. 
Burke, K. 1969, A grammar of motives, University of California Press, Berkeley and 
Los Angeles. 
Burke, K. 1970, The rhetoric of religion: Studies in logology, University of 
California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles. 
Burke, K. 1984a, Attitudes towards history, University of California Press, Berkeley 
and Los Angeles. 
Burke, K. 1984b, Permanence and change: An anatomy of purpose, University of 
California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles. 
Burke, K. 1989, 'Poem', in Simons, H. W. and Melia, T. (Eds.), The Legacy of 
Kenneth Burke, the University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, pp. 263. 
Burritt, R. L. and Welch, S. 1997, 'Accountability for environmental performance of 
the Australian Commonwealth public sector', Accounting, Auditing & 
Accountability Journal, vol. 10 no. 4, pp. 532-561. 
Catasús, B., Ersson, S., Gröjer, J. E. and Yang Wallentin, F. 2007, 'What gets 
measured gets … on indicating, mobilizing and acting', Accounting, Auditing 
& Accountability Journal, vol. 20 no. 4, pp. 505-521. 
CDP Water 2012, CDP Water Disclosure, viewed 28 Apr 2012, 
<https://www.cdproject.net/water>. 
Chalmers, K., Godfrey, J. and Lynch, B. 2010, 'Globalising water accounting: 
Lessons from the globalisation of financial reporting.' Paper presented at 
Accounting and Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand Annual 
Conference (AFAANZ), Christchurch, New Zealand. 
Cheit, R. E. 1983, 'Risk and culture: An essay on the selection of technical and 
environmental dangers', Ecology Law Quarterly, vol. 11 no. 2, pp. 241-263. 
Chen, R. S. 1975, 'Social and financial stewardship', The Accounting Review, vol. 50 
no. 3, pp. 533-543. 
Cheney, G., Christensen, L. T., Conrad, C. and Lair, D. J. 2004, 'Corporate rhetoric 
as organizational discourse', in Grant, D., Hardy, C., Oswick, C. and Putnam, 
L. L. (Eds.), The Sage handbook of organizational discourse, Sage, London, 
pp. 79-104. 
Christie, N., Dyck, B., Morrill, J. and Stewart, R. 2013, 'CSR and accounting: 
Drawing on Weber and Aristotle to rethink generally accepted accounting 
principles', Business and Society Review : A Quarterly Forum on the Role of 
Business in a Free Society, vol. 118 no. 3, pp. 383-411. 
Chua, W. F. 1986a, 'Radical developments in accounting thought', The Accounting 
Review, vol. 61 no. 4, pp. 600-632. 
Chua, W. F. 1986b, 'Theoretical constructions of and by the real', Accounting, 
Organizations and Society, vol. 11 no. 6, pp. 583-598. 
Clark, E. H. 2007, Water Prices Rising Worldwide,, viewed 28 Apr 2012, 
<http://www.globalpolicy.org/socecon/gpg/2007/0307waterprices.htm>. 




Cockcroft, R. and Cockcroft, S. 2005, Persuading People - An Introduction to 




Cohen, B. L. 1985, 'Criteria for technology acceptability', Risk Analysis, vol. 5 no. 1, 
pp. 1-3. 
Common, M. 1995, Sustainability and policy: Limits to economics, Cambridge 
University Press Cambridge. 
Commonwealth of Australia 1970, Water pollution in Australia: Report from the 
Senate Select Committee on water pollution, The Parliament of the 
Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, Australia. 
Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO) 2013a, 
Deep water: health of the Great Artesian Basin, Australian Government, 
viewed 18 Jan 2014, 
<http://www.csiro.au/Portals/Multimedia/CSIROpod/Deep-water-health-of-
the-Great-Artesian-Basin.aspx>. 
Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO) 2013b, 
Great Artesian Basin water resource assessment, Australian Government, 
viewed 18 Jan 2014, <http://www.csiro.au/Organisation-
Structure/Flagships/Water-for-a-Healthy-Country-Flagship/Sustainable-
Yields-Projects/Great-Artesian-Basin-Assessment.aspx>. 
Cooper, B. 2010, 'A Mirage in the Desert?: The Discovery, Evaluation and 
Development of the Olympic Dam Ore Body at Roxby Downs, South 
Australia [Book Review] ', Journal of Australasian Mining History, vol. 8, pp. 
188-190. 
Cooper, D. and Sherer, M. 1984, 'The value of corporate accounting reports: 
Arguments for a political economy of accounting', Accounting, 
Organizations and Society, vol. 9 no. 3/4, pp. 207-232. 
Cortese, C. L., Irvine, H. J. and Kaidonis, M. A. 2009, 'Extractive industries 
accounting and economic consequences: Past, present and future', Accounting 
Forum, vol. 33 no. 1, pp. 27-37. 
Cortese, C. L., Irvine, H. J. and Kaidonis, M. A. 2010, 'Powerful players: How 
constituents captured the setting of IFRS 6, an accounting standard for the 
extractive industries', Accounting Forum, vol. 34, pp. 76-88. 
Craig, R. and Amernic, J. 2004, 'The deployment of accounting-related rhetoric in 
the prelude to a privatization', Accounting, Auditing and Accountability 
Journal, vol. 17 no. 1, pp. 41-58. 
Daniel, M. and Sojamo, S. 2012, 'From risks to shared value? Corporate strategies in 
building a global water accounting and disclosure regime', Water Alternatives, 
vol. 5 no. 3, pp. 636-657. 
Davison, J. 2011, 'Paratextual framing of the annual report: Liminal literary 
conventions and visual devices', Critical Perspectives on Accounting, vol. 22 
no. 2, pp. 118-134. 
de Beaugrande, R. and Dressler, W. 1981, Introduction to text linguistics, Longman, 
UK. 
Department of Sustainability Environment Water Population and Communities 2011, 




Department of the Environment 2011, Great Artesian Basin Sustainability Initiative 





Dey, C. 2003, 'Corporate ‘silent’ and ‘shadow’ social accounting', Social and 
Environmental Accountability Journal, vol. 23 no. 2, pp. 6-9. 
Dey, C., Russell, S. and Thomson, I. 2011, 'Exploring the potential of shadow 
accounts in problematising institutional conduct', in Ball, A. and Osborne, S. 
P. (Eds.), Social accounting and public management: accountability for the 
public good, Routledge, New York, pp. 64-75. 
Dietz, T., Frey, S. and Rosa, E. 2002, 'Risk, technology, and society', in Dunlap, R. 
E. and Michelson, W. (Eds.), Handbook of environmental sociology, 
Greenwood Press, pp. 339-369. 
Dillard, J. and Brown, J. 2012, 'Agonistic pluralism and imagining CSEAR into the 
future', Social and Environmental Accountability Journal, vol. 32 no. 1, pp. 
3-16. 
Dillard, J. F. 1991, 'Accounting as a critical social science ', Accounting, Auditing & 
Accountability Journal, vol. 4 no. 1, pp. 8-28. 
Dinar, A., Rosegrant, M. W. and Meinzen-Dick, R. 1997, Water allocation 
mechanisms: Principles and examples: Policy Research Working Paper - 
World Bank WPS - Issue 1779. 
Discover Murray River™ - Official Murray River Travel Website 2016, the Murray 
Darling Basin, Discover Murray River™ - Official Murray River Travel 
Website, viewed 29 Jun 2016, <http://www.murrayriver.com.au/about-the-
murray/murray-darling-basin/>. 
Dornin, T. 2007, BHP Billiton flags further development of Olympic Dam, 
Australian Associated Press Pty Limited, viewed 01 Nov 2011, 
<http://proxy.uow.edu.au/docview/454529024?accountid=15112>. 
Douglas, M. 1966, Purity and danger: An analysis of concepts of pollution and 
taboo, Praeger. 
Douglas, M. 1970, Natural symbols: Explorations in cosmology, Barrie & Rockliff, 
London. 
Douglas, M. 1985, Risk acceptability according to the social sciences, Routledge & 
Kegan Paul, London. 
Douglas, M. 1986, How institutions think, Syracuse University Press, New York. 
Douglas, M. 1990, 'Risk as a forensic resource', Daedalus, vol. 119 no. 4, pp. 1-16. 
Douglas, M. 1992, Risk and blame: Essays in cultural theory, Routledge, New York. 
Douglas, M. 2003, 'Being fair to hierarchists', University of Pennsylvania Law 
Review, vol. 151 no. 4, pp. 1349-1370. 
Douglas, M. 2013, 'Traditional culture: Let’s hear no more about it?', in R., F. (Ed.), 
Mary Douglas:Cultures and crises, Sage, London, pp. p.284-308. 
Douglas, M. and Wildavsky, A. 1982, Risk and culture: An essay on the selection of 
technological and environmental dangers, University of California Press. 
DRET 2008, Leading edge sustainable development for the mining industry - Water 
management, Australian Government Department of Resources Energy and 
Tourism. 
Dubreuil, C. 2006, The right to water: From concept to implementation, World 
Water Council, viewed 07 Sep 2015, 
<http://www.worldwatercouncil.org/fileadmin/wwc/Library/RightToWater_F
inalText_Cover.pdf>. 
Dumay, J., Guthrie, J. and Farneti, F. 2010, 'GRI sustainability reporting guidelines 
for public and third sector organizations: A critical review', Public 




Durkin, T. 1990, How do risks become social?, American Bar Foundation, Chicago, 
USA. 
Egan, M. 2009, 'Sydney water sector change and industrial water management', 
Journal of Accounting & Organizational Change, vol. 5 no. 2, pp. 277-293. 
Egan, M. and Frost, G. 2010, Corporate water reporting - A study of the Australian 
food, beverage and tobacco sector, CPA Australia Ltd, Southbank, Vic, 
Australia. 
Egan, M., Frost, G. and Andreeva, Z. 2015, Eroding corporate water reporting? A 
study of the food, beverage and tobacco sector, CPA Australia Ltd, 
Southbank, Vic, Australia. 
Elliott, E. D. 1983, 'Anthropologizing environmentalism', The Yale Law Journal, vol. 
92 no. 5, pp. 888-899. 
Endersbee, L. 2000a, The Plutonic Waters of the Great Artesian Basin, ATSE 
(Australian Academy of Technological Sciences and 
Engineering),Melbourne. 
Endersbee, L. 2000b, The Plutonic Waters of the Great Artesian Basin, Australian 
Academy of Technological Sciences and Engineering (ATSE), Melbourne, 
VIC. 
Environment Australia 1998, Conservation guidelines for the management of wild 
river values. Part A: Wild river values, viewed 18 Jan 2014 2014, 
<http://www.environment.gov.au/node/20150>. 
ESCAP 2007, Statistical Yearbook for Asia and the Pacific 2007, Economic and 
Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP), United Nations, New 
York. 
Everett, J. 2004, 'Exploring (false) dualisms for environmental accounting praxis', 
Critical Perspectives on Accounting, vol. 15 no. 8, pp. 1061-1084. 
Ewald, F. 1991, 'Insurance and risk', in Burchell, G., Gordon, C. and Miller, P. 
M.(eds). The Foucault effect: Studies in governmentality: With two lectures 
by and an interview with Michel Foucault, Harvester Wheatsheaf, London, 
pp.197-210. 
Fairclough, N. 1992, Discourse and social change, Polity Press, Cambridge. 
Fairclough, N. 2003, Analysing discourse: Textual analysis for social research, 
Routledge, London. 
Fairclough, N. and Wodak, R. 1997, 'Critical discourse analysis', in van Dijk, T. A. 
(Ed.), Discourse as social interaction, Sage, London, pp. 258-284. 
Fogarty, T. J., Hussein, M. E. A. and Ketz, J. E. 1994, 'Political aspects of financial 
accounting standard setting in the USA', Accounting, Auditing & 
Accountability Journal, vol. 7 no. 4, pp. 24-46. 
Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations (UN-FAO) 2007, Making 
Every Drop Count, viewed 28 Apr 2012, 
<http://www.fao.org/newsroom/en/news/2007/1000494/index.html>. 
Foss, S. K., Foss, K. A. and Trapp, R. 2002, Contemporary perspectives on rhetoric, 
Waveland Press, Prospect Heights, Illinois. 
Foucault, M. and Hurley, R. 1981, The History of sexuality, Pantheon, London, UK. 
Frame, B. and Brown, J. 2008, 'Developing post-normal technologies for 
sustainability', Ecological Economics, vol. 65 no. 2, pp. 225-241. 
Freedman, M. and Stagliano, A. J. 1990, 'Consequences of the failure to account for 




accounting research, The Macmillan Press Ltd., 1990, Hampshire, pp. 260-
271. 
Friends of the Earth 2011, Campaign: Expansion of Roxby Downs, Friends of the 
Earth, viewed 29 June 2015, <http://www.adelaide.foe.org.au/campaign-
expansion-of-roxby-downs/>. 
Friends of the Earth Australia 2011, Summary + articles re Olympic Dam mine 
expansion, Friends of the Earth Austrlia, viewed 20 May 2012, 
<http://www.foe.org.au/anti-nuclear/issues/oz/u/roxby/articles>. 
Funder, M. and Ravnborg, H. M. 2004, 'Addressing water conflicts: Governance, 
institutions and functions', in Ravnborg, H. M. (Ed.), Water and Conflict 
Conflict Prevention and Mitigation in Water Resources Management, Danish 
Institute for International Studies, Copenhagen pp. 31-64. 
Funnell, W. 2003, 'Enduring fundamentals: constitutional accountability and 
auditors-general in the reluctant state', Critical Perspectives on Accounting, 
vol. 14 no. 1-2, pp. 107-132. 
Funnell, W. and Cooper, K. 1998, Public sector accounting and accountability in 
Australia, University of New South Wales Press Ltd, Sydney. 
Furner, J. 2008, 'Water policy for the future', Public Administration Today, vol. 
April-June, pp. 19-21. 
Gallhofer, S., Haslam, J., Monk, E. and Roberts, C. 2006, 'The emancipatory 
potential of online reporting: The case of counter accounting', Accounting, 
Auditing & Accountability Journal, vol. 19 no. 5, pp. 681-718. 
Garnaut, R. 2008, The Garnaut climate change review, Final report, Cambridge 
University Press, Port Melbourne, Victoria, Australia. 
GEMI 2010a, GEMI Water Sustainability Planner, viewed 25 Apr 2012, 
<http://www.gemi.org/waterplanner/>. 
GEMI 2010b, GEMI Water Sustainability Tool, viewed 25 Apr 2012, 
<http://www.gemi.org/water/>. 
Georgakopoulos, G. and Thomson, I. 2005, 'Organic salmon farming: Risk 
perceptions, decision heuristics and the absence of environmental accounting', 
Accounting Forum, vol. 29 no. 1, pp. 49-75. 
Gibson, K., Gray, R., Laing, Y. and Dey, C. 2001, The CSEAR Approach, viewed 06 
Jan 2017, <https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/csear/sa-exemplars/silent-and-
shadow/>. 
Gill, A. M. and Whedbee, K. 1997, 'Rhetoric', in van Dijk, T. A. (Ed.), Discourse 
studies: A multidisciplinary introduction, Sage, London, pp. 157-184. 
Gleick, P. H. 1998, 'The human right to water', Water Policy, vol. 1 no. 5, pp. 487-
503. 
Gleick, P. H., Cooley, H., Katz, D., Lee, E., Morrison, J., Palaniappan, M., Samulon, 
A. and Wolff, G. H. 2007, The world’s water 2006-2007: A biennial report 
on freshwater resources, Island Press, Washington. 
Global Reporting Initiative 2013, G4 sustinability reporting guidelines - reporting 
principles and standard disclosures, Global Reporting Initiative, viewed 14 
Sep 2015, <www.globalreporting.org/reporting/g4/Pages/default.aspx>. 
Gout, H. 2009, 'Olympic Dam EIS: Impact of the world’s biggest mine', The 
Independant Weekly. 
Government of South Austrlia 2011a, Frequently asked questions, Government of 






Government of South Austrlia 2011b, Assessment report_Environmental Impact 
Statement Olympic Dam expansion, Government of South Austrlia, viewed 
07 Feb 2015, 
<http://www.olympicdameis.sa.gov.au/html/AssessmentReport/ODXAssess
mentReport-web.pdf>. 
Grant, D., Keenoy, D. and Oswick, C. 1998, 'Organizational discourse: Of diversity 
dichotomy and multi-disciplinarity', in Grant, D. and Oswick, C. (Eds.), 
Discourse and organization, Sage, London, pp. 1-14. 
Gray, R. 1992, 'Accounting and environmentalism: An exploration of the challenge 
of gently accounting for accountability, transparency and sustainability', 
Accounting, Organizations and Society, vol. 17 no. 5, pp. 399-425. 
Gray, R. 2006, 'Social, environmental and sustainability reporting and organisational 
value creation: Whose value? Whose creation?', Accounting, Auditing & 
Accountability Journal, vol. 19 no. 6, pp. 793-819. 
Gray, R. 2012, 'Accountability, sustainability and the world' largest corporations', in 
Haynes, K., Dillard, J. and Murray, A. (Eds.), Corporate social responsibility: 
A research handbook, Taylor & Francis, New York, pp. 151-166. 
Gray, R., Dey, C., Owen, D., Evans, R. and Zadek, S. 1997, 'Struggling with the 
praxis of social accounting: Stakeholders, accountability, audits and 
procedures', Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, vol. 10 no. 3, pp. 
325-364. 
Gray, R. H., Owen, D. L. and Maunders, K. T. 1987, Corporate Social Reporting: 
Accounting & Accountability, Prentice-Hall, Hemel Hempstead. 
Gray, R. H., Owen, D. L. and Maunders, K. T. 1988, 'Corporate social reporting: 
Emerging trends in accountability and the social contract', Accounting, 
Auditing & Accountability Journal, vol. 1 no. 1, pp. 6-20. 
Great Artesian Basin Coordinating Committee 2009a, Great Artesian Basin 
Strategic Management Plan: Focus and prospects 2008-2015, viewed 18 Jan 
2014, 
<http://www.gabcc.org.au/tools/getFile.aspx?tbl=tblContentItem&id=364>. 
Great Artesian Basin Coordinating Committee 2009b, Great Artesian Basin 
Strategic Management Plan: Progress and achievements to 2008, viewed 18 
Jan 2014, 
<http://www.gabcc.org.au/tools/getFile.aspx?tbl=tblContentItem&id=365>. 
Great Artesian Basin Protection Group 2009a, Impact of Olympic Dam/Roxby 
Downs, viewed 07 Aug 2011, <http://www.gabpg.org.au/impact-of-olympic-
damroxby-downs>. 
Great Artesian Basin Protection Group 2009b, Management history, viewed 07 Aug 
2011, <http://www.gabpg.org.au/great-artesian-basin/management-history>. 
Great Artesian Basin Protection Group 2009c, Submission 2009, viewed 07 Aug 
2011, <http://www.gabpg.org.au/about/submission>. 
Great Artesian Basin Protection Group 2009d, Government documents, Great 
Artesian Basin Protection Group, viewed 14 April 2014, 
<http://www.gabpg.org.au/about/submission>. 
Green, S. E. 2004, 'A rhetorical theory of diffusion', Academy of Management 
Review, vol. 29 no. 4, pp. 653-669. 




Gross, C. 2011, 'Why justice is important', in Connell, D. and Grafton, Q. (Eds.), 
Basin futures: Water reform in the Murray-Darling Basin, ANUE Press, 
Canberra ACT, pp. 149-163. 
Habermehl, M. 1980, 'The Great Artesian Basin, Australia', BMR Journal of 
Australian Geology and Geophysics, vol. 5 no. n/a, pp. 9-38. 
Hanemann, W. M. 2006, 'The economic conception of water', in Rogers, P. P., 
Ramón Llamas, M. and Luis Martínez-Cortina (Eds.), Water crisis: Myth or 
reality? Marcelino Botin Water Forum 2004, Taylor & Francis London, pp. 
61-91. 
Hansen, G. 1996, 'Kenneth Burke's rhetorical theory within the construction of the 
ethnography of speaking', Folklore Forum, vol. 27 no. 1, pp. 50-59. 
Harding, R. 1998, Environmental decision-making: The roles of scientists, engineers 
and the public, Federation Press, Leichhardt, N.S.W. 
Hardy, C. and Phillips, N. 1999, 'No joking matter: Discursive struggle in the 
Canadian refugee system', Organization Studies, vol. 20 no. 1, pp. 1-24. 
Hart, R. P. 1997, Modern rhetoric criticism, Allyn and Bacon, Boston. 
Hartelius, E. J. and Browning, L. D. 2008, 'The application of rhetorical theory in 
managerial research: A literature review', Management Communication 
Quarterly, vol. 22 no. 1, pp. 13-39. 
Haskins, E. 2004, Logos and power in Isocrates and Aristotle University of South 
Carolina Press, Columbia. 
Hazelton, J. 2007, Catching the G3 wave: Would increased corporate compliance 
with GRI water-related indicators improve Australian water sustainability, 
viewed 01 Dec 2011, 
<http://www.researchonline.mq.edu.au/vital/access/manager/Repository/mq:
8778>. 
Hazelton, J. 2013, 'Accounting as a human right: The case of water information', 
Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, vol. 26 no. 2, pp. 267-311. 
Hazelton, J. 2014, 'Corporate water accountability - the role of water labels given 
non-fungible extractions', Pacific Accounting Review, vol. 26 no. 1/2, pp. 8-
27. 
Head, B. 2010, Wicked problems in water governance: Paradigm changes to 
promote water sustainability and address planning uncertainty, The Urban 
Water Security Research Alliance (UWSRA), viewed 21 Dec 2015, 
<http://www.urbanwateralliance.org.au/publications/UWSRA-tr38.pdf>. 
Hilgartner, S. 1992, 'The social construction of risk objects: Or, how to pry open 
networs of risk', in Short, J. F. and Clarke, L. B. (Eds.), Organizations, 
uncertainties, and risk, Westview Press, Boulder, pp. 39-53. 
Hillier, J. 1996, 'The Great Artesian Basin management of water resources after 100 
Years of development', Mesozoic Geology of the Eastern Australia Plate 
Conference, Geology Society of Australia. Inc., Extended Abstract, vol. n/a 
no. 43, pp. 251-255. 
Hines, R. D. 1988, 'Financial accounting: In communicating reality, we construct 
reality', Accounting, Organizations and Society, vol. 13 no. 3, pp. 251-261. 
Hines, R. D. 1989, 'The sociopolitical paradigm in financial accounting research', 
Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, vol. 2 no. 1, pp. 52-78. 




Holt, R. and Macpherson, A. 2010, 'Sensemaking, rhetoric and the socially 
competent entrepreneur', International small business journal, vol. 28 no. 1, 
(2), pp. 20-42. 
Homer, A. 2011, BHP forced to pay for Great Artesian Basin water, viewed 16 Oct 
2011, <http://www.abc.net.au/rural/news/content/201110/s3338957.htm>. 
Hopwood, A. G. 1987, 'The archeology of accounting systems', Accounting, 
Organizations and Society, vol. 12 no. 3, pp. 207-234. 
Hopwood, B., Mellor, M. and O'Brien, G. 2005, 'Sustainable development: Mapping 
different approaches', Sustainable Development, vol. 13 no. 1, pp. 38-52. 
Horlick-Jones, T. and Sime, J. 2004, 'Living on the border: Knowledge, risk and 
transdisciplinarity', Futures, vol. 36 no. 4, pp. 441-456. 
Horne, R., Grant, T. and Verghese, K. 2009, Life cycle assessment: Principles, 
practice and prospects, CSIRO Publishing,Collingwood, Vic, Australia. 
Hussey, K. and Dovers, S. 2006, 'Trajectories in Australian water policy', Journal of 
Contemporary Water Research & Education, vol. 135 no. 1, pp. 36-50. 
Hussey, K. and Dovers, S. 2007, 'Managing water for Australia. The social and 
institutional challenges', in., CSIRO Publishing, Melbourne. 
Hutchinson, A. 1989, 'Talking the good life: From free speech to democratic 
dialogue', Yale Journal of Law and Liberation, vol. 1989 no. 1, pp. 17-30. 
IASB (International Accounting Standards Board) 2001, Framework for the 
Preparation and Presentation of Financial Statements, International 
Accounting Standards Board (IASB), London. 
ICMM 2012, Water management in mining: a selection of case studies, ICMM, 
viewed 30 Jun 2015, <https://www.icmm.com/document/3660>. 
IPCC 2007, Climate change 2007: Climate change impacts, adaptation and 
vulnerability. Summary for policymakers April 6th, 2007, Working Group II 
Contribution to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. 
ISO 1997, EN ISO 14040 - Environmentall management - Life cycle assessment - 
principles and framework, International Organization for Standardization, 
Geneva. 
Jackson, S. 2005, 'Indigenous values and water resource management: A case study 
from the Northern Territory', Australian Journal of Environmental 
Management, vol. 12 no. 3, pp. 136-146. 
Jackson, S., Stoeckl, N., Straton, A. and Stanley, O. 2008, 'The changing value of 
Australian tropical rivers', Geographical Research, vol. 46 no. 3, pp. 275-290. 
Jaeger, C., Renn, O., Rosa, A. and Webler, T. 2001, Risk, uncertainty and rational 
Action, Earthscan, London. 
James, M., Dowd, A.-M., Rodriguez, S. and Jeanneret, T. 2012, How Australians 
value water: Results from a literature review, Global CCS Institute, 
Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO), 
viewed 7 Sep 2015, <http://www.globalccsinstitute.com/publications/how-
australians-value-water-results-literature-review>. 
Jones, M. J. 2010, 'Accounting for the environment: Towards a theoretical 
perspective for environmental accounting and reporting', Accounting Forum, 
vol. 34 no. 2, pp. 123-138. 
Jones, M. J. and Solomon, J. F. 2013, 'Problematising accounting for biodiversity', 




Kasperson, R. E. 1992, 'The social amplification of risk: Progress in developing an 
intregrative framework', in Krimsky, S. and Golding, D. (Eds.), Social 
theories of risk, Praeger, Westport, pp. 153-178. 
Keane, D. 1997, "The sustainability of use of groundwater from the south-western 
edge of the Great Artesian Basin, with particular reference to the impact on 
the mound springs of the borefields of Western Mining Corporation", PhD 
thesis, RMIT University, Melbourne, VIC. 
Kinhill 1982, Olympic Dam project Draft Environmental Impact Statement, Prepared 
by Kinhill-Stearns Roger for Roxby Management Services Pty Ltd, Rockville, 
Maryland. 
Kinhill 1983, Olympic Dam project Supplement to the Draft Environmental Impact 
Statement, Prepared by Kinhill Stearns for Roxby Management Services Pty 
Ltd, Rockville, Maryland. 
Kinhill 1984, Assessment of exploration and Post-European settlement significance 
of the Mound Springs of South Australia, Prepared by Kinhill Stearns Pty Ltd 
for the SA Department of Environment and Planning, Rockville, Maryland. 
Kinhill 1997, Olympic Dam expansion project Environmental Impact Statement, 
Prepared for WMC (Olympic Dam Corporation) Pty Ltd by Kinhill 
Engineers Pty Ltd, Rockville, Maryland. 
Knights, D. and Vurdubakis, T. 1993, 'Calculations of risk: Towards an 
understanding of insurance as a moral and political technology', Accounting, 
Organizations and Society, vol. 18 no. 7-8, pp. 729-764. 
Kress, G., Leite-Garcia, R. and van Leeuwen, T. 1997, 'Discourse semiotics', in Van 
Dijk, T. (Ed.), Discourse as structure and process: A multidisciplinary 
introduction, Sage, London, pp. 257-291. 
Krimsky, S. 1992, 'The role of theory in risk studies', in Krimsky, S. and Golding, D. 
(Eds.), Social theories of risk, Praeger, Westport, pp. 3-22. 
Krimsky, S. and Golding, D. 1991, 'Factoring risk Into environmental decision 
making', in Chechile, R. A. and Carlisle, S. (Eds.), Environmental decision 
making: A multidisciplinary perspective, Van Nostrand Reinhold, New York, 
NY, USA, pp. 92-119. 
Kurunmäki, L. 2004, 'A hybrid profession - the acquisition of management 
accounting expertise by medical professionals', Accounting, Organizations 
and Society, vol. 29 no. 3-4, pp. 327-347. 
Kuseski, B. K. 1988, 'Kenneth Burke's “five dogs” and Mother Teresa's love', 
Quarterly Journal of Speech, vol. 74 no. 3, pp. 323-333. 
Laine, M. 2005, 'Meanings of the term 'sustainable development' in Finnish 
corporate disclosures', Accounting Forum, vol. 29 no. 4, pp. 395-413. 
Laine, M. 2009, 'Ensuring legitimacy through rhetorical changes? A longitudinal 
interpretation of the environmental disclosures of a leading Finnish chemical 
company', Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, vol. 22 no. 7, pp. 
1029-1054. 
Laine, M. 2010, 'Towards sustaining the status quo: Business talk of sustainability in 
Finnish corporate disclosures 1987-2005', European Accounting Review, vol. 
19 no. 2, pp. 247-274. 
Lawrence, R. 2010, 'Beyond disciplinary confinement to imaginative 
transdisciplinarity', in Brown, V., Harris, J. and Russell, J. (Eds.), Tackling 
wicked problems: through the transdisciplinary imagination, Earthscan, 




Lawrence, T. B. and Suddaby, R. 2006, 'Institutions and institutional', in Clegg, S., 
Hardy, C., Nord, W. R. and Lawrence, T. B. (Eds.), The Sage handbook of 
organisation studies, Sage, London, pp. 215-254. 
Lehman, G. 1995, 'A legitimate concern for environmental accounting', Critical 
Perspectives on Accounting, vol. 6 no. 5, pp. 393-412. 
Lehman, G. 1996, 'Environmental accounting: Pollution permits or selling the 
environment', Critical Perspectives on Accounting, vol. 7 no. 6, pp. 667-676. 
Lehman, G. 1999, 'Disclosing new worlds: A role for social and environmental 
accounting and auditing', Accounting, Organizations and Society, vol. 24 no. 
3, pp. 217-241. 
Linsley, P. M. and Shrives, P. J. 2009, 'Mary Douglas, risk and accounting failures', 
Critical Perspectives on Accounting, vol. 20 no. 4, pp. 492-508. 
Linsley, P. M. and Shrives, P. J. 2014, 'Douglasian cultural dialogues and the 
Financial Reporting Council complexity project', Critical Perspectives on 
Accounting, vol. 25 no. 8, pp. 757-770. 
Livesey, S. M. 2001, 'Eco-identity as discursive struggle: Royal Dutch/Shell, Brent 
Spar, and Nigeria', Journal of Business Communication, vol. 38 no. 1, pp. 58-
91. 
Livesey, S. M. 2002a, 'The discourse of the middle ground', Management 
Communication Quarterly, vol. 15 no. 3, pp. 313-349. 
Livesey, S. M. 2002b, 'Global warming wars: Rhetorical and discourse analytic 
approaches to Exxonmobil's corporate public discourse', Journal of Business 
Communication, vol. 39 no. 1, pp. 117-146. 
Llamas, M. R. and Martinez-Santos, P. 2006, 'Significance of the Silent Revolution 
of intensive groundwater use in world water policy', in Rogers, P. P., Ramón 
Llamas, M. and Luis Martínez-Cortina (Eds.), Water crisis: Myth or reality? 
Marcelino Botin Water Forum 2004, Taylor & Francis London, pp. 163-180. 
Luhmann, N. 1993, Risk: a sociological theory, Aldine de Gruyter, New York. 
Lupton, D. 1999, Risk, Routledge, London. 
MacKenzie, D. 2009, 'Making things the same: Gases, emission rights and the 
politics of carbon markets', Accounting, Organizations and Society, vol. 34 
no. 3-4, pp. 440-455. 
MacPherson, C. 2008, Protect the Great Artesian Basin! Stop Olympic Dam!, 
viewed 07 Aug 2008, <http://uranium-news.com/2008/12/02/antinuclear-5/>. 
Mäkelä, H. and Näsi, S. 2010, 'Social responsibilities of MNCs in downsizing 
operations: A Finnish forest sector case analysed from the stakeholder, social 
contract and legitimacy theory point of view', Accounting, Auditing & 
Accountability Journal, vol. 23 no. 2, pp. 149-174. 
Maunders, K. T. and Burritt, R. L. 1991, 'Accounting and ecological crisis', 
Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, vol. 4 no. 3, pp. 9-26. 
Medawar, C. 1976, 'The social audit: A political view', Accounting, Organizations 
and Society, vol. 1 no. 4, pp. 389-394. 
Melendez, E. T. and Hazelton, J. 2009, 'Standardised water accounting in Australia: 
Opportunities and challenges.' Paper presented at 32nd Hydrology and Water 
Resources Symposium, Newcastle, Australia. 
Mennicken, A. 2011, 'Too big to fail, and too big to succeed: Accounting reforms in 





Mercer, D., Christesen, L. and Buxton, M. 2007, 'Squandering the future - Climate 
change, policy failure and the water crisis in Australia', Futures, vol. 39 no. 
2-3, pp. 272-287. 
Messner, M. 2009, 'The limits of accountability', Accounting, Organizations and 
Society, vol. 34 no. 8, pp. 918-938. 
Miller, P. 1992, 'Accounting and objectivity: The invention of calculating selves and 
calculable spaces', In Annals of Scholarship, vol. 9 no. 1/2, pp. 61-85. 
Miller, P. 1994, 'Accounting as social and institutional practice: An introduction', in 
Hopwood, A. G. and Miller, P. (Eds.), Accounting as social and institutional 
practice, Cambridge University Press, New York, pp. 1-39. 
Miller, P. 1998, 'The margins of accounting', European Accounting Review, vol. 7 no. 
4, pp. 605-621. 
Miller, P., Kurunmäki, L. and O’Leary, T. 2008, 'Accounting, hybrids and the 
management of risk', Accounting, Organizations and Society, vol. 33 no. 7-8, 
pp. 942-967. 
Miller, P. and O'Leary, T. 1987, 'Accounting and the construction of the governable 
person', Accounting, Organizations and Society, vol. 12 no. 3, pp. 235-265. 
Miller, P. and O'Leary, T. 1990, 'Making accountancy practical', Accounting, 
Organizations and Society, vol. 15 no. 5, pp. 479-498. 
Miller, P. and O'Leary, T. 1994, 'Governing the calculable person', in Hopwood, A. 
G. and Miller, P. (Eds.), Accounting as social and institutional practice, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 98-115. 
Miller, P. and O’Leary, T. 2007, 'Mediating instruments and making markets: 
Capital budgeting, science and the economy', Accounting, Organizations and 
Society, vol. 32 no. 7-8, pp. 701-734. 
Milne, M. J., Tregidga, H. and Walton, S. 2009, 'Words not actions! The ideological 
role of sustainable development reporting', Accounting, Auditing & 
Accountability Journal, vol. 22 no. 8, pp. 1211-1257. 
Minerals Council of Australia 2009a, Draft advice on Water Charge Rules for 




Minerals Council of Australia 2009b, MCA response to National Water Initiative 
2009 Biennial Assessment of progress, viewed 29 June 2015, 
<http://archive.nwc.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0013/10480/Submission_M
ineralsCouncil2.pdf>. 
Minerals Council of Australia 2011, Corporates, viewed 01 Sep 2011, 
<http://www.minerals.org.au/corporate/about_the_mca>. 
Moerman, L. and van der Laan, S. 2007, 'Pursuing shareholder value: The rhetoric of 
James Hardie', Accounting Forum, vol. 31 no. 4, pp. 354-369. 
Moerman, L. C. and van der Laan, S. L. 2005, 'Social reporting in the tobacco 
industry: All smoke and mirrors? ', Accounting, Auditing & Accountability 
Journal, vol. 18 no. 3, pp. 374-389. 
Moerman, L. C. and van der Laan, S. L. 2012, 'Risky business: Socializing asbestos 
risk and the hybridization of accounting', Critical Perspectives on Accounting, 
vol. 23 no. 2, pp. 107-116. 
Moneva, J. M., Archel, P. and Correa, C. 2006, 'GRI and the camouflaging of 




Moore, M. P. 1992, '“The Quayle quagmire”: Political campaigns in the poetic form 
of burlesque', Western Journal of Communication, vol. 56 no. 2, pp. 108-124. 
Morrison, J., Morikawa, M., Murphy, M. and Schulte, P. 2009, Water scarcity & 
climate change: Growing risks for businesses & investors, Cerese/Pacific 
Institute, Boston, MA./Oakland, CA. 
Morrison, J. and Schulte, P. 2009, Water Disclosure 2.0 - Assessment and emerging 
practice in corporate water reporting, Pacific Institute, Oakland, CA. U.S.A. 
Morrison, J., Schulte, P. and Schenck, R. 2010, Corporate water accounting - An 
analysis of methods and tools for measuring water use and its impacts, 
Pacific Institute and Institute for Environmental Research and Education, 
Oakland, California, USA; Vashon, Washington, USA. 
Mudd, G. 2000, 'Mound springs of the Great Artesian Basin in South Australia: A 
case study from Olympic Dam', Environmental Geology vol. 39 no. 5, pp. 
463-476. 
Nathan, E. 2007, Lost waters: A history of a troubled catchment, Melbourne 
University Press, Carlton, VIC. 
National Center for Atmospheric Research (NCAR) 2005, Drought’s growing reach: 
NCAR study points to global warming as key factor, The University 
Corporation for Atmospheric Research. 
National Water Commission 2007, Driving water reform, viewed 28 Apr 2012, 
<www.nwc.gov.au/www/html/2353-intergovernmental-agreement-on-a-
national-water-initiative.asp>. 
National Water Commission 2009, Regional Water Resources Assessments, 
Australian Government, viewed 10 Sep 2011, 
<http://www.water.gov.au/RegionalWaterResourcesAssessments/SpecificGe
ographicRegion/TabbedReports.aspx?PID=QLD_GW_API2072x>. 
National Water Commission 2010, National Water Commission Mining position 
statement - May 2010, viewed 02 Jun 2012, 
<http://www.nwc.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0006/9726/Mining_PS3.pdf>. 
National Water Commission 2011, Great Artesian Basin, Australian Government, 
viewed 19 Jan 2014, <http://archive.nwc.gov.au/home/water-
governancearrangements-in-australia/cross-boundary-arrangements/great-
artesian-basin>. 
National Water Commission 2013, Science provides a new understanding of Great 
Artesian Basin, Australian Government, viewed 18 Jan 2014, 
<http://www.nwc.gov.au/media-centre/media/science-provides-a-new-
understanding-of-the-great-artesian-basin>. 
News Release 2011, S.A. Government and BHP Billton sign Olympic Dam deal, 




Ney, S. and Thompson, M. 2011, 'Clumsy solutions for a wicked world', in Verweij, 
M. (Ed.), Clumsy solutions for a wicked world - How to improve global 
governance, Palgrave Macmillan, Hampshire, pp. 30-69. 
O'Connell, V. 2007, 'Reflections on stewardship reporting', Accounting Horizons vol. 




O'Dwyer, B., Unerman, J. and Hession, E. 2005, 'User needs in sustainability 
reporting: Perspectives of stakeholders in Ireland', European Accounting 
Review, vol. 14 no. 4, pp. 759-787. 
O'Sullivan, N. and O'Dwyer, B. 2009, 'Stakeholder perspectives on a financial sector 
legitimation process: The case of NGOs and the Equator Principles', 
Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, vol. 22 no. 4, pp. 553-587. 
O’Dwyer, B. 2004, Stakeholder democracy: Challenges and contributions from 
accountancy, in Matten, D. (Ed.), International Centre for Corporate Social 
Responsibility Research, Nottingham, UK. 
Olson, K. M. and Olson, C. D. 2004, 'Beyond strategy: A reader-centered analysis of 
irony's dual persuasive uses', Quarterly Journal of Speech, vol. 90 no. 1, pp. 
24-52. 
Ostrander, D. 1982, 'One and two dimensional models of the distribution of beliefs', 
in Douglas, M. (Ed.), Essays in the sociology of perception, Routledge & 
Kegan Paul, London, pp. 14-30. 
Owen, M. 2009, 'Corporate abuse' hits Great Artesian Basin, Australian, viewed 15 
Apr 2014, <http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/nation/corporate-abuse-
hits-great-artesian-basin/story-e6frg6nf-1225777245125>. 
Pallot, J. 1992, 'Elements of a theoretical framework for public sector accounting', 
Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, vol. 5 no. 1, pp. 38-59. 
Pannell, R. 1979, 'Stewardship in financial accounting', Journal of Accountancy, vol. 
148, pp. 90-94. 
Park, S. 2010, 'Book review: Risk and culture: An essay on the selection of technical 
and environmental dangers', International Review of Public Administration, 
vol. 15 no. 1, pp. 81-82. 
Parker, L. and Gould, G. 1999, 'Changing public sector accountability: Critiquing 
new directions', Accounting Forum, vol. 23 no. 2, pp. 109-135. 
Parnell, M. 2009, Olympic Dam Expansion (ODX) EIS - Summary, Greens. 
Parnell, M. 2010, Olympic Dam Expansion without uranium: Not only possible, but 
superior, viewed 07 Aug 2011, 
<http://www.markparnell.org.au/mr_prn.php?mr=801>. 
Parnell, M. 2011, Greens motion: Olympic Dam 'world's best practice' waste 
management, viewed 07 Aug 2011, 
<http://www.markparnell.org.au/speech_prn.php?speech=1056>. 
Patrick, M. 2012, "Scale and Justice in Water Allocation", PhD thesis, Edith Cowan 
University, Perth. 
Peck, P. and Sinding, K. 2003, 'Environmental and social disclosure and data 
richness in the mining industry', Business Strategy and the Environment, vol. 
12 no. 3, pp. 131-146. 
Peterson, T. R. 1997, Sharing the earth: The rhetoric of sustainable development, 
University of South Carolina Press, Columbia. 
Phillips, N. and Hardy, C. 2002, Discourse analysis: Investigating processes of 
social construction, Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks, CA. 
Plastics Industry Pipe Association of Australia Ltd 2002, Capping and piping 
artesian bores, viewed 07 Aug 2011, 
<http://www.pipa.com.au/images/pdf/GAB.pdf>. 
Plummer, J. and Tower, G. 2010, 'No accounting for water: Conflicting business and 
science viewpoints', International Business & Economics Research Journal, 




Poppins, J. 2008, Giants must be accountable, Fairfax Media Publications Pty 
Limited, viewed 20 May 2012, 
<http://proxy.uow.edu.au/docview/1020333036?accountid=15112>. 
Power, M. 1994, 'From the science of accounts to the financial accountability of 
science', Science in Context, vol. 7 no. 03, pp. 355-387. 
Power, M. 2005, 'The invention of operational risk', Review of International Political 
Economy, vol. 12 no. 4, pp. 577-599. 
Power, M. 2007, Organized uncertainty: Designing a world of risk management, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK. 
Power, N. 2002, Roxby Downs Indenture arrangements for water management Great 
Artesian Basion Consultative Council, viewed 12 Apr 2012, 
<http://www.gabcc.org.au/public/content/ViewItem.aspx?id=22>. 
Prior, L. 2003, Using documents in social research, Sage Publication, London. 
Prior, L. 2004, 'Documents', in Seale, C., Gobo, G., Gubrium, J. and Silverman, D. 
(Eds.), Qualitative Research Practice, Sage Publication, London, pp. 375-
390. 
Prosser, I. 2011, Current water availability and use, CSIRO, viewed 21 Dec 2015, 
<http://www.csiro.au/resources/Water-Book>. 
Puxty, A. G., Willmott, H. C., Cooper, D. J. and Lowe, T. 1987, 'Modes of 
regulation in advanced capitalism: Locating accountancy in four countries', 
Accounting, Organizations and Society, vol. 12 no. 3, pp. 273-291. 
Quality, R. 2011, Save the Great Artesian Basin from Olympic Dam: The Facts, 
viewed 07 Aug 2011, <http://www.savethebasin.com/p/facts_26.html>. 
Ranganathan, J., Raudsepp-Hearne, C., Lucas, N., Irwin, F., Zurek, M., Bennett, K., 
Ash, N. and West, P. 2008, Ecosystem services: A guide for decision makers, 
World Resources Institute, Washington DC. U.S.A. 
Rayner, S. 1992, 'Cultural theory and risk analysis', in Krimsky, S. and Golding, D. 
(Eds.), Social theories of risk, Praeger, Westport, pp. 83-116. 
Rayner, S. 2012, 'Uncomfortable knowledge: The social construction of ignorance in 
science and environmental policy discourses', Economy and Society, vol. 41 
no. 1, pp. 107-125. 
Reddy, S. G. 1996, 'Claims to expert knowledge and the subversion of democracy: 
The triumph of risk over uncertainty', Economy and Society, vol. 25 no. 2, pp. 
222-254. 
Renn, O. 1992, 'Concepts of risk:  A classification', in Krimsky, S. and Golding, D. 
(Eds.), Social theories of risk, Praeger, Westport, pp. 53-82. 
Ripl, W. 2003, 'Water: The bloodstream of the biosphere', Philosophical 
Transactions: Biological Sciences, vol. 358 no. 1440, pp. 1921-1934. 
Roa-García, M. C. 2014, 'Equity, efficiency and sustainability in water allocation in 
the Andes: Trade-offs in a full world', Water Alternatives, vol. 7 no. 2, pp. 
298-319. 
Roberts, J. 1991, 'The possibilities of accountability', Accounting, Organizations and 
Society, vol. 16 no. 4, pp. 355-370. 
Roberts, J. 2003, 'The manufacture of corporate social responsibility: Constructing 
corporate sensibility', Organization, vol. 10 no. 2, pp. 249-265. 
Roberts, J. and Scapens, R. 1985, 'Accounting systems and systems of 





Rodrigue, M. 2014, 'Contrasting realities: Corporate environmental disclosure and 
stakeholder-released information', Accounting, Auditing & Accountability 
Journal, vol. 27 no. 1, pp. 119-149. 
Rugh, P. 2012, Protesting BHP’s Olympic Dam - its special privileges, water 
guzzling, uranium to Fukushima, Infoshop News, viewed 14 Apr 2014, 
<http://antinuclear.net/2012/07/23/protesting-bhps-olympic-dam-its-special-
privileges-water-guzzling-uranium-to-fukushima/>. 
Aboriginal Heritage Act 1988 (SA). 
Environmental Protection Act 1993 (SA). 
Natural Resources Management Act 2004 (SA). 
Roxby Downs (Indenture Ratification) (Amendment of Indenture) Amendment Act 
2011 (SA). 
Roxby Downs (Indenture Ratification) Act 1982 (SA). 
SA Murray-Darling Basin Natural Resources 2013a, A guide to water licences and 
water allocations in the Eastern Mount Lofty Ranges, Government of South 
Australia, viewed 23 Jul 2015, 
<http://www.environment.sa.gov.au/managing-natural-resources/water-
use/water-planning/water-licences-and-permits>. 
SA Murray-Darling Basin Natural Resources 2013b, Frequently asked questions - 
water licences and water allocations, Government of South Australia, 
viewed 23 July 2015, 
<http://www.naturalresources.sa.gov.au/samurraydarlingbasin/water/permits-
and-licenses/eastern-mount-lofty-ranges-water-licence-rollout>. 
SAALNRM Board 2009a, Water allocation plan for the Far North Prescribed Wells 
Area, Government of South Australia, Adelaide. 
SAALNRM Board 2009b, Proposed amendments to the Regional Natural Resources 
Management Plan, Government of South Australia, Adelaide. 
Sampford, C. 2009, 'Water rights and water governance: A cautionary tale and the 
case for interdisciplinary governance', in Llamas, M. R., Cortina, L. M. and 
Mukherji, A. (Eds.), Water ethics: Marcelino Botin Water Forum 2007, CRC 
Press, Taylor & Francis Group, London, UK, pp. 45-67. 
Saravanamuthu, K. 2009, 'A journey of socialising the risks associated with global 
warming: a Gandhian insight into Schumacher's total accounting and 
accountability', Advances in Public Interest Accounting, vol. 14, pp. 121-189. 
Saravanamuthu, K., Lehman, C. and Nyamori, R. O. 2012, Facilitating social 
learning by integrating the multiple attributes of environmental degradation 
into risk-based accounts, viewed 02 Jun 2012, <http://elsevier.conference-
services.net/resources/247/2182/pdf/CPAC2011_0127_paper.pdf>. 
Save the basin 2011a, Save the Great Artesian Basin from Olympic Dam: An ethical 
issue, Save the basin, viewed 11 Oct 2012, 
<http://www.savethebasin.com/p/miners-must-cap-bores.html>. 
Save the basin 2011b, BHP Billiton assertion, Save the basin, viewed 11 Oct 2012, 
<http://www.savethebasin.com/p/facts.html>. 
Save the basin 2011c, Read what the Minister for Water says, Save the basin, viewed 
11 Oct 2012, <http://www.savethebasin.com/>. 
Savolainen, S. 2008, 'Promoting a new future of environmentally sustainable social 
housing', Public Administration Today, vol. April-June, pp. 15-18. 
Schwarz, M. and Thompson, M. 1990, Divided we stand - Redefining politics, 




Schweiker, W. 1993, 'Accounting for ourselves: Accounting practice and the 
discourse of ethics', Accounting, Organizations and Society, vol. 18 no. 2, pp. 
231-252. 
Selzer, J. 2004, 'Rhetorical analysis: Understanding how texts persuade readers', in 
Bazerman, C. and Prior, P. (Eds.), What writing does and how it does it: An 
introduction to analyzing texts and textual practices, Lawrence Erlbaum 
Associates, New Jersey, pp. 279-308. 
Serve the people 2008, Protect the Great Artesian Basin! Stop Olympic Dam!, 
viewed 07 Aug 2011, <http://mike-
servethepeople.blogspot.com/2008/11/protect-great-artesian-basin-stop.html>. 
Sharp, L. and Richardson, T. 2001, 'Reflections on Foucauldian discourse analysis in 
planning and environmental policy research', Journal of Environmental 
Policy and Planning, vol. 3 no. 3, pp. 193-209. 
Shearer, T. 2002, 'Ethics and accountability: From the for-itself to the for-the-other', 
Accounting, Organizations and Society, vol. 27 no. 6, pp. 541-573. 
Short, J. F. 1984, 'The social fabric at risk: Toward the social transformation of risk 
analysis', American Sociological Review, vol. 49 no. 6, pp. 711-725. 
Simons, H. 1990, The rhetoric turn, UC Press, Chicago. 
Sinclair, A. 1995, 'The chameleon of accountability: Forms and discourses', 
Accounting, Organizations and Society, vol. 20 no. 2-3, pp. 219-237. 
SKM 2008, The need for improved water data and water data sharing, Waterlines 
occasional paper No. 4, Australia National Water Commission, Canberra. 
Slembrouck, S. 2011, 'Intertextuality', in Zienkowski, J., Östman, J.-O. and 
Verschueren, J. (Eds.), Discursive pragmatics, pp. 251-266. 
Smerdon, B. 2013, Water in, water out: Assessing the future of the Great Artesian 
Basin, CSIRO, viewed 18 Jan 2014, <http://theconversation.com/water-in-
water-out-assessing-the-future-of-the-great-artesian-basin-13104>. 
Smith, D. M. 2000, Moral geographies: Ethics in a world of difference, Edinburgh 
University Press, Edinburgh. 
Solomons, D. 1978, 'The politicisation of accounting', Journal of Accountancy, vol. 
146 no. 5, pp. 65-72. 
Solomons, D. 1983, 'The political implications of accounting and accounting 
standard setting', Accounting and Business Research, vol. 13 no. 50, pp. 107-
118. 
South Australia, House of Assembly 2011a, Parliamentary Debates, 1035. 
South Australia, Legislative Council 2005, Parliamentary Debates, 1037. 
South Australia, Legislative Council 2011, Parliamentary Debates, viewed 12 May 
2012, <http://www.markparnell.org.au/speech_prn.php?speech=1103>. 
Sovic, P. 1992, 'Perception of risk: Reflections on the psychometric paradigm', in 
Krimsky, S. and Golding, D. (Eds.), Social theories of risk, Praeger, Westport, 
pp. 117-152. 
Spence, C. 2007, 'Social and environmental reporting and hegemonic discourse', 
Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, vol. 20 no. 6, pp. 855-882. 
Spence, C. 2009, 'Social accounting's emancipatory potential: A Gramscian critique', 
Critical Perspectives on Accounting, vol. 20 no. 2, pp. 205-227. 
Spence, C., Husillos, J. and Correa-Ruiz, C. 2010, 'Cargo cult science and the death 
of politics: A critical review of social and environmental accounting research', 




Stillar, G. F. 1998, Analyzing everyday texts - Discourse, rhetoric, and social 
perspectives, SAGE Publications, Thousand Oaks. 
Stoianoff, N. P. and Kaidonis, M. A. 2005, 'Rehabilitation of mining sites: Do 
taxation and accounting systems legitimise the privileged or serve the 
community?', Critical Perspectives on Accounting, vol. 16 no. 1, pp. 47-59. 
Strang, V. 2005a, 'Common senses: Water, sensory experience and the generation of 
meaning', Journal of Material Culture, vol. 10 no. 1, pp. 92-120. 
Strang, V. 2005b, 'Knowing me, knowing you: Aboriginal and european concepts of 
nature as self and other', Worldviews: Global Religions, Culture, and Ecology, 
vol. 9 no. 1, pp. 25-56. 
Suddaby, R. and Greenwood, R. 2005, 'Rhetorical strategies of legitimacy', 
Administrative Science Quarterly, vol. 50, pp. 35-67. 
Syme, G. J. 2014, 'Acceptable risk and social values: Struggling with uncertainty in 
Australian water allocation', Stochastic Environmental Research and Risk 
Assessment, vol. 28 no. 1, pp. 113-121. 
Syme, G. J., Portera, N. B., Goeftb, U. and Kington, E. A. 2008, 'Integrating social 
well being into assessments of water policy: Meeting the challenge for 
decision makers', Water Policy, vol. 10 no. 4, pp. 323-343. 
Takver 2011, BHP gets approval for world's largest open pit mine at Olympic Dam, 
Independent Media Centre, viewed 17 Oct 2011, 
<http://www.indymedia.org.au/2011/10/12/bhp-gets-approval-for-worlds-
largest-open-pit-mine-at-olympic-dam>. 
Tansey, J. and O'Riordan, T. 1999, 'Cultural theory and risk: a review', Health, Risk 
& Society, vol. 1 no. 1, pp. 71-90. 
ten Kate, A. and Wilde-Ramsing, J. 2011, Radioactive Revenues: Financial Flows 
between Uranium Mining Companies and African Governments, Stichting 
Onderzoek Multinationale Ondernemingen (SOMO) Centre for Research on 
Multinational Corporations and World Information Service on Energy 
(WISE), Amsterdam, Netherlands. 
The Economist 2008, A water warning, viewed 28 Apr 2012, 
<http://www.economist.com/node/12494630/print?story_id=12494630>. 
The Economist 2009, 'Troubled waters', The Economist. 
Thompson, M. 1980, An Outline of the Cultural Theory of Risk, International 
Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA), Laxenburgh, Austria. 
Thompson, M., Ellis, R. J. and Wildavsky, A. B. 1990, Cultural theory, Westview 
Press, Boulder. 
Thompson, M. and Rayner, S. 1998, 'Cultural discourses', in Rayner, S. and Malone, 
E. (Eds.), Human choice and climate change, Battelle Press, Pacific 
Northwest, pp. 265-343. 
Thomson, I. and Bebbington, J. 2005, 'Social and environmental reporting in the UK: 
A pedagogic evaluation', Critical Perspectives on Accounting, vol. 16 no. 5, 
pp. 507-533. 
Tinker, A. M. 1985, Paper prophets: A social critique of accounting, Holt Saunders, 
Eastbourne. 
Tinker, A. M., Merino, B. D. and Neimark, M. D. 1982, 'The normative origins of 
positive theories: Ideology and accounting thought', Accounting, 




Tinker, T., Neimark, M. and Lehman, C. 1991, 'Falling down the hole in the middle 
of the road: Political quietism in corporate social reporting', Accounting, 
Auditing & Accountability Journal, vol. 4 no. 2, pp. 28-54. 
Torrisi, C. and Trotta, P. 2009, 'Sustainable water use at Olympic Dam', Mining 
Technology, vol. 118 no. 3/4, pp. 193-204. 
Toye, C. 2013, Rhetoric: A very short introduction, Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
Tregidga, H. and Milne, M. J. 2006, 'From sustainable management to sustainable 
development: A longitudinal analysis of a leading New Zealand 
environmental reporter', Business Strategy and the Environment, vol. 15 no. 4, 
pp. 219-241. 
UNESCO 2006, 2nd United Nations world water development report: Water, a 
shared responsibility, viewed 28 Apr 2012, 
<http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0014/001454/145405E.pdf>. 
UNESCO 2009, 3rd United Nations world water development report: Water in a 
changing world, viewed 28 Apr 2012, 
<http://www.unesco.org/water/wwap/wwdr/wwdr3/pdf/WWDR3_Water_in_
a_Changing_World.pdf>. 
United Nations 2006, System of environmental-economic accounting for water, 
United Nations Statistical Division, New York, U.S.A. 
United Nations (UN) Global Compact Office 2015, The CEO Water Mandate, 
viewed 14 Sep 2015, <http://pacinst.org/issues/corporate-water-
stewardship/ceo-water-mandate/>. 
United Nations Children's Emergency Fund and World Health Organization 2011, 
Drinking water equity, safety and sustainability: Thematic report on drinking 
water, viewed 26 May 2016, 
<http://www.wssinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/resources/report_wash_low.
pdf>. 
United Nations Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights 2002, General 
Comment No. 15 - The right to water, viewed 28 Apr 2012, 
<http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu2/6/cescr.htm>. 
United Nations Division for Sustainable Development 1992, Agenda 21, viewed 28 
Apr 2012, <http://www.sidsnet.org/docshare/other/Agenda21_UNCED.pdf>. 
United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) 2006, 
Water: A shared responsibility - The United Nations world water 
development report 2, viewed 28 Apr 2012, 
<http://www.unesco.org/water/wwap/wwdr2/table_contents.shtml>. 
van Dijk, T. A. 1997, Discourse studies - A multidisciplinary introduction, Sage 
Publications, London. 
Vardon, M., Lenzen, M., Peevor, S. and Creaser, M. 2007, 'Water accounting in 
Australia', Ecological Economics, vol. 61 no. 4, pp. 650-659. 
Veiga da Cunha, L. 2009, 'Water: A human right or an economic resource?', in 
Llamas, M. R., Cortina, L. M. and Mukherji, A. (Eds.), Water ethics: 
Marcelino Botin Water Forum 2007, CRC Press, Taylor & Francis Group, 
London, UK, pp. 97-113. 
Von Schwedler, M. 2011, 'CSR in the UK water industry: ‘Doing the right thing’? A 
case study', Social and Environmental Accountability Journal, vol. 31 no. 2, 
pp. 125-137. 





Wallace, J. S., Acreman, M. C. and Sullivan, C. A. 2003, 'The sharing of water 
between society and ecosystems: From conflict to catchment-based co-
management', Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological 
Sciences, vol. 358 no. 1440, pp. 2011-2026. 
Wallace, P. and Smiles, V. 2007, Uranium mining and the question of corporate 
social responsibility, ECOS Magazine, viewed 28 Jul 2011, 
<http://www.ecosmagazine.com/?paper=EC138p20>. 
Walters-York, L. M. 1996, 'Metaphor in accounting discourse', Accounting, Auditing 
& Accountability Journal, vol. 9 no. 5, pp. 45-70. 
Water Footprint Network 2012, The water footprint of a business: taking a supply-
chain perspective, viewed 28 Apr 2012, 
<http://www.waterfootprint.org/?page=files/CorporateWaterFootprintAccoun
tingFramework>. 
Waterlines 2008, Update of Progress in Water Reform, National Water Commission, 
Canberra. 
WBCSD 2011, Global water tool, viewed 28 Apr 2012, 
<http://www.wbcsd.org/work-program/sector-projects/water/global-water-
tool.aspx>. 
Weinberg, A. M. 1981, 'Reflections on risk assessment', Risk Analysis, vol. 1 no. 1, 
pp. 5-7. 
Whyalla News 2011a, Greens leader Mark Parnell has welcomed, Fairfax Media 
Publications Pty Limited, viewed  20 Jul 2013, 
<http://proxy.uow.edu.au/docview/901134847?accountid=15112>. 
Wild, D., Francke, C.-J., Menzli, P. and Schön, U. 2007, Water: A market of the 
future - Global trends open up new investment opportunities, Sustainability 
Asset Management (SAM) Study, Zurich. 
Williams, P. F. 1992, 'Prediction and control in accounting “science”', Critical 
Perspectives on Accounting, vol. 3 no. 1, pp. 99-107. 
Wong, P. 2008, 'Water for the future', Public Administration Today, vol. April-June, 
pp. 7-14. 
World Meteorological Organisation (WMO) 2006, WMO Statement on the Status of 
the Global Climate in 2006, World Meteorological Organisation, Geneva. 
World Water Council 2000, World water vision: Making water everybody's business, 
viewed 28 Apr 2012, 
<http://www.worldwatercouncil.org/index.php?id=961&L=%20onf...blurLin
k%28this%29>. 
Wynne, B. 1989, 'Frameworks of rationality in risk management: Towards the 
testing of naive sociology', in Brown, J. (Ed.), Environmental threats: 
Perception, analysis, and management, Belhaven Press, New York, pp. 33-
47. 
Young, J. J. 1996, 'Institutional thinking: The case of financial instruments', 
Accounting, Organizations and Society, vol. 21 no. 5, pp. 487-512. 
Young, J. J. 2001, 'Risk(ing) metaphors', Critical Perspectives on Accounting, vol. 
12 no. 5, pp. 607-625. 
Young, J. J. 2003, 'Constructing, persuading and silencing: the rhetoric of accounting 
standards', Accounting, Organizations and Society, vol. 28 no. 6, pp. 621-638. 
Zeff, S. A. 1978, 'The rise of ‘economic’ consequences', Journal of Accountancy, vol. 
146 no. 6, pp. 56-63. 
